Jeffrey Armitstead

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2018001367 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/252,640 10/04/2011 Jeffrey ARMITSTEAD RESMED 3.3-068 C (515) 1072
147311 7590 04/02/2021
Botos Churchill IP Law LLP
430 Mountain Avenue
Suite 401
New Providence, NJ 07974
EXAMINER
BLOCH, MICHAEL RYAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3791
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto@bciplaw.com
rbotos@bciplaw.com
rchurchill@bciplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JEFFREY ARMITSTEAD
____________

Appeal 2018-001367
Application 13/252,640
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, BRANDON J. WARNER, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

WARNER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 52–57, 59–65, 67, and 84–99, which
are all the pending claims. Appeal Br. 2. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing, scheduled for
September 19, 2019, was waived.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as ResMed
Limited. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosed invention relates to “detection of sleep
disordered breathing patterns and the discrimination between patterns of
different disease states such as obstructive sleep apnea, central sleep apnea
and Cheyne-Stokes breathing and mixed sleep apnea.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 52
and 60 are independent. Claim 52, reproduced below with bracketed
notations and emphasis added, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
52. A method for a controlled ventilatory apparatus to
automatically determine an absence or a presence of Cheyne-
Stokes breathing in a person comprising:
[(a)] providing a signal indicative of respiration of a
person derived from a sensor;
repeatedly in a processor, [(b)] determining a presence of
an apnea or an hypopnea from said signal and, for the
determined presence of an apnea or hypopnea, [(c)] calculating
a maximum increase from multiple increases of said signal of a
hyperpnoea following the determined presence of an apnea or
an hypopnea, wherein each of the multiple increases is
determined from a predetermined time interval in a period of
the hyperpnoea between its beginning and maximum, wherein a
plurality of said maximum increases are determined from a
plurality of hyperpnoeas, the plurality of maximum increases
including a first maximum increase and a second maximum
increase such that the first maximum increase is from one
hyperpnoea and the second maximum increase is from another
hyperpnoea;
[(d)] determining any peak in a frequency spectrum of
said signal; and
in the processor, [(e)] determining the absence of
Cheyne-Stokes breathing based on the first maximum increase,
and [(f)] determining the presence of Cheyne-Stokes breathing
based on a combination of a peak in the frequency spectrum
and the second maximum increase, the first maximum increase
being greater than the second maximum increase such that the
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first maximum increase characterizes a hyperpnoea typical of
obstructive sleep apnea and the second maximum increase
characterizes a hyperpnoea typical of Cheyne-Stokes breathing.

REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review:
I. Claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply
with the written description requirement. Final Act. 3–6.
II. Claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply
with the enablement requirement. Id. at 6–10.
III. Claims 52–57, 59–65, 67, and 84–99 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Id. at 10–12.

ANALYSIS
Rejection I – Claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97
as failing to comply with the written description requirement
The Examiner finds that there is insufficient written description
support for the recitation in independent claims 52 and 60 of “a signal
indicative of respiration,” which the Examiner states “is much broader than
what the specification supports.” Final Act. 3. In other words, the Examiner
states that the claims are now using “broader terms” to encompass “all
conceivable signals that are indicative of respiration,” whereas the
Specification focuses on a particular jump determination of a ventilation
signal only. Id. at 4–5.
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The fundamental factual inquiry for sufficient written description is
whether Appellant’s Specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those
skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in
possession of the invention as presently claimed. See Ariad Pharm., Inc., v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
We agree with Appellant that the Specification provides adequate
support for the recitation of “a signal indicative of respiration” sufficient to
satisfy the written description requirement. See Appeal Br. 17–20; Reply
Br. 8–11. In particular, we agree with Appellant that the Specification
contemplates making a diagnosis using “a signal indicative of respiration”
(Appeal Br. 19, citing Spec. ¶ 19), sets forth using a “ventilation signal” as
an example signal rather than a required signal (Appeal Br. 19–20), and
discloses at least one other signal, in the form of an oxygen saturation signal,
that could similarly be used in making the diagnosis because such a signal
“will undergo the classic waxing and waning pattern also characteristic of
ventilation,” like a ventilation signal, such that the “same pattern recognition
techniques may be applied to both signals” (Appeal Br. 20, citing Spec.
¶¶ 61–63). Thus, these two signals, encompassed by the recited term “a
signal indicative of respiration” have explicit written description support in
the original disclosure of the Specification.
In short, we find that the disclosure of the Specification reasonably
conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor was in possession of the
invention as recited in claims 52 and 60 at the time of filing. Accordingly,
we do not sustain the rejection of claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and
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94–97 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the
written description requirement.

Rejection II – Claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97
as failing to comply with the enablement requirement
In rejecting claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 as failing
to comply with the enablement requirement, the Examiner determines that
the Specification, “while being enabling for processing a ventilation signal,
does not reasonably provide enablement for [the more general term,] a signal
indicative of respiration,” similar to the discussion above. Final Act. 6. In
particular, after walking through the Wands factors, the Examiner concludes
that “the claimed invention does not appear to enable the claimed scope for
the claimed processing steps for all types of disparate signals indicative of
respiration to function the same as described with the ventilation signal.” Id.
at 7.
Insofar as the substance of the enablement requirement is concerned,
the dispositive issue is whether Appellant’s disclosure, considering the level
of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the application, would have
enabled a person of such skill to make and use the claimed invention without
undue experimentation. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (CCPA
1982). Some factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure
would require undue experimentation include: (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in
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the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Here, the Examiner’s enablement rejection appears to rely on the
same basis as that relied upon in the written description rejection discussed
above. Namely, the Examiner determines that the claims lack enablement
because “the claimed invention does not appear to enable the claimed scope
for the claimed processing steps for all types of disparate signals indicative
of respiration to function the same as described with the ventilation signal.”
Final Act. 7; see id. at 7–10. As above, however, to the extent that this
determination appears to relate to the breadth of the claims, we agree with
Appellant that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that at least
respiration signals and oxygen saturation signals (both types of a signal
indicative of respiration) are sufficiently similar that the “same pattern
recognition techniques may be applied to both signals,” as also recited in the
claims. Appeal Br. 24, citing Spec. ¶ 63 (emphasis omitted).
Thus, the Examiner has not adequately explained how the breadth of
the “signal indicative of respiration” limitation, so long as such signal would
be suitable for the rest of the claim, would relate to undue experimentation.
The Examiner does not articulate any findings or analysis to show that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been unable to make and use
the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In other words, we
agree with Appellant that the Examiner “has not met the initial burden of
presenting a reasonable basis to question the enablement provided for the
claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 21.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, the Examiner has not met
the burden of establishing that claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and
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94–97 lack enablement. On this basis, we do not sustain the rejection of
claims 52, 54–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

Rejection III – Claims 52–57, 59–65, 67, and 84–99
as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The
first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
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patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised
guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating
subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. That guidance “extracts
and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to
explain that the abstract idea exception includes” the following three
groupings: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices,
commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7,
2019) (the “Revised Guidance”).
Under the Revised Guidance, in determining whether a claim is
patent-eligible, we first look to whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, including one of the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas
(“Step 2A, Prong 1”). Id. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim
includes additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, “that integrate
the [judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., apply, rely on, or
use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong 2”). Id. at 54–55.
Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application do we then look to
whether the claim “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of
limitations” that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or simply “appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
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previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception” (“Step 2B”). Id. at 56.
Appellant argues all the pending claims together as a group. See
Appeal Br. 4–17; Reply Br. 2–8. We select independent claim 52 as
representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 52. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, with a focus on
representative claim 52, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed
to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea, without significantly more.
Final Act. 10–12. The Examiner further determines that the claims do not
include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception. See id.

Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
(Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1)
Appellant’s claim 52 recites a method to automatically determine an
absence or a presence of Cheyne-Stokes breathing in a person, where the
method steps include: (a) “providing a signal indicative of respiration of a
person”; (b) “determining a presence of an apnea or an hypopnea from said
signal”; then (c) “calculating a maximum increase from multiple increases of
said signal of a hyperpnoea,” where a plurality of said maximum increases is
determined from a plurality of hyperpnoeas and includes a first maximum
increase and a second maximum increase (such that the first maximum
increase is from one hyperpnoea and the second maximum increase is from
another hyperpnoea); (d) “determining any peak in a frequency spectrum of
said signal”; and then (e) “determining the absence of Cheyne-Stokes
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breathing based on the first maximum increase” and (f) “determining the
presence of Cheyne-Stokes breathing based on a combination of a peak in
the frequency spectrum and the second maximum increase.” Appeal Br. 26
(Claims App.).
These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation,
recite steps for diagnosing Cheyne-Stokes breathing based on comparative
observation of maximum increases in a respiration signal. In particular,
step (a) involves insignificant extra-solution activity in the form of data
gathering and, although claim 52 recites that steps (b)–(f) are performed by
a “processor,” the underlying activities recited in these steps are all acts that
could be performed by a human, either mentally or manually, using pen and
paper, without the use of a computer or any other machine. By performing
these comparative observations in his or her head or using pen and paper, a
human could likewise diagnose the presence or absence of Cheyne-Stokes
breathing. Simply put, claim 52 recites a concept, including an evaluation or
judgment, which can be performed in the human mind, which is a mental
process and, therefore, an abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52. See also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in
the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable
mental processes).

Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
(Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2)
Having concluded that claim 52 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong 1), we next consider whether the claim recites
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“additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical application”
(Step 2A, Prong 2). Beyond the abstract idea, claim 52 additionally recites a
“sensor” and a “processor.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App.). Appellant
ostensibly maintains that claim 52 is not directed to an abstract idea due to
these additional elements.
Yet, to the extent Appellant maintains that claim 52 is patent-eligible
because the claim recites the use of a data-gathering sensor or a computer
processor, we note that the Court in Alice expressly rejected a substantially
similar argument. The claims in Alice “require[d] the use of a computer to
create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous
instructions; in other words, ‘[t]he computer [was] itself the intermediary.”’
Alice, 573 U.S. at 224. Still, the Court held that the use of a computer did
not render the claims patent-eligible. See id. at 223 (holding “the mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention”).
Here, Appellant’s claim 52 recites a “sensor” for gathering data and a
“processor” for making determinations based on comparative observations.
But these elements are described in the Specification at a high level of
generality, i.e., as generic computer components. We find no indication in
the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that these
additional elements implement the abstract idea with specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. And “after
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
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does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in technology and/or a technical field to the claimed invention
or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract
idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Revised
Guidance.2
Here, claim 52 does not recite a specific set of rules that would result
in an improvement to technology analogous to the claims in McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Instead, claim 52 recites results-based rules for each of steps (b) through (f),
without providing sufficient technological details for how to achieve the
desired results. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[o]ur law demands
more” than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution,
with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it”). Further,
Appellant does not identify, and we do not find, any portion of the

2 The Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. If
the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, as
determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the claim is not
“directed to” the judicial exception.
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Specification that describes a particular manner of determining a protocol or
otherwise indicates an improvement to technology.
We do not see any parallel between the rules described in McRO that
result in an improvement to technology in 3-D animation techniques, and the
result-based, functional steps recited in Appellant’s claim 52. Claim 52 may
well result in an improvement in diagnosing Cheyne-Stokes breathing, i.e., a
mental process that is the abstract idea itself. However, the additional
limitations in Appellant’s claim 52 do no more than implement the abstract
idea with generic computer components.
Finally, we are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s
argument regarding preemption. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court
has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from
patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 216. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption
is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason,
questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter [but] the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
We find nothing of record, short of attorney argument, that attributes
an improvement in technology and/or a technical field to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the
abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the
Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. At most, the
additional elements recited in claim 52, considered individually and as an
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ordered combination, do no more than generally link the use of the abstract
idea to a particular technological environment or field of use involving
diagnosing Cheyne-Stokes breathing.

Inventive Concept: Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Step 2B of the Revised Guidance
Having determined under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework
that claim 52 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B
of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice
framework, whether claim 52 includes additional elements or a combination
of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As described above, the only claim elements beyond the abstract idea
are the recited “sensor” and “processor.” However, these are no more than
the inclusion of generic computer components to “apply” the abstract idea.
Appellant cannot reasonably contend that there is a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the operation of these generic computer components
is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing
in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 52 require
any specialized hardware or inventive computer components, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving and
processing information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with
Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to
eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive
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concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the
Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer
functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also BSG Tech LLC
v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant asserts that the limitations recited in claim 52, considered as
an ordered combination, improve the functioning of processors in respiratory
event detection devices. See Appeal Br. 16. But the limitations identified
by Appellant, even if novel and non-obvious, recite no elements beyond the
abstract idea. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is
termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation
of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original). A novel
and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless,
patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
Here, Appellant has not identified, and we do not find, any additional
elements recited in claim 52 that, individually or in combination, provide
significantly more than the abstract idea. Instead, the additional elements
recite generic computer components for executing the abstract idea.
Upon consideration of claim 52 in light of the 2019 Revised
Guidance, we are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 52 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 52, and of claims 53–57,
59–65, 67, and 84–99, which fall with claim 52.
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DECISION
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 52, 54–57,
59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 52, 54–57,
59, 60, 62–65, 67, and 94–97 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 52–57, 59–65,
67, and 84–99 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
52, 54–57,
59, 60,
62–65, 67,
94–97
112 ¶ 1 Written Description
52,
54–57,
59, 60,
62–65,
67, 94–97
52, 54–57,
59, 60,
62–65, 67,
94–97
112 ¶ 1 Enablement
52,
54–57,
59, 60,
62–65,
67, 94–97
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Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
52–57,
59–65, 67,
84–99
101 Eligibility
52–57,
59–65,
67, 84–99

Overall
Outcome

52–57,
59–65,
67, 84–99

AFFIRMED