Jean-Fran¿ois Macq

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 29, 2020

13517326 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/517,326 06/20/2012 Jean-François Macq LUTZ201466 / 802693 1800
48116 7590 05/29/2020
FAY SHARPE/NOKIA
1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor
The Halle Building
Cleveland, OH 44115-1843
EXAMINER
VOLENTINE, REBECCA A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2483
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
docketing@faysharpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEAN-FRANÇOIS MACQ
Appeal 2018-007534
Application 13/517,326
Technology Center 2400
Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We refer to the Specification, filed June 20, 2012 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed October 18, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed April
24, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed May 25, 2018
(“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed July 18, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).

2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Alcatel Lucent.
Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 13/517,326

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method and arrangement for video
coding. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized in
italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for encoding at least one video stream, said
method comprising:
receiving said at least one input video stream,
constructing of a sequence of predicted pixel blocks,
processing said sequence of predicted pixel blocks and
corresponding blocks of said at least one input video stream to
obtain a sequence of processed residual pixel data,
wherein said sequence of predicted pixel blocks is
constructed from input encoding structure data comprising
sequence, picture, slice headers and pixel prediction data
derived from reference input data, said input encoding
structure data further undergoing combined entropy encoding
with said processed residual pixel data to thereby obtain at
least one encoded video stream.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Nakamura
Johar
Brown
Chatterjee
US 2007/0147502 A1
US 2008/0219356 A1
US 2009/0196344 A1
US 2010/0118982 A1
June 28, 2007
Sept. 11, 2008
Aug. 6, 2009
May 13, 2010
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–12, and 14–16 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Johar and
Chatterjee. Final Act. 7–16.
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Claims 4 and 13 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Johar, Chatterjee, and Brown. Final
Act. 16–17.
Claims 8 and 17 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Johar, Chatterjee, and Nakamura.
Final Act. 17–19.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from
which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 7–9) and (2) the Examiner’s Answer in
response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 14–20) and concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for
emphasis.
35 U.S.C. § 103
Claim 1 recites, in pertinent part, “wherein said sequence of predicted
pixel blocks is constructed from input encoding structure data comprising
sequence, picture, slice headers and pixel prediction data derived from
reference input data, said input encoding structure data further undergoing
combined entropy encoding with said processed residual pixel data to
thereby obtain at least one encoded video stream.”
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In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner primarily cites Johar, but finds as
follows:
Although Johar discloses in at least Fig.8 encoding the pixel
data and the macroblock specifications for efficiently
constructing an output video bitstream, Johar does not explicitly
disclose said input encoding structure data further undergoing
combined entropy encoding with said processed residual pixel
data to thereby obtain at least one encoded video stream. In
addition, although Johar discloses using various parameters,
Johar does not explicitly disclose wherein said sequence of
predicted pixel blocks is constructed from input encoding
structure data comprising slice headers.
Final Act. 8; see id. at 7–9 (citing, inter alia, Johar ¶ 33 (“The entropy
encoding module 428 is used for entropy encoding of the quantized
transform coefficient.”), ¶ 50 (“the VC1 bitstream is coded by using these
refined motion vectors to perform motion compensation and the transformed
and quantized prediction error is entropy coded”)).
The Examiner cites Chatterjee for the missing elements. See id. at 8–
9 (citing, inter alia, Chatterjee ¶ 55 (“A residual signal, e2(i) is generated by
subtracting output of the decoded [macroblock (MB)] processing module
424 and predicted pixel values p2(i). The residual signal e2(i) is then
quantized and transformed in module 426 to produce signal v2(i) used for
entropy encoding to generate the output video bitstream 104.), ¶ 58
(“exemplary pass-through syntax that may be processed . . . [includes] Slice
header and slice data syntax”), ¶ 82 (“The syntax pass-through module 720
may be configured to pass-through header fields, and/or other ‘overhead’
information related to encoding the input video bitstream 102, to the entropy
encoder 728 for producing the output bitstream 104.), and Figs. 7–9.). The
Examiner reasons as follows:
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It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention to combine the method
disclosed by Johar with the combined entropy encoding as
disclosed by Chatterjee in order to allow for proper signaling of
parameters within a transcoding system, thus improving overall
efficiency [see Chatterjee ¶0052 and ¶0077–¶0084]. As
disclosed by at least these citations of Chatterjee, the encoder
using the pass-through information in such a way can save
computations by enabling reuse of some syntactical elements
from the input video.
Id. at 9.
Appellant argues “Chatterjee cannot teach the claimed combined
entropy encoding of input encoding structure data with processed residual
pixel data” because “Chatterjee’s ‘overhead information’ comes from
Chatterjee’s input video bitstream 102, and does not come from reference
input data.” Appeal Br. 9–10; see Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant further argues
that “Chatterjee does not suggest that the features listed in table 1 (e.g. slice
header and slice data syntax) would be used for residual pixel data in
entropy encode 728.” Appeal Br. 11; see Reply Br. 3. Appellant contends
“Johar does not cure the deficiencies of Chatterjee.” Appeal Br. 12; Reply
Br. 4.
Appellant’s argument are unpersuasive for several reasons. For
instance, Appellant’s contention that “Chatterjee cannot teach the claimed
combined entropy encoding of input encoding structure data with processed
residual pixel data” because “Chatterjee's ‘overhead information’ comes
from Chatterjee’s input video bitstream 102, and does not come from
reference input data” (Appeal Br. 9–10; see Reply Br. 2–3) is unpersuasive
because, as the Examiner points out in the Answer, the Examiner relies on
Johar for receiving specification information separate from the input video
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bitstream. Ans. 16 (“As disclosed by Johar, the video/pixel data input into
the encoder is received separately from the specification information.”); see
Final Act. 7–9.
Appellant argues in the Reply Brief that “Johar’s macroblock
specifications . . . cannot teach the claimed input encoding structure data”
because “these macroblock specifications of Johar do not include slice
headers” and “these macroblock specifications of Johar are not derived from
reference input data; rather, these macroblock specifications of Johar are
apparently derived from the input video bit stream (see Johar, paragraph
0032).” Reply Br. 5. This argument does not persuade us of error because
the Examiner relies on Chatterjee for “slice headers” (see Final Act. 8) and
the claim does not preclude the reference input data being derived from the
input video bit stream (see Ans. 18 (“the claim does not have any limitation
placing such a requirement on the two pieces of information being received
via separate terminals”)).
Appellant’s additionally argues, “Chatterjee does not suggest that the
features listed in table 1 (e.g. slice header and slice data syntax) would be
used for residual pixel data in entropy encode 728.” Appeal Br. 11; see
Reply Br. 3. This argument also is unpersuasive. The Examiner correctly
determines that “the claim does not include any limitation describing as to
how the ‘input encoding structure data’ is used for residual pixel data.”
Ans. 18.
In view of the foregoing, and because we find no deficiency in the
Examiner’s findings regarding Chatterjee, we are not persuaded of error
based on Appellant’s argument that “Johar does not cure the deficiencies of
Chatterjee.” Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 4.
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For completeness, we note that Appellant’s arguments do not
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reasoning for combining the teachings of
the references. See Final Act. 9 (quoted infra). Our consideration of the
references includes the entirety of what they teach and suggest to one skilled
in the art, not merely portions specifically cited by the Examiner. See, e.g.,
In re Hedges 783 F.2d 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Wesslau,
353 F.2d 238, 241 (CCPA 1965)). “Just as piecemeal reconstruction of the
prior art by selecting teachings in light of appellant’s disclosure is contrary
to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103[,] so is the failure to consider as a
whole the references collectively as well as individually.” In re Passal, 426
F.2d 828, 831 (CCPA 1970). Each reference cited by the Examiner must be
read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the
prior art as a whole. In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (explaining
that when the rejection is based on a combination of references, one cannot
show nonobviousness by attacking references individually). The relevant
inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to
ordinarily skilled artisans in light of the combined teachings of the
references.
Moreover, Appellant’s arguments presume a bodily incorporation of
Chatterjee into Johar, rather than a consideration of what their combined
teachings would have taught or suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art.
“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re
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Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968
(CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an
ability to combine their specific structures.”).
Further, Appellant has not asserted that the proposed modification
would have been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the
art. Absent such an assertion, we “take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,” and
find a person of ordinary skill in the art would overcome those difficulties
within their level of skill. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007); see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
For at least the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner rejection of claim 1. Because Appellant does not argue the
remaining claims separately with particularity, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejections of all pending claims.
DECISION SUMMARY
In sum:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References  Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–7, 9–
12, 14–16
103 Johar, Chatterjee 1–3, 5–7,
9–12, 14–
16

4, 13 103 Johar, Chatterjee,
Brown
4, 13
8, 17 103 Johar, Chatterjee,
Nakamura
8, 17
Overall
Outcome:
  1–17

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED