Jeffrey Eid et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2020

11226893 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/226,893 09/13/2005 Jeffrey Eid T9047-21751US07;
IMM152F
6648
95000 7590 02/11/2020
MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C.
Immersion Corporation
1751 Pinnacle Drive
Suite 1500
Tysons Corner, VA 22102-3833
EXAMINER
SIMPSON, LIXI CHOW
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Ipdocketing@MilesStockbridge.com
awahba@milesstockbridge.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY EID, SHOICHI ENDO,
and DANNY A. GRANT

Appeal 2018-005373
Application 11/226,893
Technology Center 2600
BEFORE STACEY G. WHITE, BETH Z. SHAW, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5, 10–12, 28–40, 42, and 45–48.
Claims 2–4, 6–9, 13–27, 41, 43, and 44 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 10,
12, 14, 18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Immersion
Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed “to methods and systems for providing
customized ‘haptic messaging’ to users of handheld communication devices
in a variety of applications.” Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below with
emphases added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a handheld communication device, an input
signal, wherein the input signal is associated with a service
carrier event that is specific to a wireless service carrier of the
handheld communication device;
extracting a haptic code from the input signal;
determining a control signal based at least in part on the
extracted haptic code, wherein the control signal is configured to
cause an actuator of the handheld communication device to
output a haptic effect, wherein the haptic effect is particular to
the wireless service carrier; and
outputting the control signal to the actuator, thereby
causing the haptic effect to be output at the handheld
communication device;
wherein the determining the control signal comprises
mapping the haptic code to one of a plurality of different control
signals and then retrieving the mapped control signal from
memory, wherein each different control signal is associated with
a distinct haptic effect;
wherein the mapping to one of the different control signals
is based at least on a geographic location of the handheld
communication device, and each of the different control signals
corresponds to a different geographic location out of a plurality
of possible geographic locations;
wherein a first geographic location causes the haptic code
to be mapped to a first control signal, and a second geographic
location that is different than the first geographic location causes
the haptic code to be mapped to a second control signal that is
different than the first control signal;
wherein the first control signal is associated with a haptic
logo of a first wireless service carrier that provides service to a
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first base station in the first geographic location and is in
response to a powering on or a powering off of the handheld
communication device and is specific to the wireless service
carrier, and the second control signal is associated with a second
wireless service carrier different than the first wireless service
carrier that provides service to a second base station in the second
geographic location.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Mizikovsky US 5,255,307 Oct. 19, 1993
Alberth US 6,094,565 July 25, 2000

REJECTION
Claim 1, 5, 10–12, 28–40, 42, and 45–48 are rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Alberth in view of
Mizikovsky. Final Act. 2–8.
OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding claims 1, 5, 10–12,
28, 30, 31, 33–40, 42, and 45–48. We, however, are persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 29 and 32.

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Claims 1, 5, 10–12, 28, 30, 31, 37–40, 42, and 45–48
Haptic Code Limitations
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Alberth teaches
“extracting a haptic code from the input signal” and “mapping the haptic
code to one of a plurality of different control signals and then retrieving the
mapped control signal from memory” as recited in claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 3–5; Reply Br. 2–3. Specifically, Appellant argues that although Alberth
teaches “a handheld device that provides status indicators depending on
whether the device in in service or roaming, . . . the status indicators are
predetermined so that if using an indicator light, the light is always green if
in service, and yellow if roaming.” Appeal Br. 4. Appellant further argues
if a vibrator is used as a status indicator, then “the vibration patterns are
predetermined depending on whether the device is in service or
roaming.” Id. at 4–5. Therefore, according to Appellant, “in Alberth, any
type of input signal is merely used to indicate whether the device is in
service or roaming. The status indicator itself is pre-defined on the device
itself, and does not use a code or any type of mapping.” Id. at 5; see also
Reply 3 (“Appellants respectfully submit that Alberth clearly teaches that his
status information includes a status and not a haptic code, and, importantly,
that Alberth’s status is mapped to a ‘distinctive vibration pattern.’”).
The Examiner finds Alberth teaches “extracting a haptic code from
the input signal.” Final Act. 2. Specifically, the Examiner finds Alberth
teaches that “the control information or the status information is extracted
from the receive signals” and that “the status information is mapped to a
predetermined vibration pattern.” Id. (citing Alberth 4:7–30, 6:34–55); see
also Ans. 10 (“Alberth teaches receiving an input signal (signal 104 in
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Fig. 1) from a base station (i.e., a first wireless service carrier). The input
signal contains codes that are to be demodulated to provide a control signal
out of a plurality of control signals to control the vibrator 310 to indicate ‘in
service’, ‘roaming’ or ‘out of service’ distinctive vibration pattern.
Therefore, based on the broadest reasonable interpretation, the input signal
includes haptic code and the haptic code is mapped to a particular control
signal to provide a distinctive vibration pattern.”).
The Examiner further finds Alberth teaches “mapping the haptic code
to one of a plurality of different control signals and then retrieving the
mapped control signal from memory.” Final Act. 3. Specifically, the
Examiner finds Alberth teaches that “the memory 305 permanently stores
operating instructions and user definable information [and that] the user
definable information can be vibration patterns, which corresponds to a
plurality of different control signals, each provides a distinct vibration
pattern.” Id. (citing Alberth 4:54–5:5); see also Ans. 10–11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred in finding Alberth teaches the disputed limitations. First, we agree
with the Examiner that “haptic code” as recited in claim 1 is broad enough to
encompass the status information in the received signal. Although the
Specification does not provide a definition of the term “haptic code,” it uses
the term broadly to encompass information that is used either directly or
indirectly to determine a haptic effect. See Spec. ¶ 52. For example, the
Specification describes how “the extracted haptic code may be directly
applied to the actuator for rendering the desired haptic effect.” Id.
Alternatively, the Specification describes how a table of haptic codes can be
used indirectly to look-up a control signal that causes a haptic effect:
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In another embodiment, the haptic code may be configured
according to a predetermined scheme or protocol that includes,
for example, a table of haptic codes ( some of which may be
associated with one or more haptic logos) versus control signals
for rendering the corresponding haptic effects. In this way, a
processor in the handheld communication device can look up the
corresponding control signal from the table based on the
extracted haptic code, and output the selected control signal to
the actuator for rendering the desired haptic effect.
Id. Thus, the broadest reasonable interpretation of a “haptic code” is a code
that, either directly or indirectly, is used to generate a haptic effect.
Second, we agree with the Examiner that Alberth teaches the disputed
limitations. Alberth teaches how the transceiver of the mobile phone
receives RF signals, which includes control information such as status
information—whether the network is “in service, “roaming,” or “out of
service.” Alberth 4:7–30, 6:34–55. Alberth further teaches that instead of
displaying the status information, the controller could use a vibrator to
provide a status check by using a different vibration pattern for the different
statuses. Id. at 6:34–55. Alberth also teaches using a memory to store the
operating instructions and vibration patterns. Id. at 4:54–67. Accordingly,
Alberth teaches “extracting a haptic code from the input signal”—that is
extracting status information from the received RF signal—and “mapping
the haptic code to one of a plurality of different control signals and then
retrieving the mapped control signal from memory”—that is matching the
status information with a stored vibration pattern in the phone’s memory and
using the specific vibration pattern to indicate the status.
Haptic Logo Limitation
Appellant also argues the Examiner erred in finding Alberth and
Mizikovsky teach “the first control signal is associated with a haptic logo of
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a first wireless service carrier” as recited in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 5–6;
Reply Br. 3. According to Appellant, a haptic logo requires a distinct
vibration pattern. Appeal Br. 5. Appellant argues Alberth uses distinct
vibration patterns to distinguish between home and roaming services, not to
identify a particular wireless service carrier:
In contrast, the status indicator in Alberth is solely based on
whether the device is in service or roaming, and has nothing to
do with the particular wireless service carrier. The vibratory
status indicator in Alberth is “distinct” in order to distinguish
between home and roaming states, and has nothing to do with
identifying a particular wireless service carrier. Instead, any type
of home system indicator in Alberth (e.g., a green light or
predetermined vibration pattern) is identical no matter which
service carrier is servicing the device in its home system.
Id.
Appellant further argues that Mizikovsky does not cure the
deficiencies in Alberth. Appeal Br. 6. Specifically, Appellant argues that
“Mizikovsky discloses a control message related to a service provider that is
used merely to determine whether a mobile device in its home system or
roaming” and “as with Alberth, any type of home system indicator in
Mizikovsky is identical no matter which service carrier is servicing the
device in its home system.” Id.
The Examiner finds Alberth teaches using a specific vibration
pattern—such as 500ms on/500ms off—to indicate the home wireless
service carrier. Final Act. 4. The Examiner also finds Alberth teaches a
distinct separate vibration pattern associated with a second wireless service
carrier when the device is roaming. Id.; see also Ans. 10–11 (discussing the
different vibration patterns for different wireless service carriers). The
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Examiner further concludes that “the claim does not include limitation
specifying ‘a different indicator no matter which service carrier is servicing
the device in its home system.’” Ans. 11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred. First, we agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable
interpretation of claim 1 does not require a distinct haptic logo for every
wireless service carrier. Claim 1 does not recite the word distinct, but rather
merely recites “a haptic logo” without a qualifier that would require the logo
to be distinct. Although the Specification (Spec. ¶ 50) discusses distinct
haptic logos, we do not read limitations from the Specification into the
claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Regardless
of the general contentions and imputed intended meanings articulated by
Appellant in the Appeal Brief, “[i]t is the claims that measure the invention.”
See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the
explanations contained in the written description, it is important
not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the
claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the
written description may not be read into a claim when the claim
language is broader than the embodiment.
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Electro Med. Sys. S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). “[A]lthough the specification often describes very
specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit has] repeatedly
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.” Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations
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omitted). Because Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the
scope of the claims, they are unpersuasive. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344,
1348 (CCPA 1982).
Second, we agree with the Examiner that Alberth teaches the disputed
limitation. Specifically, Alberth teaches using a specific vibration pattern—
that is a haptic logo—to identify the home service (a first wireless carrier
service) while at the same teach teaching a different vibration pattern when a
second wireless service carrier (roaming) is used. Alberth 6:34–55.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 along
with independent claims 5, 10, and 30—which contain commensurate
limitations and are argued as a group (Appeal Br. 6)—and dependent claims
11, 12, 28, 31, 37–40, 42, and 45–48, which are not argued separately.

Claims 33–36
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Alberth teaches that
the “haptic code is further associated with a haptic logo that corresponds to
the wireless service carrier that is operative in the geographic location” as
recited in claims 33–36. Appeal Br. 6–7. Specifically, Appellant argues that
“the status information in Alberth (and similar disclosure in Mizikovsky) at
most merely indicates whether the device is roaming or not. There is no
information within the status code that could be considered the claimed
‘haptic logo.’” Id. at 7.
The Examiner finds that, for the reasons discussed above with
claim 1, Alberth teaches that “the haptic code is further associated with a
haptic logo that corresponds to the wireless service carrier that is operative
in the geographic location.” Final Act. 7 (citing Alberth 6:9–53); see also
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Ans. 12 (“As described above, based on the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the distinctive vibration pattern for in service is a ‘haptic
logo’ of the first wireless carrier.”).
For the reasons discussed above in the preceding section, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred. Specifically,
Alberth teaches using a specific vibration pattern—that is a haptic logo—to
identify the home service (a first wireless service) while at the same teach
teaching a different vibration pattern when a second wireless service carrier
(roaming) is used. Alberth 6:34–55.
Claims 29 and 32
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Alberth teaches
“wherein the haptic code includes a prescribed time at which to provide the
haptic effect; and wherein the method further comprises: determining the
prescribed time based on the extracted haptic code, wherein the haptic effect
is to be output at the prescribed time” as recited in claims 29 and 32. Appeal
Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant argues that “the status information in Alberth
and in Mizikovsky at most merely indicates whether the device is roaming
or not” and does not include “timing information in any of the received
signal that indicates a ‘prescribed time’ to output a haptic effect.” Id.
The Examiner finds Alberth teaches the disputed limitation. See Final
Act. 6–7; Ans. 12. The Examiner concludes that “the claim limitation does
not specifically say ‘extracting timing information from the received signal’.
Instead, the claim limits ‘determining the prescribed time based on the
extracted haptic code.’” Ans. 12. Based on that claim construction, the
Examiner finds that “Alberth’s determination of the distinctive vibration
pattern (with a prescribed timing of on/off time) meets the claim limitation
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in claim 29 and 32.” Id.; see also Final Act 7 (finding Alberth teaches that
“the vibrating on/off time is the prescribed time” (citing Alberth 6:45–53)).
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments as the Examiner has not
identified sufficient evidence or provided sufficient explanation as to how
Alberth teaches “determining the prescribed time based on the extracted
haptic code, wherein the haptic effect is to be output at the prescribed time,”
as recited in claims 29 and 32. Although Alberth teaches how long the
vibrator should vibrate, the cited section does not teach or suggest a specific
prescribed time for the haptic effect or obtaining that timing information
based on the extracted haptic code. See Alberth 6:45–53. Accordingly, we
agree with Appellant the Examiner’s finding that Alberth teaches the
disputed limitation is in error because it is not supported by a preponderance
of the evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of
the evidence).
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 29 and 32.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 10–12, 28, 30, 31, 33–40, 42,
and 45–48 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 29 and 32 is reversed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5, 10–12,
28–40, 42,
45–48
103(a) Alberth,
Mizikovsky
1, 5, 10–12,
28, 30, 31,
33–40, 42,
45–48
29, 32

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART