Jenell Foster, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 17, 2000
01986570 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 17, 2000)

01986570

11-17-2000

Jenell Foster, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Jenell Foster, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01986570

) Agency No.1G-787-0036-97

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning her

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621

et seq.,<1> and � 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29

U.S.C. � 791 et seq. Accordingly, the appeal is accepted in accordance

with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the agency discriminated against

complainant on the bases of age (52), physical disability (post traumatic

cervical, lumbar, and pelvic segmental dysfunction), and reprisal when

she was denied light duty; required to work outside of her limitations;

and later denied overtime when some of her restrictions were lifted.

BACKGROUND

Complainant was a Distribution Clerk at the San Antonio District

Processing and Distribution Center. In July 1997, complainant used a

chair with a back support on it to ease her neck and back problems.

The Acting Supervisor (AS) told complainant that she could only use

the chair if she was on light or limited duty, and gave complainant the

forms to request light duty. On July 28, 1997, complainant requested

a two-week light duty assignment.<2> The request was denied.<3> The

Manager, Distribution Operations (MDO) and AS averred that the request

was denied because complainant's request specified that she could not

reach above her shoulders and there was no work available on complainant's

tour within that restriction.

On August 4, 1997, when complainant reported to work, the MDO instructed

her that in order to continue working, she would have to have some of

her restrictions lifted. The MDO averred that he saw complainant working

the following day and assumed that she had her restrictions lifted.<4>

During the next two weeks, complainant worked more than eight hours per

day on six days.<5> Complainant filed a grievance claiming that she was

forced to work beyond her eight hour per day limitation.<6> Complainant

stated that the MDO then told complainant to go home because he did not

have any work within her restrictions and advised complainant to go back

to her doctor and have him lift the restriction limiting lifting above

the shoulders.

On August 21, 1997, complainant again requested light duty.<7> The

agency approved the request on August 22, 1997.

In her formal EEO complaint, complainant claimed that she was treated

differently than two other employees who each brought in notes from

their doctors. She claimed that management retaliated against her after

she filed a grievance by not allowing her to work or perform duties which

were within her restrictions. She also claimed that after her eight hour

work restriction was lifted, management failed to provide her with the

opportunity to work overtime. The MDO averred that complainant did not

provide any documentation to show that her August 21, 1997 restrictions

were lifted.

The agency issued a final decision finding no discrimination. The agency

found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of age

discrimination because she was unable to prove that the agency officials

were aware of or considered her age. The agency decision noted further

that light duty was denied for three other employees, all of whom were

under age 40. Regarding complainant's disability claim, the agency found

that she failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing that she

was an individual with a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act

because she failed to demonstrate that she had a physical impairment that

substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, that she

had a record of such impairment, or was regarded as having an impairment.

Complainant appealed.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation

of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. Complainant has the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If complainant

meets this burden, the burden shifts to the agency to articulate

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action.

Complainant must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the legitimate reason articulated by the agency was a pretext for

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In

an ADEA case, the ultimate burden remains on complainant to demonstrate,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was a determinative factor.

Loeb v. Textron, 600 F. 2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Fodale v. Department of

Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05960344 (October 16, 1998).

This established order of analysis, in which the first step normally

consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not

be followed in all cases. Where the agency articulates a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the actions at issue, the factual inquiry can

proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,

that is, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated

by discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see also U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983).

The Commission finds that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, i.e., complainant's July 28,

1997 request for light duty was denied because at that time there was

no work available within the restriction regarding lifting above her

shoulders; on August 4, 1997, the MDO informed complainant that there

was no work within her restrictions and that she could not work unless

her restrictions were lifted, and believed that the restriction was

lifted when he saw her the following day; and the MDO did not provide

complainant with the opportunity to work overtime in late August because

he was unaware at that time that some of her restrictions were lifted.

The burden returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

reasons were a pretext for discrimination, that is, that the agency was

more likely motivated by discriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at

253. Complainant provided no evidence in support of her claim that

the agency's actions were based on her age. The record reveals that

requests for light duty from three other employees, who were under age

40, were not approved because of lack of work within their restrictions.

Complainant fails to prove that she was treated differently than similarly

situated employees based on age, and has not proven that the agency's

articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, complainant

must show that: 1) she is an individual with a disability as defined in 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(g), 2) she is a "qualified" individual with a disability

as defined in 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m), and 3) the agency took an adverse

action against her. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662

F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). Complainant also must demonstrate a causal

relationship between her disabling condition and the agency's reasons

for the adverse action.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g) defines an individual with a

disability as one who: 1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of that person's major life activities,

2) has a record of such impairment, or 3) is regarded as having such an

impairment. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(h)(2)(i) defines "major

life activities" as including the functions of caring for one's self,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working.

Complainant also must show that she is a "qualified" individual

with a disability within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). That

section defines a qualified individual with a disability as meaning,

with respect to employment, a disabled person who, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

position in question.

The Commission finds that there is insufficient evidence in the record

to substantiate complainant's claim that she is an individual with a

disability within the meaning of the regulations. The two reports from

the doctor based on her July 10, 1997, examination which severely limited

her work activities, noted that her prognosis could not be determined

at that time. One month later, the doctor decreased all restrictions on

lifting, standing, walking and working, and removed the restrictions on

reaching stooping and bending. His August report listed her prognosis

as �good.� Nothing in these reports or in complainant's requests for

light duty explains how complainant's physical condition substantially

limited one or more of her major life activities.

Further, there is no evidence that complainant had a record of an

impairment or that the agency regarded complainant as an individual with a

disability. The MDO specifically stated that he assumed that complainant's

restrictions were lifted when he saw her at work on August 5, 1997.

Therefore, the Commission finds that complainant fails to prove that

she is an individual with a disability.

Complainant also claims the agency retaliated against her after she filed

a grievance. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

for an allegation of reprisal, complainant must show: 1) that she engaged

in protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding;

2) that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected

activity; 3) that she was disadvantaged by an action of the agency

contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and 4)

that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), affirmed,

545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F. 2d

80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,

683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

Nothing in the record indicates that complainant engaged in any Title

VII or EEOC activity. The record shows that complainant filed a

grievance in August 1997, claiming that on August 4-7 and 11-13, 1997,

the agency forced her to work more than the 8 hours a day listed on

her initial light duty request. Assuming arguendo, that complainant

engaged in protected activity, we find that complainant fails to show

that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination based on reprisal. The MDO averred that he believed

complainant's restriction regarding working no more than 8 hours per day

was lifted when he saw her at work on August 4, 1997. He stated that he

knew complainant's July 28, 1997 request was denied and assumed that, as

a union shop steward, she was aware that she could not work with medical

restrictions if a job was not available within those restrictions.

Complainant fails to demonstrate that the MDO's stated reason for

his actions was pretextual. The Commission therefore finds that the

agency did not retaliate against complainant, and further finds that

the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish that

the agency discriminated against her or that its actions were based on

discriminatory animus was correct.

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION

November 17, 2000

________________________ _______________________

DATE Frances Hart,

Executive Officer

Executive

Secretariat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________

__________________________

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The record contains two undated agency forms completed by complainant's

doctor based on a July 10, 1997 examination. On each, the doctor

diagnosed post traumatic cervical segmental dysfunction, noted that her

prognosis could not be determined at that time, and limited complainant's

work activity to lifting up to 10 lbs; standing and walking 4 hours per

day; working 8 hours per day; reaching to shoulder level; non-continuous

stooping or bending; and pushing and/or pulling containers to 15 to

20 lbs. On one form, the doctor recommended placing complainant in

a light duty assignment for a period of ten days. On the second, the

doctor recommended light duty for 30 days.

3 Complainant received the letter denying light duty, dated July 31, 1997,

on August 1, 1997. The letter contained no explanation for the denial.

4 The MDO stated that complainant was a union steward and knew the

agency's policy.

5 Complainant was on the Overtime Desired List during the entire incident

period.

6 In the grievance, complainant claimed that management denied her request

for light duty and worked her beyond the limitations listed by her doctor.

7 With this request, the doctor diagnosed strain/sprain of the neck and

shoulder, listed complainant's prognosis as �good,� and revised her

previous work limitations to lifting up to 20 lbs, standing and walking

to 8 hours per day, working to 10 hours per day; unlimited reaching,

stooping and bending; pushing or pulling containers to 25 lbs and

suggested if possible that complainant use a chair with a back on it.