Jingwen YaoDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 10, 202014471825 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 10, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/471,825 08/28/2014 Jingwen YAO Q213475 6744 23373 7590 01/10/2020 SUGHRUE MION, PLLC 2000 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. SUITE 900 WASHINGTON, DC 20006 EXAMINER DEJONG, ERIC S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1631 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/10/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM USPTO@sughrue.com sughrue@sughrue.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JINGWEN YAO Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 Technology Center 1600 Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, RYAN H. FLAX, and CYNTHIA M. HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. HARDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–7, and 9–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Shimadzu Corporation.” Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a mass spectrometric apparatus and method for identifying a target peptide in a test sample. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A mass spectrometric apparatus that identifies a target peptide in a test sample based on MSn spectrum data, comprising: a mass spectrometer that performs an MSn analysis (n is an integer equal to or larger than 2) on the test sample to provide the MSn spectrum data, which indicates dissociated ions of the test sample; and a data analyzing section including a sequence tag database and configured for: a) establishing the sequence tag database in advance obtaining, from an amino acid sequence of a known peptide and MSn spectrum information, a sequence tag, which is a partial amino acid sequence, and spectrum peak information corresponding to the sequence tag; b) acquiring a sequence tag of the target peptide by collating peak information extracted from a measured MSn spectrum obtained for the test sample with information in the sequence tag database; and c) identifying a peptide by performing a database search in the sequence tag database or in a protein database using, as search conditions, the sequence tag for the target peptide obtained by the acquiring the sequence tag and mass of a precursor ion deriving from the target peptide. See Response to Notification of Non-Compliant Appeal Brief, filed Jan. 31, 2018 (“Response”), at Claims Appendix. REJECTION Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3. Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 3 OPINION There are two independent claims, claims 1 and 7. Appellant made the same arguments for both independent claims. Appeal Br. 4–7; Reply Br. 2–6. We select claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Examiner’s Findings The Examiner acknowledged that the claims recite the use of a mass spectrometer and performing MSn analysis to generate and analyze spectrum data. Final Act. 3. Nevertheless, the Examiner found that the claims “embrace[] an[] abstract series of purely algorithmically driven data analysis steps.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner stated that “the claims do not recite any improvement or alteration to the manner in which a mass spectrometer is used or any improvement to the spectrometer itself.” Final Act. 4. The Examiner further stated that the claims “fail[] to alter the contents of a sample, prior to or following spectroscopic testing,” and thus “practicing the claimed invention does not involve any particular or practical application of the newly recognized identity of a samples contents.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner concluded: “Since the claims do not add anything significantly more than conventional and routine approaches to collecting MSn spectroscopic data, then the claims remain essentially directed to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specific purpose.” Final Act. 5–6. Appellant’s Contentions In response, Appellant argued that “although the present invention includes computer-based data analysis, the claim is directed to [] physical structures: including a mass spectrometer and a data analyzing section, and is not a mere algorithm.” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant further argued that the Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 4 claims are “not directed to any mathematical formula,” and “not merely directed to manipulation of data,” but rather require “‘identifying a peptide’ in a sample.” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant additionally argued that “the claims are ‘significantly more’ than a mere abstract idea because they are directed to a specific solution to a technical problem in the technical field of mass spectrometry, i.e., the improvement of the ability of a mass spectrometric apparatus to identify a target peptide in a test sample.” Appeal Br. 5–6. Analysis An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined by the courts to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 5 as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see also id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 6 eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office published revised guidance on the application of section 101. See USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7. 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, in determining what concept a claim is “directed to” (“Step 2A”), we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim contains an “‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’” the claimed judicial exception into a patent-eligible application of the judicial exception (“Step 2B”). Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. In so doing, we thus consider whether the claim: Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 7 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine and conventional in the field” (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Pursuant to the Guidance, we begin by determining whether the claims recite any judicial exception(s) to patent eligibility. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. The Examiner found that the claims recite an “abstract series of purely algorithmically driven data analysis steps” and are “essentially directed to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula.” Final Act. 4, 6. On the record before us, we determine that the Examiner has not established that Appellant’s claims recite a judicial exception. Thus, we determine that the Examiner has not carried the burden of establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). First, the Examiner has not alleged, and there is no evidence of record, that the claims recite any method of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices, commercial or legal interactions, or managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Second, the Examiner has not alleged, and there is no evidence of record, that the claims recite mental processes, or concepts that can be performed in the human mind. See id.; see also, e.g., SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 8 2010) (claims found patent eligible, despite reciting a method for calculating, where claims were “not dealing with . . . a method that [could] be performed without a machine,” and there was “no evidence . . . that the calculations [could] be performed entirely in the human mind”). The final category of abstract ideas identified by the courts is mathematical concepts, which is the focus of the Examiner’s rejection. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Contrary to the Examiner’s assertions, we find that the claims do not explicitly recite any mathematical concept, such as a specific mathematical algorithm or formula. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 586; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. While some of the steps of Appellant’s claims may be based on mathematical concepts, the mathematical concepts are not recited in the claims. Accordingly, in light of the Guidance, we find that the Examiner has not established that the claims recite an abstract idea that would make them patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (“If the claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is not directed to a judicial exception (Step 2A: NO) and is eligible.”); see also Ex parte Linden, Appeal No. 2018-003323, at 10 (PTAB Apr. 1, 2019) (informative) (reversing examiner’s eligibility rejection of a method for transcribing speech, where the Board found that step of using “predicted character probabilities” to decode a transcription did not recite a mathematical algorithm or formula). Pursuant to the Guidance, because the claims do not recite an abstract idea or other judicial exception, this concludes the eligibility analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. CONCLUSION We reverse the rejection of claims 1, 3–7, and 9–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal 2018-006926 Application 14/471,825 9 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–7, 9–12 101 Eligibility 1, 3–7, 9–12 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation