Jarrod W.,1 Complainant,v.Thomas B. Modly, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 7, 2020Appeal No. 0120182445 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 7, 2020) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Jarrod W.,1 Complainant, v. Thomas B. Modly, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency. Appeal No. 0120182445 Agency No. DON-17-40085-02443 DECISION On July 10, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 22, 2018, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a GS-1101-09 Performance Assessment Representative (PAR) in the Facilities Service Contracts Management/Facilities Support Branch, Facilities Engineering and Acquisitions Division, Public Works Department at the Agency’s Norfolk Naval Shipyard facility in Portsmouth, Virginia. Complainant’s first-line supervisor was the Facilities Service Contracts Manager (S1), his second-line supervisor was the Facilities Engineering and Acquisitions Department (S2), and his third-line supervisor was the Deputy Public Works Officer (S3). According to S3, Complainant is assigned to Facility Support Contracts within his Branch, and his work is related to contract assessment. Complainant is African-American and black, and he stated that he had previously filed several EEO complaints naming S1, S2, and S3 as responsible management officials. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120182445 2 Complainant averred that he timely applied for a GS-0802-11 Engineering Technician vacancy in his Branch advertised under announcement number SE70802-11-1830527LG529171. S3 stated that the Portsmouth Public Works Department was authorized to create three new GS- 0802-10/11 Engineering Technician positions to work on construction contracts. According to S3, he and S2 decided to fill two GS-11 positions first to find experienced and knowledgeable candidates. S3 averred that the plan was to fill the GS-10 position at a later date after the “bugs” were worked out, but he stated that the third billet was moved to a different Public Works Department near Hampton Roads, Virginia. S2 was the selecting official for the GS-11 positions. According to S2, Complainant’s name was not on the certificate of eligibles for the GS-11 vacancies. The vacancy announcement stated that candidates needed at least one year of specialized experience at or equivalent to the GS-10 grade. S2 selected two individuals who were white and Caucasian for the GS-11 positions (C1 and C2), and he stated that he made the selections based on their experience. According to the record, C1 had worked since September 2011 as a GS-0802-11 Engineering Technician in two different states. According to the record, at the time of his application, C2 was a GS-09 Facilities Operations Specialist, but he had previously worked as a WG-10 Maintenance Electrician from December 2010 through May 2015. Complainant averred that, in 2015, a white, Caucasian coworker (C3) was temporarily promoted from a GS-09 Planner/Estimator position to a GS-11 Engineering Technician position. Complainant stated that C3 did not have any contracting experience at the time of his temporary placement, but C3 was later promoted because he gained the needed knowledge and experience on the job. According to Complainant, he should have been given the same opportunity as C3 to be temporarily promoted to one of the GS-11 positions. Complainant alleged that, in announcing the positions at the GS-11 grade, S3 “moved the goal posts” to exclude Complainant from opportunities for advancement. Complainant submitted a written request to attend a Contracting Re-Boot Camp training that would be held in Norfolk from June 5-8, 2017. On April 19, 2017, S2 denied the request, emailing Complainant that this course was intended for Acquisition and Procurement personnel and that the subject matter did not align with Complainant’s PAR position. S2 recommended that Complainant take other courses related to Facility Supports Contracts, communication of computer skills, or employment benefits. According to Complainant, he re-registered for the Re- Boot training on June 1, 2017. Later that day, S1 denied his request because the course was intended as a refresher for Acquisitions and Procurement staff and suggested that Complainant take other courses targeted towards Facility Supports Contracts personnel. According to the record, none of S1’s subordinates attended the Contracting Re-Boot Camp session. Complainant also requested to attend a Vertical Transportation Equipment (VTE) Inspector Training course that was scheduled to take place from September 11-22, 2017, in Orlando, Florida. On June 23, 2017, S1 approved Complainant’s request. On July 12, 2017, S1 emailed Complainant, stating that she needed to cancel the VTE Inspector training. 0120182445 3 S1 averred that she mistakenly thought that Complainant had asked to attend a three-day course, rather than the two-week training. Complainant requested higher-level of review of S1’s decision, and on July 12, 2017, S3 stated in an email to S1 that he was inclined to allow Complainant to attend if the course was appropriate for PARs. On July 13, 2017, S1 told S3 that she had contacted the VTE Training Coordinator (VTC). According to S1, the VTC stated that, although Engineering personnel were the target audience, PARs who had taken the three-day basic course were eligible for the VTE Inspector training. On July 13, 2017, S1 informed Complainant that he could not attend the requested training. S1 stated that she would arrange to have the three-day basic course offered in Norfolk so Complainant could attend. Complainant alleged that attending the three-day course is not an actual prerequisite for the two-week training. According to S1, she also denied requests for the same training submitted by a white, Caucasian PAR (C4) and another black, African-American PAR (C5). On September 11, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (African-American), color (black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. On May 4 and June 12, 2017, he became aware that two Caucasian and White individuals were selected for GS-0802-11 Engineering Technician positions; and 2. On June 1 and July 12, 2017, he was not given permission to participate in training. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). 0120182445 4 Complainant alleged that he was subjected to discrimination when he was not selected for a GS- 11 position and when he was denied training. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Complainant for one of the GS-11 Engineering Technician positions was that he did not have at least one year of specialized experience at the GS-10 level or equivalent. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for posting the vacancies at the GS-11 level instead of the GS-10 level was to have more experienced employees in place at the beginning of the contract. Although Complainant contends that he should have been temporarily promoted to gain experience like C3, who is white and Caucasian, was temporarily promoted in 2015, this does not establish that that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for not selecting Complainant is pretextual, and the preponderance of the evidence in the record does not otherwise establish pretext for discrimination based on race, color, and/or reprisal. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying Complainant’s request to attend the Contracting Re-Boot Camp training was that it was targeted for Acquisition and Procurement personnel and would not have content aligned with Complainant’s PAR duties. Complainant disputes the assertion that he was not part of the target audience for the training, noting that he is involved in aspects of contracting as a PAR in Facilities Service Contracts Management/Facilities Support Branch. However, while Complainant’s work may have involved contracts, a preponderance of the evidence in the record establishes that the course was intended for employees involved in the acquisition and procurement side of contracting work. Complainant has not established that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not approving his requests to attend this course was pretextual. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for cancelling Complainant’s request to attend the VTE Inspector Training was that PARs were not the target audience and should take the three-day basic course as well. Although Complainant notes that the course description does not state that PARs must take the three-day basic course as a prerequisite, other PARs were also not permitted to take this course without taking the basic course first, including C4, a white, Caucasian PAR. 0120182445 5 We find that Complainant has not established by the preponderance of the evidence in the record that the Agency’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext designed to mask discriminatory or retaliatory animus. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120182445 6 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 7, 2020 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation