J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 10, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 220 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J. J. Cassone Bakery, Inc. and Bakery, Confectionery
and Tobacco Workers' International Union of
America, AFL-CIO, CLC, Local 3.' Cases 2-CA-
15429 and 2-RC-17535
January 10, 1980
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION
OF RESULTS OF ELECTION
By CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND TRUESDALE
On September 27, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Max Rosenberg issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent
filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law
Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the complaint in Case 2-CA-15429 be,
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF
ELECTION
It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid
ballots have not been cast for Bakery, Confectionery
and Tobacco Workers International Union of Ameri-
ca, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 3, in the election held on
January 31, 1978, in Case 2-RC-17535, and that said
labor organization is not the exclusive representative
of all the employees, in the unit therein involved,
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
The name of the Charging Party-Petitioner is amended to reflect the
change resulting from the merging of Bakery and Confectionery Workers
International Union and Tobacco Workers International Union on August 17,
1978.
: The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
247 NLRB No. 32
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that
the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
The General Counsel has also excepted. inter alia. to the Administrative
Law Judge's failure to find that the Respondent. through its president. Rocco
Cassone, threatened employees with job loss if the Union struck. However. we
find that the General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that such a threat was, in fact, made and, consequently, we
find no merit to this exception.
DECISION
MAX ROSENBERG, Administrative Law Judge: These
cases were heard before me in New York, on February 22,
May 30, and July 16, 1979, pursuant to a complaint filed by
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
and an answer interposed by J. J. Cassone Bakery, Inc.,
herein called Respondent.' Joined with the complaint are
objections to a rerun election conducted by the Board among
Respondent's employees on January 31, 1978, which were
lodged by Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International
Union of America, Local 3, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union, and which were consolidated for purposes of hearing
on June 26, 1978, by the Regional Director for Region 2.' At
issue is whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by certain
conduct to be detailed hereinafter. In her order consolidat-
ing cases dated June 26, 1978, the Regional Director also
referred for decision the question of whether the alleged acts
of objectionable misconduct, which find their parallel in the
allegations of the complaint, so interfered with the employ-
ees' freedom of choice as to require the holding of still
another election. Briefs have been received from the General
Counsel and Respondent which have been duly considered.
Upon consideration of the entire record made in this
proceeding, including the briefs submitted to me, and upon
my observation of the demeanor of each witness while
testifying, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a New York corporation with its office and
place of business in Port Chester, New York, is engaged in
the production and distribution of bakery goods and related
products. During the annual material period, Respondent
purchased and caused to be delivered to its plant flour and
other goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, of
which goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 were
delivered to its plant in interstate commerce directly from
States other than the State of New York. During the same
period, Respondent derived gross revenues from its opera-
tions in excess of $50,000. The complaint alleges, the answer
admits, and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
' The complaint, which issued on April 28, i978, is based on a charge which
was filed on February 24, 1978, and served on February 27. 1978.
'The first election, which was held on February 1, 1977, was nullified by
the Regional Director. upon agreement of the parties, by order dated May 12.
1977.
220
J. J. CASSONE BAKERY, INC.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is undisputed, and I find, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND
OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when, on various dates between August
1977 and January 31, 1978, the date of the rerun election, it
coercively interrogated its employees concerning their sym-
pathies and activities on behalf of the Union; threatened its
unit personnel that it would close its plant or refuse to enter
into a contract with the Union in the event that entity was
successful in the forthcoming election; threatened employees
with discharge if they engaged in union activities; offered
and promised its work complement life insurance benefits if
they eschewed union representation; and granted certain
employees pay increases in excess of the amount required to
comply with the prevailing Federal minimum wage rate in
order to wean them away from the Union. For its part,
Respondent denies the commission of any labor practices
banned by the controlling legislation and further denies that
a third election is warranted by any conduct in which it
indulged.
As chronicled above, Respondent operates a bakery in
Port Chester, New York, at which it employs approximately
96 unit employees.' On January 31, 1978, the Regional
Director conducted the rerun election, the tally of ballots in
which showed that, of the 96 eligible voters, 32 had cast
their votes for, and 44 had balloted against, the Union, with
12 challenged votes, a number insufficient to insure a union
victory even if they had been cast in favor of that labor
organization. Thereafter, on February 7, 1978, the Union
filed a total of nine objections to the election. On May 8,
1978, the Union's request to withdraw three of those
objections was approved by the Regional Director and, at
the hearing herein held on May 30, 1979, I granted the
Union's motion to withdraw three additional objections for
lack of proof thereof. Thus, as the hearing commenced, only
three objections which have their parallel in the allegations
of the complaint remained for consideration.
To support the allegations in the complaint and the
companion objections to election, the General Counsel drew
on the testimony of two employees, Arnaldo Paglioca and
Leroboldo Ceja.
Paglioca has worked for Respondent for several years as a
dough mixer and, during the Union's latest election cam-
paign, was a member of the in-plant organizing committee
and served as a union observer at the rerun election.
Paglioca testified that in late September 1977 he was called
to the office of Respondent's president, Rocco Cassone, a
happenstance which occurred almost on a daily basis during
the course of his employment. On this occasion, Rocco
Cassone showed the employee a piece of paper which
contained the names of various bakeries and remarked that
they had gone out of business because of financial difficul-
' The parties stipulated that the appropriate unit consisted of all full-time
and regular part-time packers, production workers, shipping and receiving
employees, order takers and fillers, maintenance employees, and sanitation
ties. Rocco added that "I don't want to see trouble because I
have to go careful. I got to take care of my place and I want
my place to go very well .... I want to do everything nice
for the people .... I can't have a high raise right now. I
can't pay too much. Not because I . . . no like the Union
. . I like it. If the Union come, I got to go careful because I
got to watch my position. I don't want to go broke. The
Union ask high raise but I don't know if I got to pay it."
Rocco then called attention to a new machine which
Respondent had acquired from a bakery which had been
forced to close its doors due to financial troubles occasioned
by the economic demands made upon it by a labor
organization.
Turning to the election scheduled for January 31, 1978,
President Cassone stated that, if the Union were successful
in the balloting and contract negotiations commenced
between the parties, "We got to talk-you got to see because
I got to go careful and I can't go broke. I know the Union
ask a high raise but I don't know if I got to pay it." Rocco
added that "if it come, the contract, we got to see because I
can't sign everything the people want . ... people think I
got a lot of money but I no have-in my position it's not so
great. He say, he got to see if the contract is good, I sign. If it
is no good, I can't do." Finally, Rocco observed that, if the
Union called a strike, "the people no got a work. They can't
work .... The people lose their job because of the strike.
That's bad for the people."
In his testimony, President Cassone related that, com-
mencing in 1973, he began to build an addition to the
existing bakery structure which, at the times material herein,
had not yet been completed. Cassone went on to explain that
he frequently had conversations with Paglioca while at work
and that, during one of these dialogues which occurred in
1977, he showed the employee some of the equipment which
he had purchased for the new addition from a list of bakeries
in the area which had been forced to close due to financial
problems. Cassone stated that he did not wish to experience
the same problems at Respondent's plant. Cassone also
remembered telling Paglioca that, if the Union won the
forthcoming election, it would be impossible for him to sign
an agreement with that entity which contained everything
that the employees demanded, but that he would execute a
contract with which he could live.
The complaint and a companion objection to election
allege that, by the foregoing conversation with Paglioca,
Respondent threatened the employee that the plant would be
closed or that Respondent would decline to enter into a
contract with the Union if the latter won the impending
representation election. I am unable to agree. Paglioca, who
was an ardent union supporter, made it testimonially clear
that the conversation in question occurred during one of his
frequent visits to Rocco Cassone's offices in September 1977.
During their discussion, Cassone mentioned that he had
acquired some new machinery from defunct bakeries which
had failed because of the economic hardships that had
befallen these enterprises due to excessive union bargaining
demands. As far as this record stands, Cassone's statement
in this regard was a truthful representation of what had
employees, excluding all outside sales persons, drivers. office clerical employ-
ees, inside sales clerks, guards, and all supervisors as defined in the Act
221
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occurred. Cassone then remarked that, if the Union won the
election, he would bargain with that entity because he was
not opposed to the unionization of his plant. However, he
cautioned that he was not a wealthy man and that he could
not afford to satisfy economic demands made by the Union
which would affect his corporate solvency. In my opinion,
Rocco Cassone's statements to Paglioca did not constitute
threats of plant closure or of a refusal to bargain over
contract terms in the event the Union was successful in the
election.' I shall therefore dismiss the complaint insofar as it
alleges that such statements constituted violations of Section
8(a)(l) of the Act, and I shall overrule the pertinent
objection to election.
The complaint further charges that Respondent offended
the provisions of Section 8(a)(l) of the statute by threatening
employees with discharge if they engaged in union activities,
and a companion objection to this alleged misconduct was
lodged by the Union. The evidence to support these
pleadings came from the testimony of employee Leroboldo
Ceja.
