J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 31, 1967167 N.L.R.B. 258 (N.L.R.B. 1967) Copy Citation 258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc . and Industrial Union Department , AFL-CIO. Cases 11-CA-3101, 11-CA-3109, 11-CA-3114, and 11-CA-3121 August 31, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER On March 23, 1967, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en- gaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and de- sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci- sion. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci- sion, the exceptions, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations2 of the Trial Examiner, as modified. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom- mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., Rock Hill and Greenville, South Carolina, and Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac- tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom- mended Order, as herein modified.3 1. The Trial Examiner's Recommended Order is modified by adding the words "or Board agent," after the words "at departmental supervisor level or above" in paragraph 2(g); by adding the words "in the plants where unfair labor practices have oc- curred" after the words "all its employees" in para- graph 2(g); and by deleting the words "beginning with the issuance date of this Decision" in paragraph 2(e). (See fn. 2 of this Decision.) 2. The Trial Examiner's Recommended Order is also modified by substituting for paragraph 2(d) the following: "(d) Inform employees of their rights under the Act and assure them that Respondent will not en- gage in the conduct which it is ordered herein to cease and desist, and that Respondent will comply with the affirmative requirements of this order by mailing a copy of the attached notice marked 'Ap- pendix' to each employee, and posting copies at all of Respondent's plants located in the States of North Carolina and South Carolina, for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material." i [Certain inadvertent errors and omissions in the Trial Examiner's Decision have been corrected by the addition , in brackets , of the cor- rections immediately following the appropriate words or phrases ] With respect to the discharge of James Griggs , the Trial Examiner dis- credited the testimony of the cardroom supervisors that the blend of material coming from Griggs' machine was of the wrong weight. How- ever, the Trial Examiner also appears to have found that Griggs may have used the wrong gear on his machine , which, according to the record, would cause the material to be offweight . Assuming, arguendo, that Griggs did use the wrong gear, we find , in agreement with the Trial Ex- aminer , that this error was not the real reason for his discharge In discussing the discharge of Norman Sheann , the Trial Examiner stated that the "boy" who cut the tabletops "found" the 70 defective ones allegedly made by Sheann The record shows that the defective tops were discovered by an inspector, although the boy identified the tops as being made by Sheann The Trial Examiner also found that the written repri- mand received by Sheann more than 2 years before his discharge was the only one "ever given him " The record shows that Sheann received another personnel action report after a union leaflet with his name on it was distributed in March 1965 We correct these inadvertent errors, and agree with the Trial Examiner , particularly in light of the Respondent's failure to produce the "boy" and the inspector in order to prove that the defective tabletops were actually Shearin's , that Sheann was discharged for his union activity 2 The Trial Examiner , in "The Remedy" section of his Decision, recommended , inter alia, that the "Notice to Employees" be "read by responsible officials to all its employees during working hours " The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently enforced the Board's Order in J. P Stevens I [157 NLRB 869], with certain modifications Specifically , the court provided that the "Notice to Em- ployees" be read only in the plants where the unfair labor practices oc- curred and that the Respondents have the option of having the notice read by Board representatives or its own officials. The court also refused to en- force that part of the Board's Order giving the Union access to the Respondent 's bulletin boards See, J P. Stevens & Co v N L R B , 380 F 2d 292 (C A. 2) We have modified the Recommended Order in this proceeding to conform it to the court's decision insofar as it provides for reading of the notice by either a Board agent or company official In J P Stevens II [163 NLRB 217] we are asking the court of appeals to re- consider its refusal to require the Respondent to give the Union access to its bulletin boards Accordingly , we are adopting the Trial Examiner's recommendations for such access. 3 We agree with the Charging Party that, in accord with our recent deci- sion in Harry F Berggren & Sons, inc , 165 NLRB 353, the policies of the Act will best be effectuated if the notice which the Respondent is required to sign and post, and which informs the employees of their rights, how these rights were violated , and by what process these rights are being vindicated, is expressed in simple and readily understandable language as set forth in the attached Appendix In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be added to the words "This Notice is Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" the words "as Enforced by the United States Court of Appeals." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES THIS NOTICE IS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NA- TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give evidence , the National Labor Relations Board 167 NLRB No. 38 J. P. STEVENS & CO. found that we, J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this notice to inform our employees of their rights. The Act gives all employees these rights: To organize themselves To form, join, or help unions To bargain as a group through a representative they choose To act together for collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection To refuse to do any or all of these things The Board has also ordered us to assure our employees that: WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. You are free to join the Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, or any other union , and, by majority choice, to select any union to represent you in bar- gaining with us. WE WILL NOT fire you , or punish you or treat you differently in any way because you join or favor a union. The National Labor Relations Board found that when we fired certain employees we did this because these employees were for the Union. The Board found that this violated the Act. WE WILL give back to these employees their jobs and seniority, and WE WILL make up the pay they lost and also pay them 6 percent in- terest. The names of these employees are: James Griggs Ollie Vernadore Norman Shearin J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu- tive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101, Telephone 723-2911, Extension 392. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION 259 THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: This proceeding embraces three separate complaints, each resting upon a single charge, and all consolidated for purposes of hearing and decision. The sole allegations of wrongdoing are that the Respondent discharged one employee at each of the three plants involved, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.' A hearing was held at Greenville and Rock Hill, South Carolina, and Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, on January 10, 11, and 16, 1966, respectively. A brief was received after the close of the hearing from the General Counsel. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., is a multistate textile manu- facturing and distribution company; it operates at a number of locations in the States of North and South Carolina. In the course of its business the Respondent causes large quantities of raw materials and finished products to be shipped across State lines. From each of the three plants involved in this proceeding it annually ships directly into other States products valued in excess of $100,000. I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Industrial Union Department [Textile Workers Union of America] AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the statute. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The sole issues to be decided in this proceeding are whether or not James Griggs, Ollie Vernadore, and Nor- man Shearin, employees of the Respondent, were discharged because of their union activities, or to curb union activities generally throughout the Company. The defense contends each was dismissed for cause - incom- petence or errors in their work performance. The cases were consolidated because it is a single-company Respondent involved, because this is the fourth of a se- ries of consolidated unfair labor practice proceedings arising from a companywide organizational campaign spanning several years, and because much of the evidence said to prove illegal motivation in the discharge of these three particular employees is to be found, accord- ing to the General Counsel, in the decisions resulting from the three earlier cases. Indeed, the evidence offered in support of the three complaints here is virtually limited I The complaint in Cases I I -CA-3101 and 3121 , also names one Gene Clemons as having been illegally discharged, Clemons did not appear at the hearing and the General Counsel moved to dismiss the complaint as to him The motion was granted 310-5410-70-18 260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to the facts relating to the discharges as such . There is very little evidence of union activities by the three em- ployees directly involved , or direct proof of union animus as to them . In its answers to the complaints on which this hearing was held the Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor practices . There are presented three factual questions of so-called pretext: was the real motive underlying each of these discharges to curb union activi- ties, notwithstanding the apparent justification or cause? The conduct of the Respondent ' s management person- nel considered by the Board in the first proceeding - Case 11-CA-2180 , et al.-covered the period early 1963 through mid- 1964 . There the Board found that in its vari- ous plants situated in and around the three towns where these plants are located , the Respondent unlawfully discharged , or otherwise discriminated against, 73 em- ployees in the course of a determined companywide cam- paign to deprive the employees of their statutory self-or- ganizational rights and avoid collective bargaining with any labor organization .2 In the second proceeding - Case 11-CA-2435, et al.-the Board considered evidence of continued company activities of the same kind for the period 1964 to 1965, and again found similar unfair labor practices to have continued uninterruptively, with 20 em- ployees discharged or otherwise punished in their em- ployment in violation of the Act.3 The third proceeding - Case 11-CA-2697 , et al.-has yet to be considered by the Board , but, on the basis of extensive testimony received , Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom found that in the period April 19, 1965, through April 1966, the Company persisted in the same unlawful antiunion program and committed violations of Section 8(a)(3) - discharges and other discriminations in employment - with respect to 16 additional employees. James Griggs was discharged at the Dunean plant in Greenville on August 26, 1966, Ollie Vernadore at plant 3 in Rock Hill on August 24, 1966 , and Norman Shearin from the Rosemary Delta plant in Roanoke Rapids on August 15. All three were known to the Company as out- spoken adherents and protagonists of the Union ; all three were discharged assertedly for errors in work ; all three had worked for extended periods before and never been so treated for like errors in the past . In fact , one of them, James Griggs , as proved in a prior record of testimony, had been illegally discriminated against in retaliation for his union activities (Case 11-CA-2697). A very substan- tial number of the unlawful discharges already found presented like questions of alleged mistakes in work used as pretexts to cover illegal motivation . The theory of il- legality as to the three persons to be considered here is es- sentially that they represent no more than a continuation of the pattern so clearly revealed and found over several years. B. The Discharges 1. James Griggs Griggs worked for 12 years at the Dunean plant in Greenville , South Carolina. Formerly a frame tender in the cardroom , he was last a fixer and a section man for 3 years in the same room . His job was to maintain and to fix certain drawings and roving frames ; material called laps reached his room and, after passing over and through cer- tain cards , became "sliver ," and passed into the sub- sequent spinning room . Among Griggs ' duties was adjust- ment of frames so that the various blends required on specified orders emerged of the proper weight in "grains," or "grams," when tested . He was assisted by two frame tenders, two drawing tenders, and a hauler. On August 26, seven different blends went through the 20-odd machines in his room- on the second shift from 4 p.m to 12 midnight . One was called blend 46-47. Griggs explained that the system is for the fixer to draw a sample of the sliver as it goes through , weigh it in the room , and place that sample in a sample can for laborato- ry retesting the following morning, after the first shift has arrived for work at 8 a.m . He said he did this that evening on blend 46-47, found the weight correct , and placed the sample, with its identifying ticket attached , in the sample can. When he came to work the next day at 4 p.m., he was called to the office of George Stoudemeire , the general overseer ; present also were Norris, Griggs' immediate supervisor in the cardroom , and Clarence Stamps, the cardroom overseer . Stoudemeire told Griggs he was being discharged , because on testing in the laboratory that morning blend 46-47 on which Griggs had worked the day before turned out to be too heavy, or, as Stou- demeire testified at the hearing, from 4 to 5 grains over weight. It seems that a normal variance of plus or minus 2 grains is acceptable tolerance at all times . Stoudemeire told Griggs that on one of the three machines through which this blend had passed Griggs had placed the wrong gear. Adjustment of these frames to fit each blend as it comes through does require selection and application of the appropriate gear. Griggs told Stoudemeire , and re- peated at the hearing, that he had used the correct gear on each of the three machines through which that blend had passed that day. Griggs also protested to the supervisors in the office that he had weighed a sample of the blend and found it correct ; he asked Stoudemeire to show him the sample which Griggs had weighed . The answer was "I don't know whether the lab sample is there or not." Griggs then asked to be shown the laboratory test, and again the general manager answered he "didn't know where the lab check was at." The practice long has been that written reports of laboratory tests are returned to the cardroom and at- tached to a clip board that hangs over the desk there. After the discharge , Griggs returned to the cardroom to telephone his son to come for him ; he looked over the desk for the laboratory report but there was none, and the clip board itself was also nowhere in sight. To prove, at the hearing, that Griggs had committed the error charged to him in August , the Respondent called David Sims, the fixer on the third shift , who followed Griggs in the cardroom ; he said he found the wrong gear on a machine and telephoned Stamps, the overseer, at home. Stamps testified he did receive such a call and that in the night he told Sims simply to shut down the machine and let matters wait until morning. All that Stamps could say as to why he did not show the laboratory test to Griggs when the fixer insisted his own test had weighed out correctly , was that "the lab couldn ' t find it," and that as to the sample Griggs had himself weighed , he, Stamps 2 157 NLRB 869 1 163 NLRB 217 J. P. STEVENS & CO. 261 "couldn't find it." At the hearing Stoudemeire said he "supposed" there was such a report, and nothing more. I cannot believe that the supervisors of the cardroom and Stoudemeire really found the blend material that had come through one of Griggs' machines to be of the wrong weight. The established method, and apparently the only way in which such fine measurements can be ascertained, is the cardroom weighing test, in "grains," reaffirmed by the laboratory test in the morning. Records of both these tests are always kept; for both to have disappeared simul- taneously in this instance, when the discharge was to be predicated precisely upon the error reflected in these very records, is too implausible a story to be explained away merely with the phrase "the lab could not find it." But in addition to the unexplained departure from normal procedures - even the clip board had disappeared - there is a more fundamental matter shown on the record that further widens the credibility gap and makes the entire as- serted defense of discharge for cause unpersuasive. Over- weight, or underweight materials, quite frequently pass into the finishing room by mistake; it is simply brought back and rerun through the card and drawing frames. If Overseer Stamps is to be believed, this is what he did with the two heavy blends from Griggs' machine during the day shift before Griggs reported for work at 4 p.m. Griggs' testimony, that during his 12 years in this card- room no one was ever disciplined for such error , stands uncontradicted. And Stamps himself admitted no one was "ever discharged because this material came through too heavy or too light." If in fact Stoudemeire had decided to make an exception of Griggs, he would without question have made it a special point to keep the evidence of the man's error. In an effort to distinguish this case from all those of the past, when comparable errors of this kind were con- sidered no more than the normal experience of the func- tioning of the department, the overseers stressed the as- sertion that Griggs had placed the wrong gear on frame 5, but the correct gears on the other two machines which were also processing blend 46-47. The implication here is that if only one machine had been used for that particu- lar order, and the wrong gear attached, the error would have been viewed like all others of the past, or that if Griggs had run all three machines incorrectly with three wrong gears instead of one, he would have been excused. In the light of all the other pertinent considerations, I find this explanation of the discharge wanting. The record shows that many other errors cause the material to be off weight: "A lapse could heavy up a little bit," "there's something wrong with the breaker," "it might be a roller broke." All that ever happens is that the material is rerun and made acceptable. It can be assumed that however nu- merous the possible causes that can produce defective materials, any one incident could be distinguished from all others on some miniscule and truly irrelevant detail. Such selective minute characterization cannot, however, substantively remove one error from among many. I must weigh the asserted defense of discharge for cause not only in the light of its inherent weakness, but also against the evidence of union animus of the Respond- ent. That it was determined to root out the union ad- herents throughout its many plants is now clear; the story has been told several times in the earlier proceedings and needs no retelling here. Outright discharges to prevent union activities were many, continued over an extensive period, and occurred even at this very plant; Stamps and Stoudemeire are among the particular supervisors already found to have committed unfair labor practices in the past. Griggs was a particular irritant to the Company in this respect. He first lent himself to the Company's anti- union campaign , acting as an agent to that end , and then switched sides and became an outspoken recruiter to the Union's ranks. A leaflet telling his story - and bearing his picture - was circulated in the plant, and indeed it was also proved in Case 11-CA-2697 that after Griggs became a unioneer he was unlawfully denied overtime work in violation of the statute. On the record in its en- tirety, including the evidence adduced at this hearing and the facts found in the earlier proceedings, I conclude that the Respondent discharged James Griggs on August 26, 1966, because of his union activities, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion I have considered an in- cident about 3 months [6 or 7 weeks] before the discharge when, apparently in consequence of Griggs' negligence, one of the frames became overheated for lack of oil and necessitated an expensive overhaul and repair. It seems Griggs failed to check the oil level adequately, the machine overheated, and certain parts and gears had to be replaced. The machine was shut down for an entire [two] shift[s] in consequence. At the hearing, the Respondent advanced this mistake by Griggs as further justification for the discharge 3 months later. At the time of the event all that happened was that Stoudemeire called Griggs to his office and spoke to him generally about the importance of carefully checking the oil level periodically and being careful in all his duties. No men- tion was made of this incident at the time of the discharge. In the light of the persuasive evidence of illegal motiva- tion on the record in its entirety, I deem this assertion by the Respondent for the first time at the hearing as but an afterthought, a makeweight argument to make Griggs ap- pear in a poorer light, and thereby offset the compelling force of the evidence of union animus. 2. Ollie Vernadore Mrs. Vernadore has been a weaver for 25 years; she worked for the Respondent in plant 3 of its Rock Hill, South Carolina, complex, from 1951 until August 1966, when she was discharged. She was in favor of the Union; her name appeared on the bulletin board of the plant as such a person; she testified for the General Counsel in 1964 in support of the complaint in Case 11-CA-2180; her husband, William Vernadore, and her brother- in-law, Hubert Vernadore, weavers in the same room with her, were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. According to the uncontradicted and credited testimony, in the approximately 15 years she worked as a weaver for this Company, not once was she criticized for the quality of her work [prior to the time she joined the Union]; an error of mixed colors appeared on the cloth coming from one of her looms in August of 1966 and she was discharged. Clifford Brannon, also called Alvin on the record, the supervisor who made the decision to discharge her, testified he had never before discharged a weaver "for this same kind of defect before." Brannon was involved in the illegal discharge of this lady's husband in 1963, and even more directly a party on behalf of management in the unlawful release of her brother-in- law in 1965. The complaint alleges that the discharge of Mrs. Ver- nadore was but a step in the Respondent' s continuing pro- gram of weeding the union adherents out of the plant. The 262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Company's defense is that she was released because she made mistakes in tying loose strands of yarn in placing the wrong threads where they did not belong. Vernadore looked after 25 looms, or weaving machines, in her area of responsibility. There was always a fixer working with her, and his duties included an in- spection once every shift of the cloth coming through the looms. Whenever the weaver or the fixer inspects the cloth, each attaches a ticket to it with his or her initials. Whenever cloth emerges from the weaving room with any kind of defect, it is called "second," and apparently is sold for less money or used for less costly products. There can be as many as 30 (one witness said 40) defects in the cloth, so as to result in seconds. In fact, a form sheet accompanys each order, or run of cloth, listing the many errors or faults that can occur; this is checked in each instance as the circumstances require. One of the possible mistakes occurs when a thread breaks on the loom. There are as many as 3,000 separate threads going into the cloth, and when one breaks it is necessary to retie it from the correct spool. When the cloth is not of uniform color, it is, of course, important that the correct color be joined. On March 28, 1966, Brannon , the weaving room overseer, showed Mrs Ver- nadore a piece of cloth that had been produced during her shift on one of her looms; it had a wrong colored thread running through it. She said she had not herself made the mistake, but Brannon nevertheless said he was warning her about it. A week later, on April 6, Brannon showed Vernadore two rolls of cloth revealing mixed color threads where there should have been none. Again she said it could not have been her mistake, and now asked Brannon to remove all helpers or learners from the area of her looms. He said he would do that, and at the hearing testified he then did tell the people in the area not to help Vernadore. His instructions to the contrary, shortly thereafter a helper did tie a wrong color thread on one of Vernadore' s looms. She caught that error and showed it to the overseer as illustrative of errors on her shift for which she was not responsible. Again Brannon told the helper not to assist Vernadore. In any event, on the 6th Brannon gave the weaver a personnel action notice; this is a form report of error in work. that the Company files away. Seven days later again Brannon showed Vernadore two rolls with wrong mixed threads resulting from faulty tying of broken thread. And again she denied they were her mistakes, and repeated the errors must have been made by Lonnie Bigham , a helper who still worked in her area. According to her testimony, Brannon called Bigham over and asked was he "color blind." According to Brannon, Bigham was not there, and all he did was advise Ver- nadore to change her eyeglasses. Brannon then wrote out another personnel action report on the incident. Things ran smoothly until August 24, when Vernadore arrived at midnight to start the third shift, Brannon told her, without advance warning [summarily] that she had been replaced and was being discharged because four rolls of cloth, of which he showed her two, had wrong colored thread in consequence of errors in tying loose ends. One of the defective pieces was 18 inches long, and the other shorter. She told him she had not made these mistakes. At the hearing she explained - and the other witnesses did not contradict her- that anyone passing the back of a loom will normally tie a loose thread if he sees it, that Brannon himself used to do it, or the side weaver, or even a filling hauler or a sweeper. The next day Vernadore went to Melvin Smith, the mill superintendent, and asked had he seen the defective cloth, and when Smith said "No," she protested she had not done it, and said "you're not even going to give me the benefit of the doubt?" Smith said only "it came off of your loom " Before her participation in the union activities, Ver- nadore had not once been warned or criticized respecting the quality of her work, and never before March 1966 had an error of this type been brought to her attention. She also testified that in all the years of her employment with the Respondent she recalled no one being discharged "for this type of mistake in the weaving." There is also the testimony of Charles Capps, who worked as a loom fixer for 8 years ending 1963 and said that no one had ever been discharged in his experience for defects in work. Against this, Brannon, who said he made the decision to release Ollie Vernadore, testified that he holds the weavers responsible for defective work coming from their looms, but that if the weaver could prove an error was not hers it would be different. He added Vernadore did not prove to him that the last errors were not hers. On whether this kind of mistake, among the great many that result in seconds in the cloth, had occurred in the past, and whether summary discharges like that of Vernadore had ever taken place, the testimony of Overseer Brannon, who spent 11 years in the weaveroom and was over 3 years Vernadore's supervisor, points to very poor credi- bility, and in effect serves to corroborate her insistence that errors of this kind were long deemed nothing more than inevitable lapses of human capacity. Q. Have you ever had occasion to discharge any weaver for this same kind of defect before? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever had any weaver who re- peatedly or who as often as this had this sort of de- fect') A. Not the same thing, no, sir. Q. Have you seen this sort of defect occur be- fore? A. No, sir, I haven't seen it. Q. I beg your pardon? A. No, sir. Q. What do you call this particular defect? A. The wrong color tie thread end. Q Do I understand you to say that the wrong color tie thread ends have not occurred? A. It could have occurred, but it hasn't been called to my attention. TRIAL EXAMINER: How long have you worked there? THE WITNESS: About 1 1 years. TRIAL EXAMINER: Are you saying that, when in March you noticed the wrong thread tied, and spoke to this lady about it, that was the first time in all the years that you worked there that you saw such an error in the cloth? THE WITNESS: Mr. Examiner, I hadn't been a su- pervisor until around September'63. TRIAL EXAMINER- What were you before that9 THE WITNESS: A loom fixer. TRIAL EXAMINER: How long? THE WITNESS: Approximately 7 or 8 years. TRIAL EXAMINER: And throughout that period when you started as a loom fixer, you have never seen this type of error in the cloth before? THE WITNESS: Yes, Sir, I had. J. P. STEVENS & CO. On this record I find that for many years the Company considered mistakes in single strand color ties of insuffi- cient gravity to warrant dismissal. Indeed there is no reason to discredit the testimony of both Vernadore and Capps that weavers were never discharged for defects in cloth, notwithstanding there are a great number of defects that do occur and are recorded. In these circumstances, and considering again the other relevant factors presented, I do not believe Brannon 's testimony that he decided to discharge Vernadore in this fashion, 15 years an employee, without notice [summarily], and because of the mixed threads he found in cloth that had been produced during her shift and on the looms on which she worked, even assuming the cloth he showed her had been inspected by her. The general testimony that others frequently tie loose ends as a standard thing throughout the weaving room is too persuasive, and undemed, to be ignored Brannon must assuredly know what the general practice is. When to these considerations are added the facts that Brannon had been a participant in the discharge of both Ollie Vernadore's husband and her brother-in- law, who, like her, had been open sympathizers of the Union, the conclusion is fully warranted that the Respond- ent's real reason for releasing Mrs. Vernadore was to rid itself of still another union supporter. In fact this group of supervisors over her - including Smith, Carter, and Bran- non - together had already discharged illegally no less than nine employees in the single plant . With the depar- ture of Ollie Vernadore a whole family was done away with; another brother-in-law, Edward Vernadore, suf- fered unlawful discharge in Republic plant 1, also in Rock Hill, in 1963. 1 find that by its discharge of Ollie Ver- nadore on August 24, 1966, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. There is not sufficient evidence to support the further allegation of the complaint that the lady's discharge also violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. 3. Norman A. Shearin Shearin started with the Respondent at its Rosemary Delta 4 plant near Roanoke Rapids in 1960; during his last 2 years he was a finishing inspector. There were three such persons on his shift, and their job was to unroll and reroll finished cloth while inspecting it visually as it passed over a table. Each man had his own table He was to look for defects, such as die or grease spots, frayed ends called selvedges, tears, as well as to check that the yardage and style of cloth conformed with the ticket which accompanied each roll. When an inspector finds a defect, he calls it to the attention of the supervisor, who decides whether the defect is of a kind that can be cor- rected;, sometimes the inspection operation is stopped while a laboratory test is made. If whatever is wrong is not too serious, the roll is sent back to finishing, where the defect is eliminated, and the cloth again inspected. If the errors found are too grave, the cloth is so marked and continues through into the next department, where it becomes "second," or "pound," meaning inferior cloth used for less costly end products. The ticket attached to each roll is dated and initialed by the inspector, with any appropriate notation of defect added, and accompanys the roll as it proceeds onward. On August 15, 1966, Shearin and each of the other two inspectors on his shift worked on certain material destined to become tablecloths. The rolls they inspected were of the same kind and part of a uniform material. 263 When he reported for duty the next day he was called to the office of Louis Ricks, overseer of the finishing depart- ment, who showed him about 20 tabletops made of the same cloth which the day before had passed through in- spection. The pieces had grease and die spots of such quantity as to make the goods second or pound material. Shearin conceded the cloth was defective and that it was of the type he had worked on, but, to check on whether he instead of one of the other two inspectors had looked over the particular-cloth, asked to be shown the roll to which his initialed ticket was attached. Ricks answered this was impossible because the entire roll - 421 yards - had al- ready been cut into tablecloths, each piece in this instance 54 inches long. Shearin insisted this was not his mistake, but he was discharged forthwith. Shearin recalled that during the discharge conversation Ricks did have a ticket signed by him for the type of cloth involved. At the hearing Ricks testified that the mistake had been brought to his attention by Robert Rawlings, overseer in the hemming room, who showed him about 75 defective units; a 421-yard roll would produce about 280 54-inch tabletops. Ricks said he relied on Rawlings' state- ment that these particular pieces related to a ticket of Shearin's. Rawlings, the other company witness who testified in support of the asserted fact of error by Shearin, said that he received the ticket from "the boy that was cutting. He [the boy] said he had just completed cutting that roll " Rawlings could not recall the name of the boy, who did not testify. On the record in its entirety, including other unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent, and par- ticularly by the supervisors in Shearin's department and plant, I do not credit the testimony of Ricks and Rawlings that this man was discharged because of a mistake in his work performance on August 15. It is highly unlikely that the "boy," who cut 280 separate tabletops from a single roll of cloth and found as many as 70 so defective that they became useless "pound," as Rawlings said at one point, would not have called a superior's attention to such extensive damage before completing the cutting job. In the absence of the roll itself, or at least of a substantial portion of it, either of which would have served, together with Shearin's initialed ticket attached to it, to connect him with the error, and exculpate the other two inspec- tors, the failure to produce the boy himself as witness becomes the first suspicious circumstance That the materials found to be defective were in fact inspected and erroneously passed by Shearin has not been proved by convincing evidence. Ricks testified he knew Shearin was at fault because Rawlings told him so. Rawlings testified he learned of it from "the boy," who was not produced as a witness. This leaves only Rawlings' testimony to be considered, and, on the record of the successive proceedings now before the Board, Rawlings is a completely discredited witness. I do not credit him. This is the same "Pete" Rawlings who unlawfully spied on union meetings and discharged a number of employees whom he knew or suspected of leaning toward the Union. There is more in the immediate testimony casting doubt upon the affirmative defense of discharge for cause. Shearin testified he had never known an inspector to be discharged for "this type" of poor work, he had never known an inspector to be given a written warning for it, and he had never been personally told of such mistakes. More than 2 years before the discharge Shearin received a personnel action notice for being absent I day without calling in. For the rest, the record is clear this is the only 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD written reprimand ever given him, and , of course, the sudden dismissal was totally unprecedented . Summary discharge in these circumstances , without notice , and for a first such mistake , even assuming the cloth in question had been passed by Shearin , would appear as an extreme- ly unreasonable thing at best . On the question of whether it is true the Company normally overlooks errors of this kind , the testimony of the overseers is evasive and uncon- vincing. Ricks responded obliquely to the fact of there having been no previous discharge ; he said no inspector had ever "passed that much defective work ." Similarly, Crawford , the plant superintendent , in answer to a purely leading question whether before this incident "a finishing inspector had allowed that much bad cloth to go by," simply replied "No." The complaint allegation respecting Shearin is not disposed of, however , by the finding that he was not discharged for a mistake at work . It is charged he was released to curb his own union activities, or to hamper those of the Respondent ' s employees generally. The quantum of proof required of the General Counsel is to establish , by a preponderance of the substantial evidence on the record as a whole, that in fact the Company's motivation in this instance also was, as it was shown with respect to a great many other employees during the years 1963 to 1966 , an illegal one. There was an election in this particular plant in March 1965, and Shearin acted as ob- server for the Union. A week or two later a leaflet was distributed by the Union among the employees, exhorting them to renew their efforts to achieve majority represen- tation . The leaflet was signed by 11 persons who had acted as union observers ; the listed names include that of Shearin. Among the more significant facts shedding light upon any question of motivation are the employer 's attitude generally - including, of course , other unfair labor prac- tices committed - and the timing of the critical events - union activity and discharge . In this instance the em- ployee was released 17 months after his last known ex- pression of prounion sentiment , a period so long that it cannot be deemed of slight significance . In turn, the Respondent ' s fixed resolution to stop the Union's or- ganizational campaign , in total disregard of the proscrip- tions of the statute , is most pronounced , indeed so exten- sively implemented as to make the discharge of any em- ployee favoring the Union appear in a very suspicious light, particularly when the asserted reason fails of evidentiary support Trial Examiner Leedom has already found that two of the committeemen listed on the Union's 1965 leaflet have been unlawfully discharged - Lloyd Boyd and John Love . This is an extraordinary case; the unfair labor practices found up to this writing have been "massive and deliberate." An unbroken pattern runs through them , and is repeated here, in the case of Shearin as well as Griggs and Vernadore. With due consideration to the time element with respect to Shearin, the "widespread and flagrant nature" of the Respondent's disregard , even contempt , of employee rights under this statute, dictates a finding that he too was chosen for discharge in furtherance of the overall companywide campaign to weed out every last supporter of the Union. I find that by discharging Norman Shearin on August 16, 1966, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's operations described in section 1, above, have a close, in- timate, and substantial relationship to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has committed cer- tain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and to take certain affirmative action designed to dissipate its effect. The Respondent having illegally discharged James Griggs, Ollie Vernadore , and Norman Shearin , it must be ordered to reinstate them to their former or equivalent positions, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered in consequence of the il- legal discrimination against them in their employment. Backpay shall be computed in accordance with the for- mula prescribed by the Board in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and F . W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. In view of the nature of the unfair labor prac- tices committed , the commission of similar and other un- fair labor practices reasonably may be anticipated . I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act. Unusual offenses demand unusual remedies. As the Board did in Case 11-CA-2435, I shall recommend that here too the Respondent mail a copy of the notice to each of its employees in North and South Carolina, post it in all of its plants in those States, and have the notice read by responsible officials to all its employees convened dur- ing working hours in the plants for that purpose. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discharging James Griggs, Ollie Vernadore, and Norman Shearin, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The foresaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that J . P. Stevens & Co., inc., Rock Hill and Greenville, South Carolina, and Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors , and as- signs, shall: I Cease and desist from discharging or otherwise dis- criminating against employees because of their exercise of the right to self-organization , or in any other manner in- terfering with , restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor or- ganizations , to join or assist Industrial Union Department [Textile Workers Union of America ], AFL-CIO, or any J. P. STEVENS & CO. other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to James Griggs, Ollie Vernadore, and Nor- man Shearin reinstatement to their former or substan- tially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously en- joyed, and make each of them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination against them, in the manner described in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Notify any of the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the rights of employment under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Mail a copy of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix" 4 [omitted from publication] to each employee, and In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap- peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision 265 post copies at all of its plants located in the States of North Carolina and South Carolina Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Re- gion 11, shall be signed by a representative of the Com- pany Thereafter, a copy shall be mailed by the Company to each of its employees working in its North Carolina and South Carolina plants, and additional copies shall be posted by it and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Upon request of the Union, immediately grant the Union and its representatives reasonable access, for a 1- year period beginning with the issuance date of this Deci- sion, to its bulletin boards and all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (f) Upon request of the Union, made within 1 year of the issuance date of this Decision, immediately give to the Union a list of the names and addresses of all em- ployees in its plants in North and South Carolina. (g) Convene during working time, by departments and by shifts, all its employees, and a responsible official of the Respondent, at departmental supervisor level or above, shall read to department employees the contents of the attached Appendix. (h) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.5 and Order " 5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 11 , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation