Joann Morris, Complainant,v.Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 28, 2007
0120073317 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 28, 2007)

0120073317

12-28-2007

Joann Morris, Complainant, v. Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Joann Morris,

Complainant,

v.

Pete Geren,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200733171

Agency No. ARANAD05APR07923

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's June 28, 2007 final decision on compensatory

damages. The agency had previously found in favor of complainant,

concluding that management had engaged in discrimination in violation of

the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Complainant alleged that the agency discriminated

against her on the basis of sex (female) when her supervisor made

inappropriate comments of a sexual nature.2

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2004, complainant was hired for a one-year appointment as

a temporary Tool and Parts Attendant in the Directorate of Mission,

Plans and Operations ("DMPO"), at the Anniston Army Depot in Anniston

Alabama. The Supervisor of the Maintenance Parts division ("S1") was

complainant's immediate supervisor from the time she was hired until

May 21, 2005. Beginning at the time she started work S1 subjected

complainant to frequent unwelcome comments that were sexual in nature.

The inappropriateness of S1's comments and conduct intensified as

time passed. On March 28, 2005, complainant met with an EEO Counselor

regarding the sexual harassment. Ultimately, complainant was transferred

and began working under a different supervisor; however, she states

that the harm caused by the sexual harassment is permanent in nature

and continues to date.

On December 6, 2006, the agency issued a final decision finding

discrimination. The decision awarded complainant an indeterminate

amount of compensatory damages and requested that complainant submit

evidence on damages. Upon receiving the requested information, the

agency issued its decision on damages on June 28, 2007. The agency

concluded that complainant was entitled to $65.43 in past pecuniary

damages because the only medical expenses that could be potentially

linked to the discriminatory acts were those that occurred during the

time of the harassment. According to the agency, there was insufficient

evidence showing that subsequent medical visits were connected to the

harassment or that complainant's knee pain and high blood pressure were

attributable to the harassment. With regard to non-pecuniary damages,

the agency awarded complainant $5,000.00 based on its analysis of

our case law. As for attorney's fees, the agency awarded complainant

$7,622.50. The agency did not grant her request to restore her annual

and sick leave, stating that it cannot do so in a compensatory damages

claim because "leave is an employment benefit independent of any claim

of compensatory damages" and it is a component of equitable relief.

The agency also denied complainant's claim for future pecuniary damages,

stating that the evidence did not contain objective proof from an expert

showing that complainant's medical problems are permanent in nature and

stemming directly from the harassment. Nevertheless, the agency provided

complainant a total award of $12,687.93.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant insists that the agency should have awarded her $1,540.69 in

pecuniary damages ($600.00 in medical expenses, $842.97 in pharmaceutical

expenses, and $97.72 in mileage expenses). She argues that the medical

documentation she submitted shows that the stress experienced at work

caused the multiple medical problems she experienced, and that her

doctor's statement attests to the duration and extent of her medical

complications. The fact that some of her expenses arose after the

harassment ended does not preclude her from recovering those expenses,

and the doctor's letter stating that she was able to resume her regular

duties does not imply that the medical problems disappeared. As such,

she maintains, she is entitled to recover all her medical expenses.

Complainant also argues that the $5,000 award in non-pecuniary damages

is inconsistent with awards made in similar cases and does not fully

compensate her for her harm. According to complainant, the discriminatory

conduct to which she was subjected was particularly devastating to her

emotional and physical well-being, and she has demonstrated the extent,

nature and severity of her injuries through her various proffers of

evidence. She lists several cases which, she states, are comparable to

her case and in which the Commission awarded the complainants relief

ranging from $125,000 to $33,000. Given this case law, she argues,

she is entitled to a greater award. Lastly, complainant maintains that

the agency should have restored 92.5 hours of leave which she took due

to the discrimination. Complainant explains that she took 83.5 hours

of sick leave and 9 hours of annual leave during the time in question.

Complainant argues that the agency was wrong to not restore her leave

as it is a common form of relief under Title VII. In fact, having been

found to be a victim of harassment, she pleads, she has no other forum

in which to claim the lost leave. See Appeal Statement.

In response, the agency maintains that there is no error in its decision

on damages and that it should be affirmed. With regard to past pecuniary

damages, specifically the medical expenses, the agency insists that

complainant is entitled to reimbursement only for those expenses incurred

between April 6, 2004 and March 17, 2005 that are directly related to the

discriminatory acts. Expenses for any visits outside this time period

are reimbursable only if causally related to the harassment. As such,

the agency finds that complainant is entitled to only $60.00 - the cost

involved in one office visit. With regard to pharmaceutical expenses,

the agency concludes that in light of the fact that only one office visit

was attributable to the sexual harassment and that most of the medications

prescribed were for high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and arthritis

pain - conditions which were either pre-existing or unrelated to the

harassment - none of the claimed expenses are compensable. As for the

mileage expenses, the agency maintains that the cost of traveling to the

one compensable doctor's visit entitles complainant to only $5.43. With

regard to complainant's claim for future pecuniary expenses, the agency

reiterates that there was no indication in the record that complainant

continued to experience symptoms causally related to the harassment.

Moreover, according to complainant's own primary care physician,

complainant was able to resume her regular and full duties at work.

As for her claim for non-pecuniary damages, the agency argues that

complainant failed to differentiate between past and future non-pecuniary

damages and to weigh the nature and severity of her emotional harm against

the nature and severity of the acts of discrimination she endured.

According to the agency, complainant's sparse evidence on her damages

lacks sufficient credibility and weight to justify a greater award.

Lastly, with regard to the restoration of leave, the agency explains that

she is not entitled to such an award because she took no leave on the

day of her only compensable doctor's visit. The agency further points

out that complainant impermissibly wants the agency to restore leave

that she took in 2005 and 2006 after the harassment ended. Accordingly,

the agency requests that we affirm its final decision on damages.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commission shall review the agency's final decision based on a de novo

standard. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (2004); see also EEOC Management

Directive 110, Ch. 9, � VI.B (Nov. 9, 1999) (providing that an AJ's

"decision to issue a decision without a hearing ... will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we look at this case with fresh

eyes, and we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous)

the AJ's and agency's factual conclusions and legal determinations,

including the ultimate fact of whether discrimination occurred and a

federal employment discrimination statutes was violated. See id.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to Section 102 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a

complainant who establishes a claim of unlawful discrimination may

receive compensatory damages for past and future pecuniary losses (out

of pocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses (i.e., pain and suffering

and mental anguish). See 42 U.S.C. � 1981a(b)(3). To receive such an

award, a complainant must demonstrate: (1) that she has been harmed as

a result of the agency's discriminatory action; (2) the extent, nature

and severity of the harm3, and (3) the duration or expected duration of

the harm. See Rivera v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157

(July 22, 1994), req. for recons. den'd, EEOC Request No. 05940927

(Dec. 11, 1995).

Specifically with regard to pecuniary damages, the particulars of what

relief may be awarded, and what proof is necessary to obtain that relief,

are set forth in detail in the Enforcement Guidance. Briefly stated, a

complainant must submit evidence to show that the agency's discriminatory

conduct directly or proximately caused the losses for which damages are

sought. See id. at 11-12, 14; Rivera v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal

No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994). Documentation, typically in the form of

receipts, bills, or physician statements are required to support an award

of past pecuniary damages. See Almera v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A13618 (Jan. 30, 2002); see also Valentine v. Dep't of

Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 07A30098 (Dec. 10, 2003), req. for recons. den'd,

EEOC Request No. 05A40372 (Feb. 27, 2004).

Past Pecuniary Damages

Complainant has submitted medical notes for two visits that took place

February and March 2005, during the time of the discriminatory incidents.

All of the other medical notes post-date the time of the harassment.

The February 2005 note, however, does not address or even allude to the

situation she is experienced at work. Complainant's chief complaint to

her doctor at that visit was her arthritic knee. The March 2005 note,

on the other hand, specifically states that she has been "under a lot of

stress at work and blood pressure is staying high [and that] she does

not feel good." Medical Note for March 23, 2005, Complainant's Ex. 3.

Her chief complaint is a headache and hypertension, the severity of

which was noted as mild. We agree with the agency that unlike the March

2005 note, the February 2005 note does not provide objective proof that

her physical symptoms were proximately caused by the situation at work.

As such, we agree that the March 2005 visit is compensable. As mentioned,

complainant submits many other medical notes, many of which state that

she has been under stress at work, see Medical Notes for May 25, 2005,

June 14, 2005, and June 20, 2005, Complainant's Ex. 3. However, we

find insufficient evidence directly tying this stress to the harassment,

particularly as the stress was reported after the harassment ended when

complainant no longer worked with S1. Moreover, her hypertension and

arthritic knee pain are pre-existing conditions. Although the agency is

liable for the additional harm or aggravation to pre-existing conditions

caused by the discrimination, see Wallis v. United States Postal Serv.,

EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (Nov. 13, 1995); Finlay v. United States Postal

Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01942985 (Apr. 29, 1997), we do not find a causal

link in the evidence between these conditions and the harassment.4 It is

the complainant's burden to provide objective evidence in support of her

claim and proof linking the damages to the alleged discrimination. Papas

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01930547 (Mar. 17, 1994);

Mims v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01933956 (Nov. 24, 1993).

Complainant failed to meet this burden. As such, we find the agency's

award of $65.43 for past pecuniary damages proper.

Future Pecuniary Damages

As for the agency's finding on future pecuniary damages, we also agree

that there is insufficient evidence to support her claim that the harm

is permanent in nature. Complainant provided two doctor's statements.

One statement, dated May 25, 2005, indicates that complainant suffered

from high blood pressure and depression, that she was under a lot of

stress at work, and that she needs to "avoid a stressful environment

to prevent further medical conditions." The other statement, dated

January 12, 2007 (produced nearly two years after the end of the

harassment), indicates that complainant suffered from hypertension,

headaches, depression and diabetes. It reiterates that she is under a

lot of "work-related" stress and needs to avoid stressful environments.

It further indicates that complainant was referred to a psychiatrist and

takes various medication. Complainant's Ex. 2. Neither statement spells

out the extent and expected duration of the conditions. Moreover, neither

statement clearly draws the connection between the medical conditions and

the harassment complainant experienced from April 2004 to April 2005.

As such, we affirm the agency's conclusion that complainant is not

entitled to any future pecuniary damages.

Non-Pecuniary Damages

As for the non-pecuniary damages award, we agree with complainant that

the amount is not consistent with other comparable cases and that

the evidence does support a larger award. We note that there is no

precise formula for determining the amount of non-pecuniary damages,

except that the award should reflect the nature and severity of the

harm and its duration or expected duration. See Loving v. Dep't of

the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). It should

likewise be consistent with amounts awarded in similar cases and

not be "monstrously excessive." Jackson & Beaner v. United States

Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal Nos. 01972555 & 01972556 (Apr. 15, 1999)

(citing Cygnar v. City of Chicago 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989).

Non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy harm and not

to punish the agency for its discriminatory actions.

For over a year, complainant's supervisor subjected complainant to

unwelcome comments of a sexual nature and some unwanted touching.

Complainant reports having felt degraded, threatened, stressed, and

embarrassed by the experience. She further claims to have suffered from,

among other things, depression, sleeplessness, headaches, anxiety, low

self-esteem, crying spells, high blood pressure, exacerbation of diabetes

and weight gain as a result of the harassment. See Complainant's Ex. 1.

As mentioned above, she submitted two doctor's statements discussing her

hypertension and knee problems which state that she was under workplace

stress. See Complainant's Ex. 2. She also submitted statements from

her children and co-workers which state that she became a different

person as a result of the harassment. See Complainant's Exs. 7 and 8.

Our review of our case law finds situations where complainants

experienced harm similar to that which complainant experienced. In St

John v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01996706 (Jan. 29,

2002), req. for recons. den'd, EEOC Request No. 05A20436 (June 12,

2002), we awarded complainant $20,000 where the sexual harassment

caused complainant to feel ashamed, lose weight, stop attending

social function with family and friends, and experience insomnia.

Although there were no supporting statements from family or friends, the

record contained statements from complainant's psychiatrist confirming

an exacerbation of depression and PTSD. In Darrell v. Dep't of Navy,

EEOC Appeal No. 01992288 (Jan. 19, 2001), req. for recons. den'd, EEOC

Request No. 05A10286 (May 2, 2001), we awarded $20,000 where complainant

presented a psychiatrist's statement stating that complainant had been

hospitalized for two weeks for major depression, and family members noted

that her self-confidence had decreased and that she exhibited increased

mood swings. The complainant also suffered the harm for four years.

In a more recent case, Page-Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv.,

EEOC Appeal No. 0720050080 (June 12, 2007), we awarded complainant

$15,000 where complainant had experienced harassment at the hands of

her supervisor for four years and complainant sought counseling to treat

her dread of going to work and help her cope with the sadness and stress

she felt at work.

Unlike the complainants in these other cases, complainant here experienced

the sexual harassment for a shorter duration and to a lesser degree.

Of course, we do not belittle complainant's harm and we agree with her

that she is entitled to more in damages than the agency has awarded.

However, we find her case more akin to Van Wolken v. Dep't of Homeland

Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 07A30134 (May 11, 2004), req. for recons. den'd,

EEOC Request No. 05A40960 (Aug. 25, 2004), where we awarded complainant

$12,000 to compensate her for the stress, insomnia, headaches, stomach

aches and panic attacks she experienced and for which she sought medical

treatment and medication. Similarly, we find Parker v. Dep't of the

Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01A12829 (Jan. 28, 2002) instructive. In Parker,

we awarded $12,000 where, although other factors contributed to the

complainant's physical symptoms of anxiety, humiliation, sleeplessness,

loss of appetite and depression, family statements as well as medical

evidence confirmed the symptoms. Accordingly, we find that complainant

is entitled to $12,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

Restoration of Leave

Finally, with regard to complainant's appeal to have the agency

restore the leave she took as a result of discrimination, we agree with

complainant that restoration of leave is an appropriate remedy under Title

VII; however, we also agree with the agency that restoration of leave is

an equitable remedy. Since it does not appear that complainant had the

opportunity to appeal the agency's denial of leave, in the interests of

judicial economy, we will review her claim herein. Upon review, we are

not persuaded that all of the leave taken was directly or proximately

caused by the harassment. Instead, we find that she is entitled to the

restoration of only 4 hours of sick leave. We base this on the Leave

Request Form, dated June 12, 2005, in which she requests the leave

due to "blood pressure up, upset by Supervisor." Complainant's Ex. 6.

With regard to the other claimed leave, the agency is correct to note

that the evidence does not show a correlation between the leave taken

and the harm experienced from the harassment, particularly as the leave

was taken in 2005 and 2006, after the harassment ended.5

Accordingly, we affirm the agency's decision regarding pecuniary damages;

however, we modify the agency's decision regarding non-pecuniary damages

and leave restoration, remanding the matter to the agency for further

processing in accordance with the ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

1. Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency

shall pay complainant $12,000.00 for non-pecuniary compensatory damages.

2. Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, agency shall

pay complainant $65.43 for pecuniary compensatory damages.

3. Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, agency shall

pay complainant $7,622.50 in attorneys' fees and costs; and

4. Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, agency shall

restore 4 hours of complainant's sick leave.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the

agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the

agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of

Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision

becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's

fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 28, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above referenced appeal number.

2 The agency did not find discrimination as to complainant's claim that

she had been retaliated against when management failed to convert her

to a permanent position. Complainant never appealed this finding and

the instant appeal centers solely on the issue of compensatory damages.

3 We note that emotional harm is not presumed simply because complainant

was the victim of discrimination. The existence, nature, and severity

of the harm must be proven. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance "Compensatory

and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1991" ("Enforcement Guidance"), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at II(A)(2)

(July 14, 1992).

4 In fact, the doctor's notes indicate that the aggravation of these

conditions are more likely due to complainant's weight problem, which

was also a pre-existing condition, as the doctor's continually instructed

complainant to lose weight and exercise.

5 Unlike the Leave Request Form which specifically states that

complainant took 4 hours of sick leave to care of the elevated blood

pressured caused by her supervisor, the rest of the evidence documenting

complainant's leave comes in the form the Employee Attendance Records

which do not indicate the reasons for the leave.

??

??

??

??

10

0120073317

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036