Jesse H. Davis et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2019

14338320 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/338,320 07/22/2014 Jesse H. Davis CMT01-002-US-CON 6015
86067 7590 12/31/2019
Klintworth & Rozenblat IP LLP
19 North Green Street
Chicago, IL 60607
EXAMINER
STANFORD, CHRISTOPHER J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2872
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kandrip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
___________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
___________

Ex parte JESSE H. DAVIS and JOHN. J. BACKOF II
____________

Appeal 2018-000403
Application 14/338,320
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and JASON M.
REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of Claims 22–24. App. Br. 12–13 (Claims
App’x.). Claims 1–21 are canceled. App. Br. 12. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant states the real party in interest is Creative Mobile
Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 1.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed June 6, 2017, “App. Br.”), the Reply Brief
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to a system and method for processing credit card
transactions. See Abstract.
Invention
Claims 22 and 23 are independent. App. Br. 12. An understanding of
the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 22, which is
reproduced in Table 1.
References and Rejections3
Albert US 5,991,410 Nov 23, 1999
Taylor US 2005/0165683 A1 July 28, 2005
Saunders US 2006/0278704 A1 Dec. 14, 2006
Stambaugh US 7,353,208 B1 Apr. 1, 2008
1. Claims 22–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–6.
2. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Albert, Stambaugh, Taylor, and Saunders. Final
Act. 7–11.

(filed October 13, 2017), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed August 23, 2017,
“Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed January 18, 2017, “Final Act.”), and the
Specification (filed July 22, 2014, “Spec.”) for their respective details.
3 The present application was examined under the pre-AIA first inventor
provisions. Final Act. 2.
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3. Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Albert, and Stambaugh. Final Act. 12–14.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 22–24 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this
Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief. Any
other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in
the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We are
not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. We provide the
following explanation to highlight and address specific arguments and
findings primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellant’s arguments as they
are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 3–10.
CLAIMS 22–24: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant argues these claims as a group in view of the recitations of
Claim 22. App. Br. 10. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the § 101
rejection on the basis of representative Claim 22 and refer to the rejected
claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv);
In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We review the record de
novo. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an
issue of law that we review de novo.”). Based upon our review of the
record in light of recent policy guidance with respect to patent-eligible
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subject matter rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we sustain the rejection of
Claims 22–24 for the specific reasons discussed below.
Preemption.
Appellant denies the claims are directed to an abstract idea, but
contends the claims in no way preempt application thereof. App. Br. 4–6.
Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does
not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys.,
Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-
ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made
moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We conduct
such an analysis below.
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 The
Examiner finds the claims are directed to statutory categories. Final Act. 6.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981)).

4 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at
611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at
191); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber,
smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at
69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
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nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme
Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula
in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook), 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
B. United States Patent and Trademark Office Revised Guidance.5
The USPTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal
Register concerning the application of § 101.
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:

5 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance,” or “Rev. Guid.”)
(https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes);6 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual for
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c),
(e)–(h)).7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.8
See Revised Guidance.
Step 2A(i) — Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea

6 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
7 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
8 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical
relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity —
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales
activities or behaviors; business relations); managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people (including social activities, teaching, and following
rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).
Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent-
eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis,
except in rare situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9 However, if
the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an abstract idea enumerated
above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon), the claim requires further

9 In the rare circumstance in which an Examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
of the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Guidance,
Section III.C.
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analysis for a practical application of the judicial exception in Step 2A(ii).
Step 2A(ii) — Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception in Step 2A(i), we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception in Step 2A(ii) by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and
in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application.
The seven identified “practical application” sections of the MPEP,10
cited in the Revised Guidance under Step 2A(ii), are:
(1) MPEP § 2106.05(a) Improvements to the Functioning of
a Computer or To Any Other Technology or Technical
Field
(2) MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
(3) MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
(4) MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations
(5) MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An
Exception
(6) MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
(7) MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological
Environment

10 See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Citations to the MPEP herein refer
to revision [R-08.2017].
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If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application as
determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited above, then the
claim is not directed to the judicial exception, and the patent-eligibility
inquiry ends. If not, then analysis proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
It is possible that a claim that does not “integrate” a recited judicial
exception under Step 2A(ii) is nonetheless patent eligible. For example, the
claim may recite additional elements that render the claim patent eligible
even though a judicial exception is recited in a separate claim element.11
The Federal Circuit has held claims eligible at the second step of the
Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) because the additional elements recited in
the claims provided “significantly more” than the recited judicial exception
(e.g., because the additional elements were unconventional in
combination).12 Therefore, if a claim has been determined to be directed to
a judicial exception under Revised Step 2A, we must evaluate the additional
elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine
whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).13

