01991725
09-14-1999
Jo-Ann Murray, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.
Jo-Ann Murray v. Department of Transportation
01991725
September 14, 1999
Jo-Ann Murray, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01991725
v. )
) Agency No. DOT-6-98-6006B
Rodney E. Slater, )
Secretary, )
Department of Transportation, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final agency
decision concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC
Order No. 960, as amended.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency breached the settlement
agreement reached on June 5, 1998.
BACKGROUND
Appellant filed an appeal with the Office of Federal Operations on
December 20, 1998 alleging that the settlement agreement, effective June
5, 1998, reached between her and the agency was breached when the agency
failed to reassign her, in grade, to a permanent Quality Assurance
Specialist position in the Regional Office ANM-505 Branch.
In its final decision, the agency denied that the settlement agreement
was breached. According to the agency, the agreement did not promise
appellant a permanent reassignment, instead it offered her a temporary
detail and primary consideration (if a position became available).
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides, in pertinent part,
that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by
the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be
binding on both parties. The Commission has held that such agreements
constitute a contract between the employee and the agency, and that,
when interpreting them, ordinary rules of contract construction apply.
See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05960032
(December 9, 1996). We have further held that it is the intent of the
parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention,
that controls the contract's interpretation. Eggleston v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990) (emphasis
added). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the
terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on
the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O. v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). Essentially, this rule
states that if the writing appears to be unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind. See Montgomery Elevator
Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the present case, appellant, in her complaint letter, contends that
she was told that she would be detailed for a one year period until a
permanent position became available in the Quality Assurance Branch.
However, the relevant portion of the settlement agreement reads:
The complainant will be temporarily detailed as a Quality Assurance
Specialist in the ANM-505 branch. [Appellant] will be given priority
consideration when a permanent assignment FG-2152-14, Quality
Assurance Specialist in the ANM-505 branch becomes available. Priority
consideration is granted once during the life of this settlement and will
not exceed two years from the date this agreement is signed (emphasis
added).
Consistent with the plain meaning rule, the Commission will not consider
what appellant was told if what she was told is not reflected in the
settlement agreement. The agreement before us clearly indicates that
appellant was to be detailed temporarily (the evidence in the file reveals
that she was given a four month detail) and given priority consideration
when a permanent position became available. Nothing in the file suggests
that the agency did anything other than what it promised. As such,
we find that there was no breach.
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Sept. 14, 1999
____________________________________
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations