J/B Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 27, 1979

245 N.L.R.B. 538 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
J/B Industries, Inc. and Kathryn Jenkins. Case 13
CA- 14300
September 27, 1979
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On June 19, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Hen-
ry L. Jalette issued the attached Supplemental Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions and supporting briefs, and counsel for the
General Counsel filed an answering brief to Respon-
dent's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Supplemental Decision in light of the excep-
tions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, J/B Industries, Inc.,
Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in said recom-
mended Order.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
We also find totally without merit Respondent's allegation of bias and
prejudice on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. Upon our full con-
sideration of the record, we perceive no evidence that the Administrative
Law Judge prejudged the case, made prejudicial rulings. or demonstrated
any bias against Respondent in his analysis or discussion of the evidence.
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge made an inadvertent error in the
last paragraph of sec. II, A; the record shows that on January 2. 1978.
Young had a conversation with Ron Hill, not Al Olieh, on performing the
job of costing out the individual parts on invoices.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF HE CASE
HENRY L. JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge: This sup-
plemental proceeding was instituted to determine the
amount of backpay due Judith Watson Young and Kath-
ryn Jenkins Overhulser pursuant to a decree of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, dated August 29.
1977, enforcing a Decision and Order of the National La-
bor Relations Board, dated June 24. 1976 (225 NLRB 162),
wherein the Board found that the named individuals had
been unlawfully discharged. On January 25. 1978, a back-
pay specification and notice of hearing issued, and on June
26 and 27, 1978, a hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois.'
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs. I hereby
make the following:
FlNDINGS OF FAI r
1. PREI.IMINARY SIAIEMENI
The specification, as amended at the hearing, alleges that
the backpay period for Judith Watson Young began May
13, 1975, the day following her unlawful discharge, and
ended on June 27, 1978. when she removed herself from the
labor market. The record indicates that Young returned to
work for Respondent on November I, 1977, and continued
working until January 3, 1978, when she quit. The General
Counsel contends that Young was never properly reinstat-
ed, and for that reason Respondent's backpay liability was
never tolled until Young removed herself from the labor
market. Respondent contends that Young was properly re-
instated and backpay liability ended on November 1, 1977.
or earlier when she quit interim employment.
II. HE REINSI AItMEN ISSUE
A. The Facts
Young was employed by Respondent in March 1974, as
an accounts receivable clerk at an hourly wage rate of $3.
On May 12, 1975, she was unlawfully discharged. At that
time she was receiving $4 an hour, the highest rate among
the hourly paid office employees. Her duties at the time
were as follows:
I did the payroll, as far as breaking down the time
on the time cards, and it went to Ron and were
okayed, and then I put it on a computer print-out
sheet. I handled the company's hospitalization insur-
ance, paying the bills for each month and fill out the
forms when any employee had a claim and submitting
them to the insurance company. I handled accounts
payable, from attaching receiving tickets to verifying
prices, checking prices, extensions and filing them for
payment, and when they became due, I typed the
check for payment. Accounts receivable, I posted in-
voices, posted cash receipts, typed financial statements,
did the daily deposits to the bank. I did typing for
International Business Services which is a sister com-
pany to J/B Industries, did billing for International
Business Services. I did answer the phone a little bit for
J/B Industries. I checked the billing after the girls did
At the hearing the parties agreed upon the amount of backpay due Over-
hulser and the allegations of the specification relative to her were withdrawn.
245 NLRB No. 78
538
J/B INDUSTRIES, INC.
the billing. It would come to me and I would quickly
go through it, checking for the right salesmen, correct
coding, right billing point and shipping point, referring
back to original orders and then it would go down to
the rest of the billing process. Did collection calls for
accounts receivable for J/B Industries. Then there was
another phone line in the company for Beacon Soap
Products. I answered the phone. I took orders, did the
billing, filled out tax forms each month for the com-
pany, and mostly that was it. There may have been
something small, but mostly that was it.'
At the time of her discharge Young worked in an en-
closed office equipped with two desks, two chairs, two tele-
phones, a typewriter and calculator, and four or five file
cabinets housing accounts receivable and employee records.
According to Young she was part of the accounting depart-
ment, which included herself, Overhulser,' and Ron Hill,
vice president and secretary-treasurer. There were other
clerical employees (Linda Pound, Pam Hagerman Ken-
neavy) who Young considered to be in the billing depart-
ment, apparently because of the nature of their duties. Hill
denied there were separate departments.
On November 1, 1977, when Young reported for work,
she reported to Hill. Young testified he told her that things
had changed a lot during her absence, that work was now
distributed differently, and that she was going to be an ex-
tra girl in the office. She asked him what exactly she would
be doing and he said she would be working with Al Olieh.
(Olieh is an accountant hired by Respondent on June 30,
1975.) At that point Olieh entered Hill's office, introduc-
tions were made, and Hill told Olieh he was to assign
Young some work.
Olieh, who was now the occupant of Young's office, es-
corted Young to the main office area and installed her at a
desk on the west wall of the office facing the wall. There
were six other desks in the main office, one of which was in
the center and not assigned to any other clerical. and
Young asked Olieh why she was being assigned to a desk in
a corner with her back to the rest of the office. She asked
him if the desk had been brought in just because she was
returning. He told her no, that the desk had been there
about 2 years. The desk was completely bare, lacking a
telephone, typewriter, and office supplies.
At this time, according to Young, the accounting depart-
ment consisted of Hill, Olieh, Louis Affeld, and Cecile Ben-
son. According to Young, she was not a billing department
employee along with Linda Pounds and Michelle D'Orio.
According to Olieh, it also included one Nancy Friedman.
Young described her duties upon reinstatement as proof-
reading invoices. This proofreading was her main job the
first few days, and it did not keep her fully occupied. She
had not performed this job before her discharge except for
spot checks. Linda Pounds formerly did that job. One Roy
Choate had handled what was referred to as Jarrow in-
voices.
About a week after her return, acting on her own, Young
moved to one of the two desks in the center of the office
'The foregoing is taken from Young's credited testimony at the prior
hearing. 225 NLRB at 167.
1Also referred to as Kathy Jenkins.
because it had a typewriter and she needed to correct an
invoice. Cecile Benson came up to her and asked her what
she was doing at the desk, that it was her desk. Young told
her she needed the supplies at that desk to do her work and
that she had not seen anyone at the desk for a week. About
then, Olieh came from his office and asked her wh} she was
sitting at this desk, and she told him she needed the type-
writer to correct an invoice. Olieh told her she would have
to move back to the desk assigned to her and to move the
typewriter if she needed it, returning it when she was done.
When she said the typewriter was too heavy, he moved it
for her.
(Before, this, Young had questioned Olieh about being
placed at a desk in a corner, explaining her feelings of
humiliation and of being punished for being a naughty
child. Olieh told her Hill had assigned her to the desk and
she had to remain there.)
Later that day Young complained again about her desk
assignment as well as the nature of her duties. Olieh told
her she was an extra girl and he was going to have to hunt
up things for her to do. Young told him she was going to
have to call someone to complain about not being properly
reinstated and she asked Olieh if he was aware of the work
she had done before. He said no, that he had not heard
much about her until right beftore her reinstatement.
After 2 or 3 weeks of proofreading invoices. Young
started running the computer, a machine located in the bill-
ing room. which was down the hall from the main office.
She worked at that location until sometime in December.
On or about December Olieh asked her why she was not
happy with her reinstatement, and she told him she did not
like to do billing and wanted to work in the accounting
department. Olieh asked her what she wanted, pointing out
they had already fired one girl (Michelle) to make room for
her. Young told him they fired the wrong girl: they' should
have fired one of the girls in accounting. She pointed out he
had two girls doing accounting work (Louise Affeld and
Cecile Benson) and he could give her some of it. Olieh told
her Afield did accounts payable only part of the day, that
she had been doing both accounts receivable and accounts
payable until it was learned Young was returning and
Affeld decided to work part time and keep accounts receis-
able. Young told him she understood she had the right to
do the accounting work.
Once Olieh assigned her some typing that was on Ben-
son's desk to keep her occupied. Young did the work at
Benson's desk, and the following morning Benson berated
her for working at her desk. Olieh overheard the exchange
and came out and remarked that it seemed there was a
problem. Young told him the problem was with Benson. At
that point Benson began calling her names and accusing
her of coming back and taking their jobs from them. She
said if Young touched anything on her desk again, she
would kill her, and she started towards her to hit her.
Young told Olieh to stop her. He did not, and Benson's
hand grazed her face. Crying, Young told Olieh if he did
not stop Benson she was going to call a lawyer. Olieh told
Benson to sit down.
According to Benson, on the occasion of this incident.,
she had asked Young to type a priority order and an hour
and a half later Young had not done so. An argument en-
539
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sued over what Benson viewed as Young's refusal to share
the work. Benson admitted using vulgar language and shak-
ing her finger at Young but she denied attempting to strike
her. I credit Young, who appeared to me to be very frank
and honest. Benson, for one thing, was clearly very hostile
to Young.
After this, Young followed Olieh to his office to complain
about his failure to stop Benson and to reiterate her com-
plaint about doing billing work. After further conversation
he agreed to give her Benson's work. Although that was not
enough to keep her busy full time, he refused to give her
Affeld's work because he said accounts receivable was all
she could do.
Olieh also agreed to let Young move to a desk Benson
had been using, and Young did so. She worked there that
day. This desk was close to and faced Hill's office. The next
morning Olieh told Young that Hill did not want her at that
desk and that she was to move back to the desk in the
corner. Young went to see Hill about the matter, and he
told her that was Affeld's desk. Young told him she had
never seen Affeld sit at it (Affield used a desk adjacent to the
one in question) and asked why Affeld, a part-time em-
ployee, needed two desks.
After this, Young worked in the corner but she resumed
doing some of her former duties. Since this was not enough
to keep her busy, she did other work she had not previously
done.
Young was on vacation Christmas week, returning Janu-
ary 2, 1978. That day Olieh assigned her the job of costing
out individual parts on invoices. Young objected to the te-
dium of the job and asked if it was necessary, pointing out
that the practice had always been to take a daily total of a
product and figure cost from a mark-up percentage. Olieh
said from then on they were going to get an individual cost.
Young told him she thought this was a job made up for her.
Olieh said, "Well, you said you wanted accounting work
and this will be accounting work." Young said that would
be an awful lot of work. The following day she quit, telling
Hill things had been very difficult and she felt she had no
choice.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The Board's Decision and Order in this case, enforced by
the court of appeals, directed Respondent to offer Young
reinstatement to her former job or, if it no longer existed, to
a substantially equivalent position. The record indicates
quite clearly that she was not reinstated to her former job.
That job involved a degree of responsibility and individual
judgment, short of supervisory responsibility and judgment
as found by the Board, with Young in direct liason with
Hill. That job was filled by Olieh, who possessed certain
skills not possessed by Young and who was assertedly given
supervisory authority and responsibility. In my judgment a
good case could be made to support a finding that the
changes in the job were not so substantial as to relieve Re-
spondent of the responsibility to reinstate Young to her for-
mer job. Olieh is an accountant, but it does not appear that
he spends any significant amount of time doing accounting
work. The assertion that he is a supervisor was not tested
and may well have no more substance than did the asser-
lion in the original hearing that Young was a supervisor. In
any event, the Decision in this case does not have to ad-
dress such an issue inasmuch as the General Counsel does
not contend Young should have been given the job Olieh
had. Accordingly, analysis will be based on the premise that
Young's former job no longer existed and will be addressed
to consideration of whether or not she was given a substan-
tially equivalent position.
The criteria fbr such a determination are not entirely
clear, and neither party has articulated what they should
be; rather, both advert to the treatment accorded Young
and similarities or dissimilarities of the tasks assigned to
her, and, on that basis, both argue for a favorable finding.
In my judgment the evidence is compelling that not only
was Young not given a substantially equivalent position
but, even more, she was treated in a manner to force her to
quit. The responsibility for this rests clearly on Hill, whose
conduct was indefensible and whose testimony deserves no
credence whatsoever. This is in no way better demonstrated
than by the fact that the last task assigned Young, a task
which Hill testified under oath was for the purpose of devel-
oping a cost department, was not reassigned to anyone after
Young quit. Thus, although she quit on January 3, as of
June 27 the work had not been reassigned. When one con-
siders this fact and the tedium of the task as described by
Young, the conclusion is inescapable that the assignment
was given to her in a conscious effort to compel her to quit.
Hill's attempt to justify his conduct indicates his total disre-
gard for the truth. Olieh's lack of candor is also demon-
strated by his attempt to justify the assignment of this task
to Young.
Hill's and Olieh's veracity is further impugned by the
variances in their testimony on two other matters. Thus,
according to Hill, before Young returned to work he
showed Olieh that portion of Administrative Law Judge
Wagman's decision in the underlying unfair labor practice
proceeding describing Young's duties and told him to work
within those guidelines. According to Olieh, Hill "really
didn't tell me anything . . . he told me that when she re-
ported, she had to work for me, to make sure I gave her
something to do." Olieh could not remember anything else.
and, if Hill had shown him Administrative Law Judge
Wagman's decision, it is inconceivable to me that Olieh
would not have remembered.
Hill's and Olieh's credibility was yet again impugned on
the matter of Young's desk assignment. Thus, according to
Young, when Olieh assigned her to that desk, she asked him
if it had been brought in specifically for her, and he told her
it had been there as long as he had been with Respondent.
Olieh did not deny saying this and implicitly corroborated
it when he testified that he assigned her to that desk be-
cause it was the only desk available in the room. Yet, Hill
testified that the desk was in fact moved in especially for
Young.
In short, I conclude that Hill and Olieh testified falsely
and I do not credit their testimony. Where there is a conflict
between them and Young, I credit Young, who impressed
me by her demeanor and whose testimony was in no way
seriously impugned by Respondent. The examples of con-
tradictory testimony adverted to b Respondent in its brief
are neither substantial nor persuasive.
540
J/B INDUSTRIES, INC.
In addressing myself to the credibility of Hill and Olieh, I
have digressed from the issue of the adequacy of Young's
reinstatement. The assignment given her which caused her
to quit was the last item in the total picture of a conscious
effort to deny her the reinstatement rights provided for by
the Act and the Board's Decision and Order. That effort
began on the first day Young reported to work. Thus, ac-
cording to her credited testimony, she was told she was just
going to be an "extra girl" in the office both by Hill on the
day of her return and by Olieh a week later. This statement
was verified thereafter by the very nature of her assign-
ments which were sporadic and dependent on whatever
Olieh felt like giving her to do. She was not assigned any
specific day to day tasks such as Benson and Affeld, who
had clearly defined assignments. In other words, she was
treated like an "extra girl."
Part of this treatment was her assignment to a desk with-
out equipment or supplies, physically situated to suggest
that she was unwelcome. There was a desk in the center of
the office with a telephone, supplies, and a typewriter that
was not assigned to anyone, and Respondent offered no
explanation for not placing Young at that desk. It can not
seriously be disputed that the availability of a telephone
and a typewriter would be minimal requirements for sub-
stantially equivalent employment to one with Young's prior
job functions.
Finally, there is the matter of similarity of the work as-
signed to her. Respondent argues that where Young previ-
ously checked accounts payable for extensions, prices, etc.,
she did the same in connection with the Jarrow invoices.
But the task assigned Young relative to the Jarrow invoices
was not the task she had before her discharge, which in-
volved a check of individual bills for corrections before
payment. It was only part of a variety of tasks performed
during the workday. The task assigned to her by Olieh on
her return to work consisted of checking a large number of
invoices against entries in large books one by one to deter-
mine if errors had been made. Such a task, on a full-time
basis, is significantly different from what Young did before
her discharge. As a matter of fact, there is no showing that
the task was ever performed before her return to work.
Respondent asserts that by the first week of December
Young had taken over the entire accounts payable function.
The assertion is correct, but it ignores the fact that she did
so I month after her return to work and after her com-
plaints about her reinstatement. Even then that work was
not sufficient to keep her busy. Benson, who had been doing
the work, had only worked half a day on accounts payable.
Respondent asserts that Young prepared financial state-
ments. According to Young, she "typed" financial state-
ments, whereas before her discharge she had assembled the
data for Hill to work with and then typed the financial
statement. Similarly, relative to employee insurance claims,
on her return Young typed the claims; before her discharge
she handled the entire process.
These are only some examples of the dissimilarities in
Young's working conditions and, in my judgment, more
need not be given. The foregoing clearly supports the find-
ing that Young was not given substantially equivalent em-
ployment and her backpay was not tolled by her return to
work. It was not tolled until June 27, 1978, when Young
decided at the hearing to remove herself from the labor
market.'
lit1. THE GROSS BACKPAY FORMULA
According to the General Counsel, there are two ele-
ments to an appropriate formula for Young's gross back-
pay. One element relates to the number of hours she would
have worked. According to the General Counsel, in the II
weeks prior to her discharge Young worked 434.3 straight
time hours and 48.8 overtime hours, a total straight time
equivalent of 507.3 hours, or an average of 46.14 hours per
week. The General Counsel contends that this I -week pe-
riod is a representative period and that during the backpay
period Young would have continued to work the same
overtime on average.
The second element of the gross backpay formula relates
to Young's rate of pay for the backpay period. The General
Counsel contends that Young's rate of pay should be mea-
sured against the wage experience of Al Olieh during the
backpay on the ground that there is no pattern of wage
increases to the clerical employees and that Olieh is the
only individual whose duties were comparable to Young's
prior to her unlawful discharge.
As to the first element of the formula, Respondent ap-
pears to dispute the use of overtime hours, although this is
not clear from his brief. He does not argue that there was
no overtime to be worked, but, rather, that if Young did not
work any overtime on her return, it was her own decision
not to do so. I reject this assertion. I credit Young's testi-
mony that she did not have enough work to do to keep
busy. If she received assignments of long duration, it did
not necessarily mean she could work overtime when she
was not told she could do so or that she had the discretion
to do so as she had before her discharge.
Despite my rejection of Respondent's assertion, there is
the fact that there is no evidence that any overtime was
worked by anyone during the backpay period. Normally, in
such a circumstances, a backpay award of overtime would
be inappropriate. In this case I conclude that the inclusion
of overtime in determining Young's gross backpay is appro-
priate because Respondent has precluded the making of a
definitive finding by its failure to properly reinstate Young.
Had Young been reinstated to a substantially equivalent
position, one could determine whether or not it is appropri-
ate to include overtime in the measure of gross backpay.
Since Respondent failed in its objection to reinstate Young,
it cannot be heard to complain if the backpay formula is
based on Young's past work history. There may be uncer-
tainty in this approach, but as the General Counsel points
out, "If uncertainty exists, as it frequently does, it results
from the employer's illegal conduct and should be resolved
against the Company rather than against the victims of dis-
' Respondent contends that Young's backpay should be tolled as of No-
vember 11, 1976, when she quit interim employment at Gibson's Discount
Store. The contention has no merit. The interim employment was in no way
comparable to her employment with Respondent and, according to her testi-
mony which I credit, it required her to work on Sundays and holidays,
including Thanksgiving when she could not get a babysitter for her small
children.
541
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
crimination." International Trailer Company, Inc. and Gi-
braltar Industries, Inc., 150 NLRB 1205, 1207 (1965). As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated in
N.L.R.B. v. Brown & Root, Inc., etc., 311 F.2d 447, 452
(1963), "In solving the problems which arise in backpay
cases the Board is vested with a wide discretion in devising
procedures and methods which will effectuate the purposes
of the Act."
As to the second element of the gross backpay formula;
namely, the award of a rate of pay according to the same
percentage of wage increases given Olieh, Respondent con-
tends that Young would not have received any wage in-
crease between May 1975 and June 1978 and should be
reimbursed at a rate of $4 per hour. The basis for the con-
tention is that no general wage increase had been granted
during the backpay period and the $4 had been established
by Respondent as the maximum rate of pay for an office
clerical employee. It is difficult to believe that this conten-
tion was made seriously. The fact that it is and the fact that
Young was returned to work at the same rate of pay she
had received 2-1/2 years earlier is further proof of Respon-
dent's lack of good faith and noncompliance with the
Board's reinstatement and make whole order. Moreover, it
is refuted by the record which shows that in the period from
the first quarter of 1974 through the first quarter of 1978 all
of Respondent's clerical employees, except two who were
employed only briefly, M. Martin and T. Barnes, received
wage increases in varying percentages. In addition, there is
the evidence that Nancy Friedman, who received only
$2.90 per hour at the time of Young's discharge, was paid
$3.95 per hour at the time of Yoyng's return. One would
have to be naive to believe that Young, who had a wider
range of duties and more responsibility, would have re-
mained at $4 per hour, while Friedman, was raised to $3.95
per hour. Finally, there is the fact that Al Olieh, albeit a
supervisor, performed substantially the same job Young
performed before her discharge, and Respondent placed no
ceiling on his rate of pay; rather, he received a 13.63 per-
cent wage increase on April 18, 1976, another of 12 percent
on December 5, 1976, and yet another of 6 percent on Oc-
tober 22, 1977.
For the foregoing reasons I reject the assertion that
Young would have received no wage increases during the
backpay period.
The question remains how much would Young have re-
ceived in raises. The record indicates that there was no par-
ticular pattern to the raises given during the backpay period
with the percentages varying from 4 percent in one instance
(Benson, October 22, 1977) to 14 percent for Al Olieh on
April 18, 1976. As noted earlier, because of the lack of
pattern, the General Counsel asserts that an appropriate
formula for determining Young's gross backpay is to use
the same percentages of increase as were given Al Olieh on
the ground that he is the most, if not only, comparable
employee. I agree.
Olieh was employed shortly after Young's discharge. He
occupied her office, and most of his duties were the same as
those previously performed by Young. That he may have
been a supervisor and was an accountant is no bar to use of
his record of raises in determining Young's backpay. Young
is not being awarded the same rate of pay Olieh received;
his record is used only to arrive at percentages. Moreover,
Respondent has not offered any other comparable em-
ployee or formula.
In this connection, although there is no pattern of wage
increases, it seems reasonable to infer that Respondent has
some policy on wage increases; yet, it has chosen not to
disclose that policy in the apparent belief that if it did not
do so the General Counsel would be precluded from estab-
lishing a backpay formula. But, as stated in International
Trailer Company, Inc., supra, at 1207:
The determination of gross backpay for example, in
not always a matter of arithmetic for ... questions can
arise concerning how much the claimant would have
earned had he not been discharged. In cases in which
such questions exist the Board 'may use as close ap-
proximations as possible, and may adopt formulas rea-
sonably designed to produce such approximations.' In
other words, 'in solving the problems which arise in
backpay cases the Board is vested with a wide discre-
tion in devising procedures and methods which will
effectuate the purposes of the Act.' (Citations and foot-
note omitted.) It follows, therefore, that the Board is
not required to use one formula only but may use a
combination of methods in arriving at the amount or
amounts due if it appears that such is necessary to
effectuate, as nearly as possible, the policies of the Act.
In my judgment, on the facts of this case, the use of Olieh
as a comparable employee is not only reasonable but al-
most compelling in view of the substantial similarity in the
work he and Young did and the absence of any other em-
ployee with comparable duties and responsibilities.
IV. SUMMARY
Summarizing, I conclude that Respondent's obligation to
make Judith Watson Young whole shall be fulfilled by pay-
ment to her of the total net backpay set forth and computed
in Appendix A. [Appendix A omitted from publication]. It
will be noted that beginning October 22, 1977, the gross
backpay due Young has been computed to reflect the same
6 percent increase given Al Olieh on October 22, 1977. The
General Counsel did not amend the specification to reflect
this increase, but it is consistent with the gross backpay
formula alleged and litigated at the hearing and herein
found to be appropriate.
On the basis of foregoing findings and conclusions, I rec-
ommend that the Board issue the following:
ORDER
The Respondent, J/B Industries, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall pay to Judith Watson Young,
as net backpay, $32,981.33, less any tax withholding re-
quired by law, plus interest in accordance with the formula
prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).5
The Board's Decision and Order in the original hearing issued before
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
542