11 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
12 See, e.g., Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
13 The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325.
(Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a
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Under the Revised Guidance, we must consider in Step 2B whether an
additional element or combination of elements: (1) “Adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance, III.B.
In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of
elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the
examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in
writing with, one or more of the following:
1. A citation to an express statement in the
specification or to a statement made by an applicant during
prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . .
2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions
discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s).
3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the
well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s)
. . . .
4. A statement that the examiner is taking official
notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of

skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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the additional element(s)
See Berkheimer Memo.
If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the
element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the
exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility
analysis.
However, if a determination is made that the element and combination
of elements does not amount to significantly more than the exception itself,
the claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for
lack of subject matter eligibility.
C. Analysis.
Step 1
The independent claims recite variously systems and methods, thus,
recite enumerated categories of eligible subject matter. Therefore, the issue
before us is whether the claims are directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. Based upon our review of the record in light of the
Revised Guidance with respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we affirm the rejection of Claims 22–24.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The preamble of independent Claim 22 recites: “A system for
processing credit card transactions for a plurality of vehicles of a fleet of
motor vehicles, comprising.” The limitations recited in the body of the
claim are analyzed in Table I against the categories of abstract ideas as set
forth in the Revised Guidance.
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Claim 22 Revised Guidance, p. 52
[a]14 a control center configured to
maintain simultaneous wireless
connections with a plurality of the
vehicles in the fleet to facilitate
transmission and reception of a
plurality of credit card transactions
from at least one vehicle of the
plurality of vehicles;
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., marketing
activities and business relations.
Rev. Guid. 52.
[b] a driver interactive unit (DIU)
located in each vehicle and
accessible to a driver of the vehicle,
the DIU in wireless communication
with the control center;
A machine, not included within
abstract ideas category.
[c] a passenger information monitor
(PIM) located in each vehicle, the
PIM in communication with the
DIU and including a touch screen
display facing a passenger in the
vehicle so as to be accessible to the
passenger;
A machine, not included within
abstract ideas category.
[d] a charging meter located in each
vehicle that determines charge
amounts corresponding to the
respective credit card transaction;
A machine, not included within
abstract ideas category.
[e] a payment card reader located in
each vehicle operatively coupled to
the PIM and configured to receive
payment from the passenger when
the PIM provides a prompts to the
A machine, not included within
abstract ideas category.

14 Step designators, e.g., “[a]” were added to facilitate discussion.
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passenger and provides a visual
display of the charge amounts
determined by the charging meter;
[f] the control center receiving the
plurality of credit card transactions
from the DIU or the PIM of the at
least one vehicle, each credit card
transaction containing credit card
information, including the charge
amount corresponding to each credit
card transaction;
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., marketing
activities and business relations.
Rev. Guid. 52.15
[g] the control center aggregating
the credit card transaction
information transmitted by the DIU
or PIM of the at least one vehicle;
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., marketing
activities and business relations.
Rev. Guid. 52.
[h] the control center assigning
merchant information to the credit
card transaction information, the
merchant information including
information about a driver, a
vehicle, a group of vehicles, or a
fleet of vehicles that corresponds to
the credit card transaction
information; and
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., marketing
activities and business relations.
Rev. Guid. 52.
[i] the control center and only the
control center controlling
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., marketing

15 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a ‘‘fundamental economic practice’’ and thus an abstract
idea); Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that concept of ‘‘local processing of payments for remotely
purchased goods’’ is a ‘‘fundamental economic practice, which Alice made
clear is, without more, outside the patent system.’’).
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authorization and settlement of the
credit card transactions, after receipt
of the credit card transaction
information and the merchant
information transmitted by the DIU
and the PIM of the at least one
vehicle.
activities and business relations.
Rev. Guid. 52.

In view of Table I, we find limitations [a] and [f]–[i] of independent
Claim 22 recite abstract ideas, i.e., certain methods of organizing
human activity. Thus, Claim 22 recites a judicial exception, per se. Our
findings are in agreement with those of the Examiner who finds the claims
are directed to the computer implementation of an abstract idea, i.e., the
fundamental business practice of central batch settlement of credit card debt.
Final Act 2.
Appellant contends the claims recite a plurality of hardware and
physical, electronic components, thus, removing the claims from the sphere
of abstract ideas. App. Br. 4.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
1. Integration.
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
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For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer
or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field.”
“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or
“any other technology or technical field.” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
With respect to technological improvements, Appellant contends the
Examiner mischaracterizes the claims by ignoring the technical problems
and solutions discussed in the Specification. App. Br. 7. Specifically,
Appellant argues the “invention addresses the problem of lack of transaction
information prior to the end of a driver shift along with the corresponding
possibility of data loss and poor reporting, and the problem of time-
consuming and complex settlement processing.” Id. Appellant argues the
claims provide information collection and distribution hardware in
interconnected communication with a control center that is the sole entity
that authorizes and settles transactions. Id. at 8
The problems addressed by Appellant’s claims, i.e., “the problem of
lack of transaction information” and “and the problem of time-consuming
and complex settlement processing” (see App. Br. 7) are solved in the claims
by the control center functioning as a clearinghouse mechanism. A
clearinghouse is central agency for the collection, classification, and
distribution especially of information and is broadly: an informal channel for
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distributing information or assistance.16 “The use of a third-party
intermediary (or “clearing house”) is also a building block of the modern
economy.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 208, 134
S.Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014) (citing Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 Geo. L.J. 387, 406–412 (2013)).
“Thus, intermediated settlement [i.e., clearinghouse], like hedging, is an
“abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101.” Alice, id. As found in Alice, a
clearinghouse is a fundamental business practice, but it is not a technology.
We are not persuaded the claims improve the functioning of the computer
itself or any other technology or technical field.
MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine.
Appellant contends that in the “claimed invention, the required
intercommunication between the control center and the other physical
components, such as the driver interactive unit (DIU), the passenger
information monitor (PIM), the charging meter, and the payment card
reader, inextricably tie the components together to provide a functional
system for processing credit card transactions for a plurality of vehicles of a
fleet of motor vehicles.” App. Br. 8 (citing Ex parte Steiner, 2012-0012381
(PTAB Apr. 23, 2015).17

16 See Clearinghouse Definition, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/clearinghouse (last accessed
Dec. 19, 2019).
17 The citation is apparently a typographic error where “Ex parte Steiner,
2012-001238 (PTAB Apr. 23, 2015)” is meant.
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Appellant discloses a conventional computing environment
comprising conventional hardware components. See Spec., ¶¶ 20–26. We
find unavailing Appellant’s reliance on the Board’s non-precedential
decision, Ex parte Schmid, Appeal No. 2012-002155 (PTAB Dec. 26, 2014).
App. Br. 8. As a non-precedential decision of the Board, Schmid is not
binding. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2, Rev. 10 § I, at 3
(noting that “[e]very decision other than a precedential decision by the
Precedential Opinion Panel is, by default, a routine decision. A routine
decision is binding in the case in which it is made, even if it is not
designated as precedential or informative, but it is not otherwise binding
authority.”).18 In view of Appellant’s disclosures, we find the claims are not
tied to a “particular machine.” Rather, we “conclude that the method claims,
which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, at 2357.
MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation.
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining whether a claim recites significantly more is whether the claim
effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state
or thing.” “‘Transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or
thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at
70).

18 This document is available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN
AL.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 2019).
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Appellant argues the claims provide information collection and
distribution hardware in interconnected communication with a control center
that is the sole entity that authorizes and settles transactions. App. Br. 8.
Appellant further argues “the problem of lack of transaction information”
and “and the problem of time-consuming and complex settlement
processing” are solved in the claims by the control center functioning as a
clearinghouse mechanism. See App. Br. 7. Appellant does not argue the
claims act to transform or reduce an article to a different state. “The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the
transformation prong.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations.

This section of the MPEP guides:
Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to
the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of
nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding
press. 450 U.S. at 177-78 . . . . The Court evaluated additional
elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the
mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time,
and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently
limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical
application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187 . .
. . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of
mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . . In particular, the
Court concluded that the additional elements such as the data
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processing system and communications controllers recited in
the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea
because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via
computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as for Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. “In
short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform
generic computer functions.” Id. We find that Appellant’s claims do not
add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment.
MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception.
Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more
than to merely invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception.

MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity.
The claims obtain and communicate data which we find to be a classic
example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at
963 (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment.

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[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We
have not been persuaded that the limitations act other than to simply to limit
the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
2. Well-understood, routine, conventional.
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The written description describes the claimed computer system
consistent with its being “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.” See
discussion, supra, of the conventional client-, merchant-, and service-
provider-side computer architectures.
3. Specified at a high level of generality.
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Rev. Guid., 56.
The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor does
Appellant cite Specification disclosure for the required specificity.
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We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality
consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Therefore, we conclude
that none of the claim limitations, viewed “both individually and as an
ordered combination,” amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception in order to sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into
patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 22–24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
CLAIMS 22–24:
OBVIOUSNESS OVER ALBERT, STAMBAUGH, TAYLOR, AND SAUNDERS.
Appellant states “rather than focus on the § 103 rejections in this
Appeal, applicant shall focus on the § 101 issues set forth above and will
subsequently address the § 103 issues upon an indication that the § 101
rejections have been overcome.” App. Br. 10.
Appellant does not request review of the rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. App. Br. 10. We therefore, summarily affirm this rejection. See
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1205.02 (“If a
ground of rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s
brief, that ground of rejection will be summarily sustained by the Board.”).

DECISION
The rejection of Claims 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
The rejection of Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is SUMMARILY
AFFIRMED.
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
22–24 101 Eligibility 22–24 –
22–24 103 Albert, Stambaugh,
Taylor, Saunders
22–24 –
Overall
Outcome
22–24 –

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED