01a61834
05-24-2006
Jennifer L. Torrance, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Jennifer L. Torrance v. United States Postal Service
01A61834
May 24, 2006
.
Jennifer L. Torrance,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A61834
Agency No. 4B-120-0020-05
Hearing No. 160-2005-00553X
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from the December 20,
2005 agency decision which implemented the December 16, 2005 decision
of the EEOC Administrative Judge finding no discrimination.
Complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against her on the
basis of sex (female) when,
effective March 3, 2005, she was terminated from her position as a
temporary relief carrier at the Peru, New York Post Office for failure
to keep the mail secure while in her possession.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of
the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ. The AJ
issued a decision without a hearing (summary judgment).
In his decision, the AJ concluded that the agency's termination of
complainant's employment was not due to a discriminatory intent but
was a result of complainant's own actions. Specifically, the AJ found
that complainant was terminated because she allowed an unauthorized
individual in her vehicle, thereby compromising security in violation
of Handbook PO-603. The AJ noted that the violation occurred although
complainant was previously instructed against violating the same rule.
The AJ noted also that the record did not identify any other employee
who was similarly situated who had engaged in the same conduct and was
not terminated.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
In a complaint which alleges disparate treatment and there is an absence
of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocations of burdens and
the order of presentation of proof is a three-step process. A claim
of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first
enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if
unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination,
i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse
employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency
must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). If the agency is successful in meeting its burden, complainant
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason
proffered by the agency was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.
However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
agency intentionally discriminated against complainant remains at all
times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether complainant has established a prima facie case, the prima
facie inquiry may be dispensed with when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. In such cases,
the inquiry shifts from whether complainant has established a prima
facie case and proceeds to the ultimate issue of whether complainant has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were
motivated by discrimination. See United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department
of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990).
A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a
factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293
(1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard
of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
On appeal, complainant contends that her decision to safeguard her and
the mail resulted in her termination. She noted that her car brakes
had failed and there was a blowing snowstorm. She stated that she
could not proceed and it was not safe to leave the car. She further
stated that she had her father drive her in his van so that she could
safeguard her and the mail and deliver the mail. She asserts that the
Standard Training Program for Rural Letter Carriers, Lesson 21 provides
that a carrier may encounter unusual situations that require judgment
and caution and that the incident that occurred was such a situation.
Complainant also reargues that the Postmaster, a female, who terminated
her was guilty of the same charges for which she was terminated but that
the Postmaster was treated differently.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant
of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the
relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to
complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that
any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus
toward complainant's protected classes.
The agency decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which
to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 24, 2006
__________________
Date