J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJan 21, 1977227 N.L.R.B. 1347 (N.L.R.B. 1977) Copy Citation J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc . and Professional Divers Local 1012 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-6084 January 21, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On October 15, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Platonia P. Kirkwood issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, J. Ray McDer- mott & Co., Inc., New Orleans, Louisiana, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. MEMBER WALTHER, dissenting: For the reasons previously expressed in my dissent- ing opinion in the underlying representation proceed- ing, Ocean Systems, Inc., 223 NLRB 857 (1976), I dissent from my colleagues' finding of a violation herein. I Underlying representation proceedings in Case 15-RC-5361 and 15- AC-28 (223 NLRB 857 (1976) were duly noted as an administrative and official matter during the hearing, as were the Board's findings, rulings, and Order in those proceedings. Official notice was (and is) also taken of the record in those proceedings as the term "record" is defined in Sec 102.68 and Sec 102 69(g) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. See LTV Electrosystems, Inc, 166 NLRB 938 (1968), enfd 388 F.2d 683 (C.A 4, 1968), Golden Age Beverage Company, 167 NLRB 151 (1967), enfd 415 F 2d 26 (C.A 5, 1969), Intertype Company v Penello, 269 F 2d 573 (D C Va, 1967); KFC National Management Company, 204 NLRB 630 (1973); and Sec 9(d) of the NLRA. 2 Respondent disputed the status of the Union as a labor organization partially on grounds considered and rejected by the Board in the underlying 227 NLRB No. 204 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1347 PLATONIA P. KIRKWOOD, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard at New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 20, 1976, pursuant to a charge filed on April 29, 1976, by Professional Divers Local 1012 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (herein the Union) against the J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. (herein the Respondent) and a complaint which issued on June 3, 1976. The case presents the following questions: Did the Respondent violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees composing the unit described below? Upon the entire record in the case,' including the postheanng briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Louisiana, with its principal offices located in New Orleans, Louisiana. It is engaged in the general contracting, marine contracting, oil field construction, and fabricating business. During the past 12 months, a represen- tative period, Respondent purchased and received goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Louisiana. During the same 12-month period of time, Respondent shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside Louisiana. Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that its interstate commerce operations meet the Board's discretionary jurisdictional standards. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED A prior determination by the Board in the underlying proceedings in Case 15-AC-28, 223 NLRB 857, and the credible evidence additionally adduced in this proceeding, establishes, and I find, that the Union is, and has at all times here relevant been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.2 amendment to certification proceeding. See 223 NLRB 857 As the Board's determinations and decisions are, of course, binding upon me, I would not countenance Respondent's efforts to attack the validity of the Board's rulings and decisions in the underlying proceedings in any way. Nor would I permit it or any other party to litigate at this hearing any matters which were or could have been litigated in the said prior representation proceeding. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. N.LR B, 313 U S 146, 162 (1941), Rules and Regulations of the Board, Sec. 102.67(f) and 102.69(c) In light of the Respondent's demal of the current status of the Union as a labor organization, however, I did permit Respondent the opportunity to ask the vice president of the Union a limited number of questions concerning the Union's activities as an employee representative at dates subsequent to the Board's decision in 223 NLRB 857 1348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background and Chronology of Relevant Events On April 18 , 1974, the Regional Director for Region 15 of the National Labor Relations Board , issued a Decision and Direction of Election in Case 15-RC-5316 which involved the Company herein and the International Association, of Professional Divers , a/w District 2, MEBA , AFL-CIO (herein IAPD). The unit found appropriate by the Regional Director consisted of divers , tenders, and rack operators employed by the Company in its diving division excluding all other employees , freelance divers and tenders, shop employees , dispatchers , office clerical employees, shop clerical employees , and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act . The election was conducted by mail ballot and a majority of those voting cast ballots for IAPD.3 The Board , however , set that election aside because of partially meritorious objections the Company had filed and ordered that a second election be conducted among the employees in the unit found appropriate by the Regional Director . 215 NLRB 570 (1974). The second election was also held by mail ballot. The tally of ballots was served on the parties on February 27, 1975. It disclosed that of approximately 86 eligible voters, 39 cast ballots for, and 36 against , IAPD; and 6 cast challenged ballots . The Company filed objections to that election also. On April 18, 1975 , the Regional Director issued a Second Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative in which he overruled the Company 's objections , sustained four of the six challenges , found it unnecessary to resolve the two remaining challenges as they were no longer determinative , and issued a certification to IAPD. The Company then filed a request for review with the Board, and on June 30, 1975, the Board , by telegraphic order denied that request for review.4 On July 3 , 1975, Paul Woodhall , president of the certified union , wrote Robert J. McGuire , the Company 's division manager , to request information so as to prepare for negotiations and to suggest a meeting date for bargaining. By letter dated July 9, 1975, McGuire responded that the Union 's requests were being considered . One day later, by letter of July 10, 1975, McGuire informed Woodhall that the Company did not believe that the Board 's certification was valid and that the Company was consequently declin- ing to bargain or to furnish information. On July 21, 1975, Woodhall again wrote McGuire and requested the identical information requested in the July 3 letter . Additionally , Woodhall requested the current ad- dresses of all divers, tenders, and rack operators then employed by the Company . By letter dated July 24, 1975, McGuire again refused to supply the information and repeated the challenge of the certification 's validity. On September 10, 1975, the Union filed a petition to amend the above certification , so as to designate it in place of IAPD as the certified representative. The Employer ' The tally showed that of approximately 78 eligible voters, 40 cast ballots for IAPD, 33 cast ballots against IAPD, and 3 cast challenged ballots a On April 22, 1975, before the request for review was filed, IAPD wrote the Company requesting certain information The Company replied by letter dated April 29, 1975, refusing the request stating that a request for review of opposed the petition. A hearing was then held, and on April 12, 1976, the Board granted the petition and ordered that the certification issued on April 28, 1975, supra, be amended by substituting the name of the Union for that of IAPD. 223 NLRB 857. On April 15, 1976, Woodhall wrote to McGuire again requesting a negotiation meeting and suggesting certain specific dates. On April 21, 1976, McQuire replied stating that he would not meet with the Union, and asserting further that the Company not only questioned the validity of the certification and the amendment thereto but also that it did not believe the Union currently represented a majority of the employees in "any unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining." B. The Contentions of the Parties and Their Merits The complaint's relevant provisions allege in part that "commencing on or about July 10, 1975, and continuing to date, and more particularly on or about April 21, 1976, Respondent refused and continues to refuse to recognize and or bargain with the Union on behalf of employees composing the unit for which the Union holds the certifi- cate of representative issued to it by the Board as above described." Respondent admits that, as alleged, it has refused to bargain with the Union in July 1975, and in April 1976, and continues to refuse to bargain with it. Respon- dent maintains that, nonetheless, the complaint improperly describes its conduct to be an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. It rests this claim on the following contentions, each of which I consider seriatim. 1. More than 6 months has expired since the alleged cause of action - i.e., the refusal to bargain - arose, and a complaint is therefore barred under the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Act. Respondent claims, in this respect, that its refusal to bargain with the Union in July 1975 was unequivocal in nature and that the charge - filed more than 3 months later - was therefore time-barred. I find no merit in the above contention. The undisputed facts establish that the Union made a bargaining demand on Respondent on April 18, 1976, which the Respondent admittedly refused to honor on April 21, 1976, and that the charge which initiated this proceeding was filed but 8 days later. Under well-established Board precedent, it is clear and I find that even though Respondent had rejected prior bargaining requests addressed to it, its new refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union provided the basis for an independent cause of action on which this complaint properly rests.5 See, for example, United States Gypsum Company, 143 NLRB 1122, 1126, fn. 6 (1963); Joseph T. Strong, d/b/a Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 152 NLRB 9 the Regional Director's Supplemental Decision and Certification would be filed 5 A motion to dismiss the complaint on 10(b) grounds was made in Respondent's answer to the complaint and was denied by me at the hearing. I hereby reaffirm my ruling on that motion J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO. 1349 (1965), enfd. 386 F.2d 929 (C.A. 9, 1967), affil. on other grounds 393 U.S. 357 (1969) .6 2. The certification of representative in Case 15-RC-5361 and the amendment of certification in Case 15-AC-28 were invalidly issued. It is outside my province to rule upon the issues sought to be raised by this contention of Respondent. I accept the Board's decision and its ruling in the underlying representa- tion and amendment to certification proceedings as correct and final.? 3. Respondent's final contention is that its refusal to bargain on April 21, 1976 - 3 days after the expiration of the 1 year period following the Board's certification of the Union's status as the majority representative - was predicated on a good faith doubt of the Union's continued enjoyment of majority support. Resolution of the issue raised by this contention of Respondent rests on well-settled principles of law. These principles were recently restated in Bartenders Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Association of Pocatel- lo, Idaho, and its Employer-Members, 213 NLRB 651(1974). Quoting from an earlier decision - Terrell Machine Company, 173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969), enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (C.A. 4, 1970), the Board said in relevant part: It is well settled that a certified union, upon expira- tion of the first year following its certification, enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its majority representative status continues. This presumption is designed to promote stability in collective-bargaining relationships, without impairing the free choice of employees. Accord- ingly, once the presumption is shown to be operative, a prima facie case is established that an employer is obligated to bargain and that its refusal to do so would be unlawful. The prima facie case may be rebutted if the employer affirmatively establishes either (1) that at the time of the refusal the union in fact no longer enjoyed majority representative status; or (2) that the employer's refusal was predicated on a good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's continued majority status. As to the second of these, i.e., "good faith doubt," two prerequisites for sustaining the defense are that the asserted doubt must be based on objective considerations and it must not have been advanced for the purpose of gaining time in which to undermine the 6 1 am cognizant of the existence of some court decisions expressing a view contrary to that taken by the Board in applying its concept of Sec 10(b) in cases involving successive refusal to bargain though not on facts precisely analogous to those in the case at hand N L R B v McCready and Sons, Inc, 482 F 2d 872 (C A 6, 1973), enforcement of 195 NLRB 28, cited by Respondent in its brief, is one such case Decisions by other circuits similarly holding are cited by the Sixth Circuit in its opinion in McCready Assuming those court decisions provide support for the Respondent's argument, it is clear that the Board 's decisions do not I am, of course, bound to follow the Board 's decisions and rulings until the same are reversed by the Supreme Court. See The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 119 NLRB 768 (1957), Ranco, Inc, 109 NLRB 998, 1009, fn 8 (1954), Lenz Company, 153 TT NLRB 1399 (1965) 7 Respondent may, of course , reiterate before the Board, its contentions concerning the correctness of the representation case determinations, and its position that evidence allegedly material to those determinations was not considered, inasmuch as the Board clearly has discretion both to reopen the case for the receipt of such evidence as Respondent wishes to proffer or, union. [This second point means, in effect, the assertion of doubt must be raised "in a context free of unfair labor practices." See Nu-Southern Dyeing & Finishing, Inc., 179 NLRB 573, fn. 1(1969), enfd. in part 444 F.2d 11(C.A.4, 1971.) ]8 To establish that its refusal to bargain with the Union on April 22, 1976, was predicated on a "good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt" of the Union's majority status on that date, Respondent relied on the testimony of Division Manager McGuire. According to McGuire, he arrived at a conclusion that the Union had not retained the support of a majority of the unit employees on the basis of a combination of the following objective facts: (a) the vote for union representation in the 1975 certification election exceeded the vote against representation by only a narrow margin (39 to 36); (b) only 52 of the 86 employees who were eligible to vote in the 1975 election still remained employed with the Company; (c) there were now 89 employees within the bargaining unit, an increase in the unit complement of 3 employees-and, of these 89, 37 were newly hired since the conduct of the 1975 election; and (d) each of 4 employees who resigned his job in February 1976 (each of whom was promptly replaced by a newly hired employee) had advised McGuire at the time of resignation that he had voted for the Union .9 Reviewing the above evidence, it is plain that all that Respondent has proved with respect to the existence of an objective basis for its asserted doubt of the Union's majority status on April 21, 1976, is that, in the slightly more than 1-year period following the Board's conduct of the certification election, there had been an increase in the size of the unit of less than one-half of 1 percent, and a turnover in unit personnel of approximately 52 percent. In accord with well-established Board law, I find neither of these factors to be sufficient to support a conclusion that Respondent had a reasonably grounded and valid objective basis for doubting that the Union did not continue to enjoy the majority support among the unit employees, and for refusing, accordingly, to bargain with Umon,10 as it did, on April21, 1976. In light of all the foregoing findings, I conclude that, by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union at all times here material was and now is the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit as above- described, and that the Respondent, by its refusal to without reopening , to decide that its original determinations were wrong But the Board's power and discretion to take such action does not permit me that latitude. I note, in this respect, that Respondent made no proffer of evidence newly discovered since the date of the Board's proceedings it here attacks 8 Other cases similarly holding are set out in the able brief filed by General Counsel Respondent's equally able brief recognizes the existence of these principles and their applicability as a means of testing the validity of the contention here being considered 9 McGuire also testified about his subjective belief that the Board erred in finding that a majority of the unit employees in 1975 had voted for union representation In so testifying, McGuire was not presenting any valid ground for the refusal to bargain but was reiterating a claim Respondent had unsuccessfully urged before the Board in the representation proceeding. 10 See and compare King Radio Corporation, 208 NLRB 578, 582, 583 (1974), Terrell Machine Company, 173 NLRB 1480, 1480-81 (1969), enfd 427 F 2d 1088 (C.A. 4, 1970), and the cases there cited 1350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD bargain with the Union on April 21, 1976, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent be required to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Furthermore, having found that Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative in the appropriate unit described above, I shall recommend that it be ordered to do so upon request and, if an agreement is reached, to embody that agreement in a signed contract. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER ii representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Regional 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 10246 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions , and Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " The Respondent, J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., New Orleans, Louisiana, its officers , agents , successors, and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing or refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or terms and conditions of employment with Professional Divers Local 1012 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All divers, tenders, and rack operators employed by the Respondent in its Diving Division; excluding all other employees, freelance divers and tenders, shop employ- ees, dispatchers, office clerical employees, shop clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in their exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action found neces- sary to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above- named labor organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant or facility at Harvey, Louisiana, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed by the Respondent's APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize and bargain collectively in good faith with Professional Divers Local 1012 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive repre- sentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit: All divers, tenders, and rack operators employed by the Respondent in its Diving Division; exclud- ing all other employees, freelance divers and tenders, shop employees, dispatchers, office cleri- cal employees, shop clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain collectively in good faith with the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agreement. J. RAY MCDERMOTT & Co., INC. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation