Jerdine Y. Williams, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 20, 2009
0120081584 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 20, 2009)

0120081584

08-20-2009

Jerdine Y. Williams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Jerdine Y. Williams,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120081584

Agency No. 4H335010507

DECISION

On February 13, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

January 16, 2008 final decision concerning her equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events relevant to this complaint, complainant worked as

a Rural Carrier Associate at the agency's Valrico, Florida Post Office.

On January 25, 2007, complainant returned to work after using extended

leave for a foot and abdomen injury. Later that day, complainant asserts

that she re-injured her foot and abdomen. Further, complainant alleges

that she suffered stress and anxiety that day because the Valrico Post

Office was a difficult place to work.

Subsequently, on February 21, 2007, complainant declined a limited-duty

job offer to accommodate her injury. On February 26, 2007, complainant

requested and was granted 30 days off because of stress-induced

depression.

On April 25, 2007, complainant's doctor issued the agency a letter

clearing complainant to return to work. In the letter, the doctor stated

that it is "highly recommended that [complainant] be allowed to return

to work but at a different station if that could be accomplished."

The doctor further noted that complainant was highly "stressed out"

because she felt the Valrico Post Office was a difficult place to work.

Complainant was notified that she was scheduled to work on April 28, 2007.

Complainant failed to return to work as scheduled.

On May 4, 2007, complainant wrote a letter to the Officer-In-Charge

(OIC), requesting to work in another Post Office. On May 7, 2007,

complainant notified management officials that she was now living in

North Carolina and no longer had a residence in Florida. Further,

complainant told the management officials that she refused to return to

the Valrico Post Office.

On May 11, 2007, complainant was issued a Notice of Removal effective

June 29, 2007, for "Continued Unavailability for Work - AWOL."

On May 24, 2007, complainant's doctor wrote a letter stating that

complainant had become more stressed and depressed, and as a result,

was no longer cleared for work.

On July 25, 2007, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging

that she was discriminated against on the bases of disability (stress)

and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when on May 15, 2007,

she received a Notice of Removal.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant

did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged. Complainant now

appeals that decision to the Commission.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's

disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply

the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village

Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68

(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).

Complainant must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating

that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995). Here, we will

assume, without so finding, that complainant established her prima facie

cases of disability and reprisal discrimination.

We find that the agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for its actions. Specifically, complainant was issued the Notice of

Removal because she failed to report to work as scheduled, refused to

return to work, and moved out of state without notice to the agency.

Complainant must now establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretext for

discrimination. Besides complainant's bare assertions and subjective

beliefs, the record contains no evidence that would suggest that

discriminatory or retaliatory animus played a part in the agency's

actions. The record supports the agency's assertion that complainant

was issued the Letter of Removal because she failed to report to work

on her scheduled days, told her supervisor that she refused to return

to work, and moved to a different state without notifying management,

which clearly indicated an intent to not return to work. As a result,

we find that complainant failed to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were

pretext for discrimination.

Additionally, we note that complainant is also alleging that the agency

failed to reasonably accommodate her disability when it failed to reassign

her to another postal facility. Under the Commission's regulations, an

agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical

and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless

the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29

C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o) and (p). As a threshold matter, complainant must

establish that she is an "individual with a disability." An individual

with a disability is one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2)

has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such

an impairment. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With

Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Assuming, without so finding, that complainant established that she

is a qualified individual with a disability, we find that the record

supports the agency's assertion that complainant failed to provide

sufficient medical documentation to support the need for a reasonable

accommodation. The only medical documentation that complainant provided

was a doctor's letter dated April 25, 2007, which was vague and did not

include a prognosis, diagnosis, and complainant's specific limitations.

An agency is not required to provide an accommodation if an employee

refuses to provide the relevant medical documentation. See EEOC Guidance

on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (Reasonable Accommodation Guidance), EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (as revised, October 17, 2002), at question 6. Therefore,

we find that complainant failed to establish that the agency failed to

provide her with a reasonable accommodation.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision, because a preponderance of the evidence does not establish

that discrimination occurred as alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 20, 2009

Date

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0120081584

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120081584