Jenkins Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 6, 1974

209 N.L.R.B. 439 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

JENKINS MANUFACTURING CO. 439
Jenkins Manufacturing Company and International
Molders and Allied Workers Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 10-CA-10028
March 6, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CIIAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
whether respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (Act),4 by
discharging an employee , Richard Nelson.
Upon the entire record ,5 upon my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor while testifying , and having
taken into account the arguments made and the able briefs
submitted ,6 I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT7
On October 31, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Alvin Lieberman issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter, counsel for the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings , findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and the same
hereby is, dismissed.
DECISION
SIAJEMENT OF THE CASE
ALVIN LIEBERMAN. Administrative Law Judge: The trial
in this proceeding, with all parties represented, was held
before me in Anniston, Alabama, on May I and June 26
and 27, 1973, upon the General Counsel's complaint and
amendment to complaint 1 dated, respectively, April 5 and
April 6, 1973,2 and Respondent's answer.3 The principal
issue raised by the pleadings and litigated at the trial was
i Hereinafter these pleadings will he referred tojointly as the complaint
2 The complaint was issued pursuant to a charge filed on March 2, 1973,
by International Molders and Allied Workers Union , AFL-CIO-CLC
i During the trial the answer was amended to admit par. 6 of the
complaint insofar as it alleges that Respondent discharged Richard Nelson
on February 27. 1973
4 In pertinent part these sections provide
Sec. 8(a) it shall be unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7,
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
Section 7, insofar as relevant, states
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, an Alabama corporation, is engaged at
Anniston, Alabama, in the manufacture and sale of
prehung doors and windows. During the past calendar
year, a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped
products valued at more than $50,000 directly to customers
located outside the state of Alabama. Accordingly, I find
that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdiction
over this matter by the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) is warranted. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB
81, 85.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Molders and Allied Workers Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC (Union) is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. INTRODUCTION
Briefly, this case is concerned with Respondent's
discharge of Richard Nelson, an employee who was a
staunch supporter of the Union, after an organizing
campaign mounted by the Union ended in the Union's loss
of a representation election . The General Counsel con-
tends8 that Nelson's dismissal was motivated by his
activity in support of the Union and, therefore, was
violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent maintains that Nelson was discharged
because he was physically unable to do his work. This
asserted ground for the termination of Nelson's employ-
ment is attacked by the General Counsel as being a pretext
to conceal its actual basis, Nelson' s union activism.
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join , or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
5 Issued simultaneously is a separate order correcting obvious inadvert-
ent errors in the stenographic transcript of this proceeding
6 Although all the arguments of the parties and the authorities cited by
them, whether appearing in their briefs or made orally at the teal, may not
be discussed in this Decision, each has been carefully weighed and
considered.
7 Respondent's motion made at the conclusion of the trial , upon which I
reserved decision, is disposed of in accordance with the findings and
conclusions set forth in this Decision
8 Although represented , the Union made no opening statement at the
trial nor did it submit a brief I assume, however, that its position is the
same as the General Counsel's
209 NLRB No. 83
440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS9
A. Respondent's Operations
As noted, Respondent makes doors and windows. In
assembling its windows Respondent employs crews con-
sisting of two and three men. In the latter case one of the
crew members is a leadman, whose wage rate during
February 1973 was 30 cents an hour greater than the other
two.
When three men work together two assemble the window
frame into which they insert the glazed sash. The
completed window is then turned over to the leadman, the
third member of the crew, who installs the weather
stripping and inspects the unit. After ascertaining that the
window is free from defects the leadman staples into the
finished product blocks and braces whose function is to
prevent the sash from moving while the window is in
storage or in transit to its purchaser. Upon completing the
foregoing operation the leadman lifts the window and
places it on a nearby dolly for movement into a storage
area. In the absence of a dolly the leadman carves the
window to the storage area, a distance of some 25 feet.
When the crew consists of two men, one assembles the
frame and inserts the sash. The second man performs the
same operation as does the leadman in a three-man crew.
Respondent manufactures windows of several sizes. The
smallest size weighs 28 pounds and the largest 70. Most of
the windows produced by Respondent fall within a weight
range of from 35 to 50 pounds.
B. The Prior Proceedings
1. The representation proceeding
On July 28, 1972, upon the Union's petition, a represent-
ation election was conducted among Respondent's em-
ployees at which the Union failed to receive a majority of
the votes cast. On August 1, 1972, the Union filed
objections to the election.
2. The unfair labor practice proceeding
On June 16 and July 12, 1972, the Union filed unfair
labor practice charges against Respondent . On September
11, 1972, a complaint issued on these charges in which it
was alleged that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3 ) of the Act.
3. The consolidated proceeding
Because Respondent's conduct alleged by the Union as
the basis for its objections to the representation election
was substantially similar to certain allegations contained in
the unfair labor practice complaint, the two proceedings
were consolidated. The consolidated proceeding was heard
by an Administrative Law Judge on November 14 and 15,
' The purpose of these findings is to furnish a frame of reference within
which to consider the facts relating to Respondent's alleged unfair labor
practices and the conclusions to which they may give rise To the extent that
the contentions of the parties relate specifically to the findings made here
they will be treated here, although they as well as the findings, may again be
considered in other contexts
10 The second election directed by the Board in Jenkins 1 had not yet
1972. At this hearing Richard Nelson, whose discharge on
February 27, 1973, is alleged in the instant complaint as
having been violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act,
appeared as a witness for the General Counsel.
On June 21, 1973, the Board issued its decision in the
consolidated proceeding finding that Respondent had
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and sustaining
some of the Union's objections to the representation
election. Accordingly, the Board ordered Respondent to
refrain from its unfair labor practices and to take
appropriate affirmative action to effectuate the policies of
the Act. In addition, the Board set aside the election
conducted on July 28, 1972, and directed that a new
representation election be held. Jenkins Manufacturing
Company, 204 NLRB No. 53 (Jenkins 1).10
C. Nelson's Union Activity
As found in Jenkins 1, the Union began its campaign to
organize Respondent's employees in May 1972. Toward
the end of that month the Union informed Respondent
that Richard Nelson, the subject of this proceeding, and
two other employees constituted its "In-Plant Organizing
Committee." The Board also found in Jenkins I that
Nelson "was one of the first and foremost adherents of the
Union."
As a member of the Union's organizing committee
Nelson, as he testified, "wore the Union button [and]
represented the union the whole time before the election."
In addition to his organizing committee membership,
Nelson was an observer for the Union at the representation
election conducted on July 28, 1972. Notwithstanding this,
Nelson told Clare Draper, Respondent's vice president, as
the latter stated, that "[before he voted] he had had a
change of mind [and] voted for the Company and .. .
against the Union."
Nelson continued to wear a union button until 2 or 3
months before his discharge on February 27, 1973, but,
apparently, did nothing else to further the Union's cause
after the election." Nor does there appear to have been a
continuation of union activity in Respondent's plant since
the election. As the General Counsel conceded at the trial,
during the period between the election in July 1972 and
February 27, 1973, the date of Nelson's discharge "union
activity was in a state of limbo."
Finally, in this regard, the record does not disclose any
independent coercive conduct by Respondent since the
election which might account for the discontinuance of
union activity by Nelson and its other employees.
D. Nelson's Physical Condition i2
On January 9, 1973,13 while employed in Respondent's
door department, Richard Nelson visited the office of a
physician to be treated for an enlarged prostate gland.
Medication was prescribed and the physician advised
been conducted at the time of the instant trial
11 Nelson's appearance as a witness for the General Counsel in the
consolidated proceeding discussed in the previous section of this Decision
has already been noted.
i2 These findings are made in view of Respondent 's assertion that
Nelson was discharged because he was physically unable to do his work
1i All dates hereinafter mentioned without stating a year fall within 1973
JENKINS MANUFACTURING CO.
Nelson "to go home and take it easy for a while." His
physician also informed Nelson that "an enlarged prostate
gland didn't heal ... just all of a sudden [and that the
healing process] would take a few days."
Nelson stayed home for the next 2 days. Upon his return
to work on January 12 Nelson presented Walter Lindsey,
his then supervisor, with a note from his physician stating
that on January 9 Nelson "was ill and in [his ] office for
treatment." 14 Nelson also told Lindsey what his physician
had said about his "tak[ing] it easy" and about the length
of time recovery would consume
Nelson received further treatment from his physician on
January 16. At that time the physician stated to Nelson
that his condition was "improving," advised Nelson to
continue "taking it easy." and suggested that Nelson
"come back to see [him in ] about ten days."
On January 26 Nelson paid his final visit to his
physician. At that time, after examination , the physician
"dismissed" Nelson, but told him to return "if [he] got to
having any more problems."
Nelson's prostate gland "problems" returned during the
following month. Thus, in about mid-February, while
Nelson was working in Respondent's window depart-
ment,15 he "got to hurting so bad in [the lower part of his
stomach that he] felt like [he] was going to faint." A
similar situation developed on February 27, the day Nelson
was discharged.16
V. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts Concerning Respondent's Alleged
Violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
Richard Nelson was originally employed by Respondent
in 1967. He was dismissed in June 1969 for refusing to
follow instructions given him by his supervisor. Some 10
days later Nelson was rehired. He continued in Respon-
dent's employ until his discharge on February 27, 1973,
under circumstances alleged in the complaint as having
been violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Shortly after his rehire in June 1969 Nelson was assigned
to Respondent's door department. In February 1972 he
was promoted to leadman and received a $10 a week wage
increase.
14 Resp Exh 3
11 Nelson's transfer from the door department to the window depart-
ment will be discussed below
16 My findings concerning Nelson's physical condition are based on, and
the unattributed quotations appearing in the text are taken from , testimony
given by Nelson
17 There is some dispute as to the date of Nelson 's transfer Nelson
testified that it occurred on February 15 However, Nelson's testimony as to
this appears to be contrary to the weight of the other evidence on the point
Thus, Mack Smith , an assistant foreman and Nelson's supervisor in the
window department , stated that Nelson came into that department "around
the first or second week of February" and worked there for "approximately
a month " Lowell Owens, who appears to be Respondent 's chief foreman,
related that Respondent 's records showed that Nelson was transferred on
February 1. Although the records referred to by Owens were not introduced
into evidence. Owens' and Smith's testimony as to the date of Nelson's
transfer is corroborated by two wntten warnings (Resp Exhs I and 2)
received by Nelson while he was in the window department . Resp . Exh I is
dated "2-6-73" and shows that Nelson was then working in the window
department Resp Exh 2 is dated "2-9-73" and also shows that Nelson was
then working in the window department . Although Nelson testified that
both Resp Exh I and Resp. Exh 2 were given to him on February 22 and
441
On January 30, 1973, Nelson was asked to work
overtime. Upon his refusal to do so he was given an oral
warning.
On about February 1, 1973, Nelson was transferred to
Respondent's window department to occupy the position
of leadman.17 Upon Nelson's transfer another employee
was given the job Nelson had in the door department.
Before Nelson was shifted to the window department the
leadman's work there was performed by Mack Smith, an
assistant foreman . Smith also had to oversee the employees
in the window department as well as employees in other
sections of Respondent's plant. To relieve Smith of his
leadman work, thereby permitting him to perform his
supervisory duties more efficiently, Nelson was put into the
leadman position in the window department.
Although he was the leadman, Nelson 's first assignment
in the window department was the building of frames, a
function not ordinarily performed by a leadman.18 "The
reason for this," as Smith explained, was "that if [Nelson]
built a good many [window] units, he could know the sizes
real well and what material would pass and what wouldn't
pass [and learn] how [the windows] should be put
together" The knowledge thus acquired, Smith continued,
would enable Nelson to "do a better job on inspection."
On February 6 Nelson was again asked to work overtime
and again refused to do so.19 For this he was given a
written warning.
Continuing his program of teaching Nelson to perform
the functions of a leadman, on February 8 Smith, Nelson's
supervisor, told Nelson, who was then building window
frames, that when he got "enough [frames ] up" to move to
another position and there insert sash in completed frames,
inspect the windows, and then staple on the blocks. Nelson
refused to do this, telling Smith that he "was already
behind over here on frames now" and that there was "no
way [for him to] build frames and get over there and shoot
blocks too." 20
Smith reported Nelson's refusal to follow his instruction
to Lowell Owens , Respondent's chief foreman, who,
together with another supervisor, discussed the matter with
Nelson and Smith on February 8 and 9. After hearing
Smith and Nelson, Owens told Nelson as the former
testified, "to go back on the job and follow [Smith's]
23, his testimony concerning this is believed by what he, himself , wrote on
Resp. Exh. 1. On that document, under the heading "EMPLOYEE'S
REMARKS RE- VIOLATION," appears a version of the incident giving
rise to the issuance of the warning wntten and signed by Nelson. as he
admitted Alongside Nelson's signature on Resp. Exh. I is a date "2-8-73."
Nelson testified that he did not remember writing that date and that he did
not "think" the date is in his handwriting I have carefully compared the
date with what Nelson admitted he wrote. Based on this comparison it is my
belief that the date was also written by Nelson . Accordingly , it is my
conclusion , upon consideration of all the evidence bearing on the subject,
that Nelson was transferred to the window department on or about
February 1, 1973.
is The work of a leadman in the window department, as I have found,
consists of installing weather stripping, inspecting the window , stapling
blocks and braces into the unit , and, finally, lifting and placing the
completed window on a dolly or carrying it to a storage area.
19 As I have already recounted, Nelson 's previous refusal to work
overtime occurred on January 30.
20 The findings in this paragraph are based upon testimony given by
Nelson, from which the quotations appearing in the text are taken, and by
Smith
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
instructions." In addition, a second written warning was
issued to Nelson.
During the foregoing discussion Nelson told Owens, as
related by Nelson, that he and Smith "ain't getting along so
good" and asked for a transfer. Owens suggested that
Nelson put his request in writing so that he would not
forget about it.
Because Smith expected that Nelson would be trans-
ferred pursuant to his request and not being willing, under
the circumstances, to invest the time and effort involved in
training Nelson to perform the work of a leadman, Smith
permitted Nelson, following their February 9 conference
with Owens, to resume building window frames. This
situation continued through February 26.
In the meanwhile two events occurred. One resulted in
the resumption of Nelson's training to do a leadman's
work. The other resulted in Nelson's receiving an addition-
al written warning.
Regarding the latter, on February 23, during working
time , Nelson signed a petition to have a racing car driver
participate in a certain automobile race. Also during
working time on that day, Nelson asked Smith, his
supervisor, to sign the petition. It being against Respon-
dent's rules for employees to sign, or solicit signatures to,
petitions while they were supposed to be working, Nelson
was given a third written warning.
Concerning the former, on or about February 20, Owens,
Respondent's chief foreman, informed Smith that Nelson
would not be transferred out of the window department
because there was no available job for him elsewhere in the
plant. Accordingly, Smith took advantage of his first
opportunity to resume training Nelson to do the work of a
leadman. This arose during the morning of February 27.
This time Nelson did not resist, as he had earlier done.
However, the straining involved in lifting the completed
windows apparently aggravated his prostate condition and
caused him to suffer pain. Because of this, at or about
10:15 a.m., after doing the work for approximately 45
minutes , Nelson informed Smith that he was unable to
continue. Smith reported this to Owens, who directed
Nelson to accompany him to the office of Clare Draper,
Respondent's vice president.
There Nelson told Draper that he had an enlarged
prostate gland for which he was being treated by a
physician, Dr. Harper; that lifting the windows caused him
pain; and that for this reason he was unable to do that kind
of work. Upon hearing this Draper sent Nelson and Owens
out of his office and tried to reach Dr. Harper on the
telephone. Being unsuccessful, Draper directed Owens to
permit Nelson to resume building window frames.
At or about 2:45 p.m. Draper was able to speak to Dr.
Hamer. Draper described to him the kind of work Nelson
had been doing earlier that day; informed him of the
weight of the windows Nelson was required to lift; and
asked him whether, in view of Nelson's physical condition,
Nelson could do that work. Dr. Harper replied that based
21 It will be remembered , in this connection, that Nelson was last
examined by Dr. Harper on January 26
22 N L R B v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc, 293 F 2d 300,
308 (C A. 5, 1961)
upon his last examination of Nelson he saw no reason why
Nelson could not do the work.2i
After talking to Dr. Harper, Draper sent for Nelson and
told him what his physician had said about his being able
to lift the windows. Nelson answered, as he testified, "if the
doctor says I'm able to do it, I'll go back and do it, but it
does hurt me." Nelson having stated that he would do the
work despite the pain it caused, Draper instructed Owens,
Respondent's chief foreman, to "put him on the job."
After Nelson left his office Draper, Respondent's vice
president, began having second thoughts about permitting
Nelson to lift the windows. As Draper testified, he "started
worrying about the liability, the fact that [he] was sending
a man out to do a job when he said he was hurting, even
though the doctor said he was okay. [He] was afraid it
might aggravate it [and that he] might be faced with a
workmen's comp and liability suit."
Draper also thought about Nelson's having twice refused
to work overtime and his having refused to comply with his
supervisor's instructions. This, as Draper stated, "was a
sort of horns of dilemma thing." However, Draper decided,
as he further related that he "couldn't keep [Nelson] in the
plant" if he was "hurting" as he said he was even though
Nelson had stated he would do the work despite the pain.
Accordingly, Draper again sent for Nelson and asked
him whether he was still in pain. Receiving an affirmative
reply, Draper told Nelson, as the latter testified, that
because he was "hurting [Respondent had] no right [to let
him] work" and that Respondent was going to "have to let
[him] go." Nelson's employment with Respondent was
then terminated.
B. Contentions and Concluding Findings Concerning
Respondent's Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act
Although guiding principles are not in doubt, "Section
8(a)(3) cases are difficult cases," 22 and the instant one is no
exception to this rule. Almost always present in such cases,
and present here also, are problems of motive and pretext.
"Absent an unlawful motive an employer's judgment in
discharging an employee . . . cannot be questioned." 23
Nor does an employee gain immunity "from discharge
simply because [, like Richard Nelson, here,] he is a union
member or adherent." N.L.R.B. v. Florida Steel Corpora-
tion, etc. 308 F.2d 931, 935 (C.A. 5, 1962).
Respondent argues that Nelson's discharge was not
motivated by a purpose interdicted by the Act. Nelson was
dismissed, Respondent contends, not because of his union
membership or past union activity, but because he was, in
its judgment, physically unable to do the work required of
a leadman in the window department, in which position he
was needed in order to relieve Mack Smith, the supervisor
there, of that rank-and-file work function. Respondent's
position appears to be well taken.
Unlike the explanation for a discharge offered by an
employer in another case,24 which "fail[ed] to stand under
scrutiny," the reason given by respondent for discharging
23 Vermeer Manufacturing Company, 187 NLRB 888, 891
24 N L. R B v Dam, Thomas W., d/b/a Dant & Russell, Ltd, 207 F.2d
165,167 (C A. 9).
JENKINS MANUFACTURING CO.
Nelson is supported by the evidence. Thus, Nelson
informed Clare Draper, Respondent's vice president, that
lifting and carrying the windows, an integral part of the job
of a leadman, caused him pain and made him unable to do
that work. Although despite the pain it caused, Nelson
agreed to resume lifting and carrying the windows upon
being informed of his physician's opinion that he was able
to do so, Respondent was unwilling to permit him to
continue doing the work because of the possible liability it
might incur should he in that manner aggravate his existing
prostate condition.
Seemingly, then, Respondent had sufficient cause to
discharge Nelson. But this does not end the inquiry. There
remains for consideration the General Counsel's argument
that Respondent seized upon Nelson's physical inability to
perform his work as a pretext to rid itself of an employee
because he was a union member and had supported the
Union during its campaign for recognition. Of course, had
Respondent done so it would have violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
However, I am not impressed with the General Counsel's
contention that that was the situation here. In the first
place, union activity in Respondent's plant and Nelson's
participation therein had been discontinued long before
Nelson's dismissal . Indeed, the General Counsel conceded
that during the period between the representation election
conducted in July 1972 and February 27, 1973, the date of
Nelson's discharge, "union activity was in a state of
limbo." And its moribund status was not the result of
unfair labor practices committed by Respondent.
Secondly, had Respondent been looking for a pretext to
terminate Nelson's employment because he had supported
the Union it could have found one before his discharge on
February 27. Thus, Respondent could have discharged
Nelson on January 30 when he refused to work overtime. It
could have discharged him on February 6 when he again
refused to work overtime. It could have discharged him on
February 8 when he refused to follow his supervisor's
25 In Vermeer as here, there was a dearth of union activity before the
discharge there under consideration . Furthermore , in Vermeer, several
opportunities arose before the date of the discharge which could have been,
but, as in the instant case, were not , availed of by the employer as "an
excuse . to remove [the discharges ] from its plant because he was an
adherent of the Union " A like situation was present in American
Manufacturing There the Board said "Respondent's forbearance in
discharging [the employee, whose union adherence and activism was known
to the employer for more than a year] until he disregarded . warnings [to
443
instructions. It could have discharged him on February 23
when, contrary to Respondent' s rules, he signed, and
solicited his supervisor's signature to, a petition during
working hours. However, instead of discharging Nelson on
any of these occasions Respondent merely issued warnings
to him, none of which is alleged in the complaint as being
an unfair labor practice.
In American Manufacturing Company, 196 NLRB 875,
and in Vermeer Manufacturing Company, 187 NLRB 888,
892, pretext contentions made under very similar circum-
stances were rejected.25 For the same reasons I reject it
here.
Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel has
not shown that the termination of Nelson's employment
was violative of Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act. I shall,
therefore, recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) or (1) by discharging
Richard Nelson on February 27, 1973.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant
to Section 10(c) of the Act, I recommend that the Board
issue the following:
ORDER26
It is ordered that the complaint be, and the same hereby
is, dismissed.
refrain from excessive talking and wandering away from his machine]
hardly indicates that it was [his] union activity that caused his discharge "
zs In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 .46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, recommendations, and recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.