Jeff Littlejohn et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 13, 201914717669 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/717,669 05/20/2015 Jeff Littlejohn 341-CIT-03-2009 5280 86548 7590 12/13/2019 Garlick & Markison (IH) 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 2000 Austin, TX 78701 EXAMINER DAGNEW, SABA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3682 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/13/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): MMurdock@TEXASPATENTS.COM bpierotti@texaspatents.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JEFF LITTLEJOHN, BOBBI DENISE SCHUSTER, KEYIN HSU, and JENNIFER L. SMITH ____________ Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and KENNETH G. SCHOPFER Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed December 21, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 6, 2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 10, 2018) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed August 2, 2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as iHeartMedia Management Services. Appeal Br. 4. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 2 CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant describes that the disclosure “relates generally to utilizing unique identifiers, and more particularly to tracking public performances of works using unique identifiers” (Spec. ¶ 2). Claims 1, 8, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of using a broadcasting system to track public performances of works: [(a)] coupling a server system to a plurality of content libraries, each of the plurality of content libraries employing particular content identification schemes different from content identification schemes employed by other content libraries; [(b)] receiving at the server system, from particular content libraries of the plurality of content libraries, library content identifiers identifying particular works according to the particular content identification schemes; [(c)] assigning, by the server system, unified numbering system (UNS) content identifiers to each of the particular works, wherein a single UNS content identifier is assigned to a single work, even when that single work is assigned different library content identifiers by different content libraries of the plurality of content libraries; [(d)] storing information linking the UNS content identifiers to the library content identifiers in a UNS database; [(e)] receiving at the server system, a message from a broadcaster including an alias associated with a publicly performed work, wherein the alias includes at least one of the library content identifiers; [(f)] determining, using a matching subsystem of the server system, which UNS content identifier stored in the UNS database is linked to the at least one of the library content identifiers; and Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 3 [(g)] identifying the publicly performed work based on the UNS content identifier linked to the at least one of the library content identifiers included in the message from the broadcaster. REJECTIONS2 Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chen (US 2006/0116926 A1, published June 1, 2006) and Dyko et al. (US 5,956,708, issued Sept. 21, 1999) (“Dyko”). ANALYSIS Patent Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 8–20). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 8–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to software per se. Ans. 3. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 4 patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). We are not persuaded, as an initial matter, by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of patent eligibility (Appeal Br. 13; see also, e.g., Reply Br. 7–8). The Federal Circuit has observed repeatedly that “the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has, thus, held that the USPTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for the rejection, “together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (alteration in original). Thus, what is required of the Office is that it sets forth the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 5 and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132. Id.; see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Section 132 is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.”). Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner notified Appellant that the claims are directed to “tracking [the] public performance of works using unique identifier[s],” which the Examiner concluded is similar to other concepts that courts have held abstract (Final Act. 2–3); and that the claims do not include additional elements or a combination of elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (id. at 3–4). The Examiner, thus, set forth the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. And we find that, in doing so, the Examiner established a prima facie case of patent ineligibility. After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 6 applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id.3 Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test; in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate 3 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 7 that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner mischaracterized the concept to which claim 1 is directed (Reply Br. 4),4 or that the Examiner otherwise erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 12–17). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification, including the claim language, that the claims focus on an 4 The Examiner’s characterization of claim 1 is, in our view, fully consistent with the Specification, including the claim language. That the claim includes more words than the phrase the Examiner used to articulate the abstract idea, and that the Examiner, thus, articulates the abstract idea at a higher level of abstraction than would Appellant is an insufficient basis to persuasively argue that the claim language has been mischaracterized. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction. As the Board has done, the claimed abstract idea could be described as generating menus on a computer, or generating a second menu from a first menu and sending the second menu to another location. It could be described in other ways, including, as indicated in the specification, taking orders from restaurant customers on a computer.”). Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 8 abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is entitled “TRACKING PUBLIC PERFORMANCES OF DIFFERENTLY INDEXED WORKS,” and describes in the Background section that broadcasters are often responsible for paying royalties on copyrighted works based on how often the copyrighted work has been publicly performed (Spec. ¶ 3). However, according to the Specification, known arrangements and techniques for tracking public performances are less than perfect such that broadcasters are left to wonder how often a work has actually been publicly performed (id.¶ 5). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to improve upon these prior techniques by tracking public performances of works using unique identifiers (id. ¶ 2). Claim 1, thus, recites a method of tracking public performances of works comprising: (1) receiving from each of a plurality of content libraries, library content identifiers employed by the library to identify particular works, i.e., coupling a server system to a plurality of content libraries, each of the plurality of content libraries employing particular content identification schemes different from content identification schemes employed by other content libraries; [and] receiving at the server system, from particular content libraries of the plurality of content libraries, library content identifiers identifying particular works according to the particular content identification schemes (steps (a) and (b)); (2) assigning a single unified (“UNS”) content identifier to each work and storing information associating the single UNS identifier for a particular work with the plural library content identifiers assigned to that same work, i.e., Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 9 assigning, by the server system, unified numbering system (UNS) content identifiers to each of the particular works, wherein a single UNS content identifier is assigned to a single work, even when that single work is assigned different library content identifiers by different content libraries of the plurality of content libraries; [and] storing information linking the UNS content identifiers to the library content identifiers in a UNS database (steps (c) and (d)); (3) receiving a message from a broadcaster, including a library content identifier for a publicly performed work, i.e., “receiving at the server system, a message from a broadcaster including an alias associated with a publicly performed work, wherein the alias includes at least one of the library content identifiers” (step (e)); and (4) identifying the publicly performed work by determining which UNS content identifier is associated with the received library content identifier, i.e., determining, using a matching subsystem of the server system, which UNS content identifier stored in the UNS database is linked to the at least one of the library content identifiers; and identifying the publicly performed work based on the UNS content identifier linked to the at least one of the library content identifiers included in the message from the broadcaster (steps (f) and (g)). These limitations, given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite a method for tracking how often a particular work is publicly performed by (1) assigning a unique identifier to the work and associating the unique identifier with one or more library content identifiers employed to identify the particular work; (2) receiving a message from a broadcaster, including a library content identifier for a publicly performed work; and (3) determining that the particular work has been publicly performed if the received library content identifier is associated with the unique identifier. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 10 Claim 1 recites that the method is performed using a server system. Yet, the underlying processes recited in the claim are all acts that could be performed by a human, e.g., mentally or manually, using pen and paper, without the use of a computer or any other machine. For example, a person could receive, via oral or written communication, library content identifiers identifying particular works and a message from a broadcaster that a particular work has been publicly performed. Such a person, mentally or using pen and paper, also could assign a single UNS content identifier to each work; associate that single identifier with the plural library content identifiers employed to identify the work; and identify the publicly performed work in the broadcaster message by determining which UNS identifier is associated with the library content identifier included in the message. Simply put, claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., a concept performed in the human mind, including an evaluation or judgment, and therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). See also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Federal Circuit treats “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”). Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 11 Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). The only additional elements recited in claim 1, beyond the abstract idea, are the claimed “server system,” including a “matching subsystem,” and the “UNS database” — elements that are disclosed in the Specification at a high degree of generality, i.e., as generic computer components (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 88–90). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 12 abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Revised Guidance.5 Appellant argues that the claims do not simply recite gathering and determining some abstract knowledge without any practical step applying that knowledge (Appeal Br. 14). Instead, according to Appellant, the claims recite a specialized technique of “assigning special UNS content identifiers, and then using those special UNS content identifiers to improve a broadcasting system’s ability to identify the same work broadcast by different broadcasters, even when those broadcasters use different identifiers for the same work” (id.). Citing Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Appellant, thus, maintains that the present claims are patent eligible because the claims, like those found patent eligible in Classen, “recite a real-world use of the information to achieve a real-world result, with real-world consequences, i.e. identifying which work was broadcast (publicly performed) by a particular broadcaster” (id. at 14– 15; see also Reply Br. 6). Appellant’s reliance on Classen is misplaced. In Classen, the claims held patent eligible recited methods that gathered and analyzed the effects of particular immunization schedules on the later development of chronic immune-mediated disorders in mammals in order to identify a lower risk 5 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 13 immunization schedule, and then immunized mammalian subjects in accordance with the identified lower risk schedule (thereby lowering the risk that the immunized subject would later develop chronic immune-mediated diseases). Classen, 659 F.3d at 1060–61. Although the analysis step was an abstract mental process that collected and compared known information, the Federal Circuit concluded that the immunization step was meaningful because it integrated the results of the analysis into a specific and tangible method that resulted in the method “moving from abstract scientific principle to specific application.” Id. at 1066–68. See also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55 n.26 (citing the situation in Classen as exemplary of considerations that are indicative that an additional element has integrated the judicial exception into a practical application: “For example, an immunization step that integrates an abstract idea into a specific process of immunizing that lowers the risk that immunized patents will later develop chronic immune-mediated diseases.”). Appellant ostensibly maintains here that using the UNS identifier and information included in the message from the broadcaster, to identify which work was publicly performed, corresponds to the immunization step of Classen (Appeal Br. 15), i.e., that “identifying the publicly performed work based on the UNS content identifier linked to the at least one of the library content identifiers included in the message from the broadcaster,” as recited in claim 1, integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. Yet, to the extent this step may not be considered part of the abstract idea and, therefore, an “additional element” to be considered in determining whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, it is merely insignificant post-solution activity to present the output generated by the Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 14 abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “add[ing] insignificant extra-solution activity to the” abstract idea as an example of when a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co of Can., 771 F.Supp.2d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2011) aff’d, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “providing data . . . [is] insignificant post-solution activity”); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (pointing out that “merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”). We are not persuaded that identifying a work that was publicly performed is an improvement to technology or a technical field analogous to the step in Classen of immunizing according to an optimal risk schedule, which represented a practical use that went beyond insignificant post- solution activity. Although the identification of a publicly performed work may improve a business process, i.e., determining the royalties to be paid for public performances of copyrighted works, it does not achieve an improved technological result. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim are no more than generic components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 15 a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Referencing the Federal Circuit’s holding in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Appellant asserts that the inventive concept in the claims “can be found in the non-conventional arrangement of individual claim elements” (Appeal Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 11–12). Yet, Appellant does not identify the alleged non-conventional arrangement of elements that provides the inventive concept. Appellant also likens the present claims to the claims at issue in DDR Holdings (Appeal Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 11). But, we can find no parallel between the present claims and those at issue in DDR Holdings. The claims in DDR Holdings were directed to retaining website visitors, and in particular to a system that modified the conventional web browsing experience by directing a user of a host website who clicks an advertisement to a “store within a store” on the host website, rather than to the advertiser’s third-party website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–1258. Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 16 The court determined “the claims address a business challenge (retaining website visitors) [that] is a challenge particular to the Internet.” Id. at 1257. The court also determined that the invention was “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” and that the claimed invention did not simply use computers to serve a conventional business purpose. Id. Rather, there was a change to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol. Id. Appellant asserts here that the claims recite a combination of receiving different content identifiers from different content libraries for the same work and linking those different identifiers to the same UNS identifier so that a broadcast work can be correctly identified even if different broadcasters use different identifiers for the same work (Appeal Br. 20). Appellant argues that this combination “improves [the] operation of existing automated tracking systems, which often rely on statistical methods to determine how many times a particular work has been publicly performed” (id. (citing Spec. ¶ 47)). But, we are not persuaded that determining the number of times a work is publicly performed so that appropriate compensation is paid for use of the work is a challenge particular to computer networks or one necessarily rooted in computer technology. Also, unlike the situation in DDR Holdings, there is no indication here that the claimed server system is used other than in its normal, expected, and routine manner for receiving, storing, and processing information. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 17 sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–20, which fall with claim 1. Obviousness We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 8, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) at least because neither Chen nor Dyko, individually or in combination, discloses or suggests “assigning . . . unified numbering system (UNS) content identifiers to each of the particular works, wherein a single UNS content identifier is assigned to a single work, even when that single work is assigned different library content identifiers by different content libraries of the plurality of content libraries,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 8 and 16 (Appeal Br. 28). The Examiner cites Dyko as disclosing the argued feature (Final Act. 10–11 (citing Dyko col. 8, ll. 31–57, col. 11, ll. 1–13, Fig. 4)). Yet, the best that Dyko discloses is that different identifiers are assigned to different articles. We find nothing in the cited portions of Dyko that discloses or suggests assigning a UNS identifier to a single work that has been assigned different content identifiers by different content libraries, as called for in claims 1, 8, and 16. In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2–7, 9–15, and 17–20. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). Appeal 2018-006488 Application 14/717,669 18 CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 1–20 103(a) Chen, Dyko 1–20 Overall Outcome 1–20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation