Jacqueline Anderson, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 31, 2000
01a00114 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 2000)

01a00114

03-31-2000

Jacqueline Anderson, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Jacqueline Anderson, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00114

v. ) Agency No. 4D-250-0078-98

) Hearing No. 170-99-8003X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the basis of sex (female), in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the agency properly found that complainant

failed to show by preponderant evidence that the agency discriminated

against her on the basis of sex when on February 13, 1998, she was

issued a notice of removal for unsatisfactory performance/failure to

properly perform the duties of her position.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant was a Letter Carrier at the

agency's Parkersburg, West Virginia Post Office. On September 17,

1997, complainant was out delivering her route when her supervisor (the

Supervisor) reviewed the stack of mail which was bundled for disposal

as Undeliverable Bulk Business Mail (UBBM) and No Apparent Value (NOV).

Upon review of the bundle, the Supervisor found several pieces of mail

which she considered to be deliverable but were endorsed by complainant

for disposal. The Supervisor contacted her managers who advised her

to terminate complainant for the infraction but to also do what she

felt was fit. Later that day, the Supervisor discussed the situation

with complainant and advised her that she could be terminated for the

infraction. The Supervisor conducted a second inspection of bundles on

December 10, 1997. This time, the Supervisor found eighty-one (81) pieces

of mail that were bundled and endorsed for disposal which she believed

included deliverable mail. The following day, the Supervisor spoke with

complainant and asked her to review the bundle of mail. Complainant did

so and determined that thirty-six (36) of the eighty-one (81) pieces of

mail were deliverable. Based on complainant's actions on September 17,

1997, and December 10, 1997, the agency placed complainant on off-duty

status pending disciplinary action. Upon review of complainant's actions,

the agency determined that she should be terminated and served her a

Notice of Removal for unsatisfactory performance/failure to properly

perform the duties of her position on February 13, 1998. The agency

terminated complainant on March 2, 1998. Believing she was a victim of

discrimination, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency

on March 19, 1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against

her when she received the notice of removal.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). A hearing was held on July 26, 1999. Subsequently, on August

16, 1999, the AJ issued a Bench Decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of sex discrimination because she failed to demonstrate that

similarly situated employees not in her protected class were treated

differently under similar circumstances. Particularly, the AJ found

that the complainant failed to show that the comparatives committed the

same offense as severely as she had committed on two occasions.

The AJ then concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. In particular, the agency

argued that complainant bundled several pieces of deliverable mail for

disposal on two occasions which was more severe than any other carrier.

The agency also argued that the appropriate punishment for these

deliberate and severe actions was removal.

The AJ then found that complainant did not establish that more likely

than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination. Complainant attempted to show that she did

not designate the bundle for disposal and that other mail carriers were

not punished for the same infraction. The AJ found that complainant

failed to support her claim that she did not intentionally bundle

the mail for disposal. Further, the AJ found that those other mail

carriers who committed similar errors would only have one (1) to five

(5) pieces of deliverable mail in their disposable bundles, while in

this case, complainant had thirty-six (36) pieces of deliverable mail

endorsed for disposal. Accordingly, the AJ found that complainant did

not establish that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons

were a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.

On September 1, 1999, the agency issued its final decision. In its

FAD, the agency concurred with the AJ's Bench Decision that complainant

failed to support her claim of discrimination based on sex. This appeal

followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding that discriminatory intent

did not exist is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's Bench Decision summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant

failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated

by discriminatory animus toward complainant's sex. We discern no basis

to disturb the AJ's Bench Decision.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we affirm the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 31, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Date 1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where

applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,

may also be found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.