Jenkins Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 21, 1973

204 N.L.R.B. 335 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

JENKINS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 335
Jenkins Manufacturing Company and International
Molders & Allied Workers Union , AFL-CIO-CLC,
Local 324. Cases 10-CA-9638, 10-CA-9670, and
10-RC-9211
June 21, 1973
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
tive Law Judge at one point in his Decision, that Owens' threat of elimination
of the Company's profit-sharing plan was made to employee Ramsey The
Administrative Law Judge found elsewhere, correctly, that this statement
was made to Waggoner The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility
findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established
policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect
to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc,
91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 27, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Robert Cohn issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order in Cases 10-CA-9683
and 9670, and to direct a second election in Case
10-RC-9211.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Jenkins Manufacturing
Company, Anniston, Alabama, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleged violations of the Act not
found herein.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the election conducted in
Case 10-RC-9211 among employees in the designat-
ed unit of Jenkins Manufacturing Company, be, and
it hereby is, set aside, and a new election be held. That
case is hereby remanded to the Regional Director for
Region 10 for the purpose of conducting a new elec-
tion at such time as he deems that circumstances per-
mit the free choice of a bargaining representative.
[Direction of second election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
'In the absence of exceptions, the Board herey pro forma adopts the
Admuustrative Law Judge's dismissal of certain 8(ax1) and (3}allegations.
2 The Board hereby corrects the inadvertent statement of the Administra-
ROBERT COHN, Administrative Law Judge: This consoli-
dated proceeding, held pursuant to Section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act),
was heard at Anniston, Alabama, on November 14 and 15,
1972,' pursuant to due notice. The consolidated complaint,
issued September 11, by the Regional Director for Region
10, alleges, in substance, that Jenkins Manufacturing Com-
pany (herein the Employer, Respondent, or Company) vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act through acts and
conduct of its agents and supervisors more fully detailed
hereinafter.2
By its duly filed answer, the Respondent admitted the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and also admitted
that certain named personnel were supervisors within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act; however, it denied the
commission of any unfair labor practice.
At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the General
Counsel were permitted to amend the complaint to allege
one additional incident of alleged violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. At the close of the hearing, opportunity
was afforded counsel to argue orally on the record or to file
written briefs. Oral argument was waived; however, helpful
posthearing briefs have been received from counsel for the
General Counsel and from counsel for the Respondent,
which have been duly considered.'
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observa-
tion of the demeanor of the witnesses,4 I make the follow-
' All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1972, unless otherwise
specified
2 The charges giving rise to the complaint were filed by International
Molders and Allied Workers Union , AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 324 (herein the
Union ), on June 16 (in Case 10-CA-9638), and on July 10 (in Case 10-
CA-9670) The representation case (10-RC-9211), involving objections to an
election alleging wrongful and unlawful conduct substantially similar to that
alleged in certain allegations of the complaint herein, was consolidated into
the proceedings by order of the Regional Director dated September 27, which
was adopted by the National Labor Relations Board by an order dated
October 17
3 In their brief , counsel for the General Counsel moved to correct the
transcript of proceedings (p 74) from 112 108 to 112.118 No objection
having been filed, and the proposed correction being in accordance with the
recollection of the Administrative Law Judge , the motion is granted
4 The making of many findings on the issues in this case involves the
resolving of credibility of witnesses who gave conflicting testimony This
delicate and difficult task of a fact finder was certainly not rendered less so
in the instant proceeding In making my resolutions it should be noted that
the failure to detail all conflicts in the evidence does not mean that such
conflicting evidence was not considered (Bishop and Malco, Inc, d/b/a
Walker's, 159 NLRB 1159, 1161) Also, where , as here , there is considerable
conflict of testimony , it is well to keep in mind the oft-quoted observation
204 NLRB No. 53
336
ing:
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material, an
Alabama corporation with an office and place of business
in Anniston, Alabama, where it is engaged in the manufac-
ture and sale of prehung doors and windows. During the
past calendar year, which period is representative of all
times material , Respondent manufactured and distributed
its products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to custom-
ers located outside the State of Alabama.
Based upon the foregoing facts, which are admitted by
the Respondent, I find that Respondent is, and has been at
all times material , engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges , the answer admits, and I find that
the Union is, and has been at all times material, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
There is no evidence of prior history of collective bargain-
ing at the Respondent 's plant . In May , an organizational
campaign was conducted by the Union which resulted in a
petition for an election being filed by the Union with the
Board on May 31.5 Pursuant to a stipulation for certifica-
tion upon consent election approved by the Regional Direc-
tor on June 27, an election by secret ballot was conducted
on July 28 among the Company's production and mainte-
nance employees. The tally of ballots showed that of ap-
proximately 75 eligible voters, 28 cast valid votes for, and
35 cast valid votes against, the Union; 8 cast challenged
ballots; and there were no void ballots. The challenges were
sufficient in number to affect the results of the election. On
August 1, 1972, the Union filed timely objections to the
election which were investigated by the Regional Director.
Some of the conduct alleged as objectionable therein was
also alleged as unlawful in the complaint herein, and, there-
fore, the Regional Director, in directing a hearing on those
allegations, consolidated the representation matter with the
complaint case.
It is generally acknowledged that the Respondent vigor-
ously opposed the Union's attempt to become the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the Company's employees,
and the evidence discloses that during the preelection peri-
od the Company's officers and supervisors compaigned
of Judge Learned Hand in N L R B v Universal Camera Corporation, 179
F 2d 749 (C A 2, 1950), " it is no reason for refusing to accept everything that
a witness says because you do not believe all of it ; nothing is more common
in all kinds of Judicial decisions than to believe some and not all ." See also
Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 113 NLRB 1122
5 Case 10-RC-9211
against the Union. However, as previously noted, the Com-
pany denies that it committed any unfair labor practices by
its conduct. On the other hand, the complaint alleges that
by discharging two employees during the preelection peri-
od, and by engaging in other acts of interference, restraint,
and coercion of the employees' rights protected by Section
7 of the Act, Respondent overstepped the bounds of legiti-
mate conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act. We now proceed to a consideration of the evidence
adduced in support of such contention.
B. The Termination of Charles Parker
Parker had worked for the Company on three different
occasions commencing in 1966 and terminating on or about
May 29, the last period of employment running from No-
vember 1971 until his termination .6 The issue on this aspect
of the case is whether Parker was discharged because of his
union activities as contended by the General Counsel, or
whether he quit or was dismissed by the Respondent for
failure to call in during his admitted absence from work for
the 3 days commencing Monday, May 29, as contended by
the Company.'
Parker was the instigator of the union movement in the
plant. In about mid-May he contacted the union representa-
tive and secured from him a number of union authorization
cards which he in turn solicited among some of the other
employees of the Company. Among such other employees
so solicited by Parker were Bobby Key 8 (brother of Basil
Key) and Charles Bryant, an assistant foreman. On the
morning of Friday, May 26, a discussion ensued between
Parker and Owens concerning Parker's union activities.
However, there is substantial variance in the testimony as
to (1) how the conversation started, and (2) the contents
thereof.
Parker testified that at approximately 8 a.m. (work started
at 7:30 a.m.), Owens came by his work station and told him
to go into the lunchroom where they could talk. They were
met there by Henry Hensley who shared superintendent
responsibilities with Owens. There, Owens accused Parker
of soliciting employees to sign union cards, of which Parker
denied knowledge. Owens stated that he had "some boys in
the plant" who would confirm Owen's accusations; Parker
responded that they were liars. Whereupon, Owens directed
Hensley to stay with Parker while he rounded up "them
boys"; shortly thereafter, Owens returned with Basil Key,
Bobby Key, Charles Bryant, Wesley Higgins, Mack Smith,
and Odell Maxwell.9
According to Parker's testimony, Owens again asked him
if he had solicited any of these men to sign union cards.
When Parker said "no," Owens looked over to Billy Key
and asked him whether Parker had solicited him to sign a
union card and Key said "yes." Owens followed the same
procedure with respect to Charles Bryant, and when Parker
6 The record reflects that he had left the Company on the two previous
occasions by quitting his employment.
7 During the last period of his employment, Parker worked in the exterior
door department under Assistant Foreman Basil Key The superintendent
over this department was Lowell Owens
8 Sometimes referred to in the record as Billy Key
9 All of the named persgnnel were supervisors except for Bobby Key, an
employee
JENKINS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
denied Bryant' s statement , Owens apparently became in-
censed and using profanity, stated that Jenkins would shut
the plant down if the Union came in.10 Owens then told
Parker that he hated to fire the latter because of his wife and
kids and that since he (Parker) had been wanting to change
jobs, Owens would allow him to choose any job he wanted
in the plant. Owens asked Hensley whether the latter could
use Parker "in the back (of the plant)." Hensley responded
that he could give him a job if Parker would "straighten up
and come on back there and quit what he's doing-that [he
would] make him a leadman." 1I Parker admitted that he
would like a change of jobs, but that it was Owens' responsi-
bility to assign work.12 The meeting terminated after Owens
asked each of the men whom he had brought in how they
felt about the Union. Each, in his own manner, either down-
graded the Union or stated that he was uninformed about
it.
Owens' version of the conversation is that it was instigat-
ed by Parker who approached him with a request to change
jobs. Parker claimed that his job involved work that was too
heavy for him to do. Owens responded that he had some
reports from Basil Key that Parker was not staying on the
job as he should. This was denied by Parker.13 Owens con-
tinued, stating that he had reports that Parker was talking
too much and disturbing employees in their work, which
Parker also denied and "dared" Owens to produce the per-
sons who made such claims. Whereupon, Owens called in
Assistant Foremen Smith, Key, Maxwell, Bryant, and Billy
Key and commenced asking the men, starting with Charles
Bryant, to describe the activities in which Parker had been
engaged . Bryant stated that Parker had tried to get him to
sign a union card while they were on the shipping dock.t4
Billy Key, according to Owens, also claimed that Parker had
been in his working area that morning trying to get him to
sign a card. Parker denied any recollection of such conduct.
Whereupon, according to Owens, the meeting disbanded
after having been in session only a matter of some 45 min-
utes.15
10 Odell Maxwell, a witness for the General Counsel, confirmed that during
the conversation , Owens threatened Parker with the statement that "if he
(Owens) knowed (sic) he (Parker) had anything to do with the Union, he
would run him out of there so quick he wouldn't know where the yellow
went ." These threats are alleged in the complaint to constitute a violation of
Sec 8(a)(l) of the Act. I so find
11 Testimony of Parker
17 Maxwell testified that Parker told Owens that he did not want to "take
a job away from another man and get that man mad at him "
The foregoing promise of benefit in return for abstention of union activi-
ties is alleged in the complaint to constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. I so find
13 Basil Key, a witness for the Respondent , was not interrogated on this
point.
14 Owens claimed that it was at this point that he (Owens ) first acquired
knowledge of any union activities in the plant , or that Parker had been
engaged in solicitation on behalf of the Union Owens claimed that he only
had been advised that Parker was soliciting names on a yellow pad for some
purpose unknown to him (Owens) I find this assertion of Owens-that the
reports of Bryant and others to him did not include the information that such
solicitation related to the Union-patently incredible, and one of the reasons
for discrediting Owens as a witness Bryant was not called as a witness; Billy
Key was subpenaed by the General Counsel , but did not appear at the
hearing (See G C Exh. 6).
15 Factors, in addition to the ones above mentioned , which impel me to
credit Parker's rather than Owens' version of the May 26 event, are. (I) it
seems more probable that the conversation was initiated by Owens, as Parker
testified, since it is doubtful that Owens would have waited until the middle
337
Parker did not report for work the following Monday,
May 29. He explained that over the weekend he looked for
his son's ex-wife for whom he (Parker) had signed an ap-
pearance bond in court, and that this search continued into
Monday. He testified, however, that he called the plant on
three occasions during that day to report the fact of his
absence. The first such occasion was at approximately 7:25
a.m., when he spoke with Kenneth Leahey, the shipping
foreman, and asked whether Owens or Hensley was there.
When Leahey said, "no, neither one of them," Parker told
Leahey to relay the message that he would not be at work
that day.16 The second time that Parker asserted he tele-
phoned the plant was at approximately 9:30 a.m. when he
saw one of his sons near the plant. 17 The son stated that
there was a rumor in the plant that Parker had been dis-
charged. Being concerned, Parker called the plant again and
spoke with an office clerk, Tommy Headrick. Parker asked
to speak with Owens but was told that the latter was not
present at the plant.18 Parker testified that he called the
plant for a third time about 3:30 a.m. and at that time spoke
with Owens as follows:
I asked him, "Lowell, I heard I had been fired," and
he said, "no, Parker, you have quit because you didn't
call in this morning," and I said, "I called Mr. Head-
rick-I mean Leahey-and told him to tell you that I
couldn't be there today," and he said, "I have not been
advised of that, and as far as I'm concerned, you quit."
I said, "well, Lowell, I need to work, and I have not
quit. I had to be off." And then I explained to him why
I had to be off.
Parker did not thereafter contact the plant until the fol-
lowing Monday when he came to the plant to pick up his
last check.
On Parker's termination record dated May 31, the follow-
ing appears:
Charles Parker has been absent 3 days and he has not
reported off from work. He was absent 5-29-72 and
5-30-72 and 5-31-72. He has quit.
/s/ Lowell Owens
As previously indicated, Respondent's officials and su-
of the meeting before broaching the matter of Parker's solicitation of other
employees, (2) it strains credulity that Owens did not, as he testified, disci-
pline or even threaten to discipline Parker for engaging in such conduct
during working hours although the Respondent had a rule-promulgated by
Owens himself on March 13, 1969-which prohibited employees from car-
rying on "personnel business in the plant during working time" (Resp Exh
10), nor did Owens warn or threaten Parker with disciplinary action for
allegedly being away from his job or bothering other employees while at
work ; and (3 ) the failure of Respondent to call as witnesses Assistant Fore-
men Higgins and Bryant , plus the failure to interrogate Assistant Foremen
Basil Key and Mack Smith concerning the meeting (See International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of Ameri-
ca (UAW) v NLRB (Gyrodyne Co), 459 F.2d 1329 (C A D C, 1972), see
also Monahan Ford Corporation of Flushing, 173 NLRB 204, 208, and cases
cited.
16 Leahey denied that Parker called in that morning
17 The son was an employee of Respondent, and was away from the plant
during a break
18 Headrick was not called as a witness, the Company contending that he
no longer worked there and could not be located A document was entered
into the record which purported to show that after Parker's termination, the
vice president of the Company sought to ascertain whether Parker had in fact
called into the plant that day and that Headrick had answered "no." Howev-
er the document, being obviously hearsay, is given little or no probative
value
338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pervisors deny that Parker called into the plant on May 29
or at any time thereafter. Basil Key testified that when he
noted that Parker was not present on the morning of May
29 he reported that fact to Henry Hensley and to the ship-
ping clerk, Kenneth Leahey. Although they supplied Key
with a replacement for Parker, Key nevertheless took upon
himself to go by Parker's house during the noon hour to
ascertain why he was absent.19 Key further testified that
Mrs. Parker invited him in and he found Parker in a chair
in the living room asleep; that Parker awoke and said that
he would be right in. However, Key, being under the im-
pression that Parker had been drinking , suggested that Par-
ker come in the next morning. When Key returned to the
plant , he reported the fact to Lowell Owens (who had been
absent from the plant that morning but returned in the
afternoon). A few days later, Key was advised that Parker
"wouldn't be with us anymore, as to how and why, I don't
know." 20
On May 29, the Union sent the following letter to the
Company:
Mr. Lowell Owens
Plant Mgr.
Jenkins Manufacturing Co.
315 West 17th Street
Anniston, Alabama 362,01
Dear Sir:
The following employees of Jenkins Manufacturing
Company, who are interested in having the Interna-
tional Molders & Allied Workers Union; AFL-CIO,
represent them have volunteered to act as an In-Plant
Organizing Committee and are active in the campaign
to organize the Jenkins Manufacturing Company in
Anniston, Alabama.
Charles Parker
Richard Nelson
Charles Reichel
These employees do not expect to receive treatment
different from other employees. We do not, however,
expect the Company or its agents to violate any of the
provisions of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act with respect to this committee or other union sup-
porters who may be wearing badges or otherwise cam-
paigning in a legal manner for the Union. "Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, employees have
the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
Labor Organizations , to,bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities."
19 Key acknowledged that he never checked upon an employee 's absence
before, but that he had been an assistant foremen for only 13 days. He
explained that the Company's "orders were large, and we needed really more
het."
Testimony of Key.
A copy of this letter is being mailed to the National
Labor Relations Board in Atlanta, Georgia, for their
files.
cc: Walter C. Phillips Very truly yours,
Gerald T. Parks
Spec. Rep.
Clare Draper, vice president of the Company, testified
that he recieved the letter on Tuesday or Wednesday, May
30 or 31, and called into his office "the two people in our
employ at that time , Richard Nelson and Charles Reichel."
He read the letter to them and told them that they would
receive the same treatment as other employees and that the
Company would expect them to do their job just like any
other employee. Draper testified that at that time , Parker
was no longer employed at the Company.
Analysis and Concluding Findings as to the
Termination of Charles Parker
As previously indicated, Respondent claims that Parker
was dismissed (or quit) pursuant to "an unwritten rule of 3
days. If an employee does not call in within 3 days, he's
dismissed." 21 Respondent argues that the credible evidence
shows that Parker did not, in fact, call into the plant-or
otherwise notify Respondent-of his absence on May 29, or
thereafter, and therefore on May 31 he was terminated as
indicated on the "termination notice," quoted above. Re-
spondent argues that it is evident from the record that Par-
ker has a "serious drinking problem" and that he was, in
fact, drunk on May 29 and thereafter, thereby making it
unlikely that he made the telephone calls to the plant as he
testified. Respondent also notes the lack of corroborating
testimony by Parker's son or his wife as to Parker's wherea-
bouts on May 29.22
It is true, as Respondent contends , that the record reflects
that Charles Parker had a problem with alcohol. Thus he
admitted on his employment application with Respondent
that he had been arrested for being drunk. In addition, I was
impressed with Basil Key as a witness to the extent that I
do not believe that he fabricated the incident at Parker's
house on May 29, concerning which he testified. On the
other hand, there is nothing in the record to reflect that
Respondent had ever warned or disciplined Parker during
his employment history for absenteeism or tardiness due to
"an alcohol problem" or any other reason. Indeed, the re-
cord reflects that Respondent retained Parker in its employ
with lull knowledge of any such delinquencies 23
After a consideration of all of the foregoing factors, plus
21 Testimony of Clare Draper
12 At the close of his case -in-chief, counsel for the General Counsel indi-
cated that be had been attempting to secure Mrs. Parker to testify , but that
she had been at the doctor 's office the day of the hearing, and that she was
"presently ill and feels incapable of coming up and giving testimony at this
particular point." No explanation was proffered with respect to the son of
Charles Parker.
23 Parker acknowledged that some 13 years prior to the events in question
he had been convicted of a felony (forgery ) and had served time in prison
and on parole He has further testified without contradiction that Owens was
aware of that fact
JENKINS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
demeanor considerations "along with the consistency and
inherent probability of testimony ," 24 I have concluded, and
therefore find, that Parker did communicate with the Re-
spondent on May 29, but that even if he did not , the Re-
spondent seized upon this dereliction as a pretext to rid itself
of this militant union advocate . In the first place , Parker's
testimony is consistent with the fact of what transpired at
the Respondent 's plant that day , which Parker would prob-
ably not have otherwise known about-particularly if he
had been as drunk as Respondent would have us believe.
Thus the fact is that Owens was absent from the plant on
the morning of May 29, and Parker 's telephone conversa-
tions with Leahey and Headrick confirmed this fact. Sec-
ondly, it is apparent that Leahey was not an entirely truthful
witness . Thus, he testified that Owens called in that morning
at approximately 7:30 a. m. to advise that his car had broken
down and that he would be late in reporting for work.
Leahey testified that he advised Owens at that time that
Parker was absent ; yet Leahey also testified that he was not
aware of Parker's absence until 7 : 45 a.m . when he was so
advised by Basil Key.25
Thirdly, Respondent was, of course, aware by the af-
ternoon of May 29 of Parker's whereabouts and his asserted
condition since Key reported this to Owens . It is to be
recalled that Key advised Parker not to return to work that
day but rather to come in the following morning . If Respon-
dent required Parker's services to the extent that a special
trip was made to his house on Monday for such asserted
purpose, one wonders why (if he was not considered termi-
nated or "quit") an inquiry was not made on Tuesday morn-
ing as to his whereabouts . Fourth, it appears that
Respondent did not observe its own rule when it dismissed
Parker . That is to say , the rule requires an unauthorized
absence of 3 days before an employee was subject to dis-
missal . Vice President Draper testified that at the time he
received the letter from the Union on May 30 or 31, Parker
was no longer employed at the Company. Also, as appears,
infra, Owens advised employee Richard Nelson on the af-
ternoon of May 29 that Parker had quit. All this lends
credence , in my view , to the testimony of Parker that he was
advised by Owens on the afternoon of May 29 that he had
quit because he did not report in for work that morning.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find and conclude that
Parker was terminated on May 29 in order to discourage
membership in the Union , in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
C. The Discharge of Ronald Lybrand
Lybrand, who commenced working for the Respondent
in April, was employed in the window sash department
under Supervisor Reecie Williams . He was discharged on
July 7 assertedly for threatening and intimidating other em-
ployees concerning their union affairs.
24
Universal Camera Corporation v. N.L R B, 340 U. S 474 (1951)25 One may ponder why Owens asked Leahey about Parker on this occa-
sion, or whether Leahey volunteered the information to Owens. Certainly the
absence of one employee in a plant of this size on a Monday morning would
not ordinarily be of such great interest unless, of course , some other factor
was of significance.
339
Lyband signed a union card at a meeting of the Union on
May 30, and thereafter became active in its affairs. Thus, he
participated in the distribution of leaflets at the plant gate
and wore a union button in the plant at all times subsequent
to May 30. In addition, at meetings of employees called by
Vice President Draper in which the latter campaigned
against the Union, Lybrand spoke up in defense of the
Union. For example, the Company had leaflets on the bulle-
tin board which stated that if employees did not attend
union meetings and activities of that nature they would be
fined. Lybrand told Draper that he (Lybrand) had previous-
ly belonged to a union and had never been subjected to that
sort of treatment, and that he did not think the Company
should put such material on the bulletin board unless they
could prove it.
On July 7, Lybrand was called into the office of Vice
President Draper, in the presence of Superintendent Owens.
Draper stated that there had been reports of serious miscon-
duct by him which included threats to employees that if they
did not sign union cards, Lybrand intended to whip them;
and if such employees did not sign union cards and the
Union later came in, they would be out of a job. Draper
further said that one such employee had even threatened to
quit his job because of such intimidation. Although Lyb-
rand denied such accusations, Draper testified that he could
not put any credibility in his answers since, among other
things, Draper had previously checked Lybrand's police
record and found that he had been arrested on such charges
as destruction of private property and carrying a concealed
weapon. Accordingly, Lybrand was given his final checks
and terminated from the Company at that time.
As respects the alleged misconduct, Draper testified that
the preceding Friday (June 30) it had been reported to him
by Superintendent Owens that an employee, Rayford Ivy,
had been threatened by Lybrand. Draper instructed Owens
to investigate the matter, and later in the day Ivy and Assis-
tant Foreman Smith came into Draper's office where Ivy
reported that Lybrand (who worked side by side with Ivy)
had been bothering him on the job and had threatened "to
knock hell out of him and called him a suckass and other
names ." Ivy stated that he was going to quit-that he could
not stand that kind of harassment and threats. Draper told
him to stay on, that he would find out more about it and
see that it was stopped. Draper instructed Owens to investi-
gate the matter further over the weekend of July 4.26
Draper was out of the plant on Wednesday, July 5 but
returned the following day when he received further evi-
dence of Lybrand's alleged misconduct. Thus Owens re-
ported that Lybrand had threatened another employee
(Bobby Austin), and that there were rumors in the plant that
Lybrand had a police record. Whereupon, Draper con-
firmed the rumor with the police department and ascer-
tained, as previously indicated, that Lybrand did, in fact,
have a record at the police department which included de-
struction of private property and the carrying of a concealed
weapon. Draper further interviewed Austin who stated that
Lybrand had called him a suckass and had threatened to hit
him in the head with a Coca-Cola bottle.
26 It appears that the plant was shut down on the following Monday and
Tuesday in celebration of the 4th of July holiday. It also appears that Ivy left
Anniston after the end of the workday for a vacation in Florida
340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At the hearing herein, Draper's testimony with respect to
the reports received by him were corroborated in their es-
sential aspects by the testimony of employees Ivy and Aus-
tin. Although there were some discrepancies in the record
with respect to what was actually stated by Lybrand, and
in the sequence of events, of which counsel for the General
Counsel makes much in his brief, I am convinced that after
a consideration of the record as a whole, including demea-
nor considerations, Lybrand did, in furtherance of his zeal-
ous advocacy of the Union, become impatient with those
who did not see things his way; and the record reflects that
he could become violent or utter threats of violence in cir-
cumstances where he concluded that his interests were seri-
ously threatened 27
Although the circumstances are rendered suspicious pri-
marily by the fact that Respondent did not in any manner
warn Lybrand of imposition of disciplinary action prior to
the discharge, I am unable to conclude that Respondent
would not have discharged Lybrand for such misconduct
had he not been engaged in union activities. Accordingly,
I find that the General Counsel did not sustain his burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respon-
dent discharged Lybrand on July 7 because of his participa-
tion in the union campaign . I will, therefore , recommend
that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
D. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. By Lowell Owens
Employee Richard Nelson (whom, it will be recalled, was
one of the first and foremost adherents of the Union in the
plant) testified that at about 2 p.m., on May 26, Owens came
up to him on his job and said he would like to speak with
him for a few minutes in the lunchroom. No one else was
present. Owens asked Nelson if the latter had heard any-
thing about union cards being signed. Nelson responded
that he had heard something about it, but, in response to
Owens' specific question of whether he had signed one,
Nelson said, "no, sir." When Owens sought to make sure
that Nelson did not know anything about it, the latter stat-
ed, "I haven't signed a card, and I don't know anybody that
has, but I know that I have heard that they're going around
in here." 28
I find the foregoing interrogation to constitute interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Camco, 340 F.2d 802 (C.A,
5, 1965).
Nelson further testified that on the following Monday,
27 Thus an incident occurred during the hearing in this matter which lends
credence to that conclusion Following the testimony of employee Sherman
Ramsey, a witness for the General Counsel, Lybrand assertedly threatened
him in the hall of the courthouse with the claim that "I'll get your god damn
ass." Although Lybrand denied making such statement , I cannot believe that
Ramsey fabricated it and that it was impelled because Lybrand believed that
Ramsey, on cross-examination , watered down his testimony to curry favor
with the Company. The record also reflects that Lybrand's wife swore out
a warrant against him on May 27 for assault and battery which Lybrand
elamed was caused by an argument over economic problems.
The foregoing findings are based upon Nelson 's testimony . I discredit
Owens' general denial that he had ever asked Nelson if the latter had signed
a union card.
May 29, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Owens came up to his
job again and stated that he wanted to talk with him. In
company with Henry Hensley, another foreman, Owens
again went into the lunchroom where he said, "I thought
you didn't know anything about the union cards." Nelson
repeated that he didn't know anything about them except
what he had heard. Whereupon, Owens stated that he had
"three or four out there saying you and Parker are getting
the cards signed." Nelson again denied that he had signed
a card or that he knew anyone else that had signed one, but
admitted that "talk is going around that the cards are being
signed ." Nelson further testified that the conversation then
changed to the subject of Nelson's job, and that Owens
offered him the job as shipping clerk. However, Nelson
declined, stating that he was satisfied where he was.
Nelson further testified that when Parker 's name was
broached, he asked the two supervisors where Parker was
that day and the response was: "he quit; he didn't call in
this morning, so he quit."
Both Owens and Hensley denied that they had a conver-
sation with Nelson on this date since they claim that Owens
did not return to the plant until after 3 p.m. that day. They
testified that they did have a meeting with Nelson on or
about June 27 or 28, which was instigated by Nelson, in
which the latter offered to switch some votes to the Compa-
ny in the upcoming election if they would give him a certain
job. Interestingly enough however, Hensley testified that in
the meeting Nelson asked about Charles Parker, as follows:
He asked us what happened to Parker, where Parker
was, and we told him that Parker had quit; he had just
laid out of work and didn't report off, and as far as we
knew we assumed he had just quit and got him another
job somewhere or something. He said, well-he called
him a bad name-he said, "he's the fellow that got the
whole thing started again with it, and then he left and
quit."
The foregoing testimony of Hensley lends credence in my
view to the claim of Nelson that the conversation in fact
took place on May 29 rather than on June 27 or 28, since
it seems incredible that Nelson would not have known that
Parker was no longer working in the plant a month later.
Accordingly, based upon demeanor considerations as well
as the likelihood of events, I credit the testimony of Nelson
and find that this further interrogation of him, in addition
to the creating of an impression of surveillance of his union
activities ,29 constituted an additional violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
James Wagoner was an employee of the Company on or
about July 11, in the saw department. On that day, Lowell
Owens walked up to his work station and asked him what
he thought the Union could do for the Company. Wagoner
replied that he thought it could do "plenty of things"-that
he had worked under a union before. About that time,
Assistant Foreman Basil Key walked up and handed Wag-
oner two pieces of paper (the first containing the company
letterhead) which stated about 10 or 12 things that "the
Union could not do." While Wagoner was reading the pa-
per, Foreman Henry Hensley and Mack Smith came up and
there was some general talk about the Union. In the discus-
29 See Plaslicoid Company, 168 NLRB 135 at In 3.
JENKINS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
sion , Lowell Owens made the statement that if the Union
came in , the employees would lose their profit sharing 30
I find the foregoing threat to eliminate an employee bene-
fit contingent upon their foregoing support of the Union to
constitute interference , restraint , and coercion within the
meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
Sherman Ramsey, an employee of Respondent, testified
that one day around the middle of July, at lunchtime, he
went to the parking lot to get his car and found that it had
a flat tire. However, at about that time, Lowell Owens was
backing out his car and asked Ramsey if he wanted a ride
to the restaurant with him. Ramsey did so, and during the
ride and/or lunch, the conversation turned toward the
Union and the election which was scheduled for the latter
part of the month. Testifying directly and without hesitation
on direct examination , Ramsey stated that Owens said,
"they knew who the ones were that was getting the cards
signed and was pushing to get the Union in; and said that
sooner or later that they would get rid of the ones that were
trying so hard to get the Union in." However, on cross-
examination , Ramsey indicated that he had been talking to
some union adherents in the plant who had told him that
if the Union was not successful , they would have to quit
because the Company would make it "so hard on them,"
and that he inquired of Owens whether or not that was so.
Owens acknowledged that, "they might just do that-we
know who they are." Ramsey then went on to testify that
Owens said that he did not think the Company would really
do that-that "most of the employees had been there a long
time and had been good workers, and he said that he felt
that after it was over that they go on and be maybe better
that they was to start with." On redirect examination, Ram-
sey testified that Owens stated, "if they [the union adher-
ents] get out of line a little bit, that will probably wind them
up.
Owens acknowledged having a conversation with Ram-
sey during lunch that day. He testified that Ramsey told him
that he (Ramsey) had heard from some of the union men
that they would "be run off if they lost the election ." Owens
responded that he "just kind of grinned and said, 'is that
right.' " Owens then testified that he advised Ramsey that
"any company would be crazy to run their older hands off,
that it was their own decision to make, that it was the men's
decision to make and their own decision to make; that the
Company under no circumstances did I think that the Com-
pany would run any men off for activities like that." He
30 The foregoing findings are based upon the credited testimony of Wagon-
er who impressed me as an honest and forthright witness . Key did not recall
hearing anything in the conversation . Owens recalled a conversation with
Wagoner concerning profit sharing in which he advised Wagoner that the
latter was eligible. Owens also recalled that during the conversation Basil Key
came up and had a "talk sheet" i.e , a sheet containing instructions to fore-
men as to what they could legally tell employees during the union campaign.
However, Owens denied that the Union was mentioned in connection with
the profit sharing . Under the circumstances , where the conversation admit-
tedly included union affairs in the plant , it strains credulity to believe that
the two subjects were discussed in watertight compartments Mack Smith
testified that he walked up while the conversation was in progress , and that
Lowell Owens was explaining the profit-sharing plan to Wagoner. He does
not recall that Owens stated that if the Union came in the Company would
lose the profit-sharing plan, but, admittedly, he was not there during the
whole conversation Under all circumstances , I credit Wagoner and find that
the statement was made by Owens substantially as he testified.
341
further advised Ramsey that it was his opinion that after the
election was over, "all of the employees would settle down,
and that we would have a better employee (sic)." Owens
denied that at any time during the conversation he interro-
gated Ramsey concerning his union activities or threatei ed
to fire any employee because of his union activities.
As is evident, there was probably much rambling and
speculation between the two men during this luncheon con-
versation. Ramsey, as a witness, seemed genuinely desirous
of attempting to recollect the conversation as it occurred
while at the same time appearing somewhat fearful of antag-
onizing his employer.31 After a consideration of all of the
factors in the record bearing upon this incident, including
demeanor considerations, I am convinced that Owens im-
parted to Ramsey the following information: (1) that the
Company knew who the active union members were; and
(2) that if they "got out of line" after the election, and
provided the Company with an excuse to get rid of them,
the Company would do so.32 The fact that Owens may have
told Ramsey that in his opinion the Company would be
crazy to rid itself of their older employees and that things
would settle down after the election does not, in my view,
diminish the impact of the threats contained in (1) and (2)
above.
I therefore find that the statements of Owens to Ramsey
created the impression that the union activities of the em-
ployees were under surveillance by the Respondent, and
constituted a threat that Respondent would discharge em-
ployees for engaging in union activities, all in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By Mack Smith
Wayne Hammond, an employee of the Company in the
sash department, testified that about July 1 he had a conver-
sation with Foreman Mack Smith concerning the Union
and the profit-sharing plan.33 After some general discussion
about Hammond's job, Smith asked Hammond what he
thought about the profit-sharing plan. Hammond re-
sponded that it was all right for people who participated, but
he was not on it.34 Smith then said that, "if the Union comes
in it's going to cut a lot of it Out.,, 35 Hammond then testified
that Smith asked him if he was for the Union. When Ham-
mond responded affirmatively, Smith said, "If you'll take
my advice, you won't vote for it because it ain't going to be
no good."
Smith admitted initiating with Hammond the subject of
31 The record reflects that only that morning, a few hours before he testi-
fied, he was interviewed by the Company's attorney, in the presence of
Superintendent Owens, in the Company's office
i Richard Nelson, whom I have found to be a credible witness, confirmed
that Ramsey subsequently reported to him that Owens said that "as soon as
this union activity was over , and any of the union pushers was in there, they
was going to have to get rid of them "
33 Smith was not Hammond 's regular foreman , it appears that on the day
in question Hammond was on the job earlier than usual-before many other
employees came to work-and Smith happened to be walking through the
plant
34 It appears that an employee is required to work for the Company at least
I y3 ear before he is eligible to participate in the plan
5 Testimony of Hammond on cross-examination On direct examination
Hammond testified that Smith stated, "if the union come in, they would cut
a lot of it out 11
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
profit sharing , but denied making the interrogation as well
as uttering the threatening statement that if the Union came
in the profit-sharing plan would be eliminated, wholly or in
part.
The record reflects that the profit-sharing plan was highly
valued by Respondent. Vice President Draper testified that
he told the assistant foremen that when the Company had
a plant in Birmingham, it had a profit-sharing plan; howev-
er, when the Union came in there was a lot of fighting and
bickering among employees which had an adverse effect on
production, and the profit-sharing plan went down because
the Company made very little profit. He stated that the
Company did not want that to happen in Anniston. Howev-
er, Draper further testified that he told the assistant foremen
that the Company wanted to "perpetuate the idea of profit
sharing and keep it in effect . . . that we did not want to
give them the idea that profit sharing would be cut out."
Nevertheless, it seems apparent that Draper wished to im-
bue the foremen with the idea that what had happened to
the Company in Birmingham might very well take place in
Anniston if the Union came in, and that should be avoided
if possible. With that in mind, I have found, as above relat-
ed, that Lowell Owens made a threat to Sherman Ramsey
to the effect that if the Union came in the profit-sharing
plan would be placed in jeopardy. For those reasons , as well
as demeanor considerations , I am inclined to credit Ham-
mond and find that Smith made a similar threatening state-
ment to him on this occasion. However, I find that Smith's
questioning of Hammond was not coercive in the circum-
stances in view of the fact that Hammond freely acknowl-
edged his support of the Union and was, in fact, wearing a
union button at the time.
3. By Basil Key
Bobby Steed was an employee of the Company in the
interior door department from January through July (he
quit his employment the day after the election). He partici-
pated in the union campaign and wore a union button while
at work. Steed testified that on the morning of the day of
the election, Basil Key walked up to him on the job and
asked if he had changed his mind about voting for the
Union. Steed told him that he had not, and that the reason
was the relatively low wage scale and the difficulty of the
work. Key advised that if Steed would tell Vice President
Draper that he would vote against the Union, Draper would
probably give him a raise.
I find this promise of benefit in return for restricting or
ceasing to exercise rights guaranteed to employees in Sec-
36 The foregoing findings are based upon the credited testimony of Steed.
Key apparently did not know Bobby Steed although he testified that he knew
J. W Steed (Bobby's father ) very well Although I have credited Key's
testimony in other respects , I do not believe that Bobby Steed , who appeared
an honest and truthful witness on the stand , fabricated this testimony
As for the timing thereof , Steed placed it on the day of the election
following a meeting of employees called by Vice President Draper Draper
denied that he had any such meeting within the 24-hour period immediately
preceding the election , and there has been no charge of any such incident,
which would have been grounds for upsetting the election However Draper
did admit having such meetings during the preelection period when the
holding thereof was legally permissible Accordingly, I find that the conver-
sation took place shortly before the election but not on the day thereof
tion 7 to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
As previously noted, some of the issues raised by the
Union's objections to conduct affecting the results of the
election in Case 1O-RC-921 I were consolidated for the pur-
pose of hearing with the complaint proceedings. Specifical-
ly, hearing was ordered respecting the issues raised by the
Union's Objections I, II, III, and IX, which, in essence,
related to and were generally coextensive with the allega-
tions of violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
contained in the complaint which occurred within the "crit-
ical period," i.e., from May 31 through July 28. (Ideal Elec-
tric and Manufacturing Company, 134 NLRB 1275.)
As hereinabove set forth, I have found that substantial
evidence supports the contentions of the General Counsel
and of the Charging Union respecting allegations of viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) within the critcal period prior to the
election . On the other hand, I have found that the General
Counsel did not sustain his burden of proving that Ronald
Lybrand was discharged on July 7 for discriminatory rea-
sons ; I therefore recommended that the complaint be dis-
missed to that extent. It follows that Objection III should
be overruled.37
The conduct found to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act within the critical period is conduct which, a fortiori, is
conduct which interfered with a free and untrammelled
election ; accordingly, I shall recommend that the results of
the election be set aside and a new one held 38
V THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the interstate opera-
tions of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon
the entire record, I make the following:
37 As found by the Regional Director, the discharge of Parker occurred
prior to the date of the filing of the petition, and therefore may not be
considered in connection with that objection Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company, 138 NLRB 453
38 In making this finding and recommendation, I note that the Lowell
Owens-Sherman Ramsey incident, which occurred in mid-July, was inserted
into the complaint by amendment at the commencement of the hearing At
that time, counsel for Respondent strenuously objected to its being consid-
ered in the objections case because of untimeliness
It is, of course, recognized that the incident was not known to the Regional
Director at the time of the issuance of his Report, and therefore could not
have been a basis for his recommendation. On the other hand, it is certainly
well settled that the Board determines whether an election should stand or
be set aside based upon a consideration of all the evidence presented prior
to such determination in this case, the issue was fully litigated and it would
seem to exalt form over substance to exclude it from consideration, and I
have therefore considered it in reaching my conclusion Nevertheless, it
should also be stated that my conclusion and recommendation as to the
objections case would be the same even if this incident were not considered.
JENKINS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 343
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3. By unlawfully interrogating employees concerning
their union activities, by threatening employees with plant
closure, discharge, or other dire economic consequences if
they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, by promising benefits if employees would cease
their support or activities on behalf of the Union, and by
creating an impression of surveillance of employees' union
activities, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. By discharging Charles Parker, as described above, the
Respondent discriminated against an employee in regard to
his hire and tenure of employment, and terms and condi-
tions thereof, in order to discourage membership in the
Union, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Except to the extent that violations of the Act have
been specifically found, as set forth above, the General
Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence the remaining allegations of the complaint herein,
and it will be recommended that said complaint be, to that
extent, dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Charles Parker, I shall recommend that Respon-
dent be ordered to offer him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and to
make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suf-
fered by reason of the discrimination against him. Any
backpay found to be due shall be computed in accordance
with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Company, 138
NLRB 716.
As the unfair labor practices committed by Respondent
strike at the very heart of employee rights safeguarded by
the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to
cease and desist from in any manner infringing on the rights
of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Entwistle
Manufacturing Company, 23 NLRB 1058, enfd. as modified
120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941).
Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact,
and the conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:39
ORDER
Respondent, Jenkins Manufacturing Company, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities.
(b) Threatening employees with plant closure, discharge,
or other economic reprisal should the employees select a
labor organization as their collective bargaining representa-
tive.
(c) Promising benefits to employees in return for their
restricting or ceasing activities on behalf of a labor organi-
zation.
(d) Creating the impression of surveillance of employees'
union activities.
(e) Threatening that if the employees vote a union in the
plant, Respondent would cease operation of its profit-shar-
ing plan, or other economic benefit to the employees.
(f) Discouraging membership in International Molders
and Allied Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 324, or
any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharg-
ing employees because of their union membership or activi-
ties.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named labor
organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Charles Parker immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights or privileges, and make him whole
for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of
the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in
the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary and
relevant to analyze and compute the amount of backpay
due under this recommended Order.
(c) Post at its Anniston, Alabama, plant, copies of the
attached notices marked "Appendix." 40 Copies of said no-
39 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
401n the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
10, after being duly signed by the Company's authorized
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous place, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Union's objections to
the election Nos. I, II and IX be sustained , and that the
results of said election be set aside, and that Case 10-
RC-9211 be remanded to the Regional Director for Region
10 for the purpose of conducting a new election at such time
as he deems the circumstances permit the free choice of a
bargaining representative.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dis-
missed in all other respects.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which both sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National La-
bor Relations Board has ordered that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post
this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing
To engage in activities together for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To refrain from the exercise of any such activities.
WE WILL NOT question you about your union member-
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
ship and activities or about the union membership and
activities of your fellow employees.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will close the plant if you
join or support International Molders and Allied
Workers Union , AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 324, or any
other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten that we will stop the profit-
sharing plan or any other benefit , if you join or support
the above-named labor organization.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we know who has joined or
is a member of the above -named labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any employee for
joining or supporting the above -named labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT promise you raises or other benefits in
return for your ceasing to join or support the above-
named labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re-
strain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL reinstate Charles Parker to his former job,
or substantially equivalent postion , and pay him any
wages he would have earned from the date of his dis-
charge on May 29 , 1972, to the date we offer to rein-
state him , less any interim net earnings , if any,
computed on a quarterly basis at 6 percent interest.
All our employees have the right to join or assist, or not
to join or assist , International Molders and Allied Workers
Union , AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 324, or any other labor orga-
nization.
JENKINS MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any question concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Peachtree Building, Room 701, 730
Peachtree Street, N. E., Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone
404-526-5760.