James M. Lorenzo et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 2, 2019

14126891 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/126,891 05/22/2014 James M. Lorenzo 018156-000039-44 9881
20230 7590 10/02/2019
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
1909 K St., NW
9th Floor
WASHINGTON, DC 20006-1152
EXAMINER
FREEMAN, JOSHUA E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3641
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patlaw@vorys.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JAMES M. LORENZO and ROBERT A. PYLES
____________

Appeal 2018-001185
Application 14/126,891
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, BRANDON J. WARNER, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

WARNER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22, which are all the pending claims.
Appeal Br. 1. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
An oral hearing, scheduled for September 19, 2019, was waived.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Covestro
LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2018-001185
Application 14/126,891

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosed invention “relates in general to blast and
ballistic protection and more specifically to a polycarbonate laminate useful
for protection against close-proximity blast, ballistic and severe storm
events.” Spec., p. 1, ll. 10–12. Claims 1, 8, 15, and 22 are independent.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A laminate for protecting an object against one of a
close-proximity blast, a ballistic event and a severe storm event,
the laminate comprising:
- two or more layers of polycarbonate; and
- one or more layers of a thermoplastic polyurethane,
wherein each layer of [] thermoplastic polyurethane is
positioned in between two or more layers of polycarbonate.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Pinckney US 2011/0088541 A1 Apr. 21, 2011
Krause US 8,011,146 B2 Sept. 6, 2011
Carberry US 2012/0297964 A1 Nov. 29, 2012

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Application 14/126,891

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REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review:2 Claims 1–22 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Krause and
Pinckney. Final Act. 2–4.

ANALYSIS
The Examiner determined that a combination of teachings from
Krause and Pinckney renders obvious the subject matter recited in
claims 1–22. See Final Act. 2–4. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s
reasoning is insufficient to support the obviousness rejection. See Appeal
Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 1–4. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive.
In particular, Appellant asserts that “the layers in Krause are already
bonded together by silicone, so there is no motivation to add a layer of
thermoplastic polyurethane in between each layer of polycarbonate.”
Appeal Br. 7; see id. at 6–8; see also Reply Br. 1–2 (same assertion). Upon
review of the cited art, we agree with the Examiner that Krause discloses
laminated window 120 being bonded to mullion 40 and pressure bar 80 with
structural silicone adhesive, but that “Krause is silent [as] to how the layers
of laminate armor are bonded together.” Ans. 5–6 (underlining omitted); see
also Krause, Fig. 3 (depicting laminated window 120 being formed of

2 We note that rejections of claims 1–4, 7–11, 14–17, and 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Carberry, and of claims 5, 6,
12, 13, 18–20, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Carberry and Pinckney, have been withdrawn by the Examiner “to expedite
the appeal process” and thus are not before us for review as part of the
instant appeal. Ans. 5; see Final Act. 4–8.
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Application 14/126,891

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multiple layers, but not depicting any particular adhesive, such as structural
silicone adhesive, disposed between the layers).
The Examiner found that Pinckney discloses a transparent laminate
armor where the layers of laminate are bonded together with thermoplastic
polyurethane layers disposed therebetween, as in the present claims. See
Final Act. 2; see also Pinckney, Fig. 2 (depicting bonding material 18
between the layers of laminate), ¶ 18 (disclosing that the layers of laminate
“[are] bonded together using either (1) a two-part epoxy material of
negligible thickness, or (2) using an autoclave process with thermoplastic
polyurethane (PU) adhesive layers,” where both known bonding materials
are represented by numeral 18 in Figure 1).
Given the prior art teachings relied upon, we discern no error in the
Examiner’s rationale that, “[w]hile Krause discloses adhesive along the edge
as sufficient to bond the composite laminate to the resistant mullion 40 and
pressure bar 80, Krause is silent [as] to how the individual layers of the
composite armor 120 are bonded together,” such that “[i]t would be more
securely held together if the entire interlayer was covered, as taught by
Pinckney,” where “[t]he benefit would be more securely bonding the layers
together prior to attachment to the mullion and pressure bar.” Ans. 6
(emphasis omitted).
As the Examiner correctly notes, our reviewing court has stated:
“[A]n implicit motivation to combine exists not only when a
suggestion may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but
when the ‘improvement’ is technology-independent and the
combination of references results in a product or process that is
more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper,
cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.
Because the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by
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improving a product or process is universal-and even common-
sensical-we have held that there exists in these situations a
motivation to combine prior art references even absent any hint
of suggestion in the references themselves. In such situations,
the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses
knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the
prior art references.”
Ans. 6–7 (quoting DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we discern no error in the Examiner’s reasonable
conclusion that “it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made to have modified Krause such that
the armor laminate had thermoplastic polyurethane interlayers, in view of
Pinckney, to obtain the desired result of bonding all of the layers more
securely together providing a more durable system.” Ans. 7.
Further, Appellant does not persuasively explain how the Examiner’s
combination of incorporating a known laminate layer bonding material of
thermoplastic polyurethane (from Pinckney) in between known
polycarbonate laminate layers (from Krause) would have yielded
unpredictable results or somehow been beyond the level of ordinary skill in
the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). In this
regard, Appellant’s assertions neglect to adequately consider that “[a] person
of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421. The analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103
presumes not only common sense, but also skill in the art. See In re Sovish,
769 F.2d 738, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
After careful consideration of the record before us, Appellant’s
arguments do not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s factual findings,
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Application 14/126,891

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which are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, or the Examiner’s
reasonable conclusion of obviousness, which is rationally articulated based
on prior art teachings. In short, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–22
based on the reasoned positions set forth therein, and in light of the
Examiner’s thorough responses to Appellant’s arguments. See Final
Act. 2–4; Ans. 5–7.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–22 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Krause and Pinckney.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Krause and Pinckney
1–22

AFFIRMED