Ceja was hired by Respondent in November 1972 as a
general clerk, and his duties consisted of cleaning ovens and
painting the machinery in the bakery. Ceja testified that,
about a week prior to the January 31, 1978, rerun election,
he was conversing with employee Rubin Rodriguez while at
work when President Rocco Cassone approached. Accord-
ing to Ceja, Rocco Cassone accused the former of talking
about the Union on company time and Ceja denied the
accusation. Rocco then inquired whether the employee knew
that he could be discharged for this activity, and Ceja invited
Respondent's president to fire him if Rocco so desired.
When reminded that the complaint alleged that Dominic
Cassone, and not Rocco, had engaged in this alleged
misconduct, the General Counsel thereupon amended his
complaint to add the name of Rocco Cassone as the newly
discovered miscreant. Ceja also remembered that, approxi-
mately a week before the rerun election, Dominic Cassone
also warned him that he could be discharged for talking to
employees about the Union, a warning which was repeated
about a half hour later while Ceja was cleaning the oven.
I do not credit Ceja's testimony on this score, not only
because he failed to impress me with his candor as a witness,
but also because his testimony, when considered as a whole,
lacks both plausibility and corroboration. Thus, Ceja testi-
fied that his only overt activity on behalf of the Union
during the rerun election campaign actually took place on
election day when he served as a union observer. Although
Ceja testified that he had spoken in favor of the Union to all
employees at the bakery, he then confessed that he had not
talked to employees about the Union on the day when
Dominic and Rocco Cassone allegedly threatened him with
discharge for doing so. Finally, he made the surprising
admission that he had never broached the subject of the
Union in Cassone's presence because "I wasn't going to wait
that somebody is around to speak about the Union."
Moreover, I deem it implausible that Rocco Cassone
could have threatened Ceja with discharge for discussing the
subject of unionization with employee Rubin Rodriguez a
week before the January 31, 1978, election in light of
Rocco's uncontroverted testimony that he was not conver-
sant in the Spanish language, Ceja's native tongue. Further-
more, Ceja admitted that he had been warned by his
supervisors on several occasions before the rerun election for
excessive talking while at work which was unconnected with
any union topic. Finally, Ceja's testimonial report of Rocco
Cassone's warning about discussing the Union with Rodri-
guez a week before the election lacks corroborative support
from Rodriguez who was not summoned as a witness by the
General Counsel although, so far as appears, he was still in
Respondent's employ, and no reason was advanced for
counsel's failure to do so.
In sum, I am persuaded and find that neither Rocco nor
Dominic Cassone unlawfully threatened to discharge Ceja
for supporting the Union's cause in the forthcoming election.
I shall therefore dismiss this allegation from the complaint
and overrule the parallel objection to the election.
The General Counsel further contends that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)( ) of the Act and engaged in objection-
able preelection misconduct when, in August 1977 and on
various dates in January 1978, it offered and promised its
unit employees life insurance benefits if they shunned union
representation.
The testimony surrounding this allegation is not in
essential dispute, and I find the facts to be as follows.
For some years prior to the advent of the Union,
Respondent maintained a pension plan for its eligible
employees which also provided life insurance policies for
those who were covered thereunder. Under the arrangement,
employees were entitled to a death benefit after 3 years of
employment pursuant to a whole-life insurance policy which
was owned by the pension trust. During the summer of 1977,
an accounting firm which handled Respondent's business
affairs recommended that Rocco Cassone contact an insur-
ance agent named Stephen Kramer in order to have the
existing pension plan reviewed to explore the impact upon it
occasioned by the passage of the new Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA). Kramer learned of this
referral from the accounting firm and telephoned Rocco
Cassone about the matter. After examining the plan,
Kramer referred the work to be done on the plan to an
attorney with legal expertise on the subject.
After Respondent's pension plan was conformed to the
ERISA laws and the method of funding was altered from
funding by an insurance carrier to self-funding, Kramer
considered the resultant costs to be a "rip-off." Consequent-
ly, Kramer advised Rocco Cassone to adopt a plan providing
for group termlife insurance, explaining that Respondent
could effect a cost-saving of between 25 and 30 percent by
substituting group term for whole-life policies. Kramer
further explained that, in addition to covering its entire work
complement, group term insurance afforded the additional
advantages of being completely tax deductible to the
corporation and of providing the officers and shareholders
up to $50,000 in life insurance which was free from the
burdens of taxation.
Upon receiving this explanation sometime in June or July
1977, Rocco Cassone agreed to implement Kramer's recom-
mendation. Accordingly, in August 1977 Kramer dispatched
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J. . CASSONE BAKERY. INC.
enrollment cards to Steven Rysick, Respondent's bookkeep-
er, who distributed them to all employees whom he believed
eligible to receive the benefit. Thereafter, the signed cards,
together with an application and a check for 2 months'
advance premium, were forwarded to Kramer's office.
Kramer was unable to review the documents which he
received until the new policy was issued in November 1977.
After noticing that the number of employees on the first
premium billing was substantially less than the eligible
employees listed on the payroll, Kramer telephoned Respon-
dent's bookkeeper about this discrepancy and learned that
Rysick had only submitted the names of those employees
who had been covered under the abandoned pension plan
and had discarded the remaining enrollment cards. Kramer
thereupon advised Rysick that all employees who were on
the payroll on September 1, 1977, the effective date of the
new policy, and who met the eligibility requirements, were
to be covered.
Kramer departed for his vacation during the last 2 weeks
in November. In early January 1978 he delivered the
additional enrollment cards to Respondent's bakery and
again explained to Rysick which employees were eligible for
group term insurance. During his visit, he urged Respondent
to have the eligible employees immediately fill out the
enrollment cards because the information was critical to a
determination of the premium rate and to forestall possible
litigation by potential beneficiaries in the event of the demise
of an eligible employee. Kramer's testimony is unrefuted and
I find that, at no time during his discussions with Rocco
Cassone or bookkeeper Rysick, was he aware that a union
election campaign was in progress or that a representation
election was scheduled for January 31, 1978. Moreover, I
accept his undenied testimony that Rocco Cassone never
discussed the subject of unionization with the insurance
agent. I also find, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, that Respondent's officials never announced the
change in insurance coverage to its employees at any time
prior to the election.5
Upon my review of the record evidence developed at the
hearing, I am not convinced that Respondent's change in
insurance coverage for its employees was calculated to
impinge upon their freedom of choice in the rerun election
held on January 31, 1978. That evidence discloses that
Respondent had maintained a life insurance program for
years before the Union entered the scene, and even Paglioca
admitted that he had been the beneficiary of the pension
plan, which contained life insurance benefits, during the
many years of his employment. In June 1977 Rocco Cassone
learned by happenstance from his accountant that a friend,
Stephen Kramer, specialized in insurance programs and
could be of assistance in assuring that Respondent's existing
insurance format was in line with the strictures of the new
ERISA laws. Kramer contacted Cassone and, after a
detailed study was made, informed Respondent's president
that the continued maintenance of the group whole-life
insurance plan under funding by an insurance carrier was a
"rip-off." Kramer explained that a self-funding program
' In this connection, employee Arnaldo Paglioca testified that in September
1977 he signed an insurance enrollment card which he found on a desk in the
bakery shop. According to Paglioca, he learned about the presence of the card
from another employee. Similarly, employee Leroboldo Ceja testified that he
overheard other employees mention the insurance enrollment cards which
were in the plant a few weeks before the rerun election. Ceja did not sign one.
providing for group termlife insurance was available at a
savings of 25 to 30 percent which would be tax deductible to
the corporation, and also offered coverage in the amount of
$50,000 to the officers and shareholders with concomitant
tax advantages. Upon learning of these savings and tax
advantages, Rocco Cassone decided to avail Respondent of
this windfall and, without notifying the employees, instruct-
ed Kramer to implement the new program.
It is axiomatic that an employer does not offend the
provisions of the statute, and an election will not be nullified,
as a result of his grant of benefits during the pendency of a
representation petition, unless the award of such benefits is
designed to intrude upon the employees' freedom of electoral
choice or the effect of granting the benefits can be reasonably
said to be calculated to accomplish that end.' In applying
this axiom, the Board has eschewed utilization of a mechani-
cal approach to its assessment of such preelection conduct.'
And, the Board has made it clear that existing terms and
conditions of employment need not remain static until a
union campaign, no matter how extended in duration, comes
to an end.'
With these precepts in mind, I am persuaded and
conclude that the alteration which Respondent adopted in
its life insurance program was not condemned by the Act
and affords no basis for upsetting the election results. As
heretofore found, Respondent had maintained an insurance
program for its work complement long before the Union
entered the picture. In June or July 1977, more than 6
months prior to the rerun election, Respondent learned that
its current insurance plan, when brought into conformity
with ERISA requirements, would be overly expensive and
that a plan suggested by an independent insurance agent
would be more beneficial, not only to the employees, but also
to Respondent and its officials. Armed with this intelligence,
Respondent gave the insurance agent authority to implement
the new plan. This plan, which was never announced to the
employees, became effective on September 1, 1977. Because
of administrative bungling by Respondent's bookkeeper, full
enrollment was not achieved until January 1978. Viewed
against this backdrop, I am convinced that Respondent was
not statutorily obligated to stay or abandon implementation
of the new insurance program which was bottomed on
sound, business considerations, simply because an election
had been scheduled to take place some 6 months in the
future. In short, I conclude that the plan was not violative of
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, and I shall dismiss this allegation
from the complaint. I shall also overrule the pertinent
objection to the election.
The complaint also alleges that, in or about January 1978,
Respondent granted certain employees pay raises in excess
of the amounts required to comply with the January 1, 1978,
increase in the Federal minimum wage rate, and thereby
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. An objection to the
election echoes this allegation.
On January 1, 1978, the Federal minimum wage rate was
increased from $2.50 to 2.65 per hour. President Rocco
Cassone testified, without contradiction, and I find that,
'N.LR.B. v. Exchange Parts Co.. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
' Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co., 152 NLRB 300 (1965).
' Drug Fair-Community Drug Co.. Inc., 162 NLRB 843 (1967'
223
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prior to that date, a few of his employees were paid $2.50 an
hour. After the Federal rate was escalated, these employees
were afforded an hourly rate of $2.75. Cassone explained
that, when he personally attended to the corporate book-
keeping chores in the past, he made it a practice of rounding
out the hourly wage rates to increments of 25 cents, i.e., $2,
$2.25, $2.50, $2.75, etc., to simplify bookkeeping procedures.
With the advent of the Federal increase, Respondent's
bookkeeper, who had assumed Rocco's payroll chores,
sought permission to follow the president's past practice in
order to make his bookkeeping calculations uniform and
therefore simpler. Without announcing or otherwise publi-
cizing the rate increases to the employees, Rocco advised the
bookkeeper to continue the former's prior practice and raise
the involved employees' hourly wage rate from $2.50 to
$2.75 rather than $2.65. So far as this record stands, there is
no evidence to establish that any of the increases were
actually paid to the affected employees prior to the rerun
election of January 31, 1978.
In Essex International, Inc.,9 the Board announced that,
although the granting of employee benefits, such as wage
increases, during the period immediately preceding an
election is not per se objectionable, it would find such actions
calculated to influence employees in their choice of a
bargaining representative unless the employer shoulders the
burden of establishing that the timing of the action was
governed by factors other than the pendency of the elec-
tion."°
In the instant case, the concept of the wage increase was
mandated by Federal law beginning on January 1, 1978.
Rocco Cassone testified and I have found that, in accor-
dance with past bookkeeping procedures, Respondent es-
sayed to simplify its payroll calculations by paying its
employees' wage increases in increments of 25 cents. When
the Federal minimum rate was raised from $2.50 to $2.65 on
the above date, Cassone complied with his bookkeeper's
request to follow standard practice and pay a few employees
$2.75 rather than $2.65 an hour. Moreover, as heretofore
'216 NLRB 575. 576 (1975).
"'See Micro Measurements. et al.. 233 NLRB 76. 77 (1977).
"In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
chronicled, there is no probative evidence on this record
which demonstrates that any of these scattered increases
were either announced or granted prior to the rerun election.
Under all the circumstances, I am convinced and conclude
that the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of
proving that Respondent granted its employees increases in
January 1978, with an object of influencing them in their
choice of a bargaining representative. I shall therefore
dismiss this allegation from the complaint and overrule the
companion objection to the election.
Finally, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act and engaged in objectionable
preelection misconduct when, in September 1977, it coer-
cively interrogated its employees concerning their sympa-
thies and activities on behalf of the Union. No evidence was
presented at the hearing to substantiate this claim. I shall
therefore dismiss this allegation from the complaint and
overrule the parallel objection to the election.
I have found that Respondent has not committed any of
the unfair labor practices alleged in the General Counsel's
complaint. I shall therefore dismiss the complaint in its
entirety. I have also overruled the Union's objections to the
rerun election of January 31, 1978, on the ground that they
afford no basis in fact or law for overturning the results of
that balloting. I shall consequently recommend that the
election results be certified and that the petition in Case 2-
RC-17535 be dismissed.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER"
It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be, and it
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the objections filed in
Case 2-RC-17535 be overruled and that the petition in that
case be dismissed.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
224