Jack Cooper Transport Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2003

340 N.L.R.B. 659 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO. 659
Jack Cooper Transport Co., Inc. and General Driv-
ers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union
89, a/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Case 26–CA–19350
September 30, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND SCHAUMBER
On May 8, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Keltner
W. Locke issued the attached bench decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge’s
decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.1
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to supply information re-
quested by Local 89. He based his finding on Local 89’s
shared interest with the other local unions covered by a
multiemployer bargaining agreement in making sure that
the employers covered by the agreement followed its
terms. We affirm the judge’s finding of the 8(a)(5) and
(1) violations, but only for the reasons set forth below.
The Respondent is a member of a multiemployer
committee called the National Automobile Transporters
Labor Division Negotiating Committee. Local 89, and
numerous other local unions make up the Teamsters Na-
tional Transporters Industry Negotiating Committee.
Through these two committees, the Respondent and Lo-
cal 89 are among the signatories/parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement. The most recent agreement was
effective from June 1, 1999, to May 31, 2003.
On August 4, 1999, the Respondent’s president, Rudy
Cleveland, told Frederick Zuckerman, then assistant to
the president, and now president, of Local 89, that the
Respondent had a “competitive agreement” that allowed
it to use its Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas drivers to trans-
port Corvettes from the General Motors plant in Bowling
Green, Kentucky.2 Cleveland’s statement led Zuckerman,
who was not aware that the Union had authorized a com-
petitive agreement, to suspect that the Respondent was

1 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decision in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996).
2 Cleveland’s remark to Zuckerman occurred when the two men
were serving on a committee hearing a grievance that did not involve
either the Respondent or Local 89.
operating under a defunct competitive agreement.3
Therefore, on August 6, Zuckerman sent a letter to the
Respondent notifying it of a grievance concerning the
matter and making an information request for, inter alia,
copies of any competitive agreement that the Respondent
had entered into that affected movement of traffic from
Bowling Green, Kentucky. The Respondent refused to
supply the requested information.
In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to supply
the requested information, we rely solely on the specific
evidence establishing that Local 89 had reason to believe
that the Respondent was operating within Local 89’s ju-
risdiction on a “defunct” competitive agreement and in a
manner that directly affected the employees represented
by Local 89. (As noted, a competitive agreement would
enable the Respondent to undercut what Local 89 mem-
bers were paid for hauling cars from General Motors.) In
these circumstances, the requested information was rele-
vant and necessary to Local 89’s interest in policing the
Respondent’s compliance with the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement. Crowley Marine Services, 329
NLRB 1054, 1060 (1999), enfd. 234 F.3d 1295 (D.C. Cir.
2000).4 Accordingly, the Respondent had an obligation to
supply the requested information and its refusal to do so
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Jack
Cooper Transport Co., Inc., Kansas City, Missouri, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraphs 2(b) and (c):
“(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its office and place of business in Kansas City, Missouri
3 Local 89’s jurisdiction encompasses the Bowling Green, Kentucky
area, and it represents drivers who also haul cars from the same General
Motors plant.
Competitive agreements, authorized by art. 22 of the collective-
bargaining agreement, allow an employer to pay its drivers based in
another area less than the standard wage rate that the local unionized
drivers would receive. In this case, under a competitive agreement, the
Respondent could pay its drivers from Dallas/Forth Worth less than the
standard rate that the members of Local 89 would receive in Bowling
Green, Kentucky, for hauling vehicles from the General Motors plant.
In order to utilize the competitive agreement clause for this purpose, the
employer would have to receive permission from the local union in the
area. Further, if the competitive agreement was not used within a cer-
tain time, it became void or “defunct.”
4 See also Daimler Chrysler Corp., 331 NLRB 1324 (2000), enfd.
288 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (employer’s duty to bargain includes,
inter alia, providing information that a union needs for the processing
of grievance and the investigation of potential grievances).
340 NLRB No. 78
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 660
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”3
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 26, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 6, 1999.
“(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.”

Michael W. Jeannette, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Loyd E. Owen Jr., Esq. (Lathrop & Gage, P.C.), of Kansas
City, Missouri, for the Respondent.
James F. Wallington, Esq. (Baptiste & Wilder, P.C.), of Wash-
ington, D.C., for the Charging Party.
BENCH DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KELTNER W. LOCKE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
this case on April 8, 2002, in Nashville, Tennessee. After the
parties rested, I heard oral argument, and on April 10, 2002,
issued a bench decision pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(1) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, setting forth findings of fact
and conclusions of law. In accordance with Section 102.45 of
the Rules and Regulations, I certify the accuracy of, and attach
as “Appendix A,” the portion of the transcript containing this
decision.1 The conclusions of law, remedy, Order, and notice
are set forth below.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act, including posting the notice to em-
ployees attached as “Appendix B.”
Respondent must provide the Charging Party with the infor-
mation sought in its August 6, 1999 request. Contrary to Re-
spondent’s argument at hearing, I conclude that such a remedy
is not unduly burdensome.

1 The bench decision appears in uncorrected form at pages 208
through 226 of the transcript [omitted from publication]. The final
version, after correction of oral and transcriptional errors, is attached as
Appendix A to this Certification.
Respondent asserts that it should be required to provide in-
formation only to the local unions which play a direct role in
representing its employees, but that it has no duty to provide
information to the numerous other local unions which, together
with their bargaining committee, comprise the exclusive bar-
gaining representative. Respondent argues that ordering it to
provide information whenever requested by any of these many
local unions could greatly increase its staff’s work.
This argument ignores a fundamental element which must be
present to establish that an employer has a duty to provide in-
formation: The information sought must be relevant to the
union’s function as collective-bargaining representative, and
must be necessary to the performance of this function. In
many, perhaps most cases, information in the Respondent’s
possession will not be relevant to the functions of one of the
“distant” local unions which are not directly involved with
Respondent’s employees.
In the present case, however, the information sought con-
cerned an arrangement, ostensibly sanctioned by the collective-
bargaining agreement, which had a direct impact on the em-
ployees customarily represented by the Charging Party. Under
this arrangement, when Respondent’s employees were perform-
ing certain work in Local 89’s geographical area, these work-
ers, based in another State, would receive lower wages than
local employers had to pay employees represented by Local 89.
Because this “competitive” arrangement—a dispensation
from the strictures of the collective-bargaining agreement—
could hurt the employees represented by Local 89, that local
union had a significant interest in making sure that the dispensa-
tion was legitimate. Local 89 had an immediate need to find
out, for example, whether the “competitive” arrangement really
complied with all terms of the collective-bargaining agreement,
and whether the arrangement remained current or had expired.
Local 89’s interest in assuring compliance with the collective-
bargaining agreement—and with the procedures established
pursuant to that agreement—was fully consistent with the inter-
ests of the Union as a whole. The Union, and all of its constitu-
ent local unions, shared an interest in making sure that employ-
ers followed the terms of the agreement. Implicitly, it acted
with the authority of the Union when it requested that Respon-
dent provide the information described in its August 6, 1999
letter. The information it sought clearly was relevant to deter-
mine whether the collective-bargaining agreement was being
followed or ignored, and was necessary for this purpose.
The bargaining relationship in this case is unusual: Numer-
ous local unions and their negotiating committee constitute a
single “labor organization” which is the exclusive bargaining
representative. This relationship may appear cumbersome to the
Respondent, but Respondent agreed to it. By signing the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, Respondent recognized the union
defined in that contract, and in doing so, Respondent assumed
certain legal obligations. The remedy ordered below simply
requires Respondent to fulfill its obligations to the union it rec-
ognized.
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO. 661
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Jack Cooper Transport Co., Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, General Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers, Local Union 89, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Local unions covered by the National Master Automobile
Transporters Agreement, together with the Teamsters National
Automobile Transporters Industry Negotiating Committee,
constitute a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
4. The following unit constitutes an appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act: “All employees covered by the National Master Automo-
bile Transporters Agreement.”
5. Since May 22, 1995, the labor organization described in
paragraph 3, above, has been and is the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act, of the unit described in paragraph 4, above.
6. On August 6, 1999, the Charging Party, as a constituent
part of the labor organization described in paragraph 3, above,
requested that the Respondent provide certain information rele-
vant to, and necessary for the Union to perform its functions as
collective-bargaining representative.
7. Since August 6, 1999, Respondent has failed and refused
to provide the information described above in paragraph 6.
8. By the actions described above in paragraph 7, Respon-
dent failed and refused to bargaining in good faith with the
exclusive representative of certain of its employees, and
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
On the findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the en-
tire record in this case, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Jack Cooper Transport Co., Inc., Kansas
City, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to provide the Union with requested informa-
tion relevant to the Union’s proper performance of its collec-
tive-bargaining duties as the exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, these findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board, and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(a) Furnish to the Union in a timely fashion the information
requested by the Union which Respondent has unlawfully re-
fused to provide as determined in this decision.
(b) Post at its office and place of business in Kansas City,
Missouri, and at all other places where notices customarily are
posted, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”3
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 26, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees customarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken
to comply.
APPENDIX A
This is a bench decision in the case of Jack Cooper Transport
Co., Inc., which I will call the “Respondent,” and General
Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 89, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which, I will
call the “Charging Party.” The case number is 26–CA–19350.
The General Counsel has alleged that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
provide information, requested by the Union, which was rele-
vant and necessary for the Union to perform its bargaining
obligations. I find that Respondent violated the Act as alleged.
Procedural History
This case began on September 13, 1999, when the Charging
Party filed its initial charge in this proceeding. The Charging
Party amended this charge on October 30, 2000.
After investigation of the charge, the Regional Director of
Region 26 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a Com-
plaint and Notice of Hearing. In issuing this complaint, the
Regional Director acted on behalf of the General Counsel of the
Board, whom I will refer to as the “General Counsel” or as the
“government.” On August 2, 2001, the Regional Director issued
an Amended Complaint and Notice of Hearing, which I will call
the “Complaint.” Respondent filed a timely Answer.
On April 8, 2002, a hearing on the Complaint opened before
me in Nashville, Tennessee. The parties presented evidence and
oral argument. Additionally, counsel for the General Counsel
and for Respondent filed legal memoranda, which I have con-
sidered.
Today, April 10, 2002, I am issuing this bench decision pur-
suant to Section 102.35(a)(10) and Section 102.45 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 662
Admitted Allegations
In its Answer, Respondent admitted certain allegations raised
by the Complaint. Based on these admissions, I find that the
government has proven the allegations set forth in Complaint
paragraphs 1(a), 1(b), 3(a), 3(b), 4, 5(a), 5(b), and 6. Addition-
ally, I find that the General Counsel has proven the material
allegations set forth in Complaint paragraph 2.
More specifically, I find that the General Counsel has estab-
lished that the Charging Party filed the charge and amended
charge as alleged. Further, I find that Respondent is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act and that its president, Rudy Cleve-
land and its vice president of labor relations, Joe L. Citarello,
are its supervisors and agents within the meaning of Sections
2(11) and 2(13) of the Act.
Complaint paragraph 5(a) alleges that the Charging Party is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act. Respondent has admitted this allegation and I so find.
Complaint paragraph 5(b) alleges that all local unions party
to the agreement described in Complaint paragraph 7(a) are “a
labor organization” within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act. The use of the singular, “a labor organization,” rather than
the plural “labor organizations,” conveys the sense that to-
gether, the various local unions constitutes a single body meet-
ing the statutory definition. Based on the admission in Respon-
dent’s Answer, and the record as a whole, I find this to be the
case.
Section 2(5) of the Act defines the term “labor organization”
to mean “any organization of any kind, or any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.” Collectively, as well as individually, the local unions
described in Complaint paragraph 5(b) meet that definition.
Undisputed Facts
At hearing, the parties entered into a number of stipulations
and most of the relevant facts are undisputed. A number of
employers, including Respondent, transport new cars from
automobile assembly plants to car dealers. Some of these em-
ployers have formed a committee to negotiate collective-
bargaining agreements with a committee representing various
locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
The employers’ committee is called the “National Automo-
bile Transporters Labor Division Negotiating Committee.” For
simplicity, I will refer to it simply as the “employers’ commit-
tee.”
The committee which represents the local unions is called
the “Teamsters National Automobile Transporters Industry
Negotiating Committee.” I will call it simply the “local unions’
committee.” It should be noted that this committee represents
only local unions. Although these local unions are all affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, the International Un-
ion itself is not a party to the negotiations.
The employers’ committee and the local unions’ committee
have negotiated a number of collective-bargaining agreements
binding on the employers and the local unions. The current
agreement took effect June 1, 1999 and will continue in effect
through May 31, 2003. Respondent entered into this collective-
bargaining agreement and also was a signatory to its predeces-
sor.
These contracts establish that Respondent delegated its bar-
gaining rights to the employers’ committee, which in turn
reached agreement with the local unions’ committee. However,
the contracts do not reveal how the Respondent’s bargaining
obligation originated. Neither does any other evidence in the
record. We do not know when Respondent’s employees se-
lected a union. Also, we do not know which local union these
employees chose to represent them.
The record does indicate that in resolving its employees’
grievances, Respondent now deals with Teamsters Local 745.
Previously, it dealt with Teamsters Local 47, which became
Local 745 after it merged with another local union. The record
further reveals that the Charging Party, Teamsters Local 89,
does not get involved in representing Respondent’s employees
at grievance meetings.
The Charging Party’s president, Frederick Zuckerman, testi-
fied that his local does not notify the Respondent when there is
a change of local union officers, because no members of his
local work for Respondent. Zuckerman also testified that he
could not remember any time his Local 89 received dues
checkoff money from any of Respondent’s employees. Based
on Zuckerman’s testimony and the record as a whole, I find that
Local 89 plays no part in representing Respondent’s employees
in grievance proceedings, a function performed by Teamsters
Local 745.
Further, I conclude that Respondent’s relationship with the
Charging Party arises solely because at some point, Respondent
chose to delegate its bargaining authority to the multiemployer
group represented by the employers’ committee. In one sense,
Respondent’s relationship with the employers’ committee is
analogous to the Charging Party’s relationship to the local un-
ions’ committee. Just as Respondent is one of the constituents
represented by the employers’ committee, the Charging Party is
one of the constituents represented by the local unions’ com-
mittee.
The two committees have agreed upon a rather intricate
grievance resolution process, which is described at length in the
collective-bargaining agreement. Under this contractual proce-
dure, representatives of various employers and representatives
of various local unions form committees to hear and resolve
grievances.
To avoid the possibility of bias, a particular employer repre-
sentative will not sit on a committee hearing a grievance in-
volving that employer. Similarly, a particular local union rep-
resentative will not sit on a committee hearing a grievance in-
volving that local union.
On August 4, 1999, the Respondent’s president, Rudy Cleve-
land, and the man who would become the Charging Party’s
president, Frederick Zuckerman, were sitting on one of these
grievance committees. Zuckerman then held the position of
assistant to the local union president.
According to Zuckerman, during this meeting Respondent’s
president made a statement which led Zuckerman to believe
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO. 663
that Respondent was violating the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. This statement concerned a practice described in Article
22 of the contract, “Competitive Agreements.”
Under this article, an employer may receive permission from
the local union to pay its drivers less than the standard contrac-
tual wage rate. The local union would grant such permission so
that the employer could remain “competitive” with nonunion
trucking companies. Employers sought such dispensations
when they wanted to take over transporting assignments (“traf-
fic”) previously performed by the nonunion companies.
Zuckerman testified that at this August 4, 1999 grievance
meeting, Respondent’s president told him that Respondent had
a competitive agreement allowing it to transport cars from a
plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Such information clearly
would concern Zuckerman, whose local union represents em-
ployees in parts of Kentucky. It signified that Respondent’s
employees, represented by the local union in Fort Worth,
Texas, were coming into Kentucky—the “turf” of Local 89—
and performing work at wages lower than the rates usually paid
to employees represented by Local 89.
On August 6, 1999, Zuckerman sent Respondent a letter
which included both a grievance and a request for information.
The letter referred to Respondent as “JCT” (Jack Cooper
Transport) andto the collective-bargaining agreement as
“NMATA” (National Master Automobile Transporters Agree-
ment). It stated, in part, as follows:

Please consider this as a formal written grievance pro-
testing JCT’s violating Article 22 and 33 Sec. 5 and any
other applicable Articles. Local 89 demands that JCT
cease and desist immediately or be held liable for these
violations. . .
Also be advised that Local 89 will pursue jurisdic-
tional claims and this notification is consistent with Article
20 of the NMATA.

As already noted, Article 22 of the contract includes the provi-
sions related to granting “competitive agreements” allowing an
employer to pay lower wage rates under certain circumstances.
Article 33, Section 5 obligates an employer to negotiate with a
local union when the employer does work within the local un-
ion’s territory.
Article 20 of the contract addresses the problem of “jurisdic-
tional disputes” arising between different local unions. This
provision excludes such jurisdictional disputes from the arbitra-
tion provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. It also
prohibits the parties from submitting a jurisdictional dispute to
any “legal or administrative agency” for determination. In-
stead, it reserves the resolution of jurisdictional disputes to
internal union processes.
Clearly, Article 20 limits the role of an employer in resolving
a jurisdiction dispute. An employer may seek a Board or court
order prohibiting a work stoppage or picketing, but otherwise,
Article 20 relegates an employer to the role of bystander. In-
deed, the language of Article 20 suggests that the unions do not
have even an obligation to notify the employer of a jurisdic-
tional dispute unless the dispute could create pension fund
withdrawal liability for the employer. Thus, Article 20, Section
(b) states, in part:

The Employer will be notified by the Local Union of
the existence of any such jurisdictional dispute which may
create Pension Fund withdrawal liabilities for the Em-
ployer. In those cases, the Employer shall be permitted to
provide relevant information on that potential liability. . . .

In his August 6, 1999 letter to Respondent, Zuckerman also
requested the following information and documents:

1. Copies of any and all competitive agreements JCT
has entered into with any Terminal that affects movement
of traffic from Bowling Green, Kentucky.
2. Copies of any contracts with General Motors and
JCT for the movement of traffic from the Bowling Green,
Ky. facility.
3. Copies of dispatch sheets, waybills, bills of lading,
trip sheets, and driver pay records for all trips pulled from
Bowling Green, Ky. by JCT drivers.
4. Dates JCT was awarded traffic from Bowling
Green, KY.

Zuckerman sent this request to Respondent on letterhead of
the “General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union
No. 89.” Below Zuckerman’s signature appears the title, “Fred
Zuckerman, Assistant to the President, TEAMSTERS LOCAL
UNION # 89.” This identification is significant because Zuck-
erman also is an official of the International Union. However,
nothing in the letter indicates that Zuckerman was filing the
grievance or making the information request on behalf of either
the International Union or the local unions’ committee which
negotiates with the employers’ committee. The letter identified
Zuckerman solely as an official of the Charging Party.
The record suggests that the letter surprised Respondent’s
management. Local 89 did not play any role in representing
Respondent’s employees in the grievance process and none of
Respondent’s employees belonged to Local 89. Therefore,
Respondent doubted that Local 89 had standing to bring a
grievance on behalf of any of its employees.
Additionally, Respondent had applied for and received
“competitive relief” allowing it to pay drivers lower wage rates
for certain runs between Texas and Bowling Green, Kentucky.
Therefore, management regarded Zuckerman’s August 6, 1999
grievance as specious. In an August 27, 1999 reply to Zucker-
man’s letter, Respondent’s vice president of labor relations
stated, in part, as follows:

Attached is a copy of the decision of the Central–Southern
Joint Arbitration Committee from the May 1986 meeting, in
Case 650, which approved the competitive [agreement] be-
tween Arlington [Texas] and Bowling Green [Kentucky]. I
am unable to find a copy of the Competitive Agreement, but
when I do, I will send it to you. Given the fact that we are op-
erating in accordance with an approved competitive, we do
not feel that we have any obligation under the contract to pro-
vide you with the information outlined in Paragraphs 2,3 and
4 of your letter. Information concerning Allied’s participa-
tion, whose employees you represent, should be requested
from Allied.

In this letter, “Allied” referred to another company which
transported automobiles from the same factory. The phrase
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 664
“whose employees you represent” indicates that Respondent
regarded Local 89 as the bargaining representative of Allied’s
unit employees, but regarded other local unions as the represen-
tatives of its own employees.
After receiving the August 27, 1999 reply, Zuckerman noti-
fied the Respondent that Local 89 intended to file a charge
against Respondent with the Board. It did so on September 13,
1999.
Disputed Allegations
The Complaint alleges that Respondent breached its duty to
bargain in good faith by failing to provide the information
sought in Zuckerman’s August 6, 1999 letter. To establish such
a violation, the General Counsel must plead and prove a num-
ber of different elements. Respondent has denied these allega-
tions.
Complaint paragraph 7(a) alleges that at all material times,
Respondent was bound by the 1999–2003 National Master
Automobile Transporters Agreement (“NMATA”). Respon-
dent denies this allegation. However, it is undisputed that Re-
spondent was signatory to this agreement. Therefore, to the
extent that this agreement is consistent with the labor law, I
conclude that Respondent was bound by it.
Complaint paragraph 7(b) alleges that the employees covered
by the NMATA constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act. Respondent denies this allegation. I will consider it later
in this decision, in connection with other allegations concerning
the bargaining relationship.
Complaint paragraph 8 alleges that “Since about May 22,
1995, and at all material times, Local unions covered by
NMATA, including Local 89, hereinafter collectively referred
to as the Union, have been the designated exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the Unit and since then the Union
has been recognized as the representative by Respondent. This
recognition has been embodied in successive collective-
bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is effective
from June 1, 1999 to March 31, 2003.” Respondent denies this
allegation.
Respondent contends that its bargaining obligation extends
to the local unions, such as Local 745, which directly represent
its employees. Such local unions have delegated their bargain-
ing authority to the local unions’ committee, as have other local
unions not involved with Respondent’s employees. Respon-
dent concedes that it also has an obligation to bargain with this
committee, to which the local unions have delegated their au-
thority. However, Respondent argues, other unions do not
become the representative of Respondent’s employees merely
because they, too, have delegated their authority to the same
committee. In its prehearing brief, Respondent stated, in part

The independent local unions represent the majority of
employees in an appropriate unit. 29 U.S.C. Section
159(a). As such they are the sole and exclusive representa-
tive of those employees. Id. Participating in multiem-
ployer/multiunion negotiation does not alter that relation-
ship. The independent local unions have only delegated to
their representative the power to negotiate the terms of the
contract. Davey v. Fitzsimmons, 413 F.Supp 670 (DDC
1976); Rice Lake Creamery Co., 131 NLRB 1270 (1961).
These independent locals continue to be independent labor
organizations and represent their members in all facets of
their employment. Nothing in the agreement or authoriza-
tions given to TNATINC [the local unions’ committee]
grants it the right to delegate to other independent local
unions the right to negotiate or represent other independ-
ent local unions. Additionally, it would be an unfair labor
practice for Jack Cooper to recognize Local 89 as the rep-
resentative of its employees when the employees already
have a sole and exclusive labor organization to represent
them. See NLRB v. Autodie International, Inc. 169 F.3d
378 (6th Cir. 1999); Citywide Service Corp., 317 NLRB
861 (1995). [Emphasis in original.]

The best evidence concerning the union which Respondent
recognized comes from the collective-bargaining agreement
which Respondent signed. A recognition clause appears in
Article 3, Section 1 of this contract, and states as follows:

The Employer recognizes and acknowledges that the
Teamsters National Automobile Transporters Industry Ne-
gotiating Committee and the Local Unions affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters are the exclu-
sive representatives of all employees in the classifications
of work covered by this National Master Agreement, and
Supplements thereto for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing as provided by the National Labor Relations Act.

This recognition clause differs somewhat from the descrip-
tion in Complaint paragraph 8, which identified the exclusive
bargaining representative as “Local unions covered by
NMATA, including Local 89,” but made no mention of the
local unions’ committee. In accordance with the language in
the collective-bargaining agreement, I find that Respondent
recognized, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees, the Teamsters National Automobile Transporters
Industry Negotiating Committee and the Local unions.
Returning to the issue raised in Complaint paragraph 7(b), I
must determine whether this unit is an appropriate one within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. A bargaining unit
established on a multiemployer basis is consensual, created by
the agreement of the parties. It requires the unequivocal mani-
festation by each member of the group that all be bound in
collective bargaining by the group, rather than as individuals.
See, e.g., Kroger Co., 148 NLRB 569 (1964).
By entering into the collective-bargaining agreement, Re-
spondent agreed to the unit described in Article 3, Section 1 of
that agreement. It now seeks to challenge, belatedly, the unit to
which it previously gave consent.
Respondent has advanced an interpretation of the unit de-
scription which is inconsistent with the words in that descrip-
tion. Respondent contends in its brief that “Nothing in the
agreement or authorizations given to TNATINC [the local un-
ions’ committee] grants it the right to delegate to other inde-
pendent local unions the right to negotiate or represent other
independent local unions.”
The problem with this argument resides in the word “inde-
pendent.” The contractual recognition clause makes clear that
the local unions are not independent. Rather, they are grouped
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO. 665
together, along with the local unions’ committee, to constitute
one bargaining representative.
The agreement reserves to the local unions the power to ne-
gotiate with individual employers concerning local matters.
Article 2, Section 5 of the Agreement defines “local matters” to
be those peculiar to the operations of an employer and not of
general application to the industry. A local union and an em-
ployer can negotiate a rider to the national agreement to cover
such local matters.
The fact that local unions can bargain regarding local matters
does not detract from the fact that all of the unions together,
along with the bargaining committee, comprise the exclusive
bargaining representative. Although the collective-bargaining
agreement creates a kind of federal system, it leaves no doubt
about the supremacy of the entity as a whole. For example,
Article 2, Section 4 of the agreement defines the bargaining
unit as follows:

The employees, Unions, Employers and Association, covered
by this National Master Agreement and the various Supple-
ments thereto, shall constitute one (1) bargaining unit. It is
understood that the printing of this National Master Agree-
ment and the aforesaid Supplements in separate Agreements
is for convenience only and is not intended to create separate
bargaining units and contracts.

Respondent criticizes this language, arguing that only em-
ployees, and not employers, can be in bargaining units. How-
ever, I do not interpret this language to be an attempt to de-
scribe a bargaining unit as the Labor Board uses that term in
administering Section 9 of the Act. Rather, the language
clearly is intended to refute any argument, such as the one ad-
vanced by Respondent here, that each local union is the repre-
sentative of a bargaining unit consisting of the employees of a
particular employer.
Moreover, to the extent that it is necessary to construe this
language, clearly the Board may interpret it in a manner which
give it meaning, rather than in a way which renders it meaning-
less. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975); Raley’s,
336 NLRB No. 30 [374] (September 28, 2001).
In these circumstances, I conclude that the Respondent is
bound to recognize the unit to which it agreed when it entered
into the collective-bargaining agreement. By the terms of that
contract, Local 89 was just as much a part of the exclusive bar-
gaining representative as any other part, and had the right to
request information from the Respondent. Likewise, Respon-
dent had the duty to provide that information if it was relevant
and necessary to the Union in administering the contract.
In deciding whether the information was relevant and neces-
sary, I look to how Local 89 could use this information. It is
true that under Article 20, Local 89 could not submit its juris-
dictional dispute with Local 745 to arbitration. However, the
contract did not prohibit Local 89 from using this information
at other steps of the grievance procedure, and likewise did not
preclude Local 89 from using it in negotiations.
Moreover, I note that when the Respondent sought and ob-
tained “competitive agreement” authority allowing it to pay
lower wages to its employees on this particular run, Local 89
was part of that process. The application for such authority
identified it specifically as an interested party.
In these circumstances I conclude that the information re-
quested was relevant and necessary to Local 89 in performing
its functions as a bargaining representative, and that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to
provide it.
When the transcript of this proceeding has been prepared, I
will issue a Certification which attaches as an appendix the
portion of the transcript reporting this bench decision. This
Certification also will include provisions relating to the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Remedy, Order and Notice.
When that Certification is served upon the parties, the time
period for filing an appeal will begin to run.
During the hearing, counsel impressed me greatly with both
their skill as advocates and with their great civility. I truly
appreciate the professionalism which all counsel demonstrated
throughout this proceeding.
The hearing is closed.
Hearing Closed: April 10, 2002 at 2:29 pm
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of these rights, guaranteed to them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the union representing our
employees under the National Master Automobile Transporters
Agreement with relevant information requested by the union
which is necessary for the union to perform its function as ex-
clusive bargaining representative.
WE WILL provide to General Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers, Local Union 89, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, the information it requested on May 6,
1999.
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO., INC.