Jano Graphics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 12, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 251 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 251
Jano Graphics, Inc. and Communications Workers of
America, Local 14904, Southern California Ty-
pographical and Mailer Union. Cases 31–CA–
24241, 31–CA–24350, and 31–CA–24592
June 12, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND ACOSTA
On September 28, 2001, Administrative Law Judge
Jay R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and an an-
swering brief, and the General Counsel filed a reply
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.2
We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by making unilateral
changes in its employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment. We need not decide whether there was in fact
an impasse on July 29, 1999, when the Respondent pre-
sented its “Best and Final Offer” and requested that the
Union submit the offer to the unit employees for a ratifi-
cation vote. Even if there had been an impasse at that
time, there was no legally cognizable impasse on January
26, 2000, the date of the Respondent’s unilateral imple-
mentation. This is so for two reasons. First, any impasse
on July 29 was broken on August 4, when the Union
informed the Respondent that it had new proposals and
was seeking further bargaining.3 Second, the Respon-
dent’s continued insistence on a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining—the ratification vote by unit employees—
and its refusal to bargain on and after August 4 tainted
any subsequent impasse. Taken together, these unfair
labor practices precluded the Respondent from lawfully
implementing its final offer in January. See Royal Motor
Sales, 329 NLRB 760, 762 (1999), enfd. mem. Royal
Motor Sales v. NLRB, No. 99-1428 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall substitute a new notice in accordance with our decision in
Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
3 Member Acosta finds it unnecessary to pass on this basis.
We further agree that the Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition from the Union was unlawful. We rely upon
the fact that the employee petition, on which the with-
drawal of recognition was premised, was tainted. It was
circulated on January 28, 1 day after the Respondent’s
announcement that the unlawful unilateral changes had
been implemented.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Jano Graphics, Inc., Ventura,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order, except that the
attached notice should be substituted for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Com-
munications Workers of America, Local 14904, Southern
California Typographical and Mailer Union by unilater-
ally implementing our final contract offer in the absence
of a lawful impasse.
WE WILL NOT condition bargaining with the Union on
submission of our proposal to the bargaining unit em-
ployees for ratification.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and bargain with the Un-
ion as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit de-
scribed below with respect to rates of pay, hours of em-
4 The petition was signed by employees between January 28 and
February 1, 2000.
In finding the withdrawal of recognition unlawful, we do not rely
upon Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 334 NLRB 399 (2001).
That case sets up an insulated period for bargaining after an unlawful
withdrawal of recognition.
339 NLRB No. 38
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 252
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment
including contributions to health insurance, union secu-
rity, and wages.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition either directly or
impliedly from the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of our employees in the unit
described below.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the Union with re-
quested information relevant and necessary to its respon-
sibilities as exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees including health insurance, job
classification, and wage information.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, meet and bargain with the Un-
ion as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of our employees in the appropriate bargaining unit de-
scribed below with respect to rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, and other terms and conditions of employment
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:

Included: All employees as described in our collective
bargaining agreement with the Union including all
journeymen and apprentices, electronic pre-press op-
erators, camera/stripper/platemakers, press operators,
bindery employees and driver/helpers.

Excluded: All other employees, supervisors and guards
as defined in the Act.

WE WILL provide the Union with the information nec-
essary and relevant to its status as exclusive collective-
bargaining representative, which the Union requested in
May and June 2000.
WE WILL, on request by the Union, rescind any unilat-
eral changes we have implemented in our employees’
terms and conditions of employment.

JANO GRAPHICS, INC.

Ann Weinman and Michelle Youtz, Esqs., for the General Coun-
sel.
James W. Michalski, Esq. (Riordan & McKinzie), of Los Ange-
les, California, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in trial at Los Angeles, California, on June 25–29, 2001.
On November 23, 1999, Communications Workers of America,
Local 14904, Southern California Typographic and Mailer Union
(the Union) filed the charge in Case 31–CA–24241 alleging that
Jano Graphics (Respondent) committed certain violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
On February 14, 2000, the Union filed the charge in Case 31–CA–
24350 against Respondent. The charge in Case 21–CA–24350
was amended on April 4, 2000, and again on June 15, 2000. In
addition, on June 15, 2000, the Union filed the charge in Case 31–
CA–24592 against Respondent. On August 17, 2000, the Re-
gional Director for Region 31 of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) issued a consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing against Respondent, alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respondent filed timely an-
swers to the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.
The parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record, from my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses,1 and having considered
the posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a California corporation, with an office and
principal place of business in Ventura, California, where it has
been engaged in the wholesale printing and engraving business.
In the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint, Re-
spondent purchased and received goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 from outside the State of California. Ac-
cordingly, Respondent admits and I find that Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
Respondent operates a printing and engraving shop in Ven-
tura, California. It has had a collective-bargaining relationship
with the Union since at least 1991. The parties have had a se-
ries of 1-year collective-bargaining agreements since 1991.
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement was effective
from January 1 until December 31, 1997. The 1997 bargaining
agreement covered Respondent’s production employees.
On February 3, 1998, the Union filed a charge in Case 31–
CA–23194 alleging that Respondent had violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The charge was amended on March
24, 1998, to allege that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union, unilater-
ally granting a wage increase, bypassing the Union and dealing
directly with employees, and refusing to furnish information to
the Union, relevant to collective bargaining. On August 26,
1998, the parties entered into an informal settlement agreement
1 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review
of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the
logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings of
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As to those wit-
nesses testifying in contradiction to the findings herein, their testimony
has been discredited, either as having been in conflict with credited
documentary or testimonial evidence or because it was in and of itself
incredible and unworthy of belief.
JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 253
resolving the case. As part of the settlement agreement Re-
spondent posted a notice stating that it would not: (1) refuse to
meet and bargain with the Union; (2) withdraw recognition
from the Union; (3) fail to provide requested information, rele-
vant to collective bargaining; (4) bypass the Union and bargain
directly with employees; and (5) implement any unilateral
changes. As a result of this settlement, a petition to decertify
the Union, filed in Case 31–RD–1381, was withdrawn.
However, on October 23, 1998, another decertification peti-
tion was filed in Case 31–RD–1398 by employee Lori Sage.
That petition was withdrawn based on a determination by the
Regional Director that the petition was filed during the compli-
ance period of the settlement in Case 31–CA–23194. Thereaf-
ter, on November 10, 1998, Sage filed another decertification
petition in Case 31–RD–1400.
On December 9, 1998, the Union filed another charge in
Case 31–CA–23636 alleging further violations of Section
8(a)(5) and (1). On March 1, 1999, Respondent entered into a
settlement of Cases 31–CA–23194 and 31–CA–23636. In the
March 1, 1999 settlement, Respondent agreed not to: (1) refuse
to meet and bargain with the Union; (2) withdraw recognition
from the Union; (3) refuse to provide relevant information; (4)
bypass the Union and bargain directly with employees; (5)
unilaterally change wages or other terms and conditions of
employment; and (6) refuse to meet and bargain because of the
pendency of unfair labor practice charges. Further, Respondent
agreed to affirmatively: meet and bargain with the Union over
rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment including a pension plan, health plan con-
tributions, and/or wage increases.
As consequence of this settlement, the Regional Director
dismissed the petition previously file in Case 31–RD–1400. As
will be seen below, Respondent filed a petition in Case 31–
RM–1267, in February 2000, seeking to decertify the Union.
That petition was dismissed pending the outcome of the instant
unfair labor practice hearing.
Beginning in March 1999 and continuing until July 29, 1999,
the parties met in seven bargaining sessions in an unsuccessful
attempt to negotiate a new contract. The parties did not reach
agreement and on January 26, 2000, Respondent implemented
the terms of its “ best and final proposal” to the Union.
Within this factual framework, the General Counsel alleges
that Respondent unlawfully conditioned bargaining on its final
offer being submitted to the bargaining unit employees for rati-
fication and implemented its final proposal in the absence of a
lawful bargaining impasse. Respondent contends that the par-
ties were at impasse and, therefore, it could lawfully implement
the terms of its final proposal. Secondly, Respondent contends
that the Union had agreed to submit its final proposal to the
bargaining unit employees privileging Respondent’s declaration
of impasse and implementation of its final offer.
The complaint further alleges that Respondent failed and re-
fused to furnish the Union information relevant to collective
bargaining. In addition the complaint alleges that Respondent
refused to resume bargaining with the Union in June 2000.
Respondent asserts that since February 2000, the Union no
longer represents a majority of the bargaining unit employees.
Thus, the principal issue, involving Respondent implementa-
tion of its “best and final offer” and the resultant changes in the
bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment, is whether the parties had reached an impasse in their
contract negotiations so as to have permitted the implementa-
tion of the proposed contract.
III. THE FACTS
As stated above, the most recent collective-bargaining
agreement was effective from January 1 until December 31,
1997. The 1997 collective-bargaining agreement provided:

ITU NEGOTIATED PENSION PLAN
22-01. The parties will meet prior to July 1, 1997,
to determine a pension plan and employees
may divert some wage money towards such
a plan.

By letter dated June 20, 1997, the Union requested midterm
bargaining regarding a pension plan, and suggested three meet-
ing dates. Respondent made no response. Therefore, the Union
sent another letter dated June 30, suggesting three more meet-
ing dates. By letter dated July 14, Respondent stated that it was
interested in a plan “not necessarily administered by the Union”
and asked that the Union submit a pension proposal in writing,
after which Respondent would unilaterally implement a plan it
deemed to be “fair and reasonable.”
In August, the Union presented Respondent with a written
proposal for a new agreement. Respondent made no response.
A bargaining session was scheduled for the evening of Decem-
ber 10 at Respondent’s premises. However, prior to negotiating
with the Union about a pension plan, Respondent unilaterally
signed up for a simple IRA plan and announced the plan to its
employees. When Alexander (Al) Jannone, president of Re-
spondent, finally notified Ken Prairie, International representa-
tive for the Union, of the plan, on December 9, 1997, it was a
fait accomplait. Prairie informed Jannone that he was obligated
to first bargain with the Union. However, Jannone had already
announced the plan and decided to let the plan go into effect.
Jannone believed that he and the Union could negotiate an ami-
cable resolution of this issue. The unilateral implementation of
the IRA plan was the first of a series of unfair labor practices
giving rise to the settlement agreements, which precede the
alleged impasse at issue in the instant case. On December 10,
Howard Dudley, union president, arrived at Respondent’s
premises. However, a dispute arose between Dudley and Jan-
none and no bargaining took place. In January, Respondent,
without prior notice or bargaining with the Union, implemented
its simple IRA plan and unilaterally granted the bargaining unit
employees a wage increase of 1.5 percent. On January 29,
1998, a decertification petition was filed in Case 31–RD–1381.
On February 3, 1998, the Union filed charges in Case 31–
CA–23194 alleging that Respondent had failed to bargain in
good faith, had refused to furnish relevant information, and had
bargained directly with employees. Thereafter, on March 12,
1998, Al Jannone wrote the Union stating, inter alia, that Re-
spondent had deferred bargaining with the Union based on the
pending decertification petition but that Respondent was again
willing to negotiate with the Union. However, while Respon-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 254
dent agreed to bargain with the Union, it continued to question
the Union’s majority status stating, “I must advise you that
though Jano is willing to meet with you, we have heard nothing
from our employees which would lead me to believe that they
have changed their opinion about their desire to sever their
union relations.” As indicated earlier the decertification peti-
tion was dismissed and Respondent entered into a settlement
agreement on August 26, 1998.
On March 30, Al Jannone and Sally Jannone, his wife, met
with Dudley concerning a successor collective-bargaining
agreement. Respondent proposed a 2-percent wage increase2
and that Respondent and the employees split health care con-
tibutions on a 50/50 basis. Based on the unfair labor practice
charges filed by the Union, Jannone did not bargain with the
Union again until late August.
On July 1, Respondent, without prior notice or bargaining
with the Union, unilaterally granted a wage increase of .5 per-
cent. On August 24, 1998, Respondent settled the unfair labor
practice charges and proposed several changes to the expired
collective-bargaining agreement. Most important Respondent
proposed that the bargaining unit be redefined so as to include
only employees who chose to become union members. The
expired agreement had covered all production employees and
had included a union-security agreement with dues checkoff.
In addition to proposed changes to the bargaining unit descrip-
tion and union security, Respondent made proposals regarding
health care, pension, and wages. The Respondent proposed that
the agreement be for “no fixed term.” On August 31, Al Jan-
none wrote Howard Dudley, president of the Union, notifying
the Union that Respondent had unilaterally given employees a
1-1/2-percent wage increase in January 1998 and another half-
percent wage increase in July 1998. Jannone also gave Dudley
information regarding the simple IRA plan that Respondent had
unilaterally implemented in January 1998.
The Union drafted a counter proposal for a 1-year contract
with the employer paying 95 percent of employee health insur-
ance coverage and 75 percent of dependent coverage escalating
to 95 percent at the expiration of the contract. In the expired
agreement, Respondent paid 50 percent of health insurance
coverage. The Union’s proposal called for a 4-percent raise in
wages. The Union also offered to propose language changing
the union-security clause to a maintenance-of-membership
agreement.
The parties held four bargaining sessions in the fall of 1998.
During these sessions, the parties discussed wages and health
premiums. During one session the parties agreed to a lower
wage rate for the platemaker classification. The Union also
agreed to language permitting Respondent to pay deserving
employees at over scale wage rates. As to health benefits, the
Union was seeking a higher contribution to premiums from the
Respondent. Jannone made clear to the Union that “health care
is one of the uncontrollable costs of a company, it is a cost that
I can’t control and if you introduce a health plan to a company
you can’t take it away from the employees.” Jannone stated

ing of the session.

2 Respondent had already implemented 1.5 percent of the proposed
2-percent wage increase in January 1998. The remaining .5-percent
wage increase was unilaterally implemented in July 1998.
that he would pay 50 percent of the health care premiums and
that the employees would have to pay 50 percent of the health
care premiums. Respondent was taking the position that it
would consider a wage increase but would not pay more than
50 percent of health care premiums.
On December 9, 1998, the Union filed the charge in Case
31–CA–23636.3 As a result of the unfair labor practices,
Respondent did not meet with the Union until February 19,
1999. Angered by the unfair labor practice charge, Jannone’s
wife resigned from Respondent’s negotiating team and was
replaced by Manager John Candelaria at the February 19, bar-
gaining session. Candelaria, based on a distrust of Dudley,
insisted that proposals and tentative agreements be in writing.
At the February 19 meeting, Respondent presented a proposal
for a contract of “no fixed term,” a maintenance-of-membership
clause, and recognition of the Union only for employees who
were members of the Union. Jannone proposed the no fixed
term so that employees could file for decertification of the Un-
ion at any time during the contract. Jannone offered the 2-
percent wage increase that Respondent had already unilaterally
implemented. Respondent offered to pay 50 percent of health
care premiums. Candelaria wanted to tape the bargaining
session because of “Dudley’s credibility problems” but the
Union objected to a record
On March 1, 1999, Respondent entered into a settlement of
Cases 31–CA–23194 and 31–CA–23636. In the March 1, 1999
settlement, Respondent agreed not to: (1) refuse to meet and
bargain with the Union; (2) withdraw recognition from the
Union; (3) refuse to provide relevant information; (4) bypass
the Union and bargain directly with employees; (5) unilaterally
change wages or other terms and conditions of employment;
and (6) refuse to meet and bargain because of the pendency of
unfair labor practice charges. Further, Respondent agreed to
affirmatively: meet and bargain with the Union over rates of
pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment including a pension plan, health plan contribu-
tions, and/or wage increases.
On March 5, Respondent again sought to use a tape recorder
but the Union objected. Respondent provided the Union with
wage information that the Union had requested. However, the
Union claimed to still have questions regarding the 1998-wage
increases. Jannone complained about the Union’s filing of
unfair labor practice charges.
Bargaining sessions were held on April 7 and 13. The par-
ties continued to discuss the duration of the contract, wages,
pension plan, health care, and maintenace of membership/union
security. No agreements were reached at these meetings. Re-
spondent was still seeking a contract of no fixed term so that
“the employees could decide whether to keep the Union.”
Respondent was also still proposing the already implemented
wage increase and its proposal that the employees pay 50 per-
cent of health care premiums. The Union sought a 2-year con-
tract with a 4-percent wage increase and an additional 2-percent
wage increase which could be diverted to health care premi-
3 Lori Sage had filed the decertification petition in Case 31–RD–
1400 on November 10, 1998.
JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 255
ums. At these sessions Jannone repeatedly stated that the em-
ployees did not want the Union.
On April 28, Fred Jannone, son of Al Jannone, attended the
bargaining session to give the Union certain information per-
taining to wages. At this session Al Jannone asked the Union
what it would take for the Union to accept a maintenance-of-
membership clause instead of the Union’s union-security
clause. In response, the Union presented a written counter-
proposal calling for a 4-percent wage increase and a union
dues-deduction clause indicating voluntary membership, with
specific language “to be worked out.”
On May 5, 1999, Respondent provided the Union with in-
formation regarding wages, health insurance deductions, union
dues deductions, tentative agreements, and recognition/union
security. Respondent stated that its position on union security
was based on the decertification petition filed with the Board.
A decertification petition in Case 31–RD–1400 was filed on
November 10, 1998. That petition was dismissed on May 5,
1999, based on the charge in Case 31–CA–23194. Notwith-
standing that Respondent settled Case 31–CA–23636 on March
1, 1999, with an affirmative bargaining obligation, it was still
relying on the Union’s weakened majority status in negotia-
tions.
On June 3, 1999, the parties reached tentative agreement on
recognition and jurisdiction of the Union. The parties also
reached tentative agreement on general language of the con-
tract, overtime, struck work, picket line, grievance procedure,
workweek, lunch period, holidays, shifts, call back, reproduc-
tion, foremen, sanitary regulations, vacations, priority claims,
sick leave, severance pay, and apprentice regulations. The only
remaining issues were term of the agreement, rates of pay,
health care contributions, pension plan, and union security.
On June 11, the Union made a proposal for a 1-year term of
agreement, a 2-percent wage increase based on the previous
wage increases with a new 4-percent wage increase, an em-
ployer contribution of 85 percent of health premiuns to be
raised 5 percent in 6 months and another 5 percent at 12
months. The proposal also required the employer to pay 85
percent of health premiums for dependents rising to 95 percent
after 1 year. The proposal called for dues-checkoff language to
be worked out later and that the Union would be notified of any
changes in scale and new employees. The Union modified this
proposal twice during the June 11 meeting. That same date the
Union requested information regarding Respondent’s labor
costs and health care costs. Respondent proposed a 2.6-percent
wage increase (total) and no change in the 50/50 healthcare
split.
On June 14, Jannone wrote the Union agreeing to a 1-year
contract and agreeing to provide requested information. Jan-
none also confirmed that the Union had agreed to his existing
IRA as a pension plan for employees. Jannone summarized
that the parties were at that time separated by three issues: un-
ion security, wages, and health care contributions.
On June 24, Dudley wrote Jannone confirming that he had
received the requested information regarding health insurance
but requested additional information regarding a proposed in-
crease in health premiums.
On July 29, the parties met at the offices of a Federal media-
tor. The Union proposed an increase of 1-1/2 percent effective
August 1998 and a 3-percent increase effective August 1, 1999.
The Union further proposed that Respondent pay 60 percent of
employee health care premiums rising to 70 percent at the end
of 6 months. The Union also proposed the same union-security
clause as the prior contract. The Respondent proposed a 3-
percent wage increase over the 1997 contract (in effect, a 1-
percent wage increase). The Employer further adhered to its
position that it would only pay 50 percent of health care bene-
fits and that the employees pay the other 50 percent of premi-
ums. The Employer proposed maintenance of membership
instead of union security. The Employer agreed to notify the
Union of changes in scale and new employees and any changes
in the pension program. The Union changed its wage proposal
but did not change its other proposals. The Employer coun-
tered with a higher wage proposal but maintained its position
on health insurance and maintenance of membership. Through-
out negotiations Respondent maintained the position that it
could not control health care costs and would only pay 50 per-
cent of health care contributions. In the Union’s third proposal
of that date, the Union proposed the wage increases of 1998
and a 3-percent wage increase in 1999. It proposed that the
Employer pay 75 percent of employee health care contributions
raising 10 percent in 6 months and another 10 in 12 months.
The percentages for dependent coverage were 70-percent rising
every 6 months to 95 percent. The Union changed its proposal
and agreed to maintenance of membership with dues checkoff
contingent on the Employer agreeing to its wage and health
insurance package. The Union also proposed an alternative
package. The alternative proposal included union security but
lowered the Employer contributions to 60 and 70 percent after
8 months. Respondent proposed what it termed its “Company’s
Best and Final Offer.” In this best and final offer the Company
proposed wages at 4 percent above the 1997 contract. It con-
tinued to adhere to its 50-50-percent offer on health care con-
tributions and maintenance of membership. Respondent re-
quested that the Union take its best and final offer to the em-
ployees for ratification.
At first, Prairie refused to take the offer to the employees.
After consultation with Dudley, Prairie agreed that the Union
would “run it by the employees.” However, Prairie did not
agree to ratification. Evidently, it was the intention of the Un-
ion to take a poll of the bargaining unit employees as opposed
to taking a ratification vote of the union membership.4 How-
ever, the Union later decided to pursue further bargaining and
did not take a poll of the employees.
On July 30, Al Jannone wrote Dudley enclosing a typed copy
of Respondent’s best and final offer and asking for notification
of a ratification vote. Dudley wrote Jannone on August 2,
questioning what Janone meant by “best and final.” Appar-
ently, Dudley was prepared to argue that since Jannone had not
said “last, best and final offer,” the Employer had not made its

4 Under the Union’s constitution and bylaws a ratification vote is
voted on by the entire membership of the Union and not merely by the
bargaining unit. Jannone wanted a ratification vote of his bargaining
unit employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 256
last offer to the Union. Dudley further requested information
regarding the employees then on Respondent’s payroll. Dudley
asked a question about Respondent’s hand bindery employees
and questions about Respondent’s maintenance-of-membership
proposal. For the first time, Dudley raised the question of
agency fees. Dudley also raised disingenuous questions about
the notice provisions of Respondent’s proposals. Dudley re-
quested a response from Jannone by August 6. On August 4,
Dudley wrote Jannone requesting further negotiations. Dudley
stated that he wished to discuss Respondent’s most recent pro-
posal and that he wished to make additional proposals to Re-
spondent. Dudley offered to have the Federal mediator present,
if Jannone so desired.
On August 6, Jannone wrote Dudley answering the questions
raised by Dudley in his July 30 letter. Jannone stated that Re-
spondent had made its final offer and that Dudley knew what
that meant. Jannone supplied the information concerning the
bargaining unit employees. In addition, Jannone explained that
he had agreed to the Union’s proposal regarding bindery em-
ployees. He further explained that Respondent had agreed to
dues checkoff for those employees who had voluntarily agreed
to checkoff. He also explained his agreement to notify the
Union of changes in wage rates and of new hires. Finally, he
stated that Respondent had agreed to notify the Union prior to
any changes in the pension plan. Thus, by August 6, Respon-
dent had answered Dudley’s questions but had not responded to
his August 4 request to bargain. On August 9, Jannone replied
to Dudley’s August 6 letter. Jannone claimed that the Union
had agreed to present the Employer’s final offer to the bargain-
ing unit employees for acceptance or rejection. Jannone stated
that he would not meet again until after the employees rejected
or accepted his final offer. In effect, Jannone conditioned fur-
ther bargaining on the Union holding a vote on his best and
final offer.
On August 10, Dudley wrote Jannone again requesting fur-
ther bargaining. Dudley stated, “[A]lthough we did tell you
that we intended to have our members votre, we never intended
that to be a final vote on acceptance or rejection of any final
offer.” Dudley took the position that he seeks employee input
but that in this case, “it would be premature to take any vote on
these questions.” Dudley stated that the Union still had ques-
tions and further proposals to make. Dudley stated that the
Union wished to further discuss health care contributions and
requested that Jannone provide correspondence between Re-
spondent and its health insurance provider.
On August 17, Jannone responded to Dudley’s letter of Au-
gust 7. Jannone accused Dudley of engaging in self-serving
rhetoric to aid the Union’s unfair labor practice charges. Jan-
none accused Dudley of “weaseling” out of his agreement to
submit the best and final offer for ratification. Jannone again
requested that Dudley submit the agreement for ratification and
again refused to meet until the ratification vote was held. He
argued that the Union had already had 18 months to submit its
proposals. He urged Dudley to submit any new proposals in
writing to him. Jannone stated that he would post a copy of the
letter for employees to see.
On August 24, Dudley answered Jannone’s August 17 letter.
Dudley insisted that the parties had not reached impasse. He
again stated that the Union had questions about the best and
final offer and had additional proposals to make. He further
argued that it was unlawful for Jannone to condition bargaining
on the submission of questions and/or proposals in writing.
Dudley again took the position that it was premature to take
Respondent’s offer back to the bargaining unit employees.
Dudley argued that there was merit to the unfair labor practice
charges and that Respondent had entered into two settlement
agreements. Dudley again requested bargaining and proposed
various dates for such meetings. On August 25, Jannone re-
plied that Dudley’s August 24 letter did not change his position.
Jannone again took the position that there was no reason to
meet until the employees had voted on the best and final offer.
Jannone reiterated his position that the parties were at impasse
on July 29.
On August 30, Dudley again wrote Jannone denying an im-
passe and seeking to return to the bargaining table. Dudley
asked for information to explain previously received informa-
tion regarding health care costs. On September 2, Jannone
wrote Dudley again arguing that the parties reached impasse on
July 29. Jannone argued that Dudley had received all the in-
formation regarding health care insurance and was no longer
acting in good faith. However, Jannone continued to supply
information.
On January 27, 2000, Respondent posted on its bulletin
boards its “Jano Graphics Final Offer,” the same proposal it had
made to the Union on July 29, 1999. The posting stated, “[A]s
you know Jano Graphics put into effect its final offer to the
Union. Jano Graphics will now be operating in accordance
with the terms of that Final Offer. To make you familiar with
those terms, I have outlined the changes that became effective
yesterday, January 26, 2000.” The notice then listed the
changes to the following topics; wages, six-color press, union
security, health insurance, term of agreement, language, and
new sections. These changes were consistent with the best and
final offer made to the Union on July 29, 1999.
On January 28, employee Lori Sage circulated a petition stat-
ing that the employees no longer wished to be represented by
the Union. All but one of the bargaining unit employees signed
the petition.5 The employees all knew that negotiations be-
tween the Respondent and Union had broken down and that
Respondent had unilaterally implemented its best and final
offer. Based on the employee petition, on February 1, Respon-
dent filed the petition in Case 31–RM–1267.
On March 1, 2000, Dudley wrote Jannone seeking to negoti-
ate over wages, term of agreement, and union security. The
next day, March 2, Dudley requested following information
from Respondent:

(1) The hourly rate paid to each employee as well as
the total wages received by each employee each month;

5 Sage had previously filed two decertification petitions. The peti-
tion in Case 31–RD–1398 was filed on October 23, 1998, and with-
drawn on November 2, 1998. The petition in Case 31–RD–1400 was
filed on November 10, 1998, and was dismissed on May 5, 1999. The
petitions were withdrawn and dismissed based on the Respondent’s
undertakings in the August 26, 1998, and March 1, 1999 settlement
agreements.
JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 257
(2) the number of hours worked by each employee each
month (3) payments made to employees other than their
regular wages (i.e., their hourly rate multiplied by the
number of hours worked); (4) deductions from each em-
ployee each month broken down by the types of deduc-
tions; (5) the classification of each employee and, if a
change was made, the date of the change; and (6) the
status of each employee, i.e., whether the employee is a
journeyman or apprentice and, if a change was made, the
date of the change.

On March 13, Jannone wrote Dudley denying the informa-
tion based on the employee petition it received on January 28.
Also on March 13, Jannone wrote Dudley refusing to bargain
based on the then pending petition in Case 31–RM–1267.
On May 26, Dudley wrote Janone seeking to resume collec-
tive bargaining after the Board’s General Counsel had author-
ized a refusal to bargain complaint against Respondent. Dudley
again requested information regarding the unit employees and
information concerning communications between Respondent
and its health insurance provider. Dudley did not receive a
response to his May 26 letter, and, therefore, on June 6 again
wrote Jannone seeking to resume negotiations and requesting
further information for bargaining. On June 5, Jannone denied
Dudley’s requests for bargaining and his requests for informa-
tion. Jannone took the position that the parties had been at
impasse on July 29, 1999, and January 26, 2000.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Alleged Impasse
As stated earlier, the first issue is whether the parties reached
impasse in their negotiations so as to permit Respondent to
implement its final offer. By definition, an impasse occurs
whenever negotiations reach that point at which the parties
have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement and
further discussions would be fruitless. Laborers Health &
Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484
U.S. 539, 543 (1988). After an impasse has been reached on
one or more subjects of bargaining, an employer may imple-
ment any of its preimpasse proposals. Western Publishing Co.,
269 NLRB 355 (1984).
“A genuine impasse in negotiations is synonymous with a
deadlock; the parties have discussed a subject or subjects in
good faith, and, despite their best efforts to achieve agreement
with respect to such, neither party is willing to move from its
respective position.” Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 NLRB 22,
23 (1973). In Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478
(1967), enfd. 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the Board listed
the following factors for determining whether an impasse ex-
isted:

The bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in nego-
tiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the
issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, the
contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of the negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in
deciding whether an impasse in bargaining existed.

The Board has further held that, even if impasse is reached over
an issue, it may be broken if one of the parties moves off its
previously adamant position. Tom Ryan Distributors, 314
NLRB 600, 604–605 (1994), enfd. mem. 70 F.3d 1272 (6th Cir.
1995) (no impasse found where union demonstrated intent to
move on key issue, parties had met only eight times before
employer declared impasse, and the key issue had been dis-
cussed conceptually but not in detail). “As a recurring feature in
the bargaining process, impasse is only a temporary deadlock
or hiatus in negotiations ‘which in almost all cases is eventually
broken, through either a change of mind or the application of
economic force.’” Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB,
454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982), quoting 243 NLRB 1093–1094
(1979). See Royal Motor Sales, 329 NLRB 760 (1999).
Finally, because impasse as a defense to a charge of an
unlawful unilateral change, the burden of proof rests on the
party asserting that impasse exists. North Star Steel Co., 305
NLRB 45 (1991); Roman Iron Works, 282 NLRB 725 (1987).
In the instant case the parties met in 13 bargaining sessions
from March 31, 1998, to July 1999, prior to Respondent’s im-
plementation of its final offer in January 2000. However, the
parties only met seven times in the 5 months after the March 1,
1999 settlement agreement. I find the fact that such bargaining
took place for less than 6 months weighs against a finding of
impasse. The inability of the Federal mediator to facilitate an
agreement is a factor supporting a finding of impasse. NLRB v.
Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F.2d 48, 55 (6th Cir. 1954).
Respondent argues that there was no prospect of an agreement
and that the Union was never going to agree to its proposal for
50-50-percent health care contributions or a maintenance-of-
membership clause. The Union contends that it would have
agreed to the Employer’s health proposal if wages could be
agreed upon and that it had offered to agree to maintenance of
membership if wages and health care contributions were re-
solved. The Union further argues that it notified the Employer
that it had additional proposals but that the employer would not
meet and bargain. It is undisputed that Respondent conditioned
further bargaining on the Union taking the Employer’s best and
final offer to a ratification vote.
While Respondent argued in July 1999 and January and May
2000, and again at the instant hearing that the parties were at
impasse, “both parties must believe they are at the end of their
rope.” Larsdale, Inc., 310 NLRB 1317, 1318 (1993); Huck
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 693 F.2d 1176, 1177 (5th Cir. 1982). See
also NLRB v. Powell Electrical Mfg., 906 F.2d 1007, 1011–
1012 (5th Cir. 1990). Recently in Grinnell Fire Protection
Systems Co., 328 NLRB 585 (1999), the Board concluded that
the parties had not yet reached a legal impasse even though the
employer asserted that it had reached its final position, as dur-
ing the final session, the charging party-union “not only contin-
ued to declare its intention to be flexible, but demonstrated this
throughout its dealings with the Respondent that day.” The
Board stated:

Where as here, a party who has already made significant con-
cessions indicates a willingness to compromise further, it
would be both erroneous as a matter of law and unwise as a
matter of policy for the Board to find impasse merely because
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 258
the party is unwilling to capitulate immediately and settle on
the other party’s unchanged terms. . . . Further, even assum-
ing arguendo that the Respondent has demonstrated it was
unwilling to compromise any further, we find that it has fallen
short of demonstrating that the Union was unwilling to do so.
[Id. at 586.]

In this case, the Union continually argued that the parties
were not at impasse. It is not sufficient for a finding of impasse
to simply show that the Employer had lost patience with the
Union or its chief negotiator. Impasse requires a deadlock. As
the Board stated in Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 287 NLRB 969,
973 (1987):

That there was no impasse when the Company declared is not
to suggest that if the parties continued their sluggish bargain-
ing indefinitely there would have been agreement on a new
contract. Such a finding is not needed, nor could it be made
without extra-record speculation, to find on this record that
when the Company declared an impasse there was not one,
even as far apart as the parties were. They had most of their
work ahead of them, and judging by the opening sessions
clearly had different goals in mind for a contract. Whether
their differences ever would have been resolved cannot be
known; but that is the nature of the process. It is for the par-
ties through earnest, strenuous, tedious, frustrating and hard
bargaining to solve their mutual problem—getting a con-
tract—together, not to quit the table and take a separate path.

As stated above, the fact that Al Jannone believed that the
Union would never agree to Respondent’s contract proposals
does not establish an impasse. In light of the Union’s proposals
at the July 29, 1999, I cannot find the parties had reached a
deadlock in their negotiations. Even assuming a temporary
deadlock on July 29, in early August, Dudley notified Jannone
that the Union had questions about Respondent’s final offer and
had additional proposals to make. Respondent was not privi-
leged to deny that request to bargain. Jannone could not create
an impasse simply by insisting that he was not going to move
from his bargaining position.
The union did not agree to take Respondent’s best and final
offer to ratification. Ratification is an internal Union matter.
While the Union did agree to poll the employees, there was no
consideration for that agreement. The Union could upon fur-
ther reflection of Respondent’s offer decide to bargain further
before polling the employees. As the Board stated in Cotter &
Co., 331 NLRB 787 (2000), in finding no impasse:

The Respondent contends, however, that the union negotia-
tors’ respose to its “last, best and final offer’—that the Re-
spondent was not offering anything that the Union could rec-
ommend to its employees—establishes that the parties were at
impasse. We are not persuaded. It is a commonplace that ex-
perienced negotiators make concessions cautiously and that
negative initial reactions are later reconsidered in order to ob-
tain an agreement. [Id.]

Here, on August 4, Dudley wrote Jannone requesting further
negotiations. Dudley stated that he wished to discuss Respon-
dent’s most recent proposal and that he wished to make addi-
tional proposals to Respondent. Dudley offered to have the
Federal mediator present, if Jannone so desired. On August 9,
Jannone stated that he would not meet again until after the em-
ployees rejected or accepted his final offer. Jannone condi-
tioned further bargaining on the Union taking Respondent’s
best and final offer to the employees for a vote of acceptance or
rejection. On August 10, Dudley wrote Jannone again request-
ing further bargaining. Dudley stated, “[A]lthough we did tell
you that we intended to have our members votre, we never
intended that to be a final vote on acceptance or rejection of
any final offer.” Dudley took the position that he seeks em-
ployee input but that in this case, “it would be premature to take
any vote on these questions.” Dudley stated that the Union still
had questions and further proposals to make. Dudley stated
that the Union wished to further discuss health care contribu-
tions.
On August 24, Dudley insisted that the parties had not
reached impasse. He again stated that the Union had additional
proposals to make. Dudley again took the position that it was
premature to take Respondent’s offer back to the bargaining
unit employees. Dudley argued that there was merit to the
unfair labor practice charges and that Respondent had entered
into two settlement agreements. Dudley again requested bar-
gaining and proposed various dates for such meetings. On
August 25, Jannone replied that Dudley’s August 24 letter did
not change his position. Jannone again took the position that
there was no reason to meet until the employees had voted on
the best and final offer. Jannone reiterated his position that the
parties were at impasse on July 29.
First, under Section 8(d) of the Act, Respondent was obli-
gated to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment. Respondent has not proven a lawful impasse suffi-
cient to excuse its obligations under Section 8(d). Further Re-
spondent was unlawfully conditioning bargaining upon a ratifi-
cation vote, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. See Detroit
Newspapers, 327 NLRB 799 (1999); Sheet Metal Workers Lo-
cal 263 (Sheet Metal Contractors), 272 NLRB 43 (1984).
I find that in August 1999, and in January 2000, there was
still more earnest, tedious, strenuous, frustrating, and hard bar-
gaining remaining before agreement or impasse was reached.
In general, impasse on one or several issues does not suspend
the obligation to bargain on remaining, unsettled issues. Pat-
rick & Co., 248 NLRB 390 (1980), enfd. mem. 644 F.2d 889
(9th Cir. 1981); Atlas Tack Corp., 226 NLRB 222 (1976), enfd.
mem. 559 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1977). The Union expressed, on
several occasions, its belief that if wages could be worked out it
could agree to Respondent’s health proposal or if wages and
benefits could be worked out it could agree to maintenance of
membership. I find the Union’s proposals and concessions at
the July 29 meeting make it inappropriate for me to conclude
that impasse had been reached. Further in early August, the
Union stated that it had further questions and additional pro-
posals. I find that Respondent’s president, Al Jannone, had lost
patience with the Union and Dudley and was no longer willing
to explore the possibility of narrowing the issues or reaching
agreement. Further, Jannone was unlawfully insisting on a
ratification vote.
JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 259
In summation, the fact that Respondent’s president believed
that the Union would never agree to its contract proposals does
not establish an impasse. In light of the findings regarding the
Union’s proposals and concessions and the Respondent’s prior
unilateral granting of benefits and wage increases, I cannot find
the parties had reached a lawful impasse or deadlock in their
negotiations in July 1999. I find insufficient evidence that such
condition changed in January 2000, when Respondent again
declared impasse in an attempt to justify its unilateral imple-
mentation of its best and final offer. Rather the situation had
been made worse by Jannone’s refusal to bargain unless and
until the Union submitted his offer to the employees for ratifi-
cation. No progress was made between July 29, 1999, and
January 26, 2000, because Respondent had unlawfully refused
to bargain any further with the Union.
In addition, I note that Respondent continued to question the
Union’s majority status in spite of two settlement agreements in
which Respondent affirmatively agreed to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union for a reasonable period of time. The Board
has held that “a reasonable period of time” in such cases is at
least 6 months. See Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 334
NLRB 399 (2001); Wyndham Palmas del Mar Resort & Villas,
334 NLRB 514 (2001). In the instant case, Respondent had
entered a settlement agreement on March 1, 1999, agreeing to
recognize and bargain with the Union. However, as early as
May 5, 1999, Jannone was questioning the Union’s majority
status and making proposals regarding maintenance of mem-
bership based on a majority status weakened by unilateral
changes and other unfair labor practices. Jannone continued to
question the Union’s majority status throughout the bargaining
process.
As I have found that on January 26, no lawful impasse ex-
isted, Respondent’s implementation of the terms of its final
offer that day, without the agreement of the Union, was viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Royal Motor Sales,
329 NLRB 760 (1999); WPIX, Inc., 293 NLRB 10 fn. 1 (1989),
enfd. 906 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1990); Sacramento Union, 291
NLRB 552, 557 (1988).
Further, Respondent cannot rely on the employee petition of
January 28, 2000, to establish a lack of majority status. In Lee
Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., supra, the Board reaffirmed
that when an employer has unlawfully refused to recognize or
bargain with an incumbent union, any employee disaffection
arising during the course of the unlawful conduct will be pre-
sumed to be caused by that conduct. Absent unusual circum-
stances, the presumption can be rebutted only if the employer
can show that the disaffection arose after it resumed recogniz-
ing the union and bargained for a reasonable period of time
without committing other unfair labor practices that would
adversely affect the bargaining. The Board modified the “rea-
sonable period of time” standard, however. It held that, in such
circumstances, a “reasonable period of time” before the union’s
status as the employees’ bargaining representative can be chal-
lenged will be no less than 6 months and no more than 1 year.
Here, the employee dissatisfaction arose only 2 days after Re-
spondent had unlawfully implemented its best and final offer in
the absence of a lawful impasse. See also Wyndham Palmas
del Mar Resort & Villas, supra.
B. The Refusal to Furnish Information
In the instant case, after the unlawful implementation of
January 26, 2000, the Union continued to seek to negotiate for a
collective-bargaining agreement. In furtherance of that objec-
tive, the Union requested information relevant to the collective-
bargaining process. Respondent continued to adhere to its le-
gally incorrect position that the parties were at impasse. Re-
spondent compounded its errors by refusing to provide the rele-
vant information to the Union.
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentatives of his employees, subject to the bargaining unit pro-
visions of Section 9(a). The duty to bargain in good faith re-
quires an employer to furnish information requested and needed
by the employees’ bargaining representative for the proper
performance of its duties to represent unit employees of that
employer. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437
(1967). A union’s request for information regarding the terms
and conditions of employment of the employees employed
within the bargaining unit represented by the union, is “pre-
sumptively relevant” to the union’s proper performance of its
collective-bargaining duties, Samaritan Medical Center, 319
NLRB 392, 397 (1995), because such information is at the
“core of the employee-employer relationship,” Graphics Com-
munications Local 13 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 fn. 5 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), thus it is relevant by its “very nature.” Emeryville
Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1971).
Therefore, an employer’s statutory obligation to provide in-
formation presupposes that the information is relevant and nec-
essary to a union’s bargaining obligation vis-a-vis its represen-
tation of unit employees of that employer. White-Westinghouse
Corp., 259 NLRB 220 fn. 1 (1981). Whether the requested
information is relevant and sufficiently important or needed to
invoke a statutory obligation to provide it is determined on a
case-by-case basis. Id.
In making this determination of relevance, the Board has fol-
lowed the following principles:

Wage and related information pertaining to employees in the
bargaining unit is presumptively relevant, for, as such data
concerns the core of the employer-employee relationship, a
union is not required to show the precise relevance of it,
unless effective employer rebuttal comes forth; as to other re-
quested data, however, such as employer profits and produc-
tion figures, a union must, by reference to the circumstances
of the case, as an initial matter, demonstrate more precisely
the relevance of the data it desires.

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965),
cited with approval in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB 424,
425 (1993).

Thus, if the requested information goes to the core of the em-
ployer-employee relationship, and the employer refuses to
provide that requested information, the employer has the bur-
den to prove either lack of relevance or to provide adequate
reasons why it cannot, in good faith, supply the information.
If the information requested is shown to be irrelevant to any
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 260
legitimate union collective-bargaining need, however, a re-
fusal to furnish it is not an unfair labor practice.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB at 425 (citing Emeryville
Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971)).
The standard to determine a union’s right to information will
be “a broad discovery type standard,” which permits the union
access to a broad scope of information potentially useful for the
purpose of effectuating the bargaining process. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial, 385 U.S. at 437 fn. 6; See also Anthony Motor Co.,
314 NLRB 443, 449 (1994). There only needs to be “the prob-
ability that the desired information was relevant, and that it
would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties
and responsibilities.” Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. at 437.
Even had the parties been at impasse, Respondent would still
have been obligated to provide the relevant information.

The bargaining process, itself, contemplates that passage of
time following such a hiatus will lead one or the other party to
modify its position(s) on deadlocked issues, ibid., and, once
that occurs, all parties are obliged to resume negotiations in a
renewed effort to reach agreement on terms for a collective-
bargaining contract. Accordingly . . . impasse . . . served only
to interrupt the ongoing process of bargaining for a contract; it
did not serve to interrupt or suspend the Union’s status as the
statutory bargaining agent of employees in the historic bar-
gaining unit.
As a general proposition, during such a hiatus in nego-
tiations for a contract, an employer’s duty to disclose rele-
vant information is no different, and certainly no less, than
exists before impasse. For, “wage and related information
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit should,
upon request, be made available to the bargaining agent
without regard to its immediate relationship to the negotia-
tion or administration of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment,” Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537, 1541
(1954), enfd. 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), since “a labor
organization’s right to relevant information is not depend-
ent upon the existence of some particular controversy or
the need to dispose of some recognized problem.” [Cita-
tions omitted.] Oil Workers Local 6-418 v. NLRB, 711
F.2d 348, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Retlaw Broadcasting Co.,
324 NLRB 138, 141 (1997).

Therefore, Respondent could not justify its refusal to provide
the presumptively relevant information to the Union simply
because the request was made after an alleged impasse. Re-
spondent remains under a duty to provide this information.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in a
business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
refusing to bargain with the Union, by conditioning bargaining
upon a ratification vote, by unilaterally implementing its final
contract proposal on January 26, 2000, and by withdrawing
recognition from the Union after February 2000.
4. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
by failing to provide the Union with information concerning
health insurance, job classifications, and wages.
5. Respondent’s conduct in paragraphs 3 and 4 above are un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectu-
ate the purposes and policies of the Act. For the reasons stated
by the Board in Cateair International, 322 NLRB 64 (1996),
and Wyndham Palmas del Mar Resort & Villa, supra, I find that
an affirmative bargaining order is warranted in this case for the
Respondent’s unlawful refusal to bargain with the Union in
August 1999, and its unlawful withdrawal of recognition from
the Union in March 2000.
First, an affirmative bargaining order in this case vindicates
the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were denied the
benefits of collective bargaining by the employer in August
1999 and again in February 2000. At the same time, the af-
firmative bargaining order, with its attendant bar to raising a
question concerning the Union’s continuing majority status for
a reasonable time, does not unduly prejudice the Section 7
rights of employees who may oppose continued union represen-
tation because the duration of the order is no longer than is
reasonably necessary to remedy the ill effects of the violation.
This is particularly important in this case because Respondent’s
unfair labor practices have tainted decertification petitions and
Respondent has continually questioned the Union’s majority
status. The Union should be free for a reasonable period of
time from such actions.
Second, The affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective bargain-
ing and industrial peace. That is, it removes Jannone’s incen-
tive to delay bargaining in the hope of further encouraging the
filing of another decertification petition. It also ensures that the
Union will not be pressured, by the possibility of another decer-
tification petition, to achieve immediate results at the bargain-
ing table following the Board’s resolution of its unfair labor
practices and issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
Third, a cease and desist order, without a temporary decerti-
fication bar, would be inadequate to remedy the Respondent’s
violations because it would permit a decertification petition to
be filed before the Respondnet had afforded the employees a
reasonable time to regroup and bargain through their represen-
tative in an effort to reach a collective-bargaining agreement.
In this case, there is every reason to believe that a decertifica-
tion petition will be filed as soon as permitted by the Board. A
decertification petition prior to a reasonable period of good-
faith bargaining would be particularly unfair in these circum-
stances, where a series of settlement agreements, unfair labor
practices, and litigation, has taken over 3-1/2 years, thereby
heavily tainting the employee dissatisfaction from the Union.
In this case, I find that the above circumstances out weigh the
temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order will have on
the rights of employees who oppose continued union represen-
JANO GRAPHICS, INC. 261
tation. For the foregoing reason, I recommend an affirmative
bargaining order with its temporary decertification bar as a
remedy for the violations found in this case.
On the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
upon the entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, Jano Graphics, Inc., Ventura, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively by unilaterally
implementing its final contract offer to the Union on January
26, 2000.

(b) Conditioning bargaining with the Union on submission of
Respondent’s proposal to the bargaining unit employees for
ratification.
(c) Refusing to meet and bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit with respect to
rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment including contributions to health insur-
ance, union security, and wages.
(d) Withdrawing recognition either directly or impliedly
from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining represen-
tative of Respondent’s employees in the unit described.
(e) Refusing to provide the Union with requested informa-
tion relevant and necessary to its responsibilities as exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respondent’s employ-
ees including health insurance, job classification, and wage
information.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request, meet and bargain with the Union as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit described below with respect to
rates of pay, hours of employment, and other terms and condi-
tions, and if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement. The appropriate bargaining unit
is:

6 All motions inconsistent with this recommended order are denied.
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

Included: All employees as described in our collective bar-
gaining agreement with the Union including all journeymen
and apprentices, electronic pre-press operators, cam-
era/stripper/platemakers, press operators, bindery employees
and driver/helpers.

Excluded: All other employees, supervisors and guards as de-
fined in the Act.

(b) Within 14 days from the date of this order, provide the
Union with the information, necessary and relevant to its status
as exclusive collective-bargaining representative, which the
Union requested in May and June 2000.
(c) On request by the Union, rescind any unilateral changes it
has implemented in its employees’ terms and conditions of
employment.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix”7 at its location in
Ventura, California. Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to en-
sure the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current and
former employees employed by Respondent at any time since
August 9,1999.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 31, a sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by Region 31 attesting
to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”