James Stewart. Rankin et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 22, 2019

14480670 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 22, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/480,670 09/09/2014 James Stewart Rankin 83475625 4930
28395 7590 07/22/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
PACK, CONRAD R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/22/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JAMES STEWART RANKIN,
BASAVARAJ TONSHAL, PIETRO BUTTOLO,
YIFAN CHEN, GARY STEVEN STRUMOLO,
JEFFREY ALLEN GREENBERG,
DIMITAR PETROV FILEV, and
KRISHNASWAMY VENKATESH PRASAD
____________________

Appeal 2018-008662
Application 14/480,670
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JENNIFER S. BISK, LARRY J. HUME, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.

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DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellants2 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 21–40, which are all claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellants’ disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to a
user interface in a vehicle multimedia system. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 21,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
21. A vehicle computer system comprising:
a wireless transceiver configured to establish a
connection with a nomadic device, wherein the wireless
transceiver is further configured to send a nomadic device
human machine interface (HMI) utilizing a web browser format
and configured to operate vehicle functions using the nomadic
device;
a vehicle display configured to output an in-vehicle HMI
for controlling various vehicle functions, wherein the in-vehicle
HMI utilizes the web browser format; and
a vehicle server configured to generate the in-vehicle
HMI for the vehicle display and generate the nomadic device
HMI configured to operate vehicle functions using the nomadic
device.
Claims App’x 1 (emphasis added).

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
specification, filed September 9, 2014 (claiming the benefit of U.S. patent
application 13/767,303, filed February 14, 2013); “Final Act.” for the Final
Office Action, mailed October 19, 2017; “App. Br.” for Appellants’ Appeal
Brief, filed March 19, 2018; “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 12,
2018; and “Reply Br.” for Appellants’ Reply Brief, filed September 4, 2018.
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 2.
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THE REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 21–26, 28–35, and 37–40 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Craig (US 2010/0235045 A1, published
Sept. 16, 2010) and Moinzadeh (US 2011/0093137 A1, published Apr. 21,
2011). Final Act. 3–16.
R2. Claim 27 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Craig, Moinzadeh, and Johnson (Kerry Johnson, Moving
Beyond the Browser: HTML5 as an Automotive App Environment, QNX
AUTO BLOG (June 11, 2012), http://qnxauto.blogspot.com/2012/06/moving-
beyond-browser-html5-as.html). Final Act. 16–17.
R3. Claim 36 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Craig, Moinzadeh, and Chutorash (US 2011/0257973 A1,
published Oct. 20, 2011). Final Act. 18–19.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate,
substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments
are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
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Obviousness Rejection R1 of Claims 21–26, 28–35, and 37–40
Appellants argue claims 21–26, 28–35, and 37–40 together as a group.
See App. Br. 4–7. Therefore, consistent with the provisions of 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we limit our discussion to independent claim 21.
Appellants first argue that the Final Office Action did not present a
prima facie case of obviousness. App. Br. 4, 6; see Reply Br. 3. We
disagree. The Examiner identified the relevant portions of Craig and
Moinzadeh, explained how each reference teaches or suggests various
limitations of the claim, and provided a rationale to combine these
references. See Final Act. 3–8, 20–21. These findings provided sufficient
notice of the reasons for the rejection, and consequently, the Examiner
established a prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (A prima facie case is established when the
rejection provides notice of the reasons for the rejection, and it is deficient
when it of “is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.”).
Next, we evaluate Appellants’ arguments alleging error in the
rejection. In particular, Appellants argue that the cited references fail to
teach or suggest “a vehicle server configured to generate the in-vehicle HMI
for the vehicle display and generate the nomadic device HMI configured to
operate vehicle functions using the nomadic device,” as required by
claim 21. App. Br. 4 (emphasis omitted); see Claims App’x (quoting claim
21). For the reasons provided below, Appellants’ arguments fail to persuade
us of error.
For the disputed limitation, the Examiner relied on a combination of
Craig and Moinzadeh. Final Act. 3–8, 20–21. Specifically, the Examiner
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found Craig’s mobile information display system (MIDS 200) teaches the
claimed “vehicle server.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Craig ¶¶ 32–34, 40–42, 55–57).
The Examiner explained that Craig’s MIDS 200 downloads information
from a remote server and provides information to display screen 204 (which
teaches the claimed “in-vehicle HMI”) and secondary displays 226 (which
teach the claimed “device HMI”). Id. The Examiner found that, although
Craig’s secondary displays teach a device and its corresponding HMI, Craig
does not teach that the display is a “nomadic device,” as required by the
claim. Id. at 6–7. But, the Examiner found that Moinzadeh’s mobile phone
teaches a “nomadic device.” Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 20 (“Moinzadeh is
relied on for its teachings rendering obvious implementation of wireless
transmission of interface data to a nomadic device.”). The Examiner
explained that Craig and Moinzadeh are analogous art, and the Examiner
reasoned that it would have been obvious to combine Craig and Moinzadeh
because a mobile device may be more conveniently moved than a fixed
display and because Moinzadeh “teaches the value of providing a
mechanism to control, manage, and arbitrate extension of mobile phone
applications operating on a head unit of a vehicle.” Id. at 8 (citing
Moinzadeh ¶¶ 3–7).
Appellants argue “Craig does not disclose” the claimed “vehicle
server configured to generate the in-vehicle HMI for the vehicle display.”
App. Br. 4. Specifically, Appellants contend that, although paragraph 32 of
Craig describes an “in-vehicle server,”3 this “paragraph [] is completely

3 Appellants refer to paragraph 22 of Craig (App. Br. 4), but this paragraph
does not appear to be relevant. Instead, this appears to be a typographical
error intended to reference paragraph 32, which describes the “in-vehicle
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silent that this ‘in-vehicle server’ is configured to generate an ‘in-vehicle
HMI for the vehicle display.’” Id. Appellants explain that Craig’s in-
vehicle server “does not generate an HMI to control vehicle functions.”4 Id.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error. The Examiner found that
Craig’s MIDS teaches a vehicle server, and that the MIDS displays HTML
encoded web pages on the head unit (i.e., display screen 204) and provides
different web pages to the additional displays. Final Act. 4–6. Appellants
do not dispute these findings (see App. Br. 4), and we perceive no error in
them (see, e.g., Craig ¶¶ 27 (MIDS has a display screen 204), 29 (MIDS 200
downloads HTML for display), 32–34 (MIDS 200 can act as an “in-vehicle
server,” displays different content on screen 204 and secondary displays
226, and provides HTML to displays 226.)).
Rather, Appellants appear to contend Craig fails to teach that the
server generates an “in-vehicle HMI for controlling various vehicle
functions.” Id. However, Appellants do not sufficiently explain their
position, and Appellants fail to address the relevant parts of the reference.
Compare id. (addressing only Craig ¶¶ 26, 32) with Final Act. 5 (finding
Craig ¶¶ 27, 29, 40–42, and Figs. 5–9 teach the claimed “in-vehicle HMI for
controlling various vehicle functions”). The passages of Craig cited by the
Examiner teach, for example, that MIDS 200 includes display 204, which
shows “sub-screens containing controls for the audio system . . . or the
environmental system,” such as are shown in Craig’s Figure 6. Craig ¶¶ 27,

server” and was cited in the Examiner’s rejection. Accordingly, in this
Decision, we reference paragraph 32 rather than paragraph 22.
4 An earlier limitation in claim 21 recites “in-vehicle HMI for controlling
various vehicle functions.” Claims App’x. The Examiner also found Craig
teaches this limitation. Final Act. 5 (citing different paragraphs of Craig).
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40, Fig. 6. The audio system and environmental system are “vehicle
functions” under the broadest reasonable interpretation5 of that term. See
Ans. 5 (“[A] function performed within a vehicle or associated with a
vehicle can generally be viewed as a vehicle function under a broadest
reasonable interpretation.”); Reply Br. 2 (omitting response to the
Examiner’s construction of “vehicle functions”). Consequently, we perceive
no error in the Examiner’s finding that Craig’s MIDS 200 generates “in-
vehicle HMI for controlling various vehicle functions,” as required by the
claim. See Final Act. 5.
In addition, Appellants argue Moinzadeh fails to teach or suggest that
the nomadic device HMI is generated by a “vehicle server,” as required by
claim 21. App. Br. 4–5. We are not persuaded of error because Appellants
do not address the rejection as articulated. As noted above, the Examiner
found Craig—not Moinzadeh—teaches the claimed server that generates in-
vehicle HMI and device HMI. Final Act. 5–6.6 The Examiner found
Moinzadeh teaches a “nomadic” device. Id. at 6–7, 20. Appellants identify
(and we perceive) no error in the Examiner’s findings.
Appellants also assert the combination with Moinzadeh “changes the
principal of operation of Craig.” App. Br. 6. However, the differences

5 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
6 Appellants contend the Examiner found Moinzadeh discloses the vehicle
server. App. Br. 5 (citing Final Act. 20). However, the Examiner made no
such finding. See Final Act. 20 (“Moinzadeh is relied on for its teachings
rendering obvious implementation of wireless transmission of interface data
to a nomadic device.”).
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identified by Appellants (i.e., which device is the main device and which is
an extension; the location of a server) do not constitute a difference in basic
principles. See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959) (discussing
“change in the basic principles under which [the reference] was designed to
operate”); see also In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding differences between electrical and optical circuits do not constitute
a change in a principle of operation).
Moreover, Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us that it would not
have been obvious to combine Moinzadeh and Craig as proposed by the
Examiner. Appellants identify alleged differences between Craig,
Moinzadeh, and the requirements of the claim, but Appellants fail to explain
the relevance of these differences to the obviousness inquiry. See App.
Br. 4–5 (comparing Moinzadeh and the claim), 6–7 (comparing Craig and
Moinzadeh). For example, Appellants submit Moinzadeh’s head unit is an
extended interface for a mobile device’s application, and Appellants indicate
that the claims require the opposite. See id. at 5. However, Appellants do
not even allege (much less provide an explanation showing) that it would not
have been obvious to combine Craig’s system, where the head unit is the
primary interface, with Moinzadeh mobile device. Id. at 4–7; see Final
Act. 6–8 (providing findings and rationale to support conclusion that it
would have been obvious to combine Craig and Moinzadeh in this manner).
Further, as the Examiner notes, Moinzadeh also teaches other
configurations, e.g., the head unit may download content, and that the head
unit and mobile device may install different applications. E.g., Moinzadeh
¶ 48 (cited by Ans. 5–6). In addition, Appellants identify no errors or
inaccuracies in the Examiner’s rationale, do not contend the Examiner’s
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proposals are beyond the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, and
do not submit that the combination of Moinzadeh and Craig would yield
undesirable, unpredictable, or unexpected results. Consequently, Appellants
have not shown error in the Examiner’s findings or ultimate conclusion as to
obviousness. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (If an
examiner presents a prima facie case, “the burden of coming forward with
evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.”).
We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments and also do not
find them persuasive. For example, Appellants’ arguments seeking to
distinguish the facts of In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981), are
misplaced. See App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 3. As the Examiner explained, In re
Keller was cited for the general proposition that obviousness is evaluated by
considering the combined teachings of the references. Ans. 6 (“This
argument is unpersuasive as the need to address an obviousness rejection
based on a combination of applied references rather than based on a
selective treatment of the applied references is established generally [and] is
not limited to a particular procedural posture.”). Moreover, we have not
considered any new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 1–3) because
Appellants have not shown good cause for introducing a new argument at
that stage. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 21, nor do
we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
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independent claim 21, and claims 22–26, 28–35, and 37–40, which fall
therewith.
Obviousness Rejections R2 and R3 of Claims 27 and 36
The Examiner rejects claims 27 and 36 over a combination of Craig,
Moinzadeh, and either Johnson or Chutorash. Final Act. 16–19. Appellants
assert dependent claims 27 and 36 are allowable based on their dependency
on independent claims 21 and 30, respectively. App. Br. 7. However, as
explained above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these independent
claims. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 27 and 36.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21–40.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED