Jemella Group Limitedv.Good Hair Care LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 29, 2019

91241327 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2019)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: July 29, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Jemella Group Limited
v.
Good Hair Care LLC
_____

Opposition No. 91241327
_____

Paul G. Juettner and Tanja Proehl of Greer, Burns & Crain, LTD,
for Jemella Group Limited
Good Hair Care LLC, pro se.
_____

Before Zervas, Wolfson, and Heasley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Good Hair Care LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark GOOD HAIR CARE (in standard characters, “HAIR CARE” disclaimed) for
“hair care products, namely, heat protection sprays, hair conditioner, hair oils, hair
spray, hair styling preparations, shampoos” in International Class 3.1

1 Application Serial No. 87383483 was filed on March 23, 2017, based on Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). During the course of examination, Applicant filed an
amendment to allege use claiming first use anywhere since April 1, 2017 and use in commerce
since at least as early as April 15, 2017. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
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Jemella Group Limited (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s mark on
the grounds of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), and dilution by blurring under Trademark Act Section 43(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c), of its applied-for marks consisting of or containing the phrase GOOD HAIR
DAY and its registered marks containing the initialisms GHD, for hair care
products.2 Opposer claims ownership of the following applied-for marks:
Mark App. No. App. Date Pertinent Goods in International Class 3
GOOD HAIR DAY 85939290 May 22, 2013
Hair lotions, shampoos, hair
dyes, hair colourants, hair
conditioners, hair styling
preparations
GOOD HAIR DAY,
EVERY DAY 85939282 May 22, 2013
Hair lotions, shampoos, hair
dyes, hair colourants, hair
conditioners, hair styling
preparations

85931081 May 14, 2013
Hair lotions, shampoos, hair
dyes, hair colourants, hair
conditioners, hair styling
preparations

And Opposer claims ownership of the following registered marks:

2 Notice of Opposition, 1 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91241327
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Mark Reg. No. Pertinent Goods in International Class 3
GHD 2855191
Hair care products namely, shampoo, conditioner,
holding spray, hair gel, volumizing gel, root lifter
and hair rebuilder
GHD STYLE 4577990
Hair lotions; shampoos; hair dyes; hair colourants;
hair conditioners; hair styling products, namely,
hairspray, hair gel, hair mousse, hair wax, non-
medicated hair balm, hair creams, heat and
moisture protection preparations for hair, non-
medicated hair strengthening treatment lotions

3740197
Shampoos; conditioners; hair care preparations;
hair wash preparations; preparations for use in
hair styling; preparations for the care and beauty
of the hair; hair waving and hair setting
preparations; hair spray; hair mousse; hair styling
and moulding preparations having the texture of
putty; creams for the hair; hair care preparations;
hair cleaning preparations; hair curling
preparations; hair grooming preparations; hair
moisturisers; hair oil; hair protection
preparations; hair strengthening treatment
lotions
GHD PLATINUM 4848579
Hair lotions; shampoos; hair dyes; hair colourants;
hair conditioners; hair styling products, namely,
hairspray, hair gel, hair mousse, hair wax, non-
medicated hair balm, hair creams, heat and
moisture protection preparations for hair, non-
medicated hair strengthening treatment lotions
3
Applicant denies the salient allegations in the notice of opposition.4
The parties have agreed to try this case via the Board’s Accelerated Case
Resolution (“ACR”) procedure.5 Specifically, they have agreed to forego a traditional
trial, and to proceed on the summary judgment model of ACR, in which each party

3 Registration No. 4208320 for GHD GOLD has been cancelled as to its Class 3 goods.
Opposer’s Notice of Opposition cites additional GHD-formative registered marks for hair care
apparatus and products such as hair dryers, straighteners, and combs, but its brief focuses
on its applications and registrations identifying hair care products in Class 3.
4 Answer, 7 TTABVUE.
5 See Stipulation, 11 TTABVUE, approved by the Board, 12 TTABVUE 4; stipulated schedule
for ACR, 13 TTABVUE, approved by the Board, 15 TTABVUE.
Opposition No. 91241327
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may submit a brief with accompanying evidentiary submissions. Their stipulation
provides that “in any summary judgment submissions the TTAB can resolve any
lingering issues of material fact in making a final determination on the merits.”6 See
generally Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, 126 USPQ2d 1601, 1602 (TTAB 2018)
(describing summary judgment ACR model); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 702.04(b) (2019). “ACR summary judgment briefs
may be presented either as cross motions for summary judgment or as a single motion
for summary judgment.” Id.
In this case, only Opposer has submitted a brief. As in a traditional Board
proceeding, the burden of proof remains with Opposer, which must establish its case
by a preponderance of the evidence. TBMP § 702.04(a). Even though Opposer has
submitted its brief in summary judgment format, under the terms of the stipulation
the Board may resolve any and all issues of material fact in the course of issuing a
final ruling. See TPI Holdings, Inc. v. TrailerTrader.com, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1409,
1411 (TTAB 2018); Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1051 (TTAB 2016) (“In order
to take advantage of any form of ACR, the parties must stipulate that the Board may
resolve any genuine disputes of material fact in the context of something less than a
full trial.”). See generally TBMP §§ 528.05(a)(2), 702.04, 705.
I. The Record

The record consists of:

• The pleadings.

6 Stipulation, ¶¶ TTABVUE 3.
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• The files of opposed Application Serial No. 87383483. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b).

• The parties’ ACR stipulation, including stipulations of fact.7

Opposer’s Evidence:

• Declaration of Emmanuelle Eyraud, Associate General Counsel for Opposer in
the United Kingdom, with exhibits.8

• Declaration of Tanja Proehl, U.S. counsel for Opposer, with exhibits including:

o Registration certificates for Opposer’s marks;
o Printouts from the USPTO database of Opposer’s three pending
trademark applications cited above;
o Printouts from the USPTO database regarding third party applications
or registrations for marks beginning with GOOD HAIR;
o Printouts of a sampling of promotional activities by celebrities endorsing
Opposer’s products;
o Printouts from Applicant’s website at GoodHairCareGold.com.9
Applicant has submitted no brief and no evidence.
II. Standing and Priority

To establish standing in an opposition or cancellation proceeding, a plaintiff must
show “both a ‘real interest’ in the proceedings as well as a ‘reasonable basis’ for its
belief of damage.” Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111
USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (quoting
ShutEmDown Sports, Inc., v. Lacy, 102 USPQ2d 1036, 1041 (TTAB 2012)); Ritchie v.
Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A “real interest” is

7 11 TTABVUE 3-5; copy attached to Opposer’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 25-27.
8 14 TTABVUE 29 et seq.
9 14 TTABVUE 86 et seq.
Opposition No. 91241327
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a “direct and personal stake” in the outcome of the proceeding. Ritchie, 50 USPQ2d
at 1026. A claim of likelihood of confusion that “is not wholly without merit,” including
prior use of a confusingly similar mark, may be sufficient “to establish a reasonable
basis for a belief that one is damaged.” Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670
F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982) quoted in Executive Coach Builders, Inc.
v. SPV Coach Co., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1175, 1179 (TTAB 2017), especially where the
party raising the claim is a competitor. Empresa Cubana, 111 USPQ2d at 1062.
The parties have stipulated to Opposer’s ownership of its pleaded registrations
and applications,10 for marks and goods that are arguably similar to and competitive
with Applicant’s. That establishes Opposer’s standing to oppose registration of
Applicant’s GOOD HAIR CARE mark based on likelihood of confusion and dilution.
Id.; Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir.
2000); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1501
(TTAB 2015).
Because the parties have stipulated to Opposer’s pleaded registrations, Section
2(d) priority is not an issue in this case as to the marks and the goods covered by
those registrations. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400,
182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974) cited in Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118
USPQ2d 1464, 1469 (TTAB 2016). The parties’ stipulation also indicates that
Opposer’s constructive priority dates for its three cited applications―all in
2013―antedate Applicant’s subject application for the mark GOOD HAIR CARE,

10 Stipulation ¶¶ 7-9, 11, 11 TTABVUE 4-5.
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which it filed on March 23, 2017, and first used in commerce on April 15, 2017.11 Zirco
Corp. v. Am. Telephone and Telegraph Co., 21 USPQ2d 1542, 1543-44 (TTAB 1991)
(“As a review of the legislative history shows, the provision [15 U.S.C. Section 1057(c)]
is intended to fix a registrant’s nationwide priority rights in its mark from the filing
date of its application whether the application is based on use or intent-to-use. This
right of priority is to have legal effect comparable to the earliest use of a mark at
common law.”) quoted in Media Online Inc. v. El Clasificado, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1285,
1288 (TTAB 2008). Opposer’s three applications thus establish its priority as to the
goods covered therein, contingent on Opposer obtaining registration of at least one of
those applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1057; Zirco v. AT&T, 21 USPQ2d at 1544; Larami
Corp. v. Talk to Me Programs, Inc., 36 USPQ2d 1840, 1845 n.7 (TTAB 1995) cited in
3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:31.10 (5th ed. June 2019
update).
In sum, Opposer has established its standing and priority.
III. Likelihood of Confusion

We base our determination of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section
2(d) on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors enunciated in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ
563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015); see also In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1161-62 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

11 Stipulation ¶¶ 11-13.
Opposition No. 91241327
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We have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant, and have treated any
other factors as neutral. See Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127
USPQ2d 1797, 1800 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342,
94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant
to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be
considered.”)); ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242
(TTAB 2015) (“While we have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we
focus our analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”). Varying weights may be
assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup
Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the
various evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination”). Two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and
the relatedness of the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (the “fundamental inquiry mandated by §
2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the
goods and differences in the marks.”); In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1672
(TTAB 2018).
A. Goods, Channels of Trade, and Classes of Customers

The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration,” Stone Lion
Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1159
Opposition No. 91241327
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(Fed. Cir. 2014), and the third DuPont factor concerns “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” Id. at 1161 (quoting
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). With respect to the second DuPont factor, the question of
likelihood of confusion must be determined based on an analysis of the goods recited
in Applicant’s application vis-à-vis the goods identified in Opposer’s applications and
registrations. See Stone Lion Capital v. Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1161; Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Svcs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Although it is not necessary that the parties’ goods be identical to support a
finding of likely confusion, see Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d
1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we find in this case that they are, in
the main, identical. The subject application identifies “hair care products, namely,
heat protection sprays, hair conditioner, hair oils, hair spray, hair styling
preparations, shampoos” in International Class 3. Opposer’s cited applications
identify hair conditioners, essential oils and hair lotions, hair styling preparations,
and shampoos, among other hair care products in International Class 3. Opposer’s
cited registrations identify hair care products such as shampoo, hair conditioners,
hair styling products, heat and moisture protection preparations, hair gel, mousse,
balm, and creams, and hairspray in International Class 3. Likelihood of confusion
may be found with respect to an entire International Class based on the relatedness
of any item in that Class. In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB
Opposition No. 91241327
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2015); see also Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209
USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981). In this case, every hair care item identified in
Applicant’s application has a counterpart in Opposer’s cited applications and/or
registrations. We find accordingly that the parties’ goods are identical and otherwise
highly related. See In re FabFitFun, 127 USPQ2d at 1672 (goods identical and
otherwise related).
Because the goods identified in Applicant’s application and Opposer’s applications
and registrations are largely identical hair care products, we must presume that the
channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same as to these goods. Id.; In re
Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Genesco Inc. v.
Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260, 1268 (TTAB 2003) (“Given the in-part identical and in-part
related nature of the parties’ goods, and the lack of any restrictions in the
identifications thereof as to trade channels and purchasers, these … items could be
offered and sold to the same classes of purchasers through the same channels of
trade”). The parties’ respective goods, and the circumstances surrounding their
marketing, are such that they could give rise to a mistaken belief among purchasers
that the goods emanate from the same source, if the marks are similar. See Coach
Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722.
Thus, the second and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.
B. The Marks

Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of
Opposition No. 91241327
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Applicant’s and Opposer’s marks in their entireties, taking into account their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 177 USPQ at
567; Stone Lion v. Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1160; Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the goods at issue are identical or virtually identical,
the degree of similarity between them necessary to support a determination that
confusion is likely declines. Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, 127 USPQ2d at 1800.
We begin our analysis by comparing Applicant’s mark, GOOD HAIR CARE, with
Opposer’s applied-for GOOD HAIR DAY standard character mark.12 If we do not find
confusing similarity with that mark, then we are unlikely to find confusing similarity
with the marks in the other applications and registrations cited by Opposer. See In
re Max Capital Group Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010); North Face Apparel
Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., 116 USPQ2d 1217, 1225 (TTAB 2015). As Opposer
correctly notes, these two marks have the same structure, the same number of words
and syllables, and the same first two words, GOOD HAIR.13 As the Federal Circuit,
our primary reviewing court, held in a recent decision comparing DETROIT
ATHLETIC CO. with DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB:
[B]oth marks consist of three words beginning with the identical phrase
“Detroit Athletic” and ending with one-syllable “C” words (i.e., “Co.” and
“Club”). Id. Both marks, moreover, conjure an image of sporting goods or
services having a connection to Detroit. When viewed in their entireties,
the marks reveal an identical structure and a similar appearance, sound,
connotation, and commercial impression. These similarities go a long way
toward causing confusion among consumers. …

12 Application Serial No. 85939290.
13 Opposer’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 12.
Opposition No. 91241327
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The identity of the marks’ initial two words is particularly significant
because consumers typically notice those words first. See Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369 ,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and
two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because VEUVE “remains a
‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to
appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am.,
970 F.2d 874 , 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY
21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must
first notice th[e] identical lead word”). Indeed, in view of the marks’
structural similarity, the lead words are their dominant portion and are
likely to make the greatest impression on consumers.

In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Here, as in Detroit Athletic Co., since the first and dominant portion of both
marks, GOOD HAIR, is the same, Applicant’s differing third word, CARE, does not
suffice to distinguish the marks. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224
USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding similarity between CASH MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNT and THE CASH MANAGEMENT EXCHANGE because they ‘are, in
large part, identical in sound and appearance and have a general similarity in
cadence’) cited in In re Detroit Athletic Co., 128 USPQ2d at 1049. Under actual
marketing conditions, consumers do not necessarily have the luxury of making side-
by-side comparisons between marks, and must rely upon their imperfect
recollections, which generally retain a general rather than a specific impression of
marks. Dassler KG v. Roller Derby Skate Corp., 206 USPQ 255, 259 (TTAB 1980);
Mini Melts v. Reckitt Benckiser, 118 USPQ2d at 1470. Consequently, it is appropriate
to give more weight to the dominant, first portions of the parties’ respective marks.
In re Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751 (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that,
Opposition No. 91241327
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for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties. Indeed, this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.”) quoted in TiVo
Brands LLC v. Tivoli, LLC, 129 USPQ2d 1097, 1116 (TTAB 2019).
We find, accordingly, that Applicant’s GOOD HAIR CARE mark is similar to
Opposer’s applied-for GOOD HAIR DAY mark. And since Opposer’s other applied-for
marks, GOOD HAIR DAY, EVERY DAY14 and ,15 incorporate the
same wording, GOOD HAIR DAY, we find Applicant’s mark similar to those marks,
as well.
We note that the last of Opposer’s applied-for marks, , contains the
initialism GHD, which characterizes its registered marks, GHD,16 ,17 GHD
STYLE,18 and GHD PLATINUM.19 Opposer contends that:
Opposer’s GHD Mark is an acronym for GOOD HAIR DAY. … Since GHD
is known to be an acronym for GOOD HAIR DAY, potential consumers will
encounter and associate the GHD Mark with GOOD HAIR DAY. …

14 Application Serial No. 85939282.
15 Application Serial No. 85931081.
16 Reg. No. 2855191.
17 Reg. No. 3740197.
18 Reg. No. 4577990.
19 Reg. No. 4848579.
Opposition No. 91241327
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Therefore, when the public encounters Applicant’s GOOD HAIR CARE
mark they are likely to associate it with Opposer’s GHD Mark.20

Although this argument is more attenuated than Opposer’s reliance on its applied-
for marks, there is support for the proposition that initialisms, acronyms or
abbreviations may come to be recognized as shorthand for companies’ trademarks or
trade names. See, e.g., Martahus v. Video Duplication Svcs, Inc., 3 F.3d 417, 27
USPQ2d 1846, 1852 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An acronym or abbreviation made up of the
first letters of the words in the name of a business may have trade name or service
mark significance.”) (citing Nat, Cable Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1572, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he undisputed and
extensive evidence of record shows that the name ‘American Cinema Editors’ is
frequently shortened to ‘ACE’ or ‘the ACE’ by its officers, by members, by film
professionals, and in the press….”)); Am. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 207
USPQ 356, 363 (TTAB 1980) (“AMEX” protected); Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. Manu-Mine Research & Development Co., 114 USPQ 47, 48
(Comr. 1957) (“although opposer’s products are normally identified in the trade as
‘3M’ products, customers frequently refer to ‘Minnesota Mining,’ ‘MM’, ‘MMM’ and
‘Triple M’. This is illustrative of the common practice of American people to shorten,
abbreviate or use contractions….”); cf. Consolidated Natural Gas Co. v. CNG Fuel
Sys., Ltd., 118 USPQ 752 (TTAB 1985) (Opposer sufficiently pleaded that acronym
CNG, for which Applicant applied, is recognized by the public as synonymous with

20 Opposer’s brief, 14 TTABVUE 14.
Opposition No. 91241327
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Opposer, Consolidated Natural Gas Company, and has thus stated a claim under
Section 2(a)).
In support of its contention that GHD would be recognized by the relevant public
of hair care consumers as an initialism of GOOD HAIR DAY, Opposer submits the
following stipulated or uncontroverted evidence:
• “‘GHD’ is an initialism for Good Hair Day.”21
• “‘GHD’ is a well-known initialism for Good Hair day.”22
• “Opposer’s GHD trademark is a famous mark and was famous prior to the
filing date of the ‘483 Application.”23
• “Opposer’s GOOD HAIR DAY products, commonly known as GHD products,
are sold in over 50,000 salons worldwide.”24
• “Since 2003, Opposer and its predecessor have continuously used the GHD
trademark in connection with hair care preparations in U.S. commerce.”25
• “At least for the last three years, media coverage has consistently generated
upwards of $10 million each year, in the U.S. alone, in advertising value for
the GHD and GOOD HAIR DAY brand.”26

21 Stipulation ¶ 3, 11 TTABVUE 4.
22 Eyraud decl. ¶ 2, 14 TTABVUE 29.
23 Stipulation ¶ 6, 11 TTABVUE 4.
24 Eyraud decl. ¶6, 14 TTABVUE 30.
25 Stipulation ¶ 2, 11 TTABVUE 4.
26 Eyraud decl. ¶8, 14 TTABVUE 30.
Opposition No. 91241327
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• Opposer’s GHD and GOOD HAIR DAY brand has been endorsed by various
celebrities, including Victoria Beckham, Madonna, Gwyneth Paltrow, and
Jennifer Aniston.27
Opposer has submitted representative samples showing how its GHD mark has
been used publicly in conjunction with GOOD HAIR DAY. For example:
28

29

27 Eyraud decl. ¶ 7, 14 TTABVUE 30; Proehl Decl. ¶ 6, 14 TTABVUE 90.
28 Wikipedia.org 12/6/2018, ex. 1 to Eyraud decl., 14 TTABVUE 33.
29 GHDHair.com 1/11/2019, ex. 2 to Eyraud decl. 14 TTABVUE 36.
Opposition No. 91241327
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30
31

Opposer’s position is strengthened by the above evidence that its GHD trademark
is famous. Although it is difficult to discern precisely where the mark’s fame falls on
the likelihood-of-confusion spectrum, see Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont
Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that
likelihood of confusion fame varies along a spectrum), Opposer’s evidence of fame is
uncontroverted. “Fame, if it exists, plays a dominant role in the likelihood of

30 GHDHair.com, ex. 4 to Eyraud decl.,14 TTABVUE 53.
31 YouTube.com/user/ghd, ex. 4 to Eyraud decl.,14 TTABVUE 71.
Opposition No. 91241327
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confusion analysis because famous marks enjoy a broad scope of protection or
exclusivity of use. A famous mark has extensive public recognition and renown.” In
re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1086 (TTAB 2016) (citing Bose Corp. v. QSC
Audio Products Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot
Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Since Opposer’s evidence of public recognition of its mark GHD as an initialism
for “good hair day” is uncontroverted, it suffices to show, for purposes of this
opposition, that the relevant public of hair care product purchasers would recognize
GHD, as used in connection with Opposer’s products, as shorthand for GOOD HAIR
DAY. Indeed, the evidence shows GHD and GOOD HAIR DAY being used together
in Opposer’s marketing. Consequently, based on the evidence of record in this
proceeding, the above reasoning finding that GOOD HAIR CARE is confusingly
similar to GOOD HAIR DAY extends to Opposer’s GHD marks in International Class
3, as well.
Hence, the first DuPont factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion.
C. Conclusion

We have considered of all of the evidence of record and all of the arguments
presented, including evidence and arguments not specifically discussed in this
opinion, as they pertain to the relevant DuPont likelihood of confusion factors. The
evidence as a whole leads us to conclude that a likelihood of confusion exists. The
marks are similar, and the goods are identical or closely related and would move in
Opposition No. 91241327
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the same channels of trade to the same classes of customers. For the above reasons,
we conclude that Applicant’s subject mark, as used in connection with the goods
identified in the Application, so resembles the Opposer’s cited applied-for and
registered marks as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. In light of our disposition of Opposer’s Section 2(d)
claim, we do not reach its dilution claim.
Decision: The opposition to registration of Applicant’s mark GOOD HAIR CARE
is sustained under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act with respect to each of Opposer’s
applied-for marks in Application Serial Nos. 85939290, 85939282, and 85931081,
contingent upon the registration of one or more of those applied-for marks. The
opposition to registration of Applicant’s mark GOOD HAIR CARE is also sustained
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act with respect to each of Opposer’s marks in
Registration Nos. 2855191, 4577990, 3740197, and 4848579. The time for filing an
appeal or for commencing a civil action will run from the date of this decision. See
Trademark Rules 2.129(d) and 2.145, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.129(d) and 2.145.