Jerome CONNOR

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 19, 2020

2019006165 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/483,674 05/30/2012 Jerome CONNOR 128196-08301 5913
145655 7590 08/19/2020
McCarter & English, LLP/LifeCell
265 Franklin Street
Boston, MA 02110
EXAMINER
PALLAY, MICHAEL B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1617
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@mccarter.com
mvaneman@mccarter.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEROME CONNOR

Appeal 2019-006165
Application 13/483,674
Technology Center 1600
Before ERIC B. GRIMES, MICHAEL A. VALEK, and
JAMIE T. WISZ, Administrative Patent Judges.

WISZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 6, 9–16, and 56–59. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Specification describes methods for producing tissue products
such as adipose tissue. Spec. ¶ 4. The “methods include selecting an
adipose tissue; mechanically processing the adipose tissue to reduce the
tissue size; and treating the mechanically processed tissue to remove
substantially all cellular material from the tissue.” Id. According to the
Specification, “[t]he processed tissue is suspended in a solution and cross-
linked to produce a stable three-dimensional structure.” Id.
Claim 1, the only independent claim, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter and is reproduced below:
1. A method for producing a porcine tissue product,
comprising:
selecting porcine-derived adipose tissue;
mechanically processing the adipose tissue to reduce the
tissue size and washing the tissue to remove lipids;
treating the tissue to remove substantially all cellular
material from the tissue;
suspending the tissue in a liquid to form a suspension;

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as LifeCell
Corporation, a subsidiary of Allergan plc. Appeal Br. 1.
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freezing and drying the tissue in the suspension to form a
porous sponge; and
stabilizing the sponge after freezing and drying the tissue
by heating the tissue to produce a stable three-dimensional
structure, wherein washing the tissue to remove lipids and
treating the tissue to remove cellular material are performed
by a process consisting of mechanically processing the
tissue, diluting the mechanically processed tissue with water,
mechanically removing freed lipids from the tissue, and
treating the tissue with a detergent.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.).

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 10–13, and 57–59 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Nahas.2
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 9–13, and 56–59 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Nahas and further in view of Hassingboe.3
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 10–14, and 57–59 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Nahas and further in view of Ksander.4
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, 10–13, 15, 16, and 57–59 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Nahas and further in view of Brown.5

2 Nahas et al., WO 2011/019822 A2, published Feb. 17, 2011 (“Nahas”).
3 Hassingboe et al., US 2009/0220579 A1, published Sept. 3, 2009
(“Hassingboe”).
4 Ksander et al., US 4,950,483, issued Aug. 21, 1990 (“Ksander”).
5 Brown et al., US 2006/0153816 A1, published July 13, 2006 (“Brown”).
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1, 6, 10–13, and 57–59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Nahas
According to the Examiner, Nahas discloses compositions and
methods for implantation of processed adipose tissue products, including
porcine adipose tissue. Final Act. 2, 4 (citing Nahas, title, 4). The Examiner
also finds that, in Example 2 of Nahas:
acellular biomaterial / processed human adipose tissue (PhAT) is
prepared by isolating subcutaneous fat (i.e., selecting an adipose
tissue) from a tissue sample by scraping, homogenizing the
scraped adipose tissue in a blender or with a press or mincing by
forcing through a die while rinsing with water to remove lipid
(i.e., mechanically processing the adipose tissue to reduce the
tissue size and mechanically removing freed lipids from the
tissue), washing with water to remove lipid and cellular debris
(i.e., treating the mechanically processed tissue to remove
substantially all cellular material from the tissue), treating with
TRITON X-100 (i.e., detergent), and solubilizing (i.e., forming a
solution, wherein a “solution” encompasses a “suspension” per
[Nahas] page 19 line 13) using weak acid and water with shaking
to promote chemical decellularization (Example 2) (i.e.,
suspending the tissue in a solution to form a suspension).
Id. at 2–3. According to the Examiner, the material is then optionally
lyophilized (i.e., freeze dried), which would form a sponge, prior to storage.
Id. at 3 (citing Nahas, 43:18–44:20). The Examiner also finds that “[t]he
processed adipose material is then made into particles for injection with or
without a biopolymer scaffold and cross-linking agents (Example 2),
wherein a biopolymer scaffold provides a three dimensional framework.”
Id. (citing Nahas, 25:1–5). Furthermore, the Examiner finds that “[a]n
external mold can be applied to shape an injected solution, the injected
implant can be molded like one would mold clay, or the mixture can be
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injected into a mold (i.e., producing a desired shape), then the biomaterial
allowed to harden (i.e., cross-linked), then the material implanted.” Id.
(citing Nahas, 36:11–15).
The Examiner acknowledges that Nahas does not disclose an example
combining all the elements above but concludes it would have been prima
facie obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention to combine all such elements with a reasonable expectation of
success given that Nahas suggests these elements and arrangements thereof.
Final Act. 4. The Examiner also finds that, although Example 2 of Nahas
“discloses use of acid such as solubilizing using weak acid and water with
shaking to promote chemical decellularization,” it would have been obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art to substitute a non-ionic detergent for
such acid with a reasonable expectation of success because Nahas “discloses
that the agent to promote decellularization may comprise an agent selected
from an acid or a non-ionic detergent such as TRITON X-100” and Example
2 also includes treatment with TRITON X-100. Id. at 4–5 (citing Nahas,
claims 29, 32, 33).
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to consider the prior art and
the invention as a whole and that “(i) the prior art does not disclose, teach or
suggest removal of lipids and cellular material from an adipose tissue
material without the use of acid” and “(ii) the prior art teaches away from
producing a porous sponge having a stable three-dimensional structure.”
Appeal Br. 6.
First, Appellant asserts that “Nahas does not enable washing tissue to
remove lipids and treating the tissue to remove cellular materials, wherein
the washing and treating consists only of the steps recited in claim 1.”
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Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, claim 1 is closed to the inclusion of
elements not recited in the washing and treating steps because the claim
recites that these steps “are performed by a process consisting of,” wherein
the list that follows does not include any step of treating the tissue with an
acid. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added). Appellant cites to Vehicular Techs.
Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and
Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 2011 WL 13209364, at *7 (W.D. Wis.
Nov. 29, 2011) in support of its argument that claim 1 cannot include any
additional washing or treating steps. Id.
Appellant also asserts that Nahas does not enable a processing step
using a detergent, without an acid, to remove lipid and cellular material from
its tissue product. Appeal Br. 9. According to Appellant, “Nahas does not
provide a single detailed instruction regarding the use of a detergent, or any
other composition, to remove lipid and cellular material from the adipose
tissue product in the absence of acid” in contrast to the enabling disclosure
provided with respect to removing cellular material and lipids using acids or
the use of non-ionic detergents in conjunction with acids. Id. at 10–11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. First, we agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 is open to steps not explicitly recited therein
because the preamble includes the transitional phrase “comprising” which is
open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited steps. “The transition
‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and
allows for additional steps.” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327
F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The “consisting of” limitation appears in
the wherein clause of claim 1 and only modifies the steps of “washing the
tissue to remove lipids” and “treating the tissue to remove cellular material.”
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Thus, while those steps exclude additional elements, the overall method
recited in claim 1 does not exclude additional unrecited steps such as “an
additional step of treating the tissue with acid for solubilization . . . or for
some other purpose,” as referenced by the Examiner. Ans. 3.
This claim construction is not inconsistent with the Vehicular and
Promega cases cited by Appellant. In Vehicular, the court explained that the
phrase “‘consisting of’ is a term of art in patent law signifying restriction and
exclusion” and “‘comprising’ indicates an open-ended construction.”
Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1382. Based on this understanding, the court
held that a claimed spring assembly only included two springs due to the use
of the phrase “consisting of” to describe the assembly components in a
product claim. Id. Vehicular did not deal with the question of whether
additional, unrecited steps could be included in a method claim reciting the
word “comprising” in the preamble.
In contrast, in Promega, the court found that when the phrase
“consisting of” was used in one step of a method claim, it did not exclude
the presence of other loci that were not explicitly recited in that step because
the preamble of the claim included the word “comprising.” See Promega,
2011 WL 13209364, at *6–7.6 Thus, neither Promega nor Vehicular is
inconsistent with the claim interpretation here wherein the “comprising”
language used in the preamble opens the claim up to other unrecited steps.
Indeed, our interpretation is consistent with the court’s construction of the

6 In contrast, the court in Promega found that the claims to a kit “consisting
of” certain components did exclude additional loci. Id. at *7. Appellant’s
claim 1, however, is distinguished by the fact that it is a method claim and,
therefore, the use of “comprising” in the preamble allows for additional
unrecited steps.
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method claim in Promega. Furthermore, “during examination proceedings,
claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
specification.” In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
We further agree with the Examiner that, even if claim 1 were
interpreted to exclude the use of acid in any step, Nahas discloses removing
lipids and cellular material without the use of acid. See Ans. 3–4. For
example, claim 29 of Nahas recites a method for preparing a processed
adipose tissue by decellularizing or extracting lipid from adipose, in which
the agent to promote decellularization comprises an agent selected from “a
weak acid, a weak organic acid, a non-ionic detergent, and a bile acid.”
Nahas 56 (emphasis added). Furthermore, claims 32 and 33 of Nahas
specifically recite use of a non-ionic detergent for decellularizing the
adipose or extracting lipid from the adipose. Id. at 57.
With regard to Appellant’s argument that Nahas fails to enable the
removal of lipids and cellular material without using an acid, we are
unpersuaded for multiple reasons. First, we agree with the Examiner that
Nahas discloses different detergent concentrations for serial washes and
discloses removal of lipids by treatment with 1% TRITON X-100 overnight
at 37º C. Ans. 4 (citing Nahas, 25:26–29, 44:4–5). Although these serial
washes are disclosed as following acid washes, the rejection here is for
obviousness, not anticipation. Therefore, the fact that the process in Nahas
differs from Appellant’s in this respect, does not distinguish claim 1 because,
even accepting Appellant’s non-enablement argument, Nahas is still prior art
for all that it teaches. Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“a non-enabling reference may qualify as prior art for
the purpose of determining obviousness under § 103”); see also Beckman
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Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(“[e]ven if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for all
that it teaches”). Here, we agree with the Examiner that Nahas’ disclosure
of concentrations, temperature, time, and repetitions of detergent treatments
would have provided ample direction for a person of ordinary skill in the art
to practice the invention without the use of an acid, especially because
Nahas discloses that the agent to promote decellularization can be an acid or
a detergent. See Ans. 4–5.
Second, we agree with the Examiner that the substitution of known
equivalents for the same purpose supports obviousness and Appellant has
not presented persuasive evidence or arguments as to why the disclosure
provided in Nahas would not enable one of skill to make or use the claimed
invention nor has Appellant presented any evidence of unexpected results
when detergent is used alone. Although Nahas does not include a specific
example of using only detergent for decellularization, a “specification need
not contain a working example if the invention is otherwise disclosed in
such a manner that one skilled in the art will be able to practice it without an
undue amount of experimentation.” In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908
(CCPA 1970). We find that Nahas includes sufficient disclosure in this
regard.
Appellant further contends that Nahas teaches away from a porous
sponge having a stable three-dimensional structure. Appeal Br. 13–14.
Specifically, Appellant asserts that Nahas is directed toward an injectable
composition and “limits steps to effect molding or supplemental crosslinking
of the graft, if any, to those performed post-implantation of its product into a
tissue.” Id. at 13. According to Appellant, Nahas “teaches steps to create a
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product with viscoelastic rheological properties but not steps to form the
stable three-dimensional structure” and “does not teach forming a porous
product, a sponge, or a product capable of acting as a manifold for
transmission of fluid.” Id. Appellant concedes that “Nahas does disclose a
pre-formed product in one sentence” but asserts that Nahas does not enable
this disclosure. Id. at 14 (citing Nahas, 36:14–15).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Nahas explicitly
teaches that the composition can be injected into a mold, the biomaterial
allowed to harden, and then the material can be implanted. Nahas, 36:14–
15. We agree with the Examiner that such “hardened implant would have a
stable three-dimensional structure.” Ans. 5. Appellant asserts that Nahas
does not enable this disclosure but provides no specific arguments or
evidence as to why this is the case. “[A] prior art printed publication cited
by an examiner is presumptively enabling barring any showing to the
contrary by a patent applicant or patentee.” In re Antor Media Corp., 689
F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, the Examiner had a reasonable
basis to find that Nahas provides an enabling disclosure of an implant that
has a three-dimensional structure. Appellant does not provide adequate
evidence or arguments that the Examiner’s reasoning is improper or
defective, and we find the Examiner is supported by the evidence of record.
With regard to porosity, we also agree with the Examiner that Nahas
specifically discloses that its matrix, when viewed by Scanning Electron
Microscopy (“SEM”) was found to be “porous in nature, facilitating cell
migration and nutrient diffusion.” Nahas, 48:11–12. Appellant argues that
it is unknown what Nahas means by the term “porous” and Nahas does not
enable “porous” nor does Nahas teach forming a sponge. Appeal Br. 19–20.
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However, as quoted above, Nahas discloses that the porosity “facilitat[es]
cell migration and nutrient diffusion” which undermines Appellant’s
argument that Nahas does not disclose “a product capable of acting as a
manifold for transmission of fluid.” Nahas, 48:11–12; Appeal Br. 13.
Furthermore, Appellant’s Specification does not explicitly define porous but
equates “porous” and “sponge-like” or “sponge” as synonymous terms. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 23 (“the extracellular matrix proteins can be further treated to
produce a three-dimensional porous, or sponge-like material.”); 25
(“resuspending the tissue in a solution to form a porous matrix or sponge.”).
Therefore, we do not agree with Appellant that Nahas teaches away from a
porous sponge having a three-dimensional structure and, in fact, find that
Nahas discloses such a structure as one embodiment. “The prior art’s mere
disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away
from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellant also asserts that the Examiner bases a prima facie
determination of obviousness on unsupported assumptions of the state of the
art, motivation to combine elements, and reasonable expectation of success.
Appeal Br. 14–20. Appellant contends that the Examiner’s Graham analysis
is insufficient because the scope and content of the prior art are not
determined and considered in their entirety. Id. at 14–17 (citing Graham v.
John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). Specifically, Appellant asserts that “Nahas
does not enable removal of lipid and cellular material in the absence of acid”
and “explicitly teaches steps to form an injectable porcine tissue product, not
a stable three dimensional structure.” Id. at 16–17. Appellant further
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contends that “Nahas does not disclose an enabling procedure for stabilizing
a sponge after freezing and drying by heating to produce a stable three-
dimensional structure.” Id. at 17. Furthermore, according to Appellant, one
of ordinary skill would not find motivation or other rationale to combine
elements of Nahas to exclude use of an acid when washing tissue to remove
lipids and treating the tissue to remove cellular material. Id. at 18–20.
Appellant’s arguments are similar to those discussed above and fail
for the same reasons as previously discussed. Furthermore, we are not
persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to
combine elements of Nahas to exclude the use of acid to remove cellular
tissue. As discussed supra, Nahas explicitly discloses using acid or
detergent for this step. Therefore, Nahas itself provides motivation to use
detergent in the washing steps disclosed therein.
For the reasons described herein and those already of record, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over Nahas. Claims 6, 10–13, and 57–59 are not
argued separately, and, therefore, fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Rejection of claims 1, 6, 9–13, and 56–59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Nahas and further in view of Hassingboe
The Examiner acknowledges that Nahas teaches heated cross-linking
but does not specifically teach heating in a vacuum or heating to 70º C to
120º C, as recited in claim 9, but finds that Hassingboe cures this deficiency.
Final Act. 5. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Hassingboe, which
teaches production of scaffolds for tissue repair and implants using
extracellular matrix materials obtained from mammals, teaches that such
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materials can be cross-linked by heat treating the material in a vacuum oven
at 120º C. Id. (citing Hassingboe ¶ 66). According to the Examiner,
Hassingboe discloses that heat treatment is preferred over chemical use and
heat treatment under a vacuum is more effective towards cross-linking than
heat treatment at ambient pressure. Id. (citing Hassingboe ¶¶ 43, 78).
The Examiner concludes:
The teachings of Nahas et al. and Hassingboe et al. are
each directed to biopolymer implants that are cross-linked. It
would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made to combine their
teachings by using the heat treatment method of Hassingboe et
al. to cross-link the tissue material of Nahas et al. as discussed
above, such that the tissue is heated to 120°C in a vacuum, which
would produce a stable three-dimensional structure as instantly
claimed, with a reasonable expectation of success.
Id. at 5–6. The Examiner also finds that, “[a] person of ordinary skill in the
art at the time the invention was made would have been motivated to
combine these teachings in order to cross-link the material while reducing
potentially harmful chemicals using a method more effective than heat
treatment at ambient pressure, as suggested by Hassingboe et al.” Id. at 6.
Appellant argues that combining Hassingboe with the teachings of
Nahas frustrates the purpose of Nahas. Appeal Br. 21. Specifically,
Appellant asserts that “Nahas teaches crosslinking by adding a polymerizing
agent prior to injection, then exposing the injected material to a cross-linking
activator, such as light, after injection” and “[c]rosslinking Nahas’ tissue
product prior to injection would change the viscoelastic properties of Nahas’
product making it too rigid for injection.” Id. (citing Nahas, 26:2–8).
Appellant concludes, “[c]onsequently, there would be no motivation or other
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reason for a skilled artisan to combine Nahas with Hassingboe because
Nahas teaches a viscoelastic product suitable for injection, which would be
impossible if cross-linked by heating as taught by Hassingboe.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner that, as discussed above, Nahas teaches that the composition can
be injected into a mold, the biomaterial allowed to harden, then the material
implanted, wherein such hardened implant would have a three-dimensional
structure. Ans. 8 (citing Nahas, 36:14–15). We further agree with the
Examiner that the heated cross-linking of Hassingboe, which would harden
the composition, “would occur after injection into a mold, and would occur
before implantation, and therefore the resulting combination would not be
too rigid for injection and would not require heating in a living subject.” Id.
For the reasons described herein and those already of record, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 9, and 56 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over Nahas and Hassingboe. Claims 6, 10–13,
and 57–59 are not argued separately, and, therefore, fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Rejection of claims 1, 6, 10–14, and 57–59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Nahas and further in view of Ksander
The Examiner’s findings with respect to Nahas are discussed supra.
The Examiner acknowledges that, although Nahas “teaches that the implant
can be formed into a desired shape for implantation, [Nahas] does not
specifically teach contacting the tissue with a flat surface and applying force
to compress the tissue to a thickness of about 2.0mm or less,” as recited in
claim 14. Final Act. 7. The Examiner finds that this deficiency is cured by
Ksander, which discloses collagen implants that are compressed to increase
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the tensile strength of the implant, including an example in which an implant
is compressed to a thickness of about 1 mm, which increases density and
tear resistance. Id. (citing Ksander 8:30–40).
The Examiner concludes that “[i]t would have been prima facie
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made
to combine their teachings by compressing the implants of Nahas et al. as
discussed above to a thickness of about 1 mm using a press as suggested by
Ksander et al., with a reasonable expectation of success.” Final Act. 7–8.
Appellant does not present any additional arguments regarding this
rejection. We, therefore, affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 1, 6, 10–14, and 57–59 for the reasons discussed above.

Rejection of claims 1, 6, 10–13, 15, 16, and 57–59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Nahas and further in view of Brown
The Examiner’s findings with respect to Nahas are discussed supra.
The Examiner acknowledges that, although Nahas:
teaches that the implant can be formed into a desired shape for
implantation, [Nahas] does not specifically teach processing the
tissue to form a drain or drain manifold in the form of a tube,
column, or sheet, further processing the tissue to add grooves,
channels, or holes; or processing the tissue to form thin strips
hav[ing] a thickness of up to about 2.0mm and rolling the thin
strips to form a drain in the shape of a hollow tube.
Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner finds that this deficiency is cured by Brown
which discloses scaffolds comprising extracellular matrix having these
limitations. Id. at 9 (citing Brown ¶¶ 23, 30, 262, 267, 271, 272, 274, 277–
280).
The Examiner concludes that:
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It would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made to combine their
teachings by forming the implant of Nahas et al. as discussed
above into 0.5 to 3 mm thick flat sheets which are cut into
rectangular strips and rolled into a tube, and wherein smaller
tubes are inserted inside larger tubes, all as suggested by Brown
et al., with a reasonable expectation of success.
Final Act. 9.
Appellant does not present any additional arguments regarding this
rejection. We, therefore, affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 1, 6, 10–13, 15, 16, and 57–59 for the reasons discussed above.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons described herein and those already of record, we
affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 6, 9–16, and 56–59.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 10–13,
57–59
103(a) Nahas 1, 6, 10–13,
57–59

1, 6, 9–13,
56–59
103(a) Nahas, Hassingboe 1, 6, 9–13,
56–59

1, 6, 10–14,
57–59
103(a) Nahas, Ksander 1, 6, 10–14,
57–59

1, 6, 10–13,
15, 16, 57–
59
103(a) Nahas, Brown 1, 6, 10–13,
15, 16, 57–
59

Overall
Outcome
1, 6, 9–16,
56–59

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED