Jiawei Technology (Usa) Ltd.v.Simon Richmond

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 1, 2015

11102229 (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2015)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 22
Tel: 571–272–7822 Entered: May 1, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________
JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (HK) LTD., JIAWEI TECHNOLOGY (USA) LTD.,
SHENZHEN JIAWEI PHOTOVOLTAIC LIGHTING CO., LTD., ATICO
INTERNATIONAL (ASIA) LTD., ATICO INTERNATIONAL USA, INC.,
CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN FLORIDA),
CHIEN LUEN INDUSTRIES CO., LTD., INC. (CHIEN LUEN CHINA),
COLEMAN CABLE, LLC, NATURE’S MARK, RITE AID CORP., SMART
SOLAR, INC., AND TEST RITE PRODUCTS CORP.,
Petitioner,
v.
SIMON NICHOLAS RICHMOND,
Patent Owner.
_______________

IPR2015-00580
Patent 7,429,827 B2
_______________

Before WILLIAM V. SAINDON, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
BARRY L. GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAINDON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108
Denying Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder
37 C.F.R. § 42.122

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I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner requests inter partes review of claims 31–34 of U.S. Patent
No. 7,429,827 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’827 patent”). Paper 10, 1 (“Pet”).
Accompanying the Petition is a timely Motion for Joinder under 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(c) to a pending inter partes review of the ’827 patent. Pet. 1, 5; see
also Paper 11 (Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder (“Mot. Joinder”)); Jiawei
Tech. (HK) Ltd. v. Simon Nicholas Richmond, Case IPR2014-00938 (PTAB
Dec. 16, 2014) (Paper 20, instituting inter partes review of claims 24–30 and
35 of the ’827 patent but not claims 31–34). Patent Owner filed an
opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder (Paper 20, “Opp. Mot.
Joinder”), to which Petitioner filed a reply (Paper 21, “Reply Mot. Joinder”).
Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that
an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the above-
mentioned papers, we do not institute an inter partes review on any
challenged claim, and we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.
A. Related Matters
The ’827 patent is subject to the aforementioned inter partes review,
IPR2014-00938. Pet. 1. We granted Petitioner’s petition for inter partes
review in IPR2014-00936 (U.S. Patent No. 7,196,477) and we denied
Petitioner’s petition for inter partes review in IPR2014-00937 (U.S. Patent
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No. 8,362,700). Pet. 4. The ’700 patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’827
patent, which is a continuation-in-part of the ’477 patent.
A number of cases pending before the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey were consolidated into Simon Nicholas Richmond v.
Jiawei Technology (HK) Ltd., Case No. 3:13-cv-1944 (MLC-DEA) (D.N.J.).
Paper 14, 3–4.
B. Asserted Ground and Prior Art
Petitioner asserts that claims 31–34 of the ’827 patent are
unpatentable in view of Chliwnyj,
1
Wu,
2
and Lau.
3
Pet. 6.
4

II. ANALYSIS
C. The First Petition—IPR2014-00938
In IPR2014-00938, we determined that, inter alia, Petitioner had not
shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 31–34 were unpatentable in view
of Chliwnyj and Wu, but that Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood
that claim 30, which depends from independent claim 27, is unpatentable in
view of Chliwnyj, Wu, and Lau. Jiawei Tech. (HK) Ltd., Case IPR2014-
00938, Paper 20 at 20. We denied inter partes review of claims 31–34
because those claims included a limitation—“color changing cycle”—that

1
U.S. Patent No. 5,924,784, issued July 20, 1999 (Ex. 1105).
2
U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0201874 A1, published Oct.
30, 2003 (Ex. 1106).
3
U.S. Patent No. 6,431,719 B1, issued Aug. 13, 2002 (Ex. 1107).
4
Claim 31 depends from independent claim 27; claims 33 and 34 depend
from independent claim 32.
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we were unpersuaded was shown in Chliwnyj. Id. at 16–17. We noted that
Petitioner had not provided a claim construction of that limitation. Id.
D. The Second Petition—IPR2015-00580
In the instant proceeding, Petitioner provides proposed constructions
for the limitation “color changing cycle.” Pet. 17–21. Petitioner alleges
that, in view of its proposed constructions and the additional analysis
provided, it has shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 31–34 are
unpatentable over Chliwnyj, Wu, and Lau. Id. at 21–51. Petitioner further
alleges that these arguments are not substantially similar to the ones it
presented in IPR2014-00938. Id. at 51–52.
E. Analysis
According to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d):
In determining whether to institute or order a
proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or
chapter 31, the Director may take into account
whether, and reject the petition or request because,
the same or substantially the same prior art or
arguments previously were presented to the Office.
As explained above, the prior art presented in the instant
proceeding—Chliwnyj, Wu, and Lau—also was presented in the earlier
proceeding, IPR2014-00938. The only difference is that Petitioner used the
specific combination of references to argue that claim 30, not claims 31–34,
are unpatentable. There is no question, however, that Chliwnyj, Wu, and
Lau were available to Petitioner at the time of filing the earlier Petition, and
actually presented to the Office as prior art to the ’827 patent. Further,
Petitioner’s arguments in the instant proceeding are substantially similar to
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those it made in the earlier proceeding, relying on Lau instead of Chliwnyj
for the “color changing cycle” limitation but presenting a similar analysis for
all other limitations of claims 31–34. Compare Pet. 21–51, with Jiawei
Tech. (HK) Ltd., Case IPR2014-00938, Paper 13 at 31–39. Under the
circumstances, we are persuaded to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C.
§ 325(d) to deny the Petition because the same prior art and substantially the
same arguments were presented previously to the Office.
Further, the proposed ground directed to claims 31–34 amounts to a
second bite at the apple for Petitioner—Petitioner offers now a claim
construction it could have offered in IPR2014-00938. Petitioner alleges that
Patent Owner admitted in district court that the claim term “varying colour,”
found, for example, in independent claim 27, means substantially the same
thing as “color changing cycle,” found in the claims now challenged.
Pet. 17–18; but see Opp. Mot. Joinder 7 (denying that Patent Owner
admitted such a construction). Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner in its
Preliminary Response in IPR2014-00938 made statements “inconsistent”
with its alleged prior position in district court and that Petitioner “could not
have reasonably anticipated” this inconsistency. Mot. Joinder 6.
Petitioner’s argument is unconvincing. In general, a petitioner must
propose those claim constructions necessary to support its burden of
showing a reasonable likelihood of success. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)
(the petition must state “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”); see
also 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (petitioner must show, in its petition, “a reasonable
likelihood” of prevailing). Petitioner, however, did not propose a
construction for “color changing cycle” in its Petition in IPR2014-00938.
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Although Petitioner states it relied on Patent Owner’s alleged admission in
district court, the claim construction standard in district court is different
from the claim construction standard applied to unexpired patents in inter
partes reviews, and, as such, district court constructions are not binding in
inter partes reviews. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1278–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Lastly, there is a
presumption against construing two different phrases in two claims to mean
the same thing, and Petitioner provided no explanation in its Petition in
IPR2014-00938 as to whether that presumption applies or does not apply in
the context of claims 31–34. See Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-Cor, Inc., 413
F.3d 1361, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Although the doctrine is at its
strongest ‘where the limitation sought to be ‘read into’ an independent claim
already appears in a dependent claim,’ Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004), there is still a presumption that two
independent claims have different scope when different words or phrases are
used in those claims, Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362,
1365–69 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987).”).
5
Thus, if Petitioner
wished us to construe “color changing cycle” to mean “varying colour” in
IPR2014-00938 based on alleged statements or constructions made in

5
In addition, we note that claim 27 recites a device to produce light of
“varying colour,” whereas claim 31, which depends therefrom, further
recites that the device produces “a continuous color changing cycle.” See
Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(denouncing claim constructions that render phrases superfluous and
selecting a construction that gave each phrase a distinct meaning).
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another proceeding, then it should have discussed those statements or
constructions and proposed a construction in IPR2014-00938. We are not
persuaded that allowing Petitioner to begin a second proceeding to argue
now a claim construction it knew of and allegedly relied on before, but never
discussed, is an appropriate circumstance to grant inter partes review. See
ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., Case IPR2013-00454, slip op. at
5–6 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2013) (Paper 12) (“The Board is concerned about
encouraging, unnecessarily, the filing of petitions which are partially
inadequate.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (directing us to construe our rules
to ensure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution to every
proceeding”).
In view of the above, we deny Petitioner’s Petition under 35 U.S.C.
§ 325(d) and we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(c) (requiring for joinder a determination that the petition “warrants the
institution of an inter partes review under section 314”).
III. ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that an inter partes review is not instituted; and
FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is denied.

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PETITIONER:

Mark Nelson
Mark.nelson@dentons.com

Daniel Valenzuela
Daniel.valenzuela@dentons.com

Lissi Mojica
Lissi.mojica@dentons.com

Kevin Greenleaf
Kevin.greenleaf@dentons.com

PATENT OWNER:

Theodore Shiells
tfshiells@shiellslaw.com

Marcus Benavides
marcusb@tlpmb.com