Janeen S.,1 Complainant,v.Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 20, 20170120160024 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 20, 2017) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Janeen S.,1 Complainant, v. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Agency. Appeal No. 0120160024 Agency No. 63-2014-00099 DECISION On September 10, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s August 13, 2015, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.2 For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2 In its final decision, the Agency stated that it found no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to any of the incidents raised in Complainant’s complaint. Final Agency Decision, p. 49. However, Complainant averred that her previous EEO complaint, filed in 2013, was based on disability. Investigative Report, 226. See also infra. Since the underlying complaint arose under the Rehabilitation Act, the instant complaint of reprisal would also arise under the Rehabilitation Act, as opposed to Title VII. We would therefore characterize the Agency’s framing of Complainant’s claim as a violation of Title VII as nothing more than harmless error. 0120160024 2 BACKGROUND Complainant worked as a Field Representative (FR) at the Agency’s Regional Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to as the “PRO”). In an EEO complaint filed on May 6, 2014 and amended on July 25, 2014 and October 17, 2014, Complainant alleged that several management officials in her chain of command subjected her to retaliatory harassment and disparate treatment for having filed a prior complaint of disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Complainant identified the following individuals as the responsible management officials: the Field Supervisor who served as her immediate supervisor (S1); the Supervisory Field Statistician who served as her second-line supervisor (S2); the Program Coordinator who served as her third-line supervisor; and the Program Manager for two surveys involving medical care (PM). IR 214. She identified the following incidents as comprising her claim: 1. On unspecified dates, Complainant was denied work assignments on certain surveys and the amount of work assigned to her continued to decrease. 2. In late January 2014, S1 and an Administrative Officer (AO) in the PRO denied some of Complainant’s payroll transactions. 3. In February 2014, after Complainant scheduled sick leave for a medical procedure, S2 ordered Complainant to attend mandatory training during that time frame, and when Complainant made arrangements to accommodate this scheduling demand, S2 rescheduled the training. 4. On February 14, February 15, February 25, and March 7, 2014, Agency officials told Complainant that there were concerns about her but refused to provide her with details about those concerns. 5. On February 14, 2014, the PM informed Complainant that she was in the process of hiring someone to be assigned to an area that Complainant had been working on for the previous two years. 6. On February 21, 2014, after Complainant informed S1 that she had run out of hours needed to complete five remaining population survey cases, S1 did not offer Complainant overtime needed to complete those cases. 7. On February 24 or 25, 2014, S1 insisted that Complainant had Month-in-Sample (MIS) 9 cases in her area and demanded that Complainant complete them, notwithstanding Complainant’s assertions that she did not have them. 8. Between February 25 and March 16, 2014, S1 never responded to any of Complainant’s requests for help. 0120160024 3 9. On March 3, 2014, S1 left Complainant a voice message saying she was apparently not receiving voice messages. 10. On March 7, 2014, S3 denied Complainant pay owed to her from the Government shutdown in October 2012. 11. On March 7, 2014, S3 told Complainant that she should feel lucky to have a job. 12. April 2, 2014, Complainant was issued a notice of proposed suspension which was reduced to a reprimand issued on June 3, 2014. 13. On unspecified dates, S1 did not inform Complainant about relevant matters with the same frequency and clarity as she did before Complainant filed her previous complaint. 14. On May 5 and May 6, 2014, S1 alleged that Complainant had not properly updated some of her cases and then reassigned those cases to someone else. 15. On June 10, 2014, S3 took actions that led Complainant to believe that she was under investigation due to the payroll hours she charted the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey Program and in the process violated Complainant’s confidentiality. 16. On September 3, 2014, a Field Supervisor (FS1), who had been directed by S1 and S2 to supervise Complainant in the performance of the second annual observation for the American Community Survey (ACS), denied her a morning break, attempted to deny her lunch break, insisted that she change interviewing procedures, refused to allow her to finish the observation at a later date knowing that she was ill, and left her without any help. 17. On October 9, 2014, S1 informed Complainant that she would lose her work in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) but would not add her to another survey that would have helped her to make up the shortfall in working hours. 18. On unspecified dates, S1 and S2 failed to respond to Complainant’s requests for information or clarification on procedures. 19. On October 10, 2014, S1 did not adjust the “11-39” ratings that Complainant had received. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the investigative report (IR) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to reprisal as alleged. 0120160024 4 Complainant’s Job Responsibilities: As a FR, Complainant was responsible for working on a number of surveys within a geographic area that comprised several counties in Western Pennsylvania and Eastern Ohio. Those surveys included: • American Community Survey – Group Quarters (ACS-GQ); • American Community Survey – Housing Unit (ACS-HU); • Current Population Survey – Survey of Construction Permit Address Listing (CPS- SOCPAL); • Demographic Area Address Listing (DAAL); • National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey / National Hospital Ambulatory Care Medical Survey (NAMCS/NHAMCS);3 • Consumer Expenditure Surveys: Consumer Expenditure Quarterly: Consumer Expenditure Diary – (CEQ/CED); and • National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). IR 214, 287, 321. Complainant’s Previous EEO Activity: On June 25, 2013, Complainant filed EEO Complaint No. 63-2023-00225 in which she alleged that she was denied a promotion because she was perceived as having a disability. IR 214, 224, 226. See also supra n. 2. S1, S2, and S3, acknowledged that they became aware of Complainant’s previous complaint in July 2013, with S2 admitting that she heard about the complaint directly from FS1. IR 286-87, 312, 321, 343. Complainant maintains that S1, S2, S3, and PM were the officials who had retaliated against her. IR 214. Incident (1): Complainant averred that S1 and S2 had continuously denied her the opportunity to work on the ACS-GQ and DAAL surveys throughout 2014. IR 215. She averred that before she filed her EEO complaint, she would typically handle up to 46 cases each month, and that afterword her workload had declined to 26 cases and was still decreasing. IR 216-17. S1 and S2 both denied reducing her workload. They pointed out that the workload for FRs fluctuates from month to month, and that they had no control over the number of cases assigned to FRs in particular geographic areas. IR 287, 322. A Supervisory Survey Statistician (SSS) who managed several of the surveys Complainant worked on averred that there had not been any work in the ACS-GQ and DAAL surveys in Complainant’s assigned area during 2014. IR 364. Incident (2): Complainant averred that S1 and AO refused to reimburse her for travel expenses she had incurred as a result of having to do field work. She stated that S1 and the AO denied that she had provided receipts for the hotel, taxis, baggage, and per diem charges. IR 217-218. S1 averred that Complainant had informed her that her paycheck was $400 short, and that the problem was eventually resolved. IR 290-91, 309-11, 371-72, 378-79. Complainant admitted that she received reimbursement in the amount of $400 in the following pay period. IR 218. 3 These were the two surveys managed by PM. See supra, n. 3. 0120160024 5 Incident (3): Complainant averred that she first requested sick leave for a medical procedure from February 4, 2014 to February 6, 2014 on January 2, 2014, and that in mid-January 2014, S2 had ordered her to reschedule her medical procedure because the training was mandatory. She further averred that two other employees were allowed to miss the mandatory training and take the training via self-directed home study. IR 218. S1 and S2 denied that she told Complainant to reschedule her medical appointment. They averred that the training was given on the weekend of February 4-6, 2014, and again on February 12-13, and that Complainant was allowed to take the training on the second weekend that it was offered. IR 291-92, 324-25. Complainant admitted that she took the training on the weekend of February 12-13, 2014. IR 218-19. Incident (4): Complainant averred that there were several instances in February and March of 2014 in which her supervisors raised concerns about her performance but had refused to disclose the details of their concerns. For example, she averred that on February 7, 2014, she was the only FR who was required to complete a status report requested by the PM. IR 220. The PM responded that all FRs who worked on cases involving the NACMS/NHACMS surveys were required to submit status reports to their Field Supervisors. IR 383-84. Next, Complainant averred that on February 15 and February 25, 2014, S1 chose not to tell her about her concerns in order to justify a proposed suspension. IR 220. S1 responded that she recalled Complainant asking her several times why she was required to submit a weekly NACMS status report. S1 responded that those reports were required by S2. IR 292. Complainant also averred that on March 7, 2014, she spoke to S3, who refused to identify the concerns raised by S1 and S2 regarding her performance. IR 220. S3 responded that she did not refuse to reveal to Complainant what management’s concerns about her performance were, and told Complainant that there were problems with her reporting on the status of several cases, particularly the NAMCS cases, and that she needed to improve her communications with S1. IR 343-45. Incident (5): Complainant averred that on February 14, 2014, PM informed her that she was going to assign another FR to Erie, Pennsylvania, where she had been working for two years, which caused her to lose work. She also averred that as a result of this action, she lost work in Ashtabula, Columbiana, and Carroll Counties in Ohio. IR 221. S1, S2, and PM averred she needed to hire an additional FR to work on the NAMCS and NHAMCS surveys in Erie because Erie was approximately 124 miles from Complainant’s home and she needed to keep travel expenses down. IR 293, 322-23, 327, 385. The PM also noted that Complainant did not lose work in any of the Ohio counties to which she was assigned. IR 385. Incident (6): Complainant averred that on February 21, 2014, when she had run out of time to complete her five remaining population survey cases, S1 did not offer her the overtime she needed to complete those cases. IR 221. S1 responded that she did not offer Complainant overtime because another FR was available who could complete the work without incurring overtime costs. IR 294, 313-14. Incident (7): Complainant averred that on February 24 or February 25, 2014, S1 insisted that Complainant complete the MIS 9 cases she had in her inventory, notwithstanding her 0120160024 6 protestations that she did not have MIS 9 cases. She further averred, that, once it was established that Complainant was assigned those cases, she took them away from Complainant and assigned them to another FR. IR 222. S1 averred that MIS cases were extra cases that pertain to CPS surveys, that she had assigned Complainant several MIS cases, and that on February 25, 2014, she called Complainant in order to inquire whether Complainant would be able to timely complete the assigned MIS 9 cases. She further averred that Complainant informed her that she did not see any MIS 9 case assignments in her computer. S1 stated that, rather than argue with Complainant about why those cases did not show up on her computer, she assigned another FR to complete those cases because they were due the evening of February 25, 2014. IR 288, 308. Incident (8): Complainant averred that between February 25, 2014, and March 16, 2014, she requested assistance from S1 on the NAMCS survey but that S1 did not respond to her requests and did not give her a reason for not responding. IR 222. S1 maintained that she did respond to Complainant when she requested assistance in order to gain cooperation at a doctor’s office she was visiting in order to work on the NAMCS survey. S1 stated that she informed Complainant that her schedule would not allow her to be available for assistance on the dates that Complainant needed to visit the doctor’s office. IR 289. Incident (9): Complainant averred that on March 3, 2014, S1 had left her a voice mail message in which S1 stated that she was not receiving voice mail messages from her, and had done so in order to set her up for a suspension. IR 222. S1 responded that on March 3, 2014, she did leave Complainant a voice mail message that ended with her statement that she would follow up via email in case Complainant did not receive the voice mail message. S1 further averred that she was unaware that a suspension was being considered for Complainant. IR 294. Incident (10): Complainant averred that on Marcy 7, 2014, S3 denied Complainant pay owed to her as a result of a government shutdown that had occurred in October 2012. She stated that she was owed 18 hours for pay periods 20 and 21 in 2012. IR 223. S3 responded that in response to Complainant’s request for reimbursement of pay for those hours, a detailed review was performed by the AO, and that Complainant was paid according to the rules and regulations that were implemented for the pay periods affected due to the government shutdown. IR 346. Incident (11): Complainant averred that on March 7, 2014, during a counseling session, S3 told her that she should feel lucky to have a job. IR 223. S3 responded that she had a telephone conversation with Complainant on March 7, 2014, in which she discussed the importance of having clear communications with supervisors and colleagues, and working as a team in a healthy environment. S3 averred that if she made the statement about Complainant being lucky to have a job, it was in the context of Complainant griping about how her work hours were reduced when in actuality she had been working forty hours per week even though she was a part-time employee. IR 346. Incident (12): Complainant averred that on April 2, 2014, she received notice of a proposed suspension. The charges and specifications included inappropriate conduct and failure to follow supervisory directives. Complainant had been sending an excessive number of emails and voice 0120160024 7 mail messages to S1. For example, in one four-day span while S1 was in training, Complainant sent her 26 emails. During that span, Complainant left a message with S1, telling S1 that it was an emergency and that she should call her back right away. When S1 did call back, Complainant told her that the emergency had been resolved. S1 also stated that Complainant was not following the directions she had been given to submit her cases prior to taking leave so as to ensure proper follow up. In addition, on March 14, 2014, Complainant called S1 telling her that she was missing several CPS cases. When S1 advised her that she would have other FRs assist with the completion of those cases, Complainant became angry and hung up on her. Complainant’s fourth-level supervisor, the Assistant Regional Director, reduced the proposed suspension to a reprimand. IR 224-26, 263-65, 295-96, 329, 344-45, 394. Incident (13): Complainant averred that on unspecified dates, S1 failed to keep her informed about matters relevant to her workload with the same frequency and clarity as she did before Complainant filed her EEO complaint in June 2013. In particular, she averred that between January and June 2014, S1 failed to keep her informed about significant survey-related issues and deadlines. IR 224-25, 256. S1, S2, and S3 responded that they kept the FRs under their supervision, including Complainant, informed of all matters that impacted on their job, including training on particular surveys. IR 296, 329, 347. Incident (14): Complainant averred that on May 5 and May 6, 2014, S1 reassigned several of her NAMCS cases to another FR after accusing her of failure to properly update them. IR 225, 257. S1 responded that Complainant claimed that she was entering notes in her NAMCS cases and was also making contact history instruction (CHI) entries, but that she, S1, did not observe those notes and entries when she viewed Complainant’s survey work in her computer. S1 had asked a Supervisory Survey Statistician (SSS) to check the system and try to find the problem. The SSS did determine that there was a technical glitch in the system which prevented S1 from seeing Complainant’s updates and CHI entries, but he was not able to resolve the problem. IR 297, 330, 348, 365. PM averred that Complainant informed her that she had to report for jury duty on one occasion, and that another FR was brought in to take up the slack. The PM also stated that this was normal practice for any FR that was not available. IR 386. Incident (15): Complainant averred that on June 10, 2014, S3 took actions that caused her to believe that she was being investigated due to the payroll hours she charged to the NAMCS survey, and that in so doing, S3 had disclosed confidential information pertaining to her personal identity to unauthorized personnel. IR 248. S3 responded that during her review of Complainant’s NAMCS survey report, she noticed that Complainant had charged several hours to the task of interviewing on a Sunday. She stated that she asked Complainant for an explanation of the charges, that Complainant provided an acceptable justification for those charges and that there was no investigation. As to the alleged unauthorized disclosure, S3 reported that she had intended to copy her response to one of Complainant’s emails to S1, but had accidently sent the response to another Field Supervisor with the same first name as S1. S3 immediately contacted this supervisor and asked her to delete the message. IR 349. 0120160024 8 Incident (16): Complainant averred that on September 3, 2014, while directing Complainant’s observation for the ACS-GQ survey at a college campus, FS1 denied Complainant her morning break, attempted to deny her lunch break, tried to prevent her from finishing the observation at a later date knowing that she was ill, and left her without any help. She averred that she had already completed this observation on April 9, 2014, and was given no explanation as to why she had to conduct a second observation at this same location. She also averred that her fellow FRs had their observations supervised by S1, not by Field Supervisors other than their rating supervisors. IR 269-70. Complainant stated that when she asked FS1 if she could take a break, FS1 told her that they had to complete the six-hour observation first. She also stated that FS1 criticized her for not following proper procedures and insisted that the observation be completed in one day and had left her for an extended time without help while she was ill. IR 270-72. S3 stated that it was normal Agency practice to have Field Supervisors who were not the actual rating supervisors to accompany FRs on their observations. IR 350. FS1 averred that S2 instructed her to accompany Complainant on her September 3, 2014 observation. She stated that they started the observation at 9:00 a.m. and that Complainant never asked for a morning break. She next stated that Complainant was not following proper procedures, and that when she tried to offer constructive feedback, Complainant became offended and upset. Third, FS1 stated that at 11:40 a.m., when Complainant asked to take a lunch break, she replied that she did not want to take a lunch break after such a short period of time, but relented after Complainant insisted and allowed her to take thirty minutes for lunch. Fourth, FS1 stated that at 12:50 p.m., Complainant informed her that she felt too ill to continue the observation, and that she contacted S3 for instructions about what to do next. IR 411-17. Both FS1 and S3 averred that Complainant insisted that FS1 leave since Complainant was going to visit her son who was a student at the college where the survey was being conducted. IR 350, 416-17. Another Field Supervisor averred that she helped Complainant to finish the observation. IR 421-22. Incident (17): Complainant averred that on October 9, 2014, S1 informed her that she would lose her work in the consumer expenditure surveys and would not be given another assignment to make up the shortfall in hours. IR 275-76. S1 averred that due to changes in priorities, she would be losing the consumer expenditure surveys in the counties that she supervised. IR 303. S2 stated that despite not having to work on the consumer expenditure survey, Complainant was still given forty hours of work per week on other surveys such as ACS-GQ, DAAL, and NAMCS/NHAMCS. IR 335. S3 stated that workload assignments were dependent upon changing priorities that were out of the supervisors’ control. IR 353. Incident (18): Complainant averred that on various dates, S1 and S2 failed to respond to her requests for information or clarification on procedures. She stated that she had repeatedly requested copies of the reports she had prepared from the observations she had conducted in April and September of 2014 and that those reports were not forthcoming until after she had filed the instant complaint. She also stated that in September 2014 she had requested some telephone work from S1 while she was on light duty, but that S1 did not provide her with the phone work until there were less than 24 hours left in the pay period. She stated that throughout September 2014, she had sent emails to S1 asking for information and clarifications, and that on October 1, 2014, S1 responded that she would get back to Complainant, but never did. IR 274-75. As to 0120160024 9 the observation report, S1 responded that she did not have a copy of the report, so she passed it on to S2, and that S2 checked on its status and had informed Complainant that it was still being worked on. IR 301. S1 also averred that Complainant would email her asking about NAMCS assignments months in advance, long before the workloads were released. IR 302. Third, S1 averred that she had given Complainant telephone work when it became available. IR 302. Fourth, S1 averred that she forward requests for clarification after unsuccessfully attempting to clarify those matters herself, and that she forwarded Complainant’s requests up the chain of command, but had yet to receive a response back. IR 302-03. S2 averred that Complainant would always inquire about what work other field representatives were working on, and what work was coming in, and that she and S1 were not always in a position to answer her questions. IR 334. Incident (19): Complainant averred that on October 10, 2012, S1 did not adjust the “11-39” ratings that she had received. She stated that the 11-39 ratings were summary report ratings that Field Representatives received that are generated by various departments within the PRO. She further stated that these ratings were based on cases assigned, cases completed, hours and mileage. Complainant maintained that prior to filing the instant EEO complaint, her ratings were adjusted for such factors as having to work multiple surveys, being assigned follow-up work when targeted respondents refused to take part in the surveys, and having to work in other counties. Complainant averred that S1 had informed her that she could no longer adjust the 11- 39 ratings, and that if her rating had been adjusted, it would have been 4.78 instead of 3.84. She averred that S1 wanted to prevent her from receiving higher ratings, which would have affected her performance plan at the end of the year. IR 272-73. S1 averred that while supervisors had been able to adjust the 11-39 ratings of the Field Representatives in the past, they could no longer do so, and that the ratings were calculated within the system, not by her. IR 300, 315-16. S2 averred that no Field Representative received adjustments on their 11-39 ratings for working on multiple surveys unless they were working outside of their assigned areas4 or if they were covering a sub-assignment in another FSA that caused their production to fall below an acceptable level. She maintained that the rating standards were set by the Agency and that managers could not change them. She confirmed that Field Supervisors were no longer able to make changes in the 11-39 ratings. IR 333. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the 4 Those areas are referred to as “FSAs.” 0120160024 10 parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). To establish a claim of harassment Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected classes; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further, the incidents must have been “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Complainant’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To ultimately prevail in her claim of retaliatory harassment, Complainant must show that she was subjected to conduct sufficient to dissuade a “reasonable person” from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, EEOC Notice No. 015.004, § II(B)(3) & n. 137 (Aug. 25, 2016). Only if both elements are present, retaliatory motivation and a chilling effect on protected EEO activity, will the question of Agency liability for reprisal-based harassment present itself. Complainant established the first element of a retaliatory harassment claim by virtue of having engaged in prior protected EEO activity. We would also agree that the conduct by the various officials named in her complaint is unwelcome from her own subjective perspective, which is enough to satisfy the second element. See Floyd L. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150737 (Apr. 27, 2017). In order to establish the third element of a claim of harassment, Complainant must show that at least one of the responsible management officials identified in her complaint relied on considerations of her current or former EEO complaint. See Aldaberto P. v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120142387 (Mar. 29, 2016). When asked by the EEO investigator why she believed that S1, S2, S3, and PM took the actions at issue in incidents (1) through (14) in retaliation for her having filed Complaint No. 63-2023- 00225, Complainant replied that before she filed the previous EEO complaint, she was treated well by management, and that afterward, her workload decreased, which resulted in reduced income and reduced hours, she was reprimanded, and was subjected to a hostile work environment. IR 216, 226. As to Complainant’s workload decreasing, S1, S2, and S3 all stated that although Complainant was on the roles as a part-time employee, she was always given forty hours of work each week due to the fact that she was assigned to work on multiple surveys. If work stopped on one survey, she had others to fall back on. Moreover, the workload was always changing due to shifting priorities, and neither S1, S2, or S3 had control over those shifts. As to the proposed suspension which was later reduced to a reprimand, the reprimand letter dated June 3, 2014, stated that Complainant was sending far too many email messages to S1, and that she had hung up the telephone on S1 in a disrespectful manner. The incidents that she characterized 0120160024 11 as harassment invariably involved difficulties in communication between Complainant and the members of her management chain, and administrative issues that were later resolved, such as reimbursement for her travel expenses and for pay lost as the result of a government shutdown. When asked by the investigator why she believed that the actions taken by S3 at issue in incident (15) were taken in retaliation for her filing the instant complaint, Complainant stated that the timing of S3’s transmission of the email containing her personal information to the other Field Supervisor was too exact to be a coincidence, and that S3 had taken no action to mitigate the effects of the disclosure. IR 248-49. To the contrary, S3 stated that she had realized her mistake right away, and had contacted the Field Supervisor and asked her to delete the email immediately. When asked why she believed the actions at issue in the remaining incidents, (16) through (19), were retaliatory, Complainant replied that her annual observations had always been undertaken in the company of the supervisors to whom she reported, and that she was given no reason as to why FS1 and FS2 were assigned to supervise her observations. She repeated that before she engaged in her prior and current EEO activity, S1 and S2 had kept her in the loop regarding the dissemination of information necessary for her to carry out her job responsibilities, and that afterward, they refused to answer her inquiries, reduced her work hours, and denied her not only work on various surveys but also the training she needed to maintain or enhance her proficiency on those surveys. IR 276-77. As we previously pointed out, however, S3 stated that it was the Agency’s normal practice to have a Field Supervisor who was not in the FR’s chain of command accompany the FR on his or her observation. S1, S2, and S3 averred that they responded to Complainant’s questions as best they could, but that Complainant often overwhelmed them with emails, many of them frivolous. They also denied that they ever refused her work hours or training opportunities, and again emphasized that she was always given forty hours of work per week and that work hours and training opportunities were determined by the needs of the Agency during a given time frame. Other than her own assertions, Complainant has not presented affidavits, declarations, or unsworn statements from witnesses other than herself or documents that expose any weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the explanations provided by any of the named officials to such an extent that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find those explanations unworthy of credence. See Opare-Addo v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120060802 (Nov. 20, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080211 (May 30, 2008). As Complainant failed to request a hearing within the prescribed regulatory time frame, the Commission does not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge’s credibility determinations after a hearing. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts based on the weight of the evidence presented. We therefore agree with the Agency that Complainant has not presented evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a retaliatory motivation on the part of S1, S2, S3, or PM with respect to any of the nineteen incidents raised in her complaint. Consequently, no further inquiry is necessary as to whether those incidents rise to the level of harassment or constitute separate acts of discrimination under disparate treatment theory. Tynisha H. v. Dept. of State, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141395 (March 17, 2017). 0120160024 12 CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding that Complainant did not establish that she was discriminated against as alleged. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The Agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 0120160024 13 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 20, 2017 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation