Jacqueline D. Allen, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 11, 2010
0120073561 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 11, 2010)

0120073561

06-11-2010

Jacqueline D. Allen, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.


Jacqueline D. Allen,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Capital Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120073561

Hearing No. 430-2007-00115X

Agency No. 4K-280-0011-06

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the Agency's

decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissing her complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.,

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 206(d) et seq. Upon review, the Commission finds that the

Agency erred when it dismissed this complaint pursuant to 29 C.F.R.

� 1614.107(a)(2), for untimely EEO Counselor contact.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that Complainant was employed as a Mail Piece Design

Analyst in the Fayetteville, North Carolina Processing and Distribution

Center (P&DC). She was asked to voluntarily assume some supervisory

duties at her location. She performed these duties without additional

compensation. In 2003, Complainant argued that she deserved a pay

provision for performing the higher-level work. She challenged this

practice through the EEO process but was told that pay provisions were

not in practice and that there were no provisions in the budget that

would allow payment for higher-level work.

In December 2005, Complainant learned that management had determined

that the Business Mail Entry Unit (BMEU) duties that she was performing

belonged to the Level 17 Supervisor of Customer Services and that that

person would receive a higher-level of pay. Again, Complainant challenged

this through the EEO process. Complainant contends however, that it

was not until July 2006 that she learned that a White male coworker

who had been performing the same type of higher-level work assignment

was being paid for higher-level work, and had also received a higher

pay-bonus percentage.

Complainant filed her formal complaint on September 5, 2006. In the

complaint, she alleged that she was subjected to discrimination on the

bases of race (Black), sex (female), color (black), age (50), and reprisal

for prior protected EEO activity when she became aware that she was not

receiving higher-pay for performing BMEU supervisory duties.

Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

The Agency submitted a Motion to Dismiss to the AJ assigned to this case

based on the decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,

550 U.S. 618 (2007). The AJ found that Complainant's pay-based claim

fell within the holding of Ledbetter. In that case, the Supreme Court

ruled that a pay-setting decision was a discrete act and the time-limit

to raise such claims begins when the decision is communicated to the

employee. The AJ found that Complainant was fully aware of the Agency's

stance more than six months before she contacted an EEO Counselor on

July 17, 2006. Therefore, the AJ granted the Agency's Motion on June

20, 2007. The Agency fully implemented the AJ's decision and dismissed

the complaint.

On appeal, Complainant acknowledges that she was aware of the pay

inequities that existed with performing higher-level work. She maintains,

however, that during the time she performed the work, she was repeatedly

told by management that there were no provisions in the budget that

would allow her to be paid for performing these duties. She maintains

that she thought this applied to all employees performing higher-level

duties but that in July 2006 she discovered that the Agency's position

had changed and learned that a male coworker was being paid for performing

higher-level work.

In response, the Agency contends that Complainant became aware of the

alleged discriminatory event at the earliest on December 2003, and at the

latest on December 6, 2005, when she was told that she was not going to

receive additional pay for performing BMEU work. The Agency argues that

Complainant did not initiate contact with an EEO Counselor until July

17, 2006, which is, at best, seven months beyond the forty-five (45)

day limitation period. Therefore, the Agency argues that Complainant's

EEO Counselor contact was untimely.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The standard of review in rendering this appellate decision is de

novo, i.e., the Commission will examine the record and review the

documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely

and relevant submissions of the parties, and issue its decision based

on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation

of the law. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a); EEOC Management Directive 110,

Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action,

within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action. The

Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a

"supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day

limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a Complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

Based on a review of the record evidence, the Commission finds that the

Agency erred when it dismissed Complainant's complaint for untimely

EEO Counselor contact. Specifically, we find that Ledbetter is not

controlling in this instance. The evidence reveals that Complainant did

not learn that the Agency's position regarding payment for performing

higher-level duties had changed until July 2006, when she learned

that a male coworker was receiving additional pay for performing

higher-level work. The Commission finds that the discovery of this

information triggered the time limitation for EEO Counselor contact.

The record shows that Complainant learned of this information in July

2006, and contacted an EEO Counselor on July 17, 2006, well within the

45-day time limitation. Therefore, we find that the Agency's dismissal

was improper.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Agency's final order VACATED and the matter is REMANDED

for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order

below.

ORDER

The complaint is remanded to the agency for further processing. The

Agency shall submit to the Hearings Division of the Charlotte District

Office the request for a hearing and a copy of the complaint file within

fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The

Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at

the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted

to the Hearings Division.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0408)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The Agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 11, 2010

Date

2

0120073561

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013