Jing Tan, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 19, 2000
01986475 (E.E.O.C. May. 19, 2000)

01986475

05-19-2000

Jing Tan, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Jing Tan v. United States Postal Service

01986475

May 19, 2000

Jing Tan, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01986475

v. ) Agency No. 4F945007998

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Jing Tan (complainant) timely filed an appeal, on August 22, 1998,

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)

from a final agency decision (FAD), dated July 24, 1998, concerning a

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R.

� 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency correctly found that complainant was not discriminated

against when she was issued a notice of a ten (10) working day suspension.

BACKGROUND

Complainant was employed, by the agency, as a letter carrier (PS-5). She

filed a formal complaint, on February 13, 1998, alleging discrimination on

the basis of national origin (Chinese) when, on December 1, 1997, she was

issued a notice of a ten (10) working day suspension for unsatisfactory

work performance/fingering mail while going up steps/committing an unsafe

act/failure to follow instructions. In its FAD, the agency found that

complainant had not been discriminated against. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which

the first step normally consists of determining the existence of

a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to

the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In response to complainant's claim that she was discriminated against

when she was issued a ten (10) working day suspension, the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

The agency asserted that complainant's suspension was warranted by her

actions when she twisted her ankle on the job. Supervisor of Customer

Services, S-1, asserted that during the investigation of complainant's on

the job injury, complainant admitted to fingering mail while attempting

to go up broken steps and that complainant failed to report that the

steps were broken. S-1 further testified that she has issued discipline

to other employees for similar infractions; these employees include

two (2) African American employees, two (2) Asian American employees,

and one (1) Caucasian American employee. Since the agency articulated

such a reason, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate

that the agency's articulated reason was pretext for discrimination.

We find that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant denies

fingering the mail. She also states that three other employees were

injured on the job, but were not suspended; these employees included

one (1) Filipino employee, one (1) Korean employee, and one (1) African

American employee. The record does, however, demonstrate that five (5)

other employees of different national origins than complainant were

suspended for infractions similar to complainant's. Complainant has,

therefore, not presented, nor does the record contain, evidence that the

agency's action was pretextual. Therefore, the agency's determination

that complainant failed to establish that she was discriminated against,

with respect to this claim, was correct.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

05-19-00

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

________________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.