Jacob Sisk

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 25, 2019

13308496 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/308,496 11/30/2011 Jacob Sisk 113027.000072US1 1244
79804 7590 10/25/2019
Duncan Galloway Egan Greenwald, PLLC
9625 Ormsby Station Road
Louisville, KY 40223
EXAMINER
KHATTAR, RAJESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
carnold@dgeglaw.com
kduncan@dgeglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JACOB SISK
____________

Appeal 2018-006110
Application 13/308,496
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32, which are all the claims pending in
this application. Claims 5, 15, 25, and 27–29 are canceled. We have
jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicants” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Although the Appeal Brief (1) identifies the real party in
interest as “Thomson Reuters Global Resources Unlimited Corporation,” as
of October 2019 (Execution Date 02/28/2019), the real party in interest is
recorded as: “REFINITIV US ORGANIZATION LLC.”

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Embodiments of Appellant’s claimed invention relate “generally to
financial services and to the mining of information from news articles and
other sources of content to discern sentiment. . . . [the invention] provides a
dynamic tool that leverages machine learning capabilities, news sentiment
expertise, and intelligent analytics that enable measuring and/or scoring of
sentiment and predictive firm valuation behavior of companies as perceived
by conventional and new media.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Rejection
Claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more.
Final Act. 2.
ANALYSIS
We reproduce infra independent claim 1 in Table One. We have
considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. To the
extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for
particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Aug. 22, 2017 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed Jan. 22, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Mar. 22, 2018 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief, filed May 22,
2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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Issue
Issue: Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, did the Examiner err by rejecting
claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32, as being directed to a judicial
exception, without significantly more?
Principles of Law — 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas’ are not patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18
(2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding of rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68
(1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane
v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
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that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
Subject Matter Eligibility — 2019 Revised Guidance
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). This
new guidance is applied in this Opinion. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance,
we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes,
or certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people);3 and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).4, 5
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a

3 Referred to as “Step 2A, Prong One” in the Revised Guidance (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 1”).
4 Referred to as “Step 2A, Prong Two” in the Revised Guidance (hereinafter
“Step 2A, prong 2”).
5 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08.2017
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so
integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id.
Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
6
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Because there is no single definition of an “abstract idea” under Alice
step 1, the PTO has recently synthesized, for purposes of clarity,
predictability, and consistency, key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas to explain that the “abstract idea” exception includes the
following three groupings:
1. Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical
calculations;

6 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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2. Mental processes— concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion);
and
3. Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, “[c]laims that do not recite
[subject] matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract
ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas,” except in rare
circumstances. Even if the claims recite any one of these three groupings of
abstract ideas, these claims are still not “directed to” a judicial exception
(abstract idea), and thus are patent eligible, if “the claim as a whole
integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that
exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, limitations that are indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any
other technology or technical field — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
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judicial exception to a particular technological
environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception
— see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a
practical application include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the
judicial exception, or merely include instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP
§ 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP 2106.05(h).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One7
The Judicial Exception
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first
considering whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas, in particular: (a) mathematical concepts,
(b) mental steps, and (c) certain methods of organizing human activities.
We note the Examiner concludes all claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and
30–32 recite an abstract idea, i.e., predicting the price behavior of the
company using sentiment scores derived from news content. See Final
Act. 3. The Examiner analogizes Appellant’s claimed concept to collecting

7 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis which has been identified by the courts as abstract. Id. In support,
the Examiner cites to Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A. (830 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). See Final Act. 3.
In Table One below, we identify in italics the specific claim
limitations that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We also identify in bold
the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations that are generic computer
components:
TABLE ONE
Independent Claim 1 Revised 2019 Guidance
[a] Presented) A non-
transitory computer useable
medium having a set of
executable code comprising:
A medium is a statutory subject
matter class — a manufacture. See
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”).

The “computer” and “medium” are
additional non-abstract limitations.

[b] a first set of computer
program code adapted to
receive by a document
processing module of
a computer electronic news
content comprising a first
news story from a set of
databases;
Receiving information is
insignificant extra-solution activity.
2019 Revised Guidance, 55 n.31; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(g).
The “computer” and “set of
databases” are additional non-
abstract limitations.

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Independent Claim 1 Revised 2019 Guidance
[c] a second set of computer
program code adapted to process by
the document processing module of
the computer the first news story to
identify information pertaining to a
first company;
Document processing is insignificant
extra-solution activity. 2019
Revised Guidance, 55 n.31; see also
MPEP § 2106.05(g).
“identify” information could be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Rev. Guid. 52.

“a first company” and “the
computer” are additional non-
abstract limitations.

[d] a third set of computer
program code adapted to
apply by a sentiment scoring
module of the computer
sentiment analysis and arrive
at a first sentiment score
associated with the first
news story as it relates to the
first company;
Abstract idea, i.e., “arrive at a first
sentiment score” is a “mathematical
concept” that could be performed
alternatively as a mental process.
See 2019 Rev. Guid. 52.

“the computer” and “the first
company” are additional non-
abstract limitations.

[e] a fourth set of computer program
code adapted to determine by the
sentiment scoring module of the
computer a derivative sentiment
value related to the first company
in close to real-time, wherein the
derivative sentiment value
represents as a function a change in
value over time of the first
sentiment score as compared to a
previous sentiment score, wherein
the fourth set of computer program
code adapted to determine the
Abstract idea, i.e., determine by the
sentiment scoring module of the
computer a derivative sentiment
value is a “mathematical concept”
that could be performed alternatively
as a mental process. See 2019 Rev.
Guid. 52.

“the computer” and “the first
company” are additional non-
abstract limitations.

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Independent Claim 1 Revised 2019 Guidance
derivative sentiment value
comprises the function:

[f] S = dx / dy

Abstract idea, i.e., “mathematical
formula” that could be performed
alternatively as a mental process.
See 2019 Rev. Guid. 52.

[g] wherein the derivative
sentiment value, S, is the
derivative of x, a first value
related to the first company,
with respect to y, a second
value related to the first
company, the first sentiment
score being determined
temporally proximate to the
publication of the first news
story and weighted more
heavily than the previous
sentiment score, the previous
sentiment score representing
a set of prior sentiment scores
related to the first company
and determined prior to the
first sentiment score over a
temporal period extending
back in time from the
publication of the first news
story;
Abstract idea, i.e., “the first
sentiment score being determined
temporally proximate to the
publication of the first news story
and weighted more heavily than the
previous sentiment score” is a
mathematical concept that could be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Rev. Guid. 52.

“the first company” is an additional
non-abstract limitation.
[h] a fifth set of computer
program code adapted to
provide by a predictive
module of the computer a
predictive model using the
derivative sentiment value
and the first sentiment
Abstract idea, i.e., “provide by
a predictive module … using
the derivative sentiment value
and the first sentiment score to
arrive at a predicted price
behavior could be performed
alternatively as a mental
process (i.e., a mathematical
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Independent Claim 1 Revised 2019 Guidance
score to arrive at a predicted
price behavior associated
with the first company, the
predictive module having
been trained using machine
learning by a feature engine,
the feature engine having
automatically generated a set
of features based on historical
sentiment data, and wherein
the set of features are
calibrated by the feature
engine by analyzing a set of
historical present data and
are used to more accurately
arrive at the predicted price
behavior; and

concept applied to a
fundamental economic
practice). See 2019 Rev.
Guid. 52.

“the computer” and “the first
company” are additional non-
abstract limitations.

Abstract idea, i.e., “analyzing a set
of historical present data” could be
performed alternatively as a mental
process. See 2019 Rev. Guid. 52.
[i] a sixth set of computer
program code adapted to
generate by the predictive
module of the computer a
visual indicator related to
and based at least in part on
the predicted behavior in a
graphical user interface
integrated with the document
processing module, the
sentiment scoring module,
and the predictive module by
an integration framework
module.
“generate by the predictive module
of the computer a visual indicator
related to and based at least in part
on the predicted behavior” is
insignificant post-solution activity.
2019 Revised Guidance, 55 n.31; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(g).

“a graphical user interface” is an
additional non-abstract limitation.

Abstract Ideas — Mental Processes and Mathematical Formulas
We conclude the italicized abstract idea steps identified above in
Table One could be performed alternatively as mental processes under the
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Revised Guidance, or as a mathematical formula or concept. See Claim 1.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Our reviewing court guides: “An abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, merely combining several
abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. See
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not
render the claim non-abstract.”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims
were directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human
using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent eligible
under § 101. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011); “That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.” CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375. See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Moreover, “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental
process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Services,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more
quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”).

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Additional Limitations
As emphasized in bold supra, we note the additional non-abstract
limitation of a generic computer. The computer (implicit because of the
recited “computer usable medium” (claim 1), the “computer-implemented
method” (claim 11), and the “computer-based system” (Claim 21)) are
additional non-abstract limitations (emphasis added). See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We also note the supporting exemplary
descriptions of generic computer, server, database, and network components
in the Specification, for example:
With reference to Fig. 1, access device 130, such as a client
device, is generally representative of one or more access
devices. In the exemplary embodiment, access device 130
takes the form of a personal computer, workstation, personal
digital assistant, mobile telephone, or any other device capable
of providing an effective user interface with a server or
database. Specifically, access device 130 includes a processor
module 131 one or more processors (or processing circuits)
131, a memory 132, a display 133, a keyboard 134, and a
graphical pointer or selector 135. Processor module 131
includes one or more processors, processing circuits, or
controllers. In the exemplary embodiment, processor module
131 takes any convenient or desirable form. Coupled to
processor module 131 is memory 132. Memory 132 stores code
(machine-readable or executable instructions) for an operating
system 136, a browser 137, document processing software 138.
In the exemplary embodiment, operating system 136 takes
the form of a version of the Microsoft Windows operating
system, and browser 137 takes the form of a version of
Microsoft Internet Explorer.
Spec. ¶ 46.
We emphasize that McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
Inc., (837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), guides: “[t]he abstract idea exception
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prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added).
Independent claims 11 and 21 recite similar language of
commensurate scope that we conclude also falls into the same abstract idea
categories of mental processes, and mathematical formulas or concepts, as
mapped above for independent claim 1. See supra Table One. Because we
conclude all claims on appeal recite an abstract idea, as identified above,
under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two.

2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance, we consider whether there
are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54–55.
MPEP § 2106.05(a)
Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or
to Any Other Technology or Technical Field

Appellant argues the claims of the present invention provide an
improvement to the functioning of a computer. See Appeal Br. 12.
The use of the specific formula, features, and calibration
method as claimed provides the claimed invention with the
ability to capture “shocks” that could not be accurately captured
or processed using prior systems and methods. The specifically
recited components, configurations, and steps of claim 11
provide for an improvement to a computer or technical field
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like the claims at issue in Enfish and McRO. The claimed
method provides for the processing and management
of data to generate a useful output and for the automatic
configuration of a special purpose computer system that
improves upon known systems and methods. Like the claims at
issue in Enfish, the feature engine of the claimed invention
improves the functioning of a computer by making it faster or
more efficient. Specifically, the feature engine enables for the
generation of a set of features and for the calibration of the seat
of features to more accurately arrive at a predicted price
behavior. Similarly, the specifically recited steps, which
provide rules like those in McRO, enable a computer to perform
a function that it could not have performed previously
and which provide for an improvement to the computer system.
Appeal Br. 12–13.
Enfish
Regarding Appellant’s arguments analogizing the claims before us on
appeal to the subject claim in Enfish, we note the Enfish court concluded
“the claims at issue . . . are not directed to an abstract idea within the
meaning of Alice. Rather, they are directed to a specific improvement to the
way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.” Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
Here, the “set of databases” recited in each independent claim does
not involve a self-referential table, as was the focus in Enfish. Therefore,
Appellant’s claims do not involve a self-referential database table similar to
the specific type of logical table arrangement the Enfish court found was
designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in
memory. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Thus, Appellant has not
persuasively shown that the recited “set of databases” improve the way the
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computer stores and retrieves data in a manner analogous to that found by
the court in Enfish.
McRO
We find Appellant’s argument based upon McRO unavailing because
we conclude Appellant’s computer usable medium (claim 1), computer-
implemented method (claim 11), and computer-based system (claim 21) are
unlike the subject claim(s) considered by the court in McRO.8 See Appeal
Br. 13.
The patent at issue in McRO describes that prior character animation
and lip synchronization were accomplished by human animators, with the
assistance of a computer, which involved the use of a so-called “keyframe”
approach in which animators set appropriate parameters, i.e., morph weights,
at certain important times, i.e., in order to produce accurate and realistic lip
synchronization and facial expressions. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1305.
Animators knew what phoneme a character pronounced at a given time from
a time-aligned phonetic transcription (a “timed transcript”). Id.
In accordance with the prior technique, animators, using a computer,
thus, manually determined the appropriate morph weight sets for each
keyframe based on the phoneme timings in the timed transcript. Id. See
also SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing McRO):
The claims in McRO were directed to the creation of something
physical—namely, the display of “lip synchronization and
facial expressions” of animated characters on screens for
viewing by human eyes. Id. at 1313. The claimed improvement
was to how the physical display operated (to produce better
quality images), unlike (what is present here) a claimed

8 Appellant refers to McRO, 837 F.3d 1299.
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improvement in a mathematical technique with no improved
display mechanism. The claims in McRO thus were not
abstract in the sense that is dispositive here. And those claims
also avoided being “abstract” in another sense reflected
repeatedly in our cases (based on a contrast not with “physical”
but with “concrete”): they had the specificity required to
transform a claim from one claiming only a result to one
claiming a way of achieving it.
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis added).
In contrast to the claimed invention in McRO that improved how a
physical display operated to produce better quality images (id.), claim 1
merely uses a generic computer to predict a price behavior associated with a
company based upon a derivative sentiment value and a first sentiment
score.
Thus, Appellant’s claims on appeal do not improve the operation of a
physical display, as was the case in McRO, nor the operation of any other
computer component, such as the generic computer implicitly required to
execute the sets of “computer program code” recited in the body of claim 1.
See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167.
Moreover, we conclude Appellant’s generic computer implementation
performs steps or functions that can be performed alternatively as mental
processes, as discussed above. On this record, we see nothing in Appellant’s
claims that specifically improves the efficiency of the computer, or another
technology or technical field.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude independent claims 1, 11,
and 21 do not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or
other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a).
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MPEP §§ 2106.05(b) and (c)
The Bilski Machine-or-Transformation test (“MoT”)
as applied to method claims 11–14 and 16–20

At the outset, we note the Supreme Court cautions that the MoT test is
not the sole test, but may provide a useful clue:
This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an
investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible “process.”

Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).
Because a generic computer is implicit in the computer-implemented
method claims on appeal, we conclude method claims 11–14 and 16–20 do
not define or rely upon a “particular machine.” See MPEP § 2106.05(b).
Further, we conclude these method claims do not transform an article to a
different state or thing. See MPEP § 2106.05(c).
We note Appellant advances no arguments regarding the Bilski
Machine-or-Transformation test in the Briefs. To the extent that the method
claims on appeal might effect a transformation of data, we note the
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. “The mere
manipulation or reorganization of data, however, does not satisfy the
transformation prong.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375.
Thus, without more, we conclude method claims 11–14 and 16–20 do
not use a “particular machine” to apply the judicial exception (see MPEP
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§ 2106.05(b)), or perform a transformation of an article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)).

MPEP § 2106.05(e) — Meaningful Claim Limitations 9
The Examiner finds: “The claim(s) do not include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the additional computer elements are recited at a high level of
generality and in doing so provide conventional computer function[s] that do
not add meaningful limitations to practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 2
(emphasis added).
Appellant argues:
The Examiner did not examine the claims as a whole or as an
ordered combination, because if he had he would see that what
is claimed has a specific way in which the derivative sentiment
value or sentiment values are determined. This meaningful
limitation consists of a specific formula, S = dx/dy’ which is
apparent in the amended independent claims and dependent
claims 26-29. This certainly adds a meaningful limitation
beyond the abstract idea of “simply organiz[ing] and
compar[ing] data without significantly more.”
Appeal Br. 20 (emphasis added).
We disagree, because Appellant’s claimed derivative is a
mathematical formula that is an abstract idea per se. Moreover, to the extent
that the derivative formula is used to obtain a derivative sentiment value that

9 MPEP § 2106.05(e): “Applying or using the judicial exception in some
other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a
whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.”
(emphasis added).

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is used to calculate “the first sentiment score to arrive at a predicted price
behavior associated with the first company” (claim 1), we note an improved
abstract idea it is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (holding
that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless patent-ineligible).
We see nothing in Appellant’s claims that specifically improves the
efficiency of the computer, or another technology or technical field, as
addressed above under MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant does not advance
further substantive arguments to any particular “meaningful” claim
limitations, such as those of the types addressed under MPEP § 2106.05(e),
that impose meaningful limits on the judicial exception.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude representative claim 1 has
no other argued meaningful limitations, as considered under section
2106.05(e) of the MPEP, pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance.

MPEP § 2106.05(f)
Merely including instructions to implement
an abstract idea on a computer, or
Merely using a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea

As noted above, the Examiner finds: “The claim(s) do not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than
the judicial exception because the additional computer elements are recited
at a high level of generality and in doing so provide conventional computer
function[s] that do not add meaningful limitations to practicing the abstract
idea.” Final Act. 2.
Without more, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s claimed
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invention merely implements the abstract idea using generic computer
components, as depicted in bold type in Table One, and as supported in our
reproduction of the Specification, paragraph 46, supra.

MPEP § 2106.05(g)
Adding insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception

As mapped in the right column of Table One, supra, we conclude
representative independent claim 1 recites extra-solution activities that
courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted
subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31.

MPEP § 2106.05(h)
Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use

The Supreme Court guides: “the prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post
solution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12, (quoting Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)).
Appellant argues that the claims of the present invention could not be
performed in the human mind. Appeal Br. 16.
But see “Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer-
implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose
them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’).”
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84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14. Moreover, the “performance of a claim limitation
using generic computer components does not necessarily preclude the claim
limitation from being in the mathematical concepts grouping, Benson, 409
U.S. at 67, or the certain methods of organizing human activity grouping,
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14.
Preemption
Appellant further contends: “even if the claims are directed towards
the alleged abstract idea, the claims do not preempt every method for
processing news stories and determining a sentiment value or derivative
sentiment in near real-time because the claims are sufficiently limited when
viewing all the limitations and the entirety of the claims as a whole.” Appeal
Br. 17 (emphasis added).
In response, we note that preemption is not the sole test for patent
eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained, “questions on preemption
are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis,” and, although
“preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
cf. OIP Techs, 788 F.3d at 1362–63 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all
price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the
e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”).
Nor do claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32 on appeal present any
other issues as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance regarding a
determination of whether the additional generic elements integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55.
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Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–
(h)), we conclude claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32 do not integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore, we proceed
to Step 2B, The Inventive Concept.

The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
The Examiner finds:
The claim 11 recites the additional limitations of a document
processing module of a computer, sentiment scoring module of
the computer, predictive module of the computer, databases and
a graphical user interface integrated with the document
processing module, the sentiment scoring module, and the
predictive module by an integration framework module. The
document processing module, sentiment scoring module and
the predictive module are all associated with a computer which
is recited at a high level of generality and its broadest
reasonable interpretation comprises a general purpose computer
(as supported by the specification in [0040]-[0043]) and other
computer related conventional components which are
performing their routine, well-understood and conventional
function similar to what has been found by the courts (in Alice)
not to be adding significantly more to the underlying abstract
idea.
Final Act. 4–5 (emphasis added).
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In the Reply Brief, Appellant cites to Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and urges: “General statements that the claimed
limitations are ‘well-understood, routine, and conventional’ are not
sufficient to show that said limitations were ‘well-understood, routine, and
conventional’ to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of
invention.” Reply Br. 3.
We note the “question of whether a claim element or combination of
elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in
the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d at
1368; see also Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811
F.3d. 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that patent eligibility inquiry may
contain underlying issues of fact).
Here, we find Appellant has failed to substantively and persuasively
traverse the Examiner’s factual findings that specifically rely on paragraphs
40–43 of the Specification as evidence. See Final Act. 4–5.

BASCOM 10
Appellant additionally cites to Bascom in support, and urges:
Specifically, the claimed invention addresses deficiencies in
systems and methods provided in the prior art that are not able
to properly identify similar entities based on both the
significance, degree of significance, and similarity of entities.
Like in Bascom, the claimed particular arrangement of
elements is a technical improvement to [the] Examiner’s
alleged abstract idea for at least the reason that, like the

10 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

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phenomes and morph weights at issue in McRO the claimed
limitations provide specific rules tied to a technological
environment that improve the functioning of the computer
system.
Appeal Br. 15.
We find Appellant’s analogy to BASCOM unavailing. See id. The
Federal Circuit held in BASCOM that the claimed Internet content filtering,
which featured an implementation “versatile enough that it could be adapted
to many different users’ preferences while also installed remotely in a single
location,” expressed an inventive concept in “the non-conventional and non-
generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at
1350.
Here, Appellant has not shown a non-conventional, non-generic
arrangement regarding the non-abstract limitations of generic computer and
database components. See independent claim 1. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 n.22. Moreover, we find no per se rules
recited in any of Appellant’s claims, such as was the case with the subject
claim considered by the court in McRO.
Therefore, it is our view that Appellant’s claims do not involve any
improvements to another technology, technical field, or improvements to the
functioning of the computer or network, as was seen by the court in
BASCOM. Instead, we conclude Appellant’s claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26,
and 30–32 merely invoke generic computer components as a tool in which
the instructions executing on the computer apply the judicial exception.
Further, regarding the use of the recited generic computer and “set of
databases” identified above in Table One, the Supreme Court has held “the
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
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abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. Our
reviewing court provides additional guidance: See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at
1096 (“[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user
interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter.”); OIP Techs, 788 F.3d at 1363 (claims reciting, inter
alia, sending messages over a network, gathering statistics, using a
computerized system to automatically determine an estimated outcome, and
presenting offers to potential customers found to merely recite “‘well-
understood, routine conventional activit[ies],’ either by requiring
conventional computer activities or routine data-gathering steps” (alteration
in original)).
This reasoning is applicable here. Therefore, on the record before us,
Appellant has not shown that the claims on appeal add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, and
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32,
considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is
not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive
concept.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1–4, 6–14, 16–24, 26,
and 30–32.11

11 To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
Under our Revised Guidance, governed by relevant case law, we
conclude all claims in the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1–4,
6–14, 16–24, 26, and 30–32.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–14, 16–
24, 26, and 30–
32
§ 101 1–4, 6–14, 16–
24, 26, and 30–
32

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED