0120130913
03-15-2016
Jamey M.,1 Complainant, v. Ray Mabus, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Jamey M.,1
Complainant,
v.
Ray Mabus,
Secretary,
Department of the Navy,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120130913
Hearing No. 510-2011-00359X
Agency No. 10-65886-01742
DECISION
Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's November 16, 2012, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission MODIFIES the Agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are whether an Equal Employment Opportunity Judge's (AJ's) issuance of a decision without a hearing was proper; (2) whether Complainant proved he was harassed on the basis of race (African-American) when he did not follow the Agency's order to get a work-order line-item voided on March 25 and March 29, 2010; (3) whether Complainant proved discrimination on the basis of retaliation when the Agency asked him to submit medical information to support his medical condition and (4) whether the remedy ordered by the AJ for disability discrimination requires additional remedies/corrective actions.
BACKGROUND
During the time period at issue, Complainant worked as an Aircraft Mechanic, WG-8852-10, at the Agency's Fleet Readiness Center Southeast in Jacksonville, Florida. On April 15, 2010, he sought EEO counseling based on his belief he was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American) when he allegedly was harassed and on the bases of retaliation and disability (physical) when he was subjected to a fitness for duty examination. When the matter was not resolved at the counseling stage, on May 28, 2010, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging discrimination on the aforementioned bases and regarding the counseled actions. The complaint was accepted for investigation.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of his right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's August 25, 2011, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision on September 25, 2012, finding that Complainant did not establish his race or reprisal claims but did establish that the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act when Complainant's supervisor (S1) made an unnecessary medical inquiry and impermissibly disclosed Complainant's medical condition to a co-worker.
As a remedy, the AJ ordered the Agency to provide eight hours of training to all management officials and supervisors at the Fleet Readiness Center Southeast in Jacksonville, Florida on their responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act and its mandates with respect to reasonable accommodation, confidential medical information, and record-keeping. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ's decision. Complainant thereafter filed this appeal.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant contends he was subjected to harassment on the basis of race and should be awarded compensatory damages for the Agency's harassment and inappropriate disclosure of his medical condition. Complainant further contends the Agency retaliated against him by asking him to submit documentation to support his medical condition after he refused the Agency's order to get a work-order line-item voided on March 25, 2010, and March 29, 2010. For its part, the Agency contends that the AJ's findings were legally correct and that Complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages. Neither party challenges the AJ's finding of discrimination on the basis of disability.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (which provides that an AJ's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo).
This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept or reject the AJ's, and the Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Issuance of a Decision without a Hearing
Initially we consider whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on the record in this case. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an AJ could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
After reviewing the record in this case, we find that the record is adequately developed, that no genuine issues of material fact remain, and that no fact-finding is necessary. We also find Complainant was given ample notice, a comprehensive statement of the undisputed facts, and the opportunity to respond. Thus, we find that the AJ's issuance of a Decision without a Hearing was proper.
Harassment Based on Race
Complainant alleges he was harassed on the basis of race when on March 25 and March 29, 2010, S1 spoke to Complainant in a hostile manner after Complainant failed to follow S1's direction to get a work-order line-item voided. Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (Mar. 8, 1994).
A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) he is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Flowers v. Southern Reg'l Physician Serv. Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. General Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001); Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998).
The AJ found that Complainant failed to prove his harassment claim. The evidence of record supports the AJ's findings. For example, when the EEO Investigator asked Complainant what evidence he had to support his racial harassment claim, Complainant stated, "I do not have anything to show that [S1]'s actions were motivated by race." See ROI at 91. Although Complainant stated he believed S1's actions were motivated by race "because [S1] wanted to control me like he was my master," a co-worker stated that asking employees to void line-items from time to time was common practice when other sections of Complainant's department were responsible for the duties required to delete lines, as this avoided duplicative effort. Id. at 99. This same co-worker acknowledged that S1 was confrontational with Complainant during the events at issue but noted that S1 was the same with everyone. Id. at 102. Based on this evidence, we find that Complainant has not established that the alleged harassing incident was based on race, and therefore he cannot prevail on his harassment claim.
Retaliation
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin, EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas and Coffman v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), Complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sep. 25, 2000). A nexus may be shown by evidence that the adverse treatment followed the protected activity within such a period of time and in such manner that a reprisal motive is inferred. See Clay v. Dep't of the Treas., EEOC Appeal No. 01A35231 (Jan. 25, 2005).
The Commission has stated that adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation. EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8: Retaliation, No. 915.003, at 8-15 (May 20, 1998); see Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (finding that the anti-retaliation provision protects individuals from a retaliatory action that a reasonable person would have found "materially adverse," which in the retaliation context means that the action might have deterred a reasonable person from opposing discrimination or participating in the EEO process).
Complainant alleged that following their disagreement about voiding the line-item, S1 asked for medical documentation with respect to Complainant's disability parking permit, and to determine if Complainant's disability would require other modifications to Complainant's work space or job responsibilities. The AJ found that the record indicated that Complainant had not engaged in prior EEO activity.2 Complainant, however, stated he was sent for a fitness for duty exam six years prior to the incidents alleged to be discriminatory in this complaint and, as a result, was placed on light duty. See ROI at 89. Accepting as true, without so finding, Complainant's belief that this constitutes prior EEO activity, we find that the temporal proximity between the alleged prior EEO activity and the events Complainant believes are discriminatory are simply too far apart to establish a sufficient nexus. See Fanelli v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC (Jun. 16, 2006) (finding that a span of four years between prior EEO activity and subject incidents of discrimination are too far apart to infer retaliatory motive). In so doing, we note there is no other evidence in the record to establish the requisite link. Inasmuch as Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of reprisal, we find that he did not prove retaliation.
Remedy Ordered by the AJ
The AJ found discrimination on the basis of disability when the Agency impermissibly disclosed Complainant's medical condition to a co-worker, and when S1 made an inquiry into the basis for Complainant's parking permit. The AJ found that it constituted a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act's prohibition against unnecessary medical inquiry. As stated earlier, neither party challenges the AJ's finding on appeal; therefore, that issue is not before us in this decision. Pursuant to her finding of discrimination, the AJ ordered the Agency to train all management officials and supervisors at the facility in which Complainant worked on their responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act.
However, the AJ did not consider other potential remedies, such as compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Further, the AJ did not consider imposing correcting actions such as requiring the Agency to consider disciplining S1 for disclosing Complainant's medical information, and displaying a posting notice of discrimination.3 Therefore, we find that the remedy ordered by the AJ requires additional remedies or corrective actions. We consider those matters in this decision and/or the Order below.
Here, we first consider the issue of compensatory damages. Because discrimination was found in this case, the Agency must provide Complainant with full, make-whole relief to restore him as nearly as possible to the position he would have occupied absent the discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01933395 (Jul. 21, 1994). The Commission recognizes that a precise measurement cannot always be used to reduce the wrong inflicted. Nonetheless, we believe that the burden of limiting the remedy rests with the agency. See Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04900010 (Nov. 29, 1990).
Compensatory damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of equitable relief authorized by the Rehabilitation Act. To receive an award of compensatory damages, Complainant must demonstrate that he has been harmed as a result of the Agency's discriminatory action: the extent, nature and severity of the harm; and the duration or expected duration of the harm. See Rivera v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (Jul. 22, 1994), recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927 (Dec. 11, 1995); EEOC's Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992). A complainant is required to provide objective evidence that will allow an Agency to assess the merits of his request for damages. See Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993).
On appeal, Complainant contends he is entitled to non-pecuniary compensatory damages, whereas the Agency contends he is not. Non-pecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e., emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 10 (Jul. 14, 1992). Complainant stated as a result of the Agency's discrimination on April 6, 2010, he underwent stress, became depressed, experienced sexual problems with his wife, which resulted in a loss of marital harmony, a loss of enjoyment in life, humiliation and embarrassment, worry, apprehension and anxiety. See ROI, Tab L, Compensatory Damages Questionnaire at q.(1)(e) and q.(5)(a). Further, information in the record suggests that Complainant suffered these effects from at least April 6 to July 12, 2010, a period spanning approximately three months. See ROI, Tab O, Compensatory Damages Questionnaire 2 at (3)(H).
Despite the Agency's arguments to the contrary, Complainant submitted medical documentation signed by three medical providers indicating that "[Complainant] was seen on [April 7, 2010] and was treated that day for anxiety and stress." See ROI, Tab O, Medical Document from University of Florida, Anchor Plaza Family Medicine and Pediatric Center. Based on this, we find that an award for compensatory damages is warranted.
In Carle v. Dep't of the Navy, the Commission explained that "objective evidence" of non-pecuniary damages can include a statement by a complainant explaining how he or she was affected by the discrimination. EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993). Statements from others, including family members, friends, and health care providers can address the outward manifestations of the impact of the discrimination on Complainant. Id. Complainant can also submit documentation of medical or psychiatric treatment related to the effects of the discrimination. Id. Non-pecuniary damages must be limited to the sums necessary to compensate the injured party for the actual harm and should take into account the severity of the harm and the length of the time the injured party has suffered from the harm. Carpenter v. Dep't of Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (Jul. 17, 1995).
Upon review, we find that an award of $5,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory damages is appropriate in this case to compensate Complainant for pain and suffering. This award is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the Commission's awards in similar cases. See e.g., Reddish v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720070068 (Apr. 28, 2009) ($4,000 awarded for finding of reprisal resulting in embarrassment, humiliation, distress, headaches and elevated blood pressure); Spencer v. Dep't of the Treas., EEOC Appeal No. 07A10035 (May 6, 2003) ($5,000 awarded for complainant's complaints of dejection, stress, and emotional pain); Brooks v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01996915 (Oct. 12, 2001) ($6,000 in non-pecuniary damages awarded for depression, anger, aggravation of high blood pressure, and adverse effects on family life).
The remainder of remedies that we shall order, or corrective actions that we may impose/recommend, do not require extensive analysis and therefore are confined to the Order below.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that the AJ's issuance of decision without a hearing was proper, that Complainant did not prove he was harassed based on race, that Complainant did not prove his retaliation claim, and that the remedy ordered by the AJ requires additional remedies or corrective actions. Accordingly, the Agency is directed to take action pursuant to this decision and the Order below.
ORDER
To the extent that it has not already done so, the Agency shall take the following actions with 120 days of the date this decision becomes final:
1. Pay Complainant the amount of $5,000 with interest in non-pecuniary compensatory damages.
2. If it has not already done so pursuant to the AJ's Order, train all management officials and supervisors at the Fleet Readiness Center Southeast in Jacksonville, Florida on their responsibilities with respect to the Rehabilitation Act with respect to reasonable accommodation, confidential medical information, and record-keeping.
3. Consider taking disciplinary action against S1. The Agency shall report its decision. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set for the reason(s) for not doing so. If S1 is no longer employed by the Agency, the Agency shall furnish proof of the date of separation.
The Agency shall submit a report of compliance in accordance with the below-entitled paragraph, "Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
POSTING ORDER (G0914)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida, copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0815)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610)
This decision affirms the Agency's final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 15, 2016
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
2 We note that Complainant first contacted an EEO Counselor on April 15, 2010, which is approximately a week after the action alleged to be discriminatory.
3 The Agency's final order did include a posting order of discrimination.
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
2
0120130913
2
0120130913