Jan Kuntz et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 1, 2019

13991550 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/991,550 07/26/2013 Jan Kuntz 0101123 (00601US) 4602
23370 7590 08/01/2019
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 PEACHTREE STREET
SUITE 2800
ATLANTA, GA 30309
EXAMINER
GILLMAN, AMELIE R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3793
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JAN KUNTZ, SOENKE BARTLING, and
MARC KACHELRIESS
____________________

Appeal 2019-000563
Application 13/991,550
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK,
Administrative Patent Judges.

HILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jan Kuntz et al. (“Appellants”)1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from
the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1, 3–7, 12, 14–26, 28, and 31–
33. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants identify Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum, Klinikum
Mannheim GMBH Universitätsklinikum Medizinische Fakultät Mannheim
Der Universität Heidelberg, and Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-
Nürnberg as the real parties in interest. Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
Appellants’ invention relates to a method and system for 4D
radiological intervention guidance. Spec. ¶ 9. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. An imaging method for radiologically guiding an
instrument during a medical intervention on an object, the
method comprising:
a) providing a prior volumetric image of said object, and
b) periodically providing a current volumetric image of
said object on the fly during the intervention to an operator by
executing the following steps in a loop:
measuring an undersampled set of projections of
said object,
reconstructing the current volumetric image based
on changes between the undersampled set of projections
and the prior volumetric image or, if the loop has already
been run at least once, an updated prior volumetric image
reconstructed in a previous run of the loop, and
displaying the current volumetric image for guiding
the instrument during the intervention,
wherein the updated prior volumetric image is periodically
reconstructed based on the prior volumetric image and/or on one
or more undersampled sets of projections measured in previous
runs of the loop, and wherein a dose rate per projection is adapted
according to an amount of changes between successive
measurements of projections, and
wherein said imaging method is based on ionizing
radiation and the undersampled set of projections is measured
with a radiation dose.

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REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 3–7, 14–18, 20–26, 28, and 31–332 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite. Final Act. 5.
II. Claims 1, 3–7, 12, 14–21, 23–25, 28, 31, and 32 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over O’Halloran (US
2008/0199063 A1, pub. Aug. 21, 2008), Chen (US 2010/0310144 A1, pub.
Dec. 9, 2010), and Heismann (US 2006/0193428 A1, pub. Aug. 31, 2006).
Final Act. 9.
III. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Mistretta (US
2005/0251010 A1, pub. Nov. 10, 2005). Final Act. 20.
IV. Claim 26 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Zou (US 2010/0303196
A1, pub. Dec. 2, 2010). Final Act. 21.
V. Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Soper (US
2005/0182295 A1, pub. Aug. 18, 2005). Final Act. 22.

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Claims 1, 3–7, 14–17, 22, and 31–33
The Examiner finds that it is unclear whether claim 1’s recitation of
“the dose rate per projection is adapted according to an amount of changes

2 An additional rejection of claim 1, a rejection of claim 12, a rejection of
claim 19, and an additional rejection of claim 23, each under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph is withdrawn in the Answer. Ans. 2–3.
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between successive measurements of projections” refers to changes (1)
between projections of an undersampled set; (2) between sets of projections
used to measure a current volumetric image; or (3) between some other
measurements of projections. Final Act. 5. The Examiner makes similar
findings for independent claim 23. Final Act. 8. For claim 23, the Examiner
also finds that it is unclear how the imaging apparatus is configured to adjust
the dose rate, because the Examiner considers that a processor or other
structure is required to determine and make the changes. Id.
Appellants argue that the Specification explains that the projection
acquisition rate or radiation dose compares the differences of projections of
several rotations to determine an amount of change. Br. 9 (citing Spec.
¶ 171). Appellants contend that “the specification explains that the amount
of changes are determined and the dose rate is then adapted to the amount of
changes.” Br. 10.
The Examiner responds that, because the claim does not recite
“projections of several rotations,” the limitation at issue is unclear. Ans. 4.
According to the Examiner, Appellants’ arguments do not explain how the
imaging apparatus is configured, as recited. Ans. 9.
Appellants have the better position. A decision on whether a claim is
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, requires a determination
of whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when
the claim is read in light of the specification. See Power-One, Inc. v.
Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Orthokinetics,
Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, the
Specification discloses that “[i]n one embodiment the differences of
projections of several rotations are compared. In case of little differences
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the projection acquisition rate or radiation dose is reduced.” Spec. ¶ 171.
Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “measuring an undersampled set of projections of
said object.” Because the imaging method of claim 1 is executed in a loop,
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “successive
measurements of projections” refers to the measured set of projections for
each successive rotation or iteration of the loop.
Thus, in light of the Specification, one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that the recitation “a dose rate per projection is adapted
according to an amount of changes between successive measurements of
projections,” means that the number of projections of the undersampled set
of projections is adjusted, such that more change in successive loops utilizes
more projections, and less change allows less projections, which appears to
correspond to number (1) of the Examiner’s rejection. This limitation,
therefore, is not unclear. Similarly, the claim 23 recitation “a dose rate of
the imaging apparatus depends on the amount of changes between
successive measurements of projections,” also is not unclear.
Regarding the configuration of the imaging apparatus, paragraph 171
of Appellants’ Specification also discloses that “data acquisition is varied
according to the amount of changes or movements in the examined volume.”
In claim 23, the imaging apparatus measures the data, namely, undersampled
sets of projections. Paragraph 171 discloses that variations in data
acquisition can be part of the algorithm or performed by the radiologist.
Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the term
“configured such that” in claim 23 requires only the ability to change the
acquisition rate or radiation dose amount, which can be done by an
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algorithm or by the operator, and specific structure for making the change
need not be specifically recited.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1
and claims 3–7, 14–17, 22, and 31–33 depending therefrom, as being
indefinite.
Claim 18
The Examiner finds that it is unclear whether the step in claim 18 of
“displaying on a screen said current volumetric image” refers back to the
claim 1 step of “displaying the current volumetric image,” or is a different
displaying step. Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 6.
Appellants argue that claim 18 refers back to claim 1, and further
details the display step of claim 1. Br. 9–10.
We agree with Appellants. Claims 1 and 18 each requires displaying
the “current volumetric image,” and one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that the claim 18 limitation “displaying on a screen” further
defines the “displaying” limitation of claim 1. We do not sustain the
rejection of claim 18 as indefinite.
Claims 20 and 21
The Examiner finds that claims 20 and 21 are indefinite because they
both include a broad limitation and a narrower limitation within the broad
limitation. Final Act. 7. Specifically, the Examiner finds that, for claim 20,
the limitation “an implantation of a cardiac pacemaker” is within the broader
limitation “an intervention on the cardiovascular system.” Id. For claim 21,
the Examiner considers the limitations “a positioning of stents in vessels or
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bronchi” and “a bronchoscopy intervention,” to be within the broader
limitation “an intervention on tubular organ structures.” Id. at 7–8.
Appellants assert that because claims 20 and 21 do not utilize the term
“such as,” one of ordinary skill in the art can determine the scope of these
claims. Br. 10.
The Examiner responds that implantation of a cardiac pacemaker is an
intervention on the cardiovascular system. Ans. 6. According to the
Examiner, the scope of the genus “interventions on the cardiovascular
system” is unclear “because the claim recites a species of that genus (i.e., ‘an
implantation of a cardiac pacemaker’) in the alternative. This suggests that
the species in not within the scope of the limitation directed towards the
genus.” Ans. 7. The Examiner finds that claim 21 suffers from a similar
ambiguity because positioning a stent in a vessel or branch is an intervention
on a tubular organ structure, and reciting these limitations in the alternative
suggests otherwise. Id.
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. Although we appreciate
that the term “such as” is not recited, the Specification does not define the
term “intervention on the cardiovascular system” in a manner that would
exclude implantation of a cardiac pacemaker.3 Nor does the Specification
define the term “intervention on tubular organ structures” in a manner that
would exclude “positioning of stents in vessels or bronchi,” or “a
bronchoscopy intervention.” Indeed, the Specification discloses that
“interventions are preferably performed on body parts, such as the

3 “[T]he patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the
patent claims.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244,
1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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cardiovascular system, tubular organ structures or on the brain,” and then
lists specific “interventions, such as in catheter interventions, bronchoscopy
interventions, implantation of cardiac pacemakers or positioning of stents.”
Spec. ¶ 103. We agree with the Examiner that reciting “interventions on the
cardiovascular system” or “an implantation of a cardiac pacemaker,” in the
same claim, suggests that implantation of a cardiac pacemaker is not within
the scope of interventions on the cardiovascular system, thus making the
scope of the term “interventions on the cardiovascular system” unclear.
Similarly, we agree with the Examiner that reciting “intervention on tubular
organ structures,” or “positioning of stents in vessels or bronchi or a
bronchoscopy intervention,” suggests that positioning stents in vessels or
bronchi or a bronchoscopy intervention are not within the scope of an
intervention on tubular organ structures. Because these distinctions are not
made explicit or explained in the Specification, the scope of claims 20 and
21 is unclear.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 20 and 21
as indefinite.

Rejection II
Claims 1, 3–5, 14–21, 23–25, 28, 31, and 32
The Examiner finds that O’Halloran discloses many of the limitations
of claim 1, including providing a prior image of an object, and providing a
current image of the object on the fly during an intervention by executing a
loop. Final Act. 10–11 (citing O’Halloran, ¶¶ 100–106; Fig. 17). The loop
includes the steps of measuring, reconstructing, and displaying. Id. The
Examiner notes that, although O’Halloran does not disclose an embodiment
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with volumetric imaging data, “O’Halloran explicitly suggests the use of
volumetric imaging data and Chen demonstrates that it is conventional in the
art to employ volumetric imaging data in O’Halloran’s HYPR reconstruction
technique.” Final Act. 14. The Examiner concludes that it would have been
obvious to modify O’Halloran to use Chen’s volumetric imaging data, as an
“application of a known technique to a known device ready for improvement
to yield the predictable result of three-dimensional visualization of the
imaging region.” Id. The Examiner also concludes that it would have been
obvious to modify the combined invention of O’Halloran and Chen to adapt
the dose rate per projection of the imaging apparatus according to the
amount of changes between measurements, “so that the overall dose for the
acquisition of successive volume data sets can be kept as low as possible.”
Id. (citing Heismann ¶ 80 (Because the invention only acquires volume data
sets for “new information as a result of a temporal variation of a subject, the
overall dose for the acquisition of successive volume data set can be kept as
low as possible.”).

Updated Composite Image
Appellants argue that O’Halloran’s “updated composite image (C)
415” is part of a loop that “always uses the originally acquired composite
image 400 and the acquired image frame 402 as inputs.” Br. 11 (citing
O’Halloran, Fig. 17). According to Appellants, O’Halloran does not operate
in a loop that includes an updated prior image that is used in a subsequent
execution of the loop. Br. 12. Appellants assert that the claim limitation “if
the loop has already been run at least once” cannot be dismissed as
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conditional language that need not be taught in the prior art, because the
claim “still requires that the loop is completed in step b).” Br. 13.
The Examiner responds that Appellants mischaracterize element 415
of O’Halloran as an “updated composite image,” whereas this element is a
“process block” in which “the composite image is updated by substituting
for the original composite image the most recent non-final image frame
produced at process block 412.” Ans. 10 (citing O’Halloran ¶ 105). The
Examiner finds that O’Halloran’s “originally acquired composite image 3 is
used during the initial iteration of subsequent image frames 2 and it is
updated after each iteration.” Id. at 11 (citing O’Halloran ¶ 106). The
Examiner states that the limitation “if the loop has already been run at least
once, an updated prior volumetric image reconstructed in a previous run of
the loop,” is a conditional limitation because “if the condition is not satisfied
(i.e., if the loop has not already been run at least once), the full scope of the
claim under broadest reasonable interpretation is addressed.” Id. at 12
(citing Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal 2013-007847 (PTAB, April 28. 2016)).
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. As the Examiner correctly
finds, O’Halloran’s prior image, i.e., originally acquired composite image 3
(see Final Act. 10) “is used during the initial iteration of subsequent image
frames 2 and it is updated after each iteration.” O’Halloran ¶ 106; see also
Ans. 11.
As to Schulhauser, we determine that it is factually distinguishable.
The method claim in Schulhauser recited, inter alia, “triggering an alarm
state if the . . . data is not within the threshold,” and “determining the current
activity level of the subject . . . if the electrocardiac signal data is within the
threshold.” Schulhauser, 2016 WL 6277792, at *1–2 (emphases added).
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The Board found the “triggering” and “determining” steps are “mutually
exclusive” and concluded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
method claim encompasses a method where only the steps of “collecting,”
“comparing,” and “triggering an alarm state if the electrocardiac signal data
is not within the threshold” are performed. Id. at *4. The Board further
found that the Examiner did not need to present evidence of the obviousness
of the remaining method steps that are not required to be performed under
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. Id.
Unlike the method claim in Schulhauser, the steps of method claim 1
are each required to be performed, albeit performed in a loop (“periodically
providing a current volumetric image of said object on the fly during the
intervention to an operator by executing the following steps in a loop”).
Thus, the Examiner cannot dismiss these requirements from claim 1.
However, we agree with the Examiner that, because O’Halloran’s steps are
iteratively performed, they are performed in a loop. Appellants do not
apprise us of Examiner error because Appellants fail to specifically identify
which portion of O’Halloran’s iterative loop is not completed.
Inner and Outer Loop
Appellants divide the flow process in O’Halloran’s Figure 17 into an
inner loop and an outer loop ,arguing that O’Halloran’s “inner loop, which
comprises the use of an ‘updated composite image,’ does not comprise the
step of measuring an undersampled set of projections of said object
according to present claim 1. Such a step is only included in the outer loop,
see block 402 ‘acquire image frame.’” Br. 12. Appellants argue that
O’Halloran fails to disclose a loop that includes each of the recited steps. Id.
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The Examiner responds that claim 1 only requires that the steps must
be “in a loop,” which “does not preclude the loop from comprising an ‘inner
loop’ and/or an ‘outer loop.’” Ans. 14. According to the Examiner,
O’Halloran’s method includes a step of measuring, a step of reconstructing,
and a step of displaying that are all “in a loop.” Id. The Examiner notes
that, as part of O’Halloran’s loop, the “prior image” is updated and used in
the subsequent execution of the process. Id. at 15 (citing O’Halloran ¶¶ 105
and 106).
The Examiner’s arguments are persuasive. Although we appreciate
that O’Halloran includes an inner loop with an updated composite image,
and an outer loop measuring an undersampled set of projections,
O’Halloran’s inner and outer loops are both used to update the “prior
image,” i.e., originally acquired composite image 3. See O’Halloran ¶¶ 105
and 106. Although O’Halloran’s iterative process may include additional
steps, Appellants do not persuasively explain why O’Halloran’s iterative
process that includes steps of measuring, reconstructing, and displaying is
not executed in a loop. We are not persuaded of Examiner error on this
point.
Application of Chen
Appellants argue that, because Chen uses 2D fluoroscopic x-ray
images during an intervention, Chen does not render obvious volumetric
(3D) images. Br. 14. According to Appellants, Chen only reconstructs the
fluoroscopic image in real time, which “only provide[s] a 2D view of the
imaging volume which can be overlayed on the 3D reconstructive data
provided before the intervention by compressed sensing.” Br. 16.
Appellants summarize the present invention and Chen, concluding that,
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based on various enumerated differences, Chen does not render the present
claims obvious. Br. 16–22.
The Examiner responds that Appellants’ arguments are not
commensurate with the rejection, which is based on a combination of
O’Halloran and Chen. Ans. 19–20. The Examiner notes that O’Halloran
already discloses in imaging technique during an intervention and Chen is
relied upon to teach that it is conventional to use O’Halloran’s HYPR
technique with “high quality 3D tomographic images” to provide “increased
image guidance.” Id. The Examiner notes Appellants do not address the
Examiner’s findings that O’Halloran suggests volumetric imaging and
“Chen demonstrates that it is conventional in the art to employ volumetric
imaging data in O’Halloran’s HYPR reconstruction technique.” Id. at 20.
Appellants’ arguments regarding the shortcomings of the disclosure of
Chen are not persuasive because Appellants are attacking the references
individually rather than addressing the references as combined by the
Examiner in the rejection. One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co.,
Inc., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, the Examiner correctly finds
that O’Halloran already discloses that “the present invention may be
employed with 3D as well as 2D versions.” Final Act. 12 (citing O’Halloran
¶ 77–78 (“The MRI system described above can be used in a wide variety of
clinical applications to acquire either 2D or 3D sets of projection views that
may be used to reconstruct one or more images.”). The Examiner relies on
the additional teachings of Chen for a specific example of using 3D images,
namely, “time-resolved 3D tomographic images are immediately acquired
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and automatically registered to facilitate improved procedural guidance.”
Chen ¶ 104. Appellants’ arguments against Chen alone do not explain
adequately why the combined teachings of O’Halloran and Chen do not
suggest a volumetric (3D) image.
Dose Rate Per Projection
Appellants also argue that Chen does not disclose “‘the number of
projections in the undersampled set of projections and/or the dose rate per
projection [being] adapted according to the amount of changes between
measurements.’” Br. 22.
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive because they are not
commensurate with the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner relies on
Heismann to disclose this feature. See Ans. 24. Appellants have not argued
or provided evidence supporting an assertion that the Examiner erred in
making findings regarding each of the disclosures of O’Halloran, Chen, and
Heismann.
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments for the patentability
of claim 1, and are not persuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over O’Halloran,
Chen, and Heismann. Appellants rely on the same arguments for the
patentability of system claim 23, and additionally argue that Chen differs
from the system of claim 23 “at least in that i) the system periodically
provides a current volumetric image ii) the system periodically provides an
updated prior volumetric image.” Br. 23. Appellants’ additional arguments
regarding the shortcomings of the disclosure of Chen are not persuasive,
because Appellants are attacking the references individually rather than
addressing the references as combined by the Examiner in the rejection.
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Appellants have not argued or provided evidence supporting an assertion
that the Examiner erred in making findings regarding each of the disclosures
of O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. Accordingly, for the same reasons
discussed regarding the rejection of claim 1, we sustain the rejection of
claim 23 as unpatentable over O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. Appellants
make no additional arguments regarding the patentability of claims 3–5, 12,
14–21, 24, 25, 28, 31, and 32 (Br. 23), all of which depend from either claim
1 or claim 23, and these claims fall with claims 1 and 23.
Claim 6
The Examiner finds that O’Halloran teaches that the updated prior
image includes the prior image and current images reconstructed in previous
runs of the loop. Final Act. 15 (citing O’Halloran ¶¶ 105 and 106). The
Examiner finds that “projections in the previous runs of the loop are
interpreted as a ‘sliding selection’ of the projections.” Id. The Examiner
notes that “O’Halloran’s discussion of a partial updated composite image
that is combined with the previous two partial updated composite images
([0083]), [] is also interpreted as a ‘sliding selection’ of projections.” Id. at
16.
Appellants’ entire argument for claim 6 is that “Chen does not
disclose any changes or updates to the prior image once the prior image has
been obtained. Thus, Chen cannot disclose or render obvious the use of a
sliding selection of undersampled sets of projections in order to provide an
updated prior image.” Br. 22.
As the Examiner correctly notes, Appellants’ arguments against Chen
individually fail to demonstrate Examiner error based on the combined
teachings of O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. Moreover, given that the
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Examiner relies on O’Halloran to teach the limitations of claim 6,
Appellants’ arguments as to Chen are not responsive to the Examiner’s
rejection. We are not apprised of Examiner error. We sustain the rejection
of claim 6 as unpatentable over O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann.
Claim 7
The Examiner finds that O’Halloran discloses undersampled sets, but
does not specify that the undersampled sets are “stored for a delayed
reconstruction in order to provide a volumetric image of soft tissue
contrast.” Final Act. 16. The Examiner finds that Chen’s Figure 7A shows
that delayed reconstruction is performed in step 718, because “data are
necessarily stored before they are reconstructed into an image.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner also finds that Chen discloses soft tissue
contrast for improved guidance. Id. (citing Chen ¶ 94). The Examiner
considers that it would have been obvious “to have the undersampled sets of
projections be stored for a delayed reconstruction and to have the
reconstruction provide a volumetric image of soft tissue contrast, as taught
by Chen, in order to provide improved image guidance.” Id. at 16–17.
Appellants argue that, because Chen uses “2D fluoroscopic x-ray
imaging during the intervention . . . the method of Chen is unable to provide
any undersampled sets of projections during the intervention.” Br. 22.
According to Appellants, the absence of under-sampled sets of projections
makes it impossible “to combine several sets of undersampled projections in
order to reconstruct a full volumetric image as described in claim 7.” Id.
As the Examiner correctly notes, Appellants’ arguments against Chen
individually fail to demonstrate Examiner error based on the combined
teachings of O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. See Ans. 26. Specifically,
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the Examiner relies on O’Halloran to teach undersampled sets of projections,
and Appellants’ arguments do not apprise us that the Examiner erred in
making findings regarding each of the disclosures of O’Halloran, Chen, and
Heismann. We sustain the rejection of claim 7 as unpatentable over
O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann.
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments, but are not
persuaded that the Examiner’s findings contain error. The Examiner’s
findings and conclusions (see Final Act. 10–20) are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Rejections III–V
Regarding Rejection III, Appellants make no argument that claim 22
would be patentable over O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Mistretta, if
claim 1 is not patentable over O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. Regarding
Rejection IV, Appellants make no argument that claim 26 would be
patentable over O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Zou, if claim 1 is not
patentable over O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. Regarding Rejection V,
Appellants make no argument that claim 33 would be patentable over
O’Halloran, Chen, Heismann, and Soper, if claim 1 is not patentable over
O’Halloran, Chen, and Heismann. For the reasons set forth above, we
sustain Rejections III–V.

DECISION
We REVERSE the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 14–18, 22–
26, 28, and 31–33, and AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 20 and
21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite.
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We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 12, 14–26,
28, and 31–33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED