Joanne DiPaolo et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 22, 2020

2020001603 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/335,056 12/15/2008 Joanne DiPaolo 76750-032US-000 9351
85539 7590 09/22/2020
James J. Pingor
1301 East 9th Street, Suite 3500
Cleveland, OH 44114
EXAMINER
SEE, CAROL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jpingor@walterhav.com
patents@walterhav.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOANNE DIPAOLO, BILL CAREY, DAN CARETTA,
BRAD ARROWOOD, and JEANINE TABACZYNSKI

_____________

Appeal 2020-001603
Application 12/335,056
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and
STACY B. MARGOLIES, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24. Claims 2, 8, 14, 16, 19, 20,
and 22 are canceled. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Wells Fargo. See Appeal Br. 3.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Introduction
Appellant’s claimed invention relates generally to “systems (and
methodologies) that put consumers in control of NSF/OD (Not Sufficient
Funds/Overdraft) fee management, where fees are solely dependent on time
to cure a negative balance.” Spec. ¶ 5.

Evidence
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Horvitz US 2002/0087649 Al Jul. 4, 2002
LeClaire, Jennifer
(“LeClaire”)
Non-patent Literature:
“A costly courtesy:
overdraft privilege,”
The Christian Science
Monitor. Boston, Mass.,
page 15.
Mar 3, 2003
Cahill et al.
(“Cahill”)
US 6,535,855 B1 Mar.18, 2003
Moebs et al.
(“Moebs”)
US 2005/0065872 A1 Mar. 24, 2005
Rep. Carolyn B.
Maloney
(“Maloney”)
Non-patent Literature:
“Rep. Maloney’s E-
Newsletter”
Oct. 7 2005
“Lloyds TSB”
(“Lloyds”)
Non-patent Literature: June 30, 2008

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed November 23, 2018
(“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief, filed May 28, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 17, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief,
filed December 17, 2019.
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“Lloyds TSB Launches
2008 Student Account”

Rejections
Rej Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis
A 1, 3–7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18, 21,
23, 24
101 Eligibility
B3 1, 3–5, 7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18, 21,
23
103(a) LeClaire, Maloney, Cahill, Moebs
C 6 103(a) LeClaire, Maloney, Cahill, Moebs,
Lloyds
D 24 103(a) LeClaire, Maloney, Cahill, Moebs,
Horvitz

Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101
USPTO § 101 Guidance
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has published
revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See USPTO

3 We have corrected a typographical error in the Examiner’s listing of claims
for Rejection B under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on page 17 of the Final Action.
Although the Examiner indicates that claims 1–5, 7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23,
and 24 are rejected, claim 2 was canceled, and the detailed rejection for
claim 24 is instead found on page 36 of the Final Action, as part of the
rejection over LeClaire, Maloney, Cahill, Moebs, and Horvitz (Rejection D
above). As corrected above, only claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, and
23 are rejected under Rejection B.

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January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“January 2019 Memorandum”).4
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes) (see January 2019
Memorandum Step 2A – Prong One); and

(2) any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)) (see January 2019 Memorandum Step 2A – Prong
Two).5
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

4 The Office issued a further memorandum on October 17, 2019 (the
“October 2019 Memorandum”) clarifying guidance of the January 2019
Memorandum in response to received public comments. See https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf.
Moreover, “[a]ll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.” January 2019 Memorandum
at 51; see also October 2019 Memorandum at 1.

5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 October Memorandum, Section III(A)(2),
page 10, et seq.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See January 2019 Memorandum Step 2B.
Because there is no single definition of an “abstract idea” under Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) Step 1, the January 2019
Memorandum synthesizes, for purposes of clarity, predictability, and
consistency, key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain
that the “abstract idea” exception includes the following three groupings:
1. Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical
calculations;
2. Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion);
and
3. Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions).
See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
According to the January 2019 Memorandum, “[c]laims that do not
recite [subject] matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of
abstract ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas,” except in rare
circumstances. Even if the claims recite any one of these three groupings of
abstract ideas, these claims are still not “directed to” a judicial exception
(abstract idea), and thus are patent eligible, if “the claim as a whole
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integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that
exception.” See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, limitations that are indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any
other technology or technical field — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article
to a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e).

In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the
judicial exception, or merely including instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See 2019 January Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).

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ANALYSIS
January 2019 Memorandum, Step 2A, Prong One
The Judicial Exception
We reproduce infra independent claim 1 in Table One. We have
considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We
highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our
analysis below.6
The Examiner finds independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea:
Claim recites a system which performs a process of fee
management. The concept of fee management corresponds to a
method of organizing human activities, as it is a concept that
relates to managing relationships or transactions between
parties. The concept is not meaningfully different from
concepts found by the courts to be abstract ideas such as
creating and managing a contractual relationship (BuySafe),
where here fee assessment is part of contractual agreement
between parties, where information about an account is being
collected/monitored, evaluated against rules that dictate certain
results, i.e., fee assessment.
Final Act. 9–10.7
Under the January 2019 Memorandum, we begin our analysis by first
considering whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas, in particular: (a) mathematical concepts,
(b) certain methods of organizing human activity, and (c) mental processes.

6 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

7 The Examiner is citing to buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Independent Claim 1
For ease of reference in connection with our analysis of Step 2A,
Prongs One and Two, in Table One below, we identify in italics the specific
claim limitations that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We also identify
in bold the additional claim elements that we find are generic computer
components:
TABLE ONE

Independent Claim 1 January 2019 Memorandum
[a] A system that facilitates
balance exception fee
management, comprising:8

Abstract Idea: Facilitating balance
exception fee management is a
method of organizing human
activity, in particular a
fundamental economic
practice (i.e., a commercial
interaction); alternatively,
facilitating balance exception
fee management can be
performed by a person and
thus is a mental process. See
January 2019 Memorandum,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

8 A system (i.e., apparatus) falls under the statutory subject matter class of a
machine. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”).

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Independent Claim 1 January 2019 Memorandum
[b] a fee accrual processing
component having one or
more processors configured
to:

One or more processors is/are
generic computer components. See
January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52 n.14.

[c] receive balance event
information associated with a
financial account;
Receiving balance event information
associated with a financial account is
insignificant extra-solution activity
(i.e., data gathering). See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
55 n.31; see also MPEP §
2106.05(g).
[d] determine that a balance
exception event has occurred
based, at least in part, on the
received balance event
information;
Abstract Idea: Determining that a
balance exception event has
occurred based, at least in part, on
the received balance event
information is a method of
organizing human activity, in
particular a fundamental economic
practice (i.e., a commercial
interaction) that can be performed
alternatively by a person as a mental
process. See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

[e] initiate a balance
exception cycle in response to
the determination that the
balance exception event has
occurred, wherein the
balance exception cycle is
divided into periods; and
Abstract Idea: Initiating a balance
exception cycle in response to the
determination that the balance
exception event has occurred is a
method of organizing human
activity, in particular a fundamental
economic practice (i.e., a
commercial interaction) that can be
performed alternatively by a person
as a mental process. See January
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Independent Claim 1 January 2019 Memorandum
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52.
[f] generate a periodic fee to
assess on the financial
account, wherein the periodic
fee increases by a fixed
amount at prescribed periods
throughout the balance
exception cycle;
Abstract Idea: Generating a
periodic fee to assess on the
financial account, wherein the
periodic fee increases by a fixed
amount at prescribed periods
throughout the balance exception
cycle is a method of organizing
human activity, in particular a
fundamental economic practice (i.e.,
a commercial interaction) that can be
performed alternatively by a person
as a mental process. See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52.
[g] terminate the periodic fee
when a maximum aggregate
fee has been reached;

Abstract Idea: Terminating the
periodic fee when a maximum
aggregate fee has been reached is a
method of organizing human
activity, in particular a fundamental
economic practice (i.e., a
commercial interaction) that can be
performed alternatively by a person
as a mental process. See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52.

[h] a notification
administration component
having one or more
processors configured to:
One or more processors is/are
generic computer components, as
shown in bold. See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14.

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Independent Claim 1 January 2019 Memorandum
[i] generate a notification to a
first contact identity of a user
when the periodic fee is
generated by the fee accrual
processing component based
on a delivery notification
preference;
Generating a notification when the
periodic fee is generated is
insignificant extra-solution activity
(i.e., data transmission). See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
55 n.31; see also MPEP §
2106.05(g).
[j] execute the notification
over a server to the first
contact identity;
Executing the notification to the first
contact is an insignificant extra-
solution activity (i.e., data
transmission). See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55
n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g).

A server is a generic computer
component. See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14.
[k] determine the notification
was not delivered to the first
contact identity;
Abstract Idea: Determining the
notification was not delivered to the
first contact identity can be
performed alternatively (to a
computer implementation) by a
person, and thus is a mental process.
See January 2019 Memorandum, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
[l] determine a second
contact identity based on the
delivery notification
preference; and
Abstract Idea: Determining a second
contact identity based on the delivery
notification preference can be
performed by a person, and thus is a
mental process. See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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Independent Claim 1 January 2019 Memorandum
[m] execute the notification
over the server to the second
contact identity,
Executing the notification to the
second contact identity is
insignificant extra-solution activity
(i.e., data transmission). See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
55 n.31; see also MPEP §
2106.05(g).
The server is a generic computer
component. See January 2019
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
n.14.
[n] wherein the period is one
day and a single fee is
assessed per period
regardless of the number of
balance exception events in a
single day.
Abstract Idea: Assessing a single fee
per period is a method of organizing
human activity, i.e., a fundamental
economic practice (i.e., a
commercial interaction) that can be
performed alternatively by a person
as a mental process. See January
2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52.

Abstract Idea
As discussed above, the Examiner finds that claim 1 recites a method
of organizing human activity, and specifically, “managing relationships or
transactions between parties.” Final Act. 9. The Examiner further explains
in the Answer that claim 1 recites “a method of organizing human activity –
a commercial interaction.” Ans. 4–5; see also Advisory Act. 2 (finding that
the claims recite “commercial or legal interactions,” which fall under the
“certain methods of organizing human activity” grouping).
Appellant notes that the January 2019 Memorandum was issued after
the Final Action mailed. See Appeal Br. 9–10. Appellant further notes the
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Advisory Action (mailed February 21, 2019), in which the Examiner first
clarifies the section 101 rejection under the January 2019 Memorandum.9
Id. Appellant urges that “prior attempts at designating an ‘abstract idea’ or
‘method of organizing human activities’ misstates the claim at a far too high
level of generality, an action warned against by the courts, and explicitly
outside of the binding guidance on patent eligible subject matter.” Appeal
Br. 10.
However, as identified above in Table One, we conclude the system
functions recited in limitations (a), (e), (f), and (g) are methods of organizing
human activity, in particular, a fundamental economic practice (i.e., a
commercial interaction involving a banking business relationship) that can
be performed alternatively (to a computer implementation) by a person as a
mental process. We conclude these functions can be performed practically
in the human mind. See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
We also conclude the “determining” functions in limitations (d), (k)
and (l), and the “assessing” function in limitation (n) of claim 1 can be
performed alternatively (to a computer implementation) by a person as a
mental process. We conclude these functions can be performed practically
in the human mind. See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see
also October 2019 Memorandum, Section II.C. Mental Processes, page 7.

9 The Examiner determines: “Regarding applicant arguments re 35 USC
101 (pgs 8, 9), under 2019 PEG, applicant claims would be grouped in
certain methods of organizing human activity as commercial or legal
interactions, with limitations that are not indicative of integration into a
practical application as no improvement in technology is reflected. Nor are
limitations indicative of an inventive concept. Claims remain rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101.” Advisory Action, mailed February 21, 2019.
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Although claim 1 requires the recited functions to be performed by
“one or more processors,” this generic computer implementation of a mental
process is insufficient to take the invention out of the realm of abstract ideas.
See also independent computer-readable medium claim 21, which similarly
recites that “a computer” and “a server” perform the recited steps.
“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If a method can be performed by human
thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract
idea and is not patent eligible under § 101. See id. at 1372–73; see also
Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an
abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’” is
insufficient to confer eligibility.).
Moreover, “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental
process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C.
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir.
2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more
quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”).
Because claim 1 considered as a whole recites an abstract idea, as
identified in Table One, supra, and because remaining independent claims
15 and 21 recite similar language of commensurate scope, we conclude all
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claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24 recite an abstract idea, as
identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One. Therefore, we proceed to Step
2A, Prong Two.
January 2019 Memorandum, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application10
The Examiner finds: “The claim does not include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea – fee
management – because the additional elements when considered both
individually and as an ordered combination do not amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner also finds that
“[a]s a whole, the claim simply instructs one to implement the concept of fee
management using processors and a server, which are generic computing
devices.” Id. (citing Spec., Figs. 9–11, ¶¶ 83, 95, 101).
Pursuant to the January 2019 Memorandum, we consider whether
there are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See January 2019 Memorandum, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55.

10 Under the January 2019 Memorandum, at Step 2A, Prong Two, we
determine whether the claims recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine (for method or process claims);
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing (for method or process claims); or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use
of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.

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As emphasized in bold in Table One, supra, we note the additional
generic computer components recited in claim 1, i.e., the “one or more
processors” and “a server.” We further note the supporting exemplary, non-
limiting descriptions of generic computer components found in the
Specification, such as the following:
[T]hose skilled in the art will appreciate that the inventive
methods can be practiced with other computer system
configurations, including single-processor or multiprocessor
computer systems, minicomputers, mainframe computers, as
well as personal computers, hand-held computing devices,
microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics,
and the like, each of which can be operatively coupled to one or
more associated devices.
Spec. ¶ 84 (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶¶ 83, 95, 101.
We emphasize that McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), guides: “The abstract idea exception
prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). See supra Table One.
Thus, we conclude Appellant’s claimed invention merely implements
the abstract idea using instructions executed on generic computer
components, as depicted in Table One (above), and as supported in
Appellant’s Specification, for example, at paragraphs 83, 84, 95, and 101.
Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s claims merely use a generic
programmed computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(f).
We note “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
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technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant postsolution
activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–12 (2010) (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). See MPEP § 2106.05(h).
As mapped in the right column of Table One, supra, we conclude that
independent claim 1 recites several additional limitations that are extra-
solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform
judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See
MPEP § 2106.05(g); January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.
For example, see claim 1, Table One, supra, limitation (c): we
conclude that receiving “balance event information” associated with a
financial account is insignificant extra-solution activity (i.e., data gathering).
See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g). See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer receives
and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is
not even arguably inventive.”).
These extra or post-solution limitations use a generic computer
component that performs a generic computer function as a tool to perform an
abstract idea. Thus, these limitations do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24. Instead, these
limitations merely perform insignificant extra-solution activities. Cf. Apple,
Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (agreeing with
the Board that limitations for printing and downloading generated menus are
insignificant post-solution activities).
We consider next the question of whether there are any claimed
improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or
technical field, applying the January 2019 Memorandum and the guidance
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set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(a).
The Examiner finds:
[C]onsidering the claim elements individually and in
combination, the claim does not amount to significantly more
than the abstract idea itself because the additional elements —
the processors, server — do not effect an improvement to
another technology or technical field, the additional elements
do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of a
computer system itself, and the additional elements do not
move beyond a general link of the use of an abstract idea to a
particular technological environment.
Final Act. 12–13 (emphasis added).
Appellant does not agree with the Examiner. Appellant urges that
“the claims are directed to a computing-centric issue, do provide
improvements to conventional computing systems through the addition of
components that are not themselves conventional (as claimed, require
configuring), and are not merely []an [abstract] idea that is stated to be
‘applied on a computer.’” Appeal Br. 11–12 (emphasis added in italics,
underlining in original omitted).
But without more specific argument regarding the claimed
configuring features, such conclusory statements that are unsupported by
factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant does not sufficiently explain what the
claimed “configuring” refers to or how it is an improvement to conventional
computing systems, as asserted. In the Reply Brief, Appellant provides
some explanation by arguing that “the claim language requir[es] execution
of components resulting in a configuring (change) in the processor.” This
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argument, however, is unpersuasive because Appellant does not identify any
improvement in the computer system that is separate from the abstract idea
of a commercial interaction. Regarding independent claims 1, 15, and 21,
our reviewing court provides further applicable guidance: The “‘mere
automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.’” Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017)).
Simply adding generic hardware and computer components to
perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical
application, because the “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; see January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55,
n.30; see id. at 55 (“merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract
idea on a computer” is an example of when an abstract idea has not been
integrated into a practical application).
To the extent Appellant claims an improved approach to “balance
exception fee management (which we conclude involves a commercial
interaction in banking business relationship — see claim 1), an improved
abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012) (holding that a novel and
nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent
ineligible); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.”).
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As set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(a):
To show that the involvement of a computer assists in
improving the technology, the claims must recite the details
regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which
the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer
to the performance of the method . . . . Merely adding generic
computer components to perform the method is not sufficient.
Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to
perform the method on a generic component or machinery to
qualify as an improvement to an existing technology.
(emphasis added).
Here, we find Appellant has not persuasively shown how the claims
“recite the details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to
which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the
performance of the method.” Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude independent claims 1, 15,
and 21, which recite similar limitations of commensurate scope, do not recite
an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or
technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Further, Appellant advances no arguments that any method claims on
appeal are tied to a particular machine, or transform an article to a different
state or thing. See MPEP § 2106.05(b), 2106.05(c).
The Examiner further concludes that “there are no meaningful
limitations in the claims that transform the judicial exception into a patent
eligible application such that the claims amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception itself.” Final Act. 13.11

11 See January 2019 Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, citing MPEP
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We agree with the Examiner, for the reasons discussed above.
To the extent that Appellant nominally argues, in the Reply Brief (at
page 7), that “[t]here is no ‘long-standing’ practice pre-empted by the
present claims,” our reviewing court provides applicable guidance: “[w]hile
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract”).
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–
(h)), we conclude claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24 do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.

The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Under the January 2019 Memorandum, only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,

§ 2106.05(e) (stating that one exemplary consideration indicative that an
additional element may have integrated the exception into a practical
application is that the additional element “applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception”) (emphasis added).
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conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Berkheimer was decided by the Federal Circuit on February 8, 2018.
On April 19, 2018, the PTO issued the Memorandum titled: “Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (hereinafter
“Berkheimer Memorandum”).12 The Berkheimer Memorandum provided
specific requirements for an Examiner to support with evidence any finding
that claim elements (or a combination of elements) are well-understood,
routine, or conventional.
In particular, the Examiner must find, and expressly support a
rejection in writing, with one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the specification or to a
statement made by an applicant during prosecution that
demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional
nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in
MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s). . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the
additional element(s). . . .
Berkheimer Memorandum at 3–4.

12 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-
berkheimer-20180419.PDF.
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Here, the Examiner finds, under Step 2B of the 2019 Memorandum,
that: (1) the processors function to “receive and process data,” and (2),
“maintaining an account” are routine and conventional functions. Final Act.
12 (noting that routine and conventional functions include “receiving,
processing, storing data, electronic recordkeeping (also see Alice for
maintaining accounts), automating mental tasks; [and] receiving or
transmitting data over a network”) (emphasis added). The Examiner also
finds “[a]s a whole, the claim simply instructs one to implement the concept
of fee management using processors and a server, which are generic
computing devices (see, e.g., specification figs 9-11, paras 83, 95, 101).”
Id.; see also Ans. 5.
Appellant disagrees, and contends the Examiner has not complied
with the Berkheimer Memorandum. See Appeal Br. 10–11. However, as
noted above, the Examiner cited to Appellant’s Specification, Figures 9–11,
and paragraphs 83, 95, and 101, as Berkheimer evidence under category one
of the the four types of factual evidence acceptable under the Berkheimer
Memorandum at 3–4. See Final Act. 12. We emphasize that Appellant has
not specifically traversed the Berkheimer evidence provided by the
Examiner.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends:
[T]he Examiner continues to attempt to apply an analysis solely
on a “piece part” basis of individual computer component
“functionalities,” and simply makes no showing of
conventionality of an ordered combination. Such is not what the
Berkheimer Memorandum calls for when the Appellant
challenges the assertion of the Examiner as to alleged
conventionality of an ordered combination. Rather, the
Examiner is required to provide appropriate evidence that the
ordered combination itself is conventional. Appellant
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respectfully reminds the Office that such evidence of
conventionality is beyond merely of anticipation or of
obviousness of individual elements. Yet, there is no analysis or
finding even remotely close to satisfying the APA and
Berkheimer Memorandum for any assertion of mere generic
computer component (in actual comparison to the claims as a
whole, an ordered combination, and requiring specific
configuration).
Reply Br. 7 (italics and bold emphases added).
However, Appellant again does not specifically traverse the
Berkheimer evidence provided by the Examiner. See Reply Brief 1–8. As
noted above, the Examiner specifically cited to Appellant’s Specification,
Figures 9–11, and paragraphs 83, 95, and 101, as Berkheimer evidence. See
Final Act. 12.
Moreover, because Appellant does not advance substantive,
persuasive arguments regarding any claimed nonconventional and non-
generic arrangement of known computer components, we find no inventive
concept in any purported ordered combination of these limitations.
Thus, we find Appellant’s claims are unlike the claims considered by
the court in BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), in which the court found “an inventive concept
. . . in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphases added). Here, we do not
find a claimed non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional structures (generic computer components).
Turning to the independent claims, we particularly note that system
claim 1 merely recites structure as “one or more processors” and “a server,”
without specifying any non-generic and non-conventional arrangement of
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processors and/or servers. We agree with the Examiner that such processors
and server are described in the Specification as generic, conventional
components. See Spec. ¶¶ 83, 95, 101; Final Act. 12 (citing same).
Likewise, we find no inventive concept in any purported ordered
combination, because claim 1 does not require any particular order or
structural arrangement of the processors and/or server(s). Claims 15 and 21
are also silent regarding any mention of structural elements arranged in an
ordered combination. Method claim 15 merely recites “a server” as a
generic computer component. Although medium claim 21 recites “a
computer” and “a server” as structural elements, no particular arrangement
or ordered combination of computers or servers is required by the language
of claim 21.
Also in the Reply Brief (2–3), Appellant cites to an intervening
(November 15, 2019) case authority: Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto
M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Appellant urges that
Koninklijke is “on point” and the claims in Koninklijke
(as here) do in fact provide an ordered combination of computer
implemented data processing steps (even ones that in the
provided case, may for argument’s sake be characterized there as
merely process[ing] data through ‘conventional’ computer
components), and that[,] as such, the claims provided do contain
an inventive concept and are directed to patent eligible material.
Reply Br. 2–3.
We have reviewed Koninklijke. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments,
we find it distinguishable from Appellant’s claims. The subject claim in
Koninklijke reorders information by performing “a permutation of bit
position relative to said particular ordered sequence for at least some of the
bits in each of said blocks making up said original data without reordering
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any blocks of original data” (Koninklijke claim 1), for the purpose of
detecting systematic data errors. See Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1147–48,
1153. This is a purported improvement over existing checksum, cyclic
redundancy check (CRC), and parity-bit data verification measures, because
“certain generating functions coincidentally produce the same check data for
a corrupted data block and an uncorrupted data block.” Koninklijke, 942
F.3d at 1145.
In contrast to the present claims, the Koninklijke court held that the
subject claims were “patent-eligible because they [were] directed to a non-
abstract improvement in an existing technological process (i.e., error
checking in data transmission).” Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1150 (emphasis
added). In particular, the Koninklijke court found the subject claims recited
varying the way that “check data” is generated by modifying the permutation
that is applied to different data blocks, and this specific solution provided an
improvement that was patent eligible. Koninklijke, 942 F.3d at 1151
(emphasis added).
Here, we have not found any similar improvement in Appellant’s
claims, as discussed above under our analysis applying the guidance under
MPEP § 2106.05(a), as set forth in the January 2019 Memorandum. Nor has
Appellant substantively and persuasively explained how the “ten identified”
claimed steps mentioned on page three of the Reply Brief provide any
improvement similar to that found by the court in Koninklijke.
Further regarding the method claims on appeal, “although a method
claim necessarily recites the steps of the method in a particular order, as a
general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order
recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.”
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Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
For these reasons, we find unavailing Appellant’s attempt to analogize
the claims here to the subject claims considered patent-eligible by the court
in Koninklijke.
In light of the foregoing, and under the January 2019 and October
2019 Memoranda, we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 1, 3–7, 9–13,
15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and
does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21,
23, and 24.13

Rejection B
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), we focus our analysis on the argued
“wherein” clause limitation that is recited identically in each of independent
claims 1, 15, and 21.
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err by finding that LeClaire, Maloney,
Cahill, and Moebs collectively teach or suggest the disputed “wherein”
clause limitation—“wherein the period is one day and a single fee is
assessed per period regardless of the number of balance exception events in
a single day”—within the meaning of independent claim 1?

13 Regarding Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101, grouped claims 3–7, 9–13,
15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24 (not argued separately) fall with representative
independent claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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Issue 2: We also address, infra, Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner has engaged in impermissible hindsight in formulating the
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See Appeal Br. 14.
The Examiner notes that LeClaire (page 2) teaches charging a fee
“once every 5 business days (periodic fee) until [the] account balance
becomes positive, where the periodic fee is assessed every five days, which
is the prescribed period throughout the balance exception cycle.” Final Act.
17–18.
But the Examiner (Final Act. 18) also reads the disputed dispositive
limitation of claim 1 on LeClaire, at page 1, last paragraph, which expressly
describes: “While some programs charge a single flat fee of $25 to $35 for
each overdraft, other banks impose daily fees until the account balance is out
of the red.” (Emphasis added).
The Examiner additionally finds:
As the example specifically showed a period of five days for
charging fee until [the] account is in red and further recites that
fees are imposed per item while other banks impose daily fees,
it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention to have modified LeClaire describing
a five day example by the institution of a single day fee
following the example as shown regarding a five day fee, as a
simple substitution depending on the particular requirements as
established by a banking facility.
Final Act. 18 (emphasis added). 14
Appellant disagrees:
The [E]xaminer errs with the view that LeClaire teaches a
single day used in place of the five day period. LeClaire does

14 We understand the Examiner’s reference to “is in red” to actually refer to
“is out of the red,” as expressly stated in LeClaire. (emphasis added).
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not teach this aspect as the applicant’s claims read. The
[E]xaminer attempts to impute this material change as a “simple
substitution” and claims that the reference teaches this change
as being a permissible one based on a “depending on the
particular requirements as established by a banking facility.”
Applicant cannot find this teaching in the cited reference.
Furthermore, not only is this feature is not actually taught by
the reference at all, the [E]xaminer could only arrive at this
view by using the applicant’s teaching as a roadmap.
Appeal Br. 14 (emphases omitted).
As an initial matter of claim construction, we note that the
Specification describes a balance exception event as follows:
For instance, balance event information can be received an
analyzed to determine if a balance exception event occurred.
More particularly, at 204, a determination is made to establish
if an NSF or OD situation occurred. If a balance exception
(e.g., negative balance) is determined not to have occurred, the
methodology returns to 202 to monitor additional balance event
information.
Spec. ¶ 42; see also id. ¶ 1 (defining “NSF/OD” as “Not Sufficient
Funds/Overdraft”). Thus, we construe a “balance exception event” within
the meaning of claim 1 as an event that occurs at least when an insufficient
funds/overdraft event occurs.
As positively recited in claim 1, a “balance exception cycle” is
initiated “in response to the determination that the balance exception event
has occurred, wherein the balance exception cycle is divided into periods.”
Claim 1 further requires that “the periodic fee increases by a fixed amount at
prescribed periods throughout the balance exception cycle” and the periodic
fee is terminated “when a maximum aggregate fee has been reached.”
The Examiner finds LeClaire teaches that there are essentially two
known banking practices for imposing fees for insufficient funds or
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overdraft events. See Final Act. 18. Specifically, the Examiner finds that
“fees are imposed per item while other banks impose daily fees.” Id. Given
the evidence (LeClaire pages 1–2), the Examiner finds that the institution of
a single day fee (i.e., a daily fee) or a five day fee is “a simple substitution
depending on the particular requirements as established by a banking
facility.” Final Act. 18 (emphasis added).
In accordance with our claim construction above, we understand
Appellant’s claim 1 to require generating a periodic fee that “increases by a
fixed amount at prescribed periods throughout the balance exception cycle”
and the periodic fee is terminated “when a maximum aggregate fee has been
reached.” The disputed “wherein” clause expressly defines the duration of
each period as being “one day,” and a single fee is thus assessed per day
“regardless of the number of balance exception events in a single day.”
Claim 1.
Appellant additionally contends:
When the claim is taken as a whole, and the different claim
terms are read in light of the specification (without
incorporating any new claim terms), the period of time as a
maximum time coupled with a maximum aggregate is not
taught by LeClaire. LeClaire expressly teaches that the
maximum aggregate (LeClaire’s actually taught period) is
necessarily more than a single day’s fee.
Appeal Br. 14.
We disagree with Appellant that “LeClaire expressly teaches that the
maximum aggregate (LeClaire’s actually taught period) is necessarily more
than a single day’s fee” (id.), because (as discussed above), LeClaire
expressly describes: “While some programs charge a single flat fee of $25
to $35 for each overdraft, other banks impose daily fees until the account
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balance is out of the red.” LeClaire page 1, last paragraph, (emphasis
added).
Thus, in the latter case of daily fees, if the account balance in LeClaire
was positive at the end of the first day of overdraft, a bank that imposed a
daily fee until the account balance was “out of the red” (i.e., positive), would
charge the overdraft fee for only a single period of one day (“regardless of
the number of balance exception events in a single day” – claim 1), and the
“maximum aggregate fee” would be the overdraft fee amount charged by the
bank for the single-day period.
Although claim 1 recites terminating “the periodic fee when a
maximum aggregate fee has been reached,” claim 1 provides no details
regarding how the “maximum aggregate fee” is determined. In accordance
with the “daily fee” disclosure in LeClaire (page 1), if the overdraft problem
is cured by the end of a single day, it logically follows that the maximum fee
(maximum aggregate fee) is the bank’s overdraft fee (daily fee), as charged
for that single day. There is no language in claim 1 that precludes the
maximum aggregate fee from being equal to the daily overdraft fee in
LeClaire, when the balance exception event is terminated at the end of a
single day.
We also agree with the Examiner that varying the number of days in a
period would have merely been a simple substitution that would have
yielded a predictable result. See Final Act. 18. Where the claimed subject
matter is no more than “the simple substitution of one known element for
another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art
ready for improvement,” and, the combination does no more than yield
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predictable results, the claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007).
Therefore, we find that terminating the periodic fee when a
“maximum aggregate fee” has been reached would merely yield a
predictable result, regardless of how the “maximum aggregate fee” is
determined. Claim 1. Further, “‘the question under 35 USC 103 is not
merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made.’” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)). (emphasis
added); see also MPEP § 2123. This reasoning is applicable here.
However, Appellant additionally urges that the Examiner could only
arrive at the view of a simple substitution “by using the applicant’s teaching
as a roadmap.” Appeal Br. 14. But Appellant has not identified knowledge
gleaned only from the present application that was not within the level of
ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made. See In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Moreover, Appellant has
not provided any objective evidence of secondary considerations (e.g.,
unexpected results), which our reviewing court guides “operates as a
beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese &
Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Nor does Appellant point to any evidence of record that shows
combining the teachings of LeClaire, Maloney, Cahill, and Moebs in the
manner found by the Examiner (Final Act. 17–21) would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog
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Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Therefore, on this record, we find the Examiner has provided a
sufficient “rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006). Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we are not
persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying factual findings and
ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding Rejection B of
independent representative claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection B of
independent representative claim 1. We note independent claims 15 and 21
recite the disputed “wherein” clause limitation using identical language.
The remaining grouped dependent claims also rejected under Rejection B
(and not argued separately) fall with representative independent claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness Rejection B of claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, and 23.

Rejections C and D under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
The remaining dependent claims 6 and 24, as rejected under
Rejections C and D respectively, were not argued separately. Arguments not
made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, for the
reasons explained above regarding Rejection B, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections C and D of remaining dependent claims 6 and 24.

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Additional Issues

We additionally note that the Examiner mailed a second Advisory
Action on December 26, 2019, after the Reply Brief was received, clarifying
that box 7 (entry of the claim amendment on appeal) was intended to be
checked in the previous after-final Advisory Action, mailed February 21,
2019. This is confirmed by a Miscellaneous Communication (PTO-90C),
also mailed on December 26, 2019, and separately entered into the record.
The Examiner indicates in the second Advisory Action that Appellant’s
arguments are not found persuasive and the rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 103(a) remain for Board review on appeal.

CONCLUSIONS
Under the January and October 2019 Memoranda, we conclude that
claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24, rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
We also conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3–7,
9–13, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24 as being obvious under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a), over the cited combinations of prior art.

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DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18,
21, 23, 24
101 Eligibility 1, 3–7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18,
21, 23, 24

1, 3–5, 7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18,
21, 23
103(a) LeClaire, Maloney,
Cahill, Moebs
1, 3–5, 7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18,
21, 23

6 103(a) LeClaire, Maloney,
Cahill, Moebs,
Lloyds
6
24 103(a) LeClaire, Maloney,
Cahill, Moebs,
Horvitz

24
Overall
Outcome
103(a) 1, 3–7,
9–13, 15,
17, 18,
21, 23, 24

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED