J. A. Bentley Lumber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 25, 1949

83 N.L.R.B. 803 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL
WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA , LOCAL 434
Case No. 15-C-1010.-Decided May 25, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On February 16, 1949, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that
the Respondent had not unlawfully discharged Erwin Johnson and
Earl Allen, as alleged in the complaint, and recommended dismissal
of the complaint as to them.,
Thereafter the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief. The Respondent's request for oral
argument is hereby denied, as the record and brief, in our opinion,
adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, as amended,
the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel [Members Reynolds, Murdock, and Gray].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the additions noted herein :
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that during the strike
the Respondent unlawfully discharged Samuel Goodwin and Robert
Johnson because of their concerted activity. We find that such a dis-
"Inasmuch as no exceptions have been filed regarding the Trial Examiner ' s recom-
mendations of dismissal , we shall adopt those portions of the Intermediate Report dealing
with the cases of Erwin Johnson and Earl Allen, and shall dismiss the allegations of the
complaint with respect to them.
83 N. L. R. B., No. 125.
803
804 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
charge constitutes a violation of- Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as well
as an independent violation of Section 8 (a) (1). Whether the
Respondent's conduct be deemed a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) or
8 (a) (3), we find that reinstatement of the complainants with back
pay,2 as recommended by the Trial Examiner, is necessary to effectuate
the policy of the Act.
We also agree with the Trial Examiner's further finding that after
the strike the Respondent unlawfully refused to reinstate those two
employees to their former or substantially equivalent position because
of their concerted activity. We are convinced by the record as a whole
that but for the complainants' refusal to abandon their concerted ac-
tivity as requested by the Respondent, they would have been con-
tinued in the Respondent's employ in their former positions, or at least
in substantially equivalent ones, notwithstanding the abandonment of
a certain section of the track. The Respondent wrongfully severed
the complainants' employment during the strike and it is apparent
that they were thereby prejudiced in the filling of available positions
after the strike. Thus, the reduction of trackage did not adversely
affect the employment of a bridge foreman who had worked on the
abandoned track, as he was transferred, in accordance with asserted
company policy, to the main line. In contrast, Robert Johnson, sec-
tion foreman on the abandoned track, was given no consideration after
the strike for employment as a section foreman on the main line, not-
withstanding the fact that' he had 20 years' seniority and the other
section foreman, who was not discharged during the strike, had been
employed by the Respondent for only "several years." Similarly,
Goodwin, the engineer on the abandoned track, was not reinstated after
the strike to one of the two remaining engineer positions. Like the
Trial Examiner, we are not convinced that the alleged short break in
Goodwin's service prior to the strike was the operative reason for
the Respondent's refusal to reinstate him. At the time Goodwin and
Johnson were actually denied reinstatement, the reason assigned was
simply that their jobs had been abolished, without any intimation
that prestrike seniority was considered in allocating available posi-
tions; at the hearing and in its brief, this latter point was raised by
the Respondent for the first time and then only as to Goodwin. Aside
from a deficiency in proof that he had less seniority than the other
2 The issues raised by the Respondent concerning the amount of back pay, if any, due
the complainants , involves a question of compliance which on the present state of the
record we will not now resolve The parties may be able amicably to adjust the amount
of back pay due upon the basis of facts disclosed when compliance with our order is taken
This is without prejudice to the Respondent ' s right, in the event that this matter is not
adjusted , to apply for leave to adduce additional evidence on this question . Matter of
Detroit Gasket and Manufacturing Company, 78 N. L R. B. 670.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 805
engineers, the spurious nature of the contention is further indicated
by the Respondent's attempt to rely on it in the case of Goodwin, but
not as to Johnson. It is also significant that in allocating available
work after the strike, the Respondent elected to continue as an en-
gineer one Hager, who worked in that capacity during the strike but,
according to an admission by one of the Respondent's witnesses, was
not a regular engineer prior to the strike.
In any event, in view of the fact that the Respondent has erroneously
contended from the outset that the complainants voluntarily termi-
nated their employment during the'strike by refusing to work, and
therefore were not its employees at the time the track was abandoned,
we cannot accept the Respondent's colorable argument and evidence
that the complainants were properly denied reinstatement after the
strike on a non-discriminatory basis. As was found with respect to
the original discharge, we find that the refusal to reinstate the com-
plainants was also violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3), which can
only be remedied by reinstatement with back pay.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, J. A. Bentley
Lumber Company, Zimmerman, Louisiana, and its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in any labor organization of its em-
ployees by discharging or failing or refusing to reinstate them, by
requiring or directing them to vacate dwellings occupied by them, or
by discriminating in any other manner against them in regard to their
tenure or any term or condition of employment;
(b) In any like or similar manner,3 interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organiza-
tion, to form labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activi-
ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as guaranteed in Section
7 of the amended Act.
s We note that for stated reasons assigned by the Trial P}xaminer , he recommends
issuance of a narrow cease and desist order . In the absence of any exceptions to this
recommendation , we shall adopt it without further comment.
844340-50-vol. 83-52
806 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL -LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies ofthe Act :
(a) Offer'to Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions, and immediate occupancy of their former or substantially
equivalent living quarters in dwellings owned by the Respondent,
upon the same terms accorded to other employees;
(b) Make whole Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson for any
loss of pay they may nave suffered by reason of the Respondent's dis-
crimination against them, by payment to Goodwin and Johnson, re-
spectively, of a sum of money equal to the amount which each nor-
mally would have earned as wages from July 15, 1946, to the date of
the Respondent's offer of reinstatement less his net earnings during
said period;
(c) Post at its plant in Zimmerman, Louisiana, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix A."' Copies of said notice, to
be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, after
being duly signed by representatives of the Respondent shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by
it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees customarily
are posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material; and
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region (New
Orleans, Louisiana), in writing within ten (10) days from the date of
this Decision and Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed, insofar*as it alleges that the Respondent has engaged in any
unfair labor practices with respect to Earl Allen and Erwin John-
son.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in any labor organization
of our employees by discharging or failing or refusing to reinstate
them, or by requiring or directing them to vacate dwellings occu-
In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a Court of Appeals , there shall
be inserted before the words, "A DECISION AND ORDER ," the words , "A DECREE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING."
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY : 807
pied by them, or in any other manner discriminating against them
in regard to their tenure or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection, and to ref rain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
i condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the amended Act.
WE WILL OFFER to the employees named below immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and immediate occupancy of their
former or substantially equivalent living quarters in dwellings
owned by us, upon the same terms accorded to our other employees,
and make the said named employees whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Samuel L. Goodwin Robert Johnson
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY,
Employe,.
By -----------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated------------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered,. defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Messrs. C. Paul Barker, Jcrome B. Sindler, and Robert B. Stark, for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Mr. Le Doua R. Provosty, of Alexandria, La., for the Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 25, 1946, International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local
434, ' filed a charge with the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region
of the National Labor Relations Board' On October 21, 1948, the General
Counsel' of the Board issued a complaint alleging, in substance, that the
Respondent, J. A. Bentley Lumber Company,' had engaged, and was engaging,
I International Woodworkers of America , C I 0, Local 434, will be referred to herein
as the Union
s The National Labor Relations Board will be referred to herein as the Board.
a The designation , General Counsel , includes the attorneys who appeared on his behalf
at the hearing
4 The caption of the complaint was amended at the hearing upon the General Counsel's
motion to show the Respondent 's name as J. A. Bentley Lumber Company.
808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections &
(a) (1), 8 (a) (3), 2 (6) and 2 (7) of the National Labor Relations Act (49
Stat. _440,45,7,,p amended. by 61 Stat. 136-163), herein referred to as the
Amended Act.
With respect to the alleged illegal conduct, the substance of the complaint is
that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert
Johnson on or about March 28 and April 2, 1946, respectively, and, "because of
their union activities" required them "to vacate company-owned living quar-
ters"; that on or about July 13, 1946, it discriminatorily terminated the em-
ployment of Earl Allen and Erwin Johnson o and thereafter failed and re-
fused to reinstate all four named employees ; that the Respondent's conduct
was caused: by the said employees' membership in the Union or by their activi-
ties in its behalf or in concert "with other employees for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining and other mutual aid and protection" ; and that such conduct
constitutes interference with, and restraint and coercion of, its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Amended Act.
Copies of the charge and the complaint were duly served upon the Respondent
The Respondent filed an answer in which it admits the jurisdictional allega-
tions of the complaint , but specifically denies the commission of the unfair labor
practices attributed to it. With respect to the, alleged discriminatory conduct,
the answer alleges, in substance, that on March 27, 1946, during the course of
collective bargaining negotiations with the Union , the Respondent's employees
"went on a `wild-cat' strike" which "was not caused by any labor dispute" ; that
Goodwin , Allen , and the two Johnsons , who participated in the strike, thus
"voluntarily terminated their employment" ; that Goodwin "was requested to
return to his job , and refused" ; that Robert Johnson "was offered reemployment,
but insisted on obtaining jobs which he could not fill and for which he was not
qualified" ; that upon conclusion of the strike , Allen and Erwin Johnson were
offered reemployment, but that they were not reemployed because they were
found to be suffering from physical disabilities , although Erwin Johnson was
subsequently reinstated in October 1946 when "he signed a waiver of disability";
that Goodwin and Robert Johnson were required to vacate their living quarters,
in common with other employees occupying company-owned dwellings, because,
"prior to the commencement of any Union activities " the Respondent had decided
to shift to another location certain operations which it had been conducting in
the vicinity of the dwellings, and, therefore, "removed, demolished or sold" all
such houses ; and that the change in operations also "did away with the engine
being operated by Samuel Goodwin and the section crew of which Robert John-
son was foreman." The answer also alleges that subsequent to the termination of
their employment both Goodwin and Robert Johnson engaged in other pursuits
constituting employment equivalent with their former jobs. In addition, the
answer contains three motions to dismiss the complaint, which were disposed of
at the hearing and will be separately treated below.
Pursuant to notice duly served upon the Respondent and the Union, a hearing
was held at Alexandria, Louisiana, on November 17 and 18, 1948, before the
undersigned, Herman Marx, duly designated as Trial Examiner by the Chief Trial
Examiner.
'Erwin Johnson is also referred to in the transcript as Irvin and Irwin. The Re-
spondent 's records show his name to be Erwiri.
6 A copy of the complaint was also duly served upon the Union.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 809
At the hearing, the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint, basing its
-motion upon the first, second, and third defenses set out in the answer.` The
grounds for the motion were (1) that there is no affirmative showing in the
charge and complaint that the Union had complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and
(h) of the Amended Act ; (12) that the Regional Director had dismissed the charge
on August 15, 1947, and had thereafter reinstated it on May 28, 1948, without
"legal or administrative authority" to make such reinstatement ; and (3) that the
proceeding was barred by laches because "more than two years (had) elapsed
since the charge was filed on August 25, 1946, or an investigation made by the
National Labor Relations Board." In connection with the claimed dismissal
-of the charge by the Regional Director, the General Counsel adduced proof estab-
lishing that the charge had not been withdrawn or dismissed! After receiving
-the evidence referred to above and bearing argument, the Trial Examiner denied
the motion to dismiss.
The General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by counsel at the
hearing,' participated therein, and were afforded a full opportunity to be heard,
examine and .cross-examine witnesses, adduce evidence bearing on the issues, sub-
mit oral argument and file briefs. The General Counsel and the Respondent
waived oral argument at the close of the hearing, but have filed briefs.
Upon the entire record and from his observation of the witnesses, the under-
signed makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
J. A. Bentley Lumber Company is a partnership composed of two trust estates
known as J. A. Bentley Trust No. 2 and E. W. Zimmerman Trust. J. W. Beasley
7 Prior to the hearing, the Regional Director in an order dated October 29, 1948, referred
the motion to the Chief Trial Examiner for appropriate disposition . The Chief Trial
Examiner duly referred the motion to Trial Examiner Robert L. Piper for consideration
and disposition. Mr. Piper, thereafter, entered an order dated November 5, 1948, denying
the motion On November 10, 1948, the Respondent filed with the Regional Director an
undated document setting forth objections to the denial of the motion on the ground that
it "was issued peremptorily, without hearing and without opportunity to present any
evidence in connection therewith." At the hearing, the Respondent 's counsel stated that
he wished to renew his motion , pointing out his previous criticism of the order denying It.
As the motion is incorporated in the answer in the form of legal defenses to the proceeding,
the undersigned, although he bore in mind that the motion had received previous considera-
tion by a Trial Examiner, treated the renewal of the motion as the submission of argument
on the defenses set out in the answer, received evidence relating thereto, and made a
-ruling thereon as part of his determination of the issues presented by the pleadings.
S The evidence revealed that on April 8, 1946, International Woodworkers of America,
C. I 0, had filed an amended charge against the Respondent, dealing with an entirely
different subject matter from that involved in this proceeding. That charge bore Case
No. 15-C-1135. On August 7, 1947, the International wrote to the Board requesting
"withdrawal of the charge" in Case No 15-C-1135 "without prejudice." The Regional
Director endorsed his approval on the letter under date of August 8, 1947, together with
his initials, and, on August 15, 1947, wrote to the Respondent "that the charge in the above
matter has, with my approval, been withdrawn without prejudice." However, the letter
set forth in its caption the case number of this proceeding instead of No. 15-C-1135.
On May 28, 1948, the Regional Director wrote to the Respondent that his letter of August
.5, 1947, "is hereby recalled and rescinded" and that Case No. 15-C-1135 "has with my
approval been withdrawn without prejudice." The Trial Examiner finds that the Insertion
.of No. 15-C-1210 (the number of this proceeding) in the caption of the letter of August
15, 1947, was the result of a mistake, and that the charge in this proceeding was never
-withdrawn or otherwise dismissed.
9 The Union was not represented at the hearing
810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Guaranty Bond and Trust Company of Alexandria, Louisiana, are the trus-
tees of both trusts 'composing the partnership. The Respondent is' engaged at
Zimmerman , Louisiana , in the manufacture and sale of yellow pine lumber and
related products. During the course of the year from April 1, 1945, to April 1,
1946, the Respondent received from points within the State of Louisiana raw mate-
rials valued in excess of $315,000, and manufactured and sold finished products
at a valuation in • excess of $828,000. Approximately 75 percent of the con-
cern's output during the first half of the year, and 60 percent during the second
half, were sold and shipped to customers located outside the State of Louisiana 10
If. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local 434, is a labor
organization which admits to its membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The background of the alleged discriminatory practices -
The Respondent owns and operates a sawmill at Zimmerman, Rapides Parish,
Louisiana, where it is engaged in the manufacture of lumber and related
products. The company owns timber lands in the parishes of Vernon, Natchi-
toches and Rapides from which it secures unfinished timber for its mill. On
March 27, 1946, it employed approximately 145 persons in its logging and man-
ufacturing operations. For the purpose of hauling logs and personnel, the
company operates a railroad between the mill and areas where it conducts
logging operations. It employs its own train and section crews for the operation
of its line.
During the spring of 1946, and for some years prior thereto, the Respondent
engaged in logging operations in Rapides Parish, and in connection therewith,
'maintained about 16 or 17 miles from the mill, a woods camp known as "Zim-
merman Front," consisting of approximately 55 houses occupied by the woods
employees, a commissary and other facilities. The company also owned, and
permitted its employees to occupy, houses located in the vicinity of the mill.
It has been the Respondent's policy to let a house to any of its employees who
wanted one. The houses were occupied only by its employees.
In the course of its business, the Respondent has denuded certain of its
timber holdings in the three parishes, and by March 1946, had advanced its
logging operations to a point between the woods camp and the mill, about 10
'miles from the camp and 7 miles from the mill. The Respondent decided to
,discontinue the camp on some unspecified date in March or April 1946, and
actually discontinued it about July 15, 1946, when it moved 15 homes to its mill
colony. It subsequently erected 10 additional homes in that area for the use
of pits employees. The houses remaining at the woods camp were sold, together
with other facilities.
On December 13, 1945, the Respondent agreed" to an election to be conducted
by the Board to determine the question of representation. The election was
held on January 15, 1946, with the result that International Woodworkers of
10 The findings with respect to the nature of the Respondent ' s business and the composi-
tion of the partnership are based variously on a synthesis of uncontradicted testimony
given at the hearing by managerial officials of the company and on admissions contained
in Paragraphs I and II of its answer The finding relating to the Respondent ' s interstate
operations is based on admissions in the answer of Paragraph III of the complaint.
11 See Matter of J. A. Bentley Lumber Company, Case No. 15-R-1519.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 811
-America, C. I. 0., was designated as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees " and was so Certified on February 25, 1946.
On January 31, 1946, the Respondent and the Union commenced bargaining
negotiations and continued them through a series of 9 meetings. On March 27,
,1946, approximately 115 of the Respondent's woods and mill employees went on
strike.19 Earl Allen, Erwin Johnson, Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson
were among the employees who struck. Except for maintenance activities, work
at the mill ceased. Logging operations were virtually discontinued, with the
exception of work by some employees to protect cut logs from the elements and
decomposition. Pickets were established in the vicinity of the mill and other
portions of the Respondent's property. The negotiating meetings continued dur-
ing the strike, and culminated in an agreement which was signed on Friday,
July 12, 1946. Arrangements were made for the resumption of operations on the
following Monday, July 15. Upon execution of the contract, William R Gorum,
the business agent of the Union, informed the striking employees that they
should return to work.
Allen, Goodwin and the two Johnsons (who are not related) made application,
in common with the other striking employees, to return to work, but the Re-
spondent rejected their applications. The General Counsel contends that the
company discharged Goodwin and Robert Johnson shortly after the strike began
and ordered them to vacate company-owned houses they occupied, and that such
discharge and the refusal to reemploy all four employees at the conclusion of
the strike was discriminatory . Among other defenses , the Respondent claims
that Goodwin and Robert Johnson voluntarily quit their employment, thus
terminating their right to occupy the houses, and that its refusal to reemploy the
four men was justified. Evidence bearing on the respective contentions will be
separately considered below.
B. The refusal to reemploy Earl Allen and Erwin Johnson
Both Erwin Johnson and Earl Allen worked on the log pond at the mill. Their
duty was to guide logs with a pike pole from one point in the pond to another.
Such logs average 150 feet in length and 1,500 pounds in weight . Both men be-
longed to the Union, voted for the strike, and participated in the picketing
activities.
Erwin worked continuously for the concern from 1924 until the strike. Allen
was first employed in 1926, left in 1930, returned about 11 months later, and
worked until about July 1943 when he was laid off. He was inducted into
the Army about 6 months later and was honorably discharged July 1945 because
of a physical disability which is not described in his discharge certificate, but
which.he testified was hypertension (high blood pressure). He returned to work
for the Respondent in August 1945 and continued to work for the firm until
the strike. Until about a month before the hearing, he drew a pension from
the Government based upon 40 percent of total disability.
Both in 1930 and 1945, on the occasions when Allen resumed his employment,
he was examined by a physician employed by the company , who, to employ
11 The unit included - all production and maintenance employees , including transporta-
tion crews , but excluded , among others , supervisory personnel.
is The purpose of the strike was to secure an increase The Respondent 's contention
that the strike was illegal and of a "wild -cat" nature because it was called without notice
to the company is without merit
812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Allen's phrase, "signed the slip ` O. K.'," 14 meaning that he was physically fit for
employment. Erwin was not examined prior to the strike.
After the agreement was signed , William Gorum, business agent of the Union
(and who was also employed at the mill), informed Erwin and Allen, in com-
mon with other striking employees, to report for work on the following Monday,
July 15. At about the same time, D. C. Buckner, the Respondent' s manager,
issued instructions that all employees returning to work should secure physical
examinations prior to the resumption of operations. All returning employees
received physical examinations in accordance with Buckner's instructions.
The Respondent adduced evidence that since 1928 it has required applicants
for employment and employees who have been away from their jobs for more
than 30 days to undergo physical examinations, and that such a policy is
not "a condition of insurance," but exists for the purpose of minimizing its
compensation risks, and thereby reducing its insurance premiums. The Ex-
aminer finds that the examination procedure has been in existence since 1928,
that its basis was the reason advanced by the Respondent,15 and that Allen's
examinations in 1930 and 1945 were made in conformity with the firm's policy
described above. The Examiner also finds, however, that the Respondent did
not always adhere to its policy, and that sometimes, as Buckner testified, the
company's doctor approved men for work without actually examining them.
In conformity with Buckner's instructions, Erwin and Allen were examined,
on the day following the signing of the agreement, by Dr. Samuel S. Williams,
a physician employed on a full-time basis by the company. The facts relating
to Erwin's examination are not disputed, but there is some conflict in the evi-
dence with respect to Allen's examination.
Erwin went to see Dr. Williams on direct instructions from his foreman,
R. L. Carley, who gave him the customary slip of paper to present to the physi-
cian. Dr. Williams examined him and told him that he had a hernia. The
physician also informed Erwin that Buckner had instructed the doctor "not
to hire anybody with a hernia" and that the latter "would have to turn (Erwin)
down." Erwin thereupon secured other employment.
Buckner left the Respondent's employ on October 1, 1946, and was replaced
as manager by a man named E. C. Johnson. Early in October, Erwin, who
was then working in Shreveport, returned to the plant and applied to the new
manager for a job. Johnson agreed to reemploy him. Erwin was thereupon
re-examined by a physician employed by the company. The doctor wrote some-
thing on a paper, gave it to Erwin to take to Johnson who requested Erwin to
sign it. Erwin signed the document and was thereupon restored to his former
duties. At the time of the hearing, he was still employed by the Respondent.
Although the document was not produced in evidence, the Examiner finds from
the general context of the evidence, that what Erwin signed was a waiver of
the company's liability for injuries he might sustain as a result of his condition.
14 When an employment applicant or an employee is examined by a company physician
under such circumstances , the Respondent 's foreman concerned usually furnishes the ap-
plicant or employee, as the case may be, with a slip upon which the doctor may indicate
his approval by endorsing "0. K." thereon
16 Buckner testified that the examination requirement resulted from an agreement with
the company's insurance carrier that every employee "would have to be physically fit," and
that the insurance company had instructed the Respondent not to employ anyone with a
hernia. Respondent's counsel and the General Counsel stipulated at a later point in the
hearing that the examinations were "not a condition of insurance," and the Respondent's
attorney asserted that "if Mr . Buckner so stated, he was misinformed or made a mistake."
The Examiner finds that Buckner's testimony resulted from a mistake concerning the
Respondent 's insurance obligations, and not from a design to mislead.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 813
Allen's version of his examination by Dr. Williams, which occurred on the
same day as that of Erwin, may be summarized as follows : At the conclusion
of the examination, the doctor gave him a slip with "0. K." inscribed on it,
which Allen took to Foreman Carley. Carley said nothing but came to see him
at his home the following morning and told him to submit to another examina-
tion. Dr. Williams re-examined him the same day and told him to get his
Army discharge. He went for the document, returned with it shortly there-
after and was informed by Dr. Williams that it was a medical discharge.
Allen denied that it was a medical discharge, asserting that it was an honor-
able discharge (as it was in fact)?s The physician then told Allen that "there's
something wrong" and that he would not "0. K. (him) for pond work." Allen
remonstrated that the doctor had found "nothing wrong," to which Dr. Williams
replied that he "had orders to turn (Allen) down." In response to a question
from the General Counsel as to whether he had asked Dr. Williams who had
given the "orders," Allen testified, "Well, he said-I think it was Mr. Buckner."
Shortly thereafter, Allen secured a job with another lumber company. Buck-
ner, however, permitted him to continue to occupy a company-owned house,
telling him, after his return from Alexandria, that he "could stay there as long
as you want-until you get somewhere else to stay." Allen occupied the house
until the following September when he found another place to live.
The only portion of Allen's testimony in material dispute is his account
of what transpired during his two claimed visits to Dr. Williams' office after
the strike. Buckner denied giving the doctor "any instructions with respect to
the physical examinations of any specific men." Dr. Williams testified that
his examination revealed that Allen had high blood pressure with a reading of
200 systolic over 86 diastolic. The physician denied that he told Allen that
"there was nothing wrong with him" and that he had given him a slip with
"0. K." endorsed thereon, asserting instead that he had advised Allen "to get
off the job" and secure less dangerous work. Dr. Williams also testified that
he examined Allen again "two months later" and that his blood pressure reading
at that time "was practically the same."
Dr. Williams was not asked in specific terms whether he examined Allen
on two successive days, as the latter claims, nor whether he specifically made the
remark that he "had orders to turn (him) down." The doctor's testimony does
not thus directly refute Allen's testimony on these two points.17 Foreman
Carley was not produced as a witness.
The respective versions given by Dr. Williams and Allen of what occurred
between them raises an issue of credibility. It is plain that if Allen's version
is true, it lends substantial support to the General Counsel's claim that the
physical examinations after the strike were used by the Respondent as- a cloak
to discriminate against Allen and Erwin.
Basing his views on the context of the testimony of both witnesses and their
demeanor on the stand, the Examiner does not feel that the issue of credibility
can be resolved simply on the basis of the testimony given by both witnesses.
1e An Army discharge for medical reasons may, of course, be honorable. Allen's discharge,
a photostat of which was placed in evidence, was honorable. On the reverse side is a state-
ment that the "reason and authority" for the discharge was "CDD," which in the Army's
terminology means a discharge for reasons of physical disability.
17 The testimony of Dr Williams was so confused that it does not appear conclusively
that he intended to testify that he examined Allen only once immediately after the strike.
Whether he examined him twice assumes importance only to the extent that it may have
a bearing on the question whether he approved Allen the first time and then received
instructions from the management to disapprove him.
814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The undersigned regards both Allen and Dr. Williams as unreliable witnesses.
According to Allen's own testimony, he quibbled with Dr. Williams whether his
discharge was an "honorable" or a "medical" one, although he well knew that
he had been discharged from the service for medical reasons and was at the
time of his examination drawing a disability pension from the Government.
Moreover, he was evasive in responding to questions put to him by the under-
signed whether at the time he spoke to the physician he was aware of the exist-
ence of the phrase "CDD" on the reverse side of the discharge. With what
appeared to the Examiner to be some reluctance, he admitted that he knew
what the phrase meant and that it was in his discharge certificate. Allen testi-
fied that after Dr. Williams told him he would not approve him "for the pond
work," he said to the doctor, "you don't find nothing wrong," and that the phy-
sician responded, "no, sir, but I got orders." The Examiner does not deem
it probable that the doctor would agree that he had found "nothing wrong"
after he and Allen had already discussed the Army discharge and the physician
had told Allen that there was "something wrong."
Dr. Williams manifested marked confusion on the witness stand, confusing
Allen with Erwin, attributing on more than one occasion the ailment of one
to the other despite some prompting and leading questions, exhibiting a very
poor memory, and evidencing some difficulty in orienting his thoughts.
In vie wof their unreliability, the testimony of both Allen and Dr. Williams
contributes little to the resolution of the basic question of whether the Respond-
ent used the physical examinations as a shield to cloak a discriminatory refusal
to reemploy Allen and Erwin. The question must be resolved on the basis
of the evidence. as a whole. Thus considered, the record does not preponder-
ately establish the General Counsel's position for the following reasons:
.. 1. The examination procedure was an established policy of the company
for many years before the strike and was clearly not devised to serve a dis-
criminatory purpose. That it was applicable to employees who had been
away from their jobs for some time, as well as to new applicants for employ-
ment, is demonstrated by the examinations of Allen in 1930 and 1945. Need-
less to say, these factors do not exclude the possibility that the procedure,
although innocent in origin, was employed as an instrument of discrimination
after the strike. But to state the possibility merely begs the question, whereas
the pre-existence of the practice lends some support to the Respondent's denial
of unlawful conduct.
2. Unreliable as to the medical testimony in the case is, the Examiner finds
from the evidence as a whole that Allen and Erwin were in fact suffering from
the ailments attributed to them.
3. The evidence does not-preponderately establish any motive for the selec-
tion of Allen and Erwin, as the objects of discrimination, from among all the
other similarly situated striking employees who returned to work 16 Their
strike activities were almost entirely confined to picketing in which they were
active. However, the entire membership of the Union participated in the
picketing activities. There is some evidence that Allen and Erwin endeavored-
to get employees to join the Union (presumably before the strike)." However,
18 Goodwin and Robert Johnson who were also refused reemployment fall in a different
factual category.
10 The evidence that Allen and Erwin had sought to induce employees to join the Union
was freely given by Buckner upon his direct examination. His frankness at this point has
been taken into consideration by the Examiner in reaching the conclusion that Buckner had
no concealed purpose to discriminate against Allen and Erwin.
J. A.' BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 815
that circumstance must be balanced 'against the fact that other persons who
participated actively in union affairs, notably Gorum, the business agent,
returned to work without discrimination.
4. Significantly, the Respondent reemployed Erwin a few months after the
strike and upon his execution of a waiver of the company's compensation
liability, a circumstance which lends weight to the view that the examinations
of the employees stemmed from its concern over its possible workmen's com-
pensation liability, and not from a design to discriminate against Allen and
Erwin. Moreover, E. C. Johnson, the manager who succeeded Buckner in
October 1946, testified that in that month Allen also applied for reemployment,
that he had him examined, and that he received a report showing that Allen
"was still suffering with high blood pressure and it was dangerous to work him
on the pond." The Examiner credits Johnson's testimony.20 Allen's examina-
tion, as well as Erwin's reemployment, lends some support to the view that
the examination in July had an innocent motive.
5. Buckner permitted Allen to continue to occupy a company-owned house
for over 2 months after the alleged discriminatory refusal to reemploy him
and told Allen he could remain there as long as necessary. Taken in conjunc-
tion witethe other evidence, such conduct is more consistent with innocence
of motive in refusing to reemploy Allen than with a design to discriminate
against him.
There is countervailing evidence which points to a possible conclusion that
the Respondent discriminated against Allen and Erwin Johnson. The Respond-
ent's failure to call Foreman Carley as a witness is a suspicious circumstance.
The reemployment of Allen in 1945 after a physical examination which should
have disclosed (and probably did disclose) 21 his ailment is, to say the least,
difficult to reconcile with his rejection a year later. A possible explanation
is that Allen's condition at that time "wasn't very bad," if that was the fact 22
(there is no evidence of the extent of Allen's pressure in 1945). Finally, Allen
attributed a statement to Dr. Williams that the latter had "orders to turn"
Allen down It should be observed that Dr. Williams told Erwin that he had
instructions "not to hire anybody with a hernia" and that he "would have to
turn (Erwin) down." • The Respondent does not dispute Erwin's testimony.
The phrasing of the remark to Erwin is so nearly like the one Allen claims
was made to him that the Examiner does not exclude the possibility that a
statement similar to the one made to Erwin was made to Allen, but that the
20 Allen gave no testimony with respect to an application for reemployment by him in
October. Johnson's testimony about Allen's October application and the report the
manager received stands uncontradicted Allen did testify that the last time Dr Williams
examined him was in July. Dr. Williams testified that he re-examined Allen "two
months" after the July examination The Examiner concludes that the last examination
to which the doctor referred, although placed by him sometime in September, is the October
examination mentioned by E C. Johnson. The Examiner does not credit Allen's statement
that the last time Dr Williams examined him was in July.
21 Dr. Williams testified that he had examined Erwin Johnson "several years ago,"
meaning (by inference from the context of his testimony) that he had examined Erwin
prior to the strike, and had found him to be suffering from a hernia. The doctor stated
that he had approved him because "there was such a shortage of labor." Plainly, Dr.
Williams was mistaken that he bad examined Erwin before the strike, because the latter had
never been examined by a company physician before the walk-out Apparently, Dr. Williams
was referring to the examination of Allen (who had hypertension and not a hernia) in 1945.
22 As described in the preceding footnote, Dr. Williams confused Allen's 1945 examina-
tion with a non-existent one of Erwin The physician testified that he passed the man he
examined , presumably Allen, because "he wasn't very bad" and there was a "shortage of
labor."
816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD .
latter, either innocently or purposely, gave it an altered complexion. The Exam-
iner regards Allen as too unreliable a witness to credit his assertion that Dr.
Williams made the statement in the form or with the meaning attributed to
him, even though there is no explicit denial in the doctor's testimony that he
made it.
In sum, there are suspicious circumstances which lend support to the General
Counsel's thesis, but the burden of proof rests with him, and the Examiner has
concluded on the basis of the record as a whole that the evidence does not pre-
ponderantly establish that the Respondent refused to reemploy Allen and Erwin
Johnson because of their protected activities.
C. The alleged discharge of Samuel Goodwin and Robert Johnson
The status of Goodwin and Robert Johnson rests on a different footing from
that of Allen and Erwin Johnson. The General Counsel contends that the Re-
spondent did not merely refuse to reinstate Goodwin and Robert Johnson at
the conclusion of the strike, but discharged them.
Both Goodwin and Robert Johnson belonged to the Union, voted for the strike,
and engaged in picketing activities. Goodwin also served on at least one occa-
sion as a member of the Union's negotiating committee while bargaining nego-
tiations between the Union and the Respondent were in progress.
Goodwin entered the Respondent's employ as a locomotive engineer in Feb-
ruary 1926 and was employed in that capacity at the commencement of the strike.
For about 5 years preceding the work stoppage he had been operating a locomo-
tive known as No. 55. The locomotive was used to haul log cars on a part of
the Respondent's trackage known as the woods main line. That portion of
the track ran from a point in the woods known as the "Y," located about 10
miles from the mill, to points where the Respondent was engaged in logging opera-
tions. Goodwin's locomotive hauled log cars between various places in the
woods and the "Y," picking up empty cars at the "Y," hauling them to loading
points, and returning to the "Y" with loaded cars. Another engine would haul
the loaded cars to the mill, returning with "empties" which Goodwin would in
turn haul to a loading point. Employed with Goodwin on the train were a fire-
man and a brakeman. Hood Reed, the company's woods foreman, was Goodwin's
immediate supervisor. Reed in turn worked under the supervision of A. J. Scott,
woods superintendent.
Goodwin stopped working, in common with the other striking employees, when
the strike began on March 27. On or about March 30, Buckner and Reed came
to his house, and Buckner spoke to him. The following is Goodwin's version of
the conversation :
A. He told me to go out on 55; that was the engine I had been running ;
the next morning, and I told him I couldn't cross the picket line to take it
out. I would be afraid to.
He said, "Well, you'll have to take it out or get fired." I said "Well, I
guess I'll have to get fired, then." He said, "0. K."
Goodwin also testified that he refused to take out the engine, not only be-
cause he did not want to cross the picket line, but because he "wouldn't scab."
The versions of the conversation given by Buckner and Reed, respectively,
differ somewhat from that of Goodwin. Buckner stated that he told Goodwin
it was necessary to bring logs which had been cut to the pond in order to preserve
them, that he asked Goodwin to return to work, and that the latter refused,
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 817
stating he "wouldn 't protect his run" and to "get someone else ." Reed gave the
following account of the conversation : 24
A. No, he asked him to go back to work-"Did he want to work" and he
told him "No" he wasn't going to work, he wasn't going against the boys. He
said "Well, you are not going against the boys and you ain't supposed to
be in this strike from what I understand and can learn about it" and he said
"Well, I'm in it anyhow." 25
It will be observed that Buckner does not specifically deny that he told Good-
win "to take (the engine) or get fired." 26 Goodwin,.impressed the undersigned
as a reliable witness and the Examiner credits his testimony that Buckner
threatened him with discharge.
However, quite aside from the threat, it is plain that Goodwin did not termi-
nate his employment. He was engaged with other employees in an economic
strike, and he had a legal right to refuse to return to work and to continue to
strike. The clear intendment of his statements to Buckner and Reed was not
that he had terminated his employment, but that he would not return to work
during the strike. The Respondent chose to regard Goodwin's refusal to take
the engine out as a severance of the employment relation , but that is only its con-
clusion, and an incorrect one21
In fact, the Respondent, both by the construction it placed on Goodwin's con-
duct and its subsequent actions, discharged Goodwin. On April 20, 1946, Buck-
ner wrote a letter to Goodwin directing him to vacate a company-owned house
which the latter occupied. An excerpt from the letter is as follows :
As you know, you gave Mr. Hood Reed and the Writer a verbal statement
that you could not protect your job as Engineer on #55, you being a monthly
man, naturally , I was compelled to tell you your salary from the J . A. Bent-
ley Lumber Company would close April 15th, you advised us at that time
that we might stop your salary as of that date, our meeting date. [Empha-
sis supplied.] 26
Goodwin remained in the house until he found another one, vacating about the
time the strike ended.
At the conclusion of the strike Gorum told him to apply to Reed for reemploy-
ment. He did so, but Reed told him that his job had been eliminated. Good-
22 In his testimony , Buckner stated that by the phrase, "protect his run," he meant "to
carry the engine and the crew out."
24 Reed testified that on the morning of the strike , he asked Goodwin if the latter "was
. . . going out ( take his engine out), that Goodwin replied in the negative, and that
Reed responded "if he wasn 't going out it would be okay."
26 Reed contradicted Buckner's testimony that the latter requested Goodwin to haul in
logs to protect them. Reed testified that the Respondent had required him to operate the
engine on the day of the strike to bring in the logs and that the loose timber had already
been brought in from the woods when Buckner spoke to Goodwin Reed stated that Buck-'
ner requested Goodwin to return to work and not merely to act in an emergency
26 At another point in his testimony in answering a question whether a letter he wrote
Goodwin on April 20, 1946, stated that he ( Buckner ) "had terminated the services of the
Company," Buckner voiced the conclusion that Goodwin had "terminated " himself and
that he had quit. That is manifestly only a conclusion and not, in terms, a denial of the,
threat
21 That Goodwin did not consider the employment relationship at an end is further
manifested by the fact that he continued to participate in the" picketing and at'the con-
clusion of the strike , in common with the other employees , applied to the company to
return to work.
21 The letter lends support to Goodwin's testimony that Buckner threatened to fire him.
818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
win then turned to farming for about a year, and in May 1947 went to work for
another lumber company as a night engineer. He was still so employed at the
time of the hearing. The Respondent has never offered him reemployment.
In the main, the significant facts in Robert Johnson's situation are substan-
tially similar to those in Goodwin's. Johnson was employed as a section foreman
from 1926 until the strike. Although he exercised supervision over a section
crew varying in number "from two to eight or ten" men, he did substantially
the same work they did, consisting of such labor as raising the track, laying ties
and driving spikes. The track maintained by the crew was substantially the
same one over which Goodwin operated. Another crew maintained the track
from the mill to the "Y." The work of both crews was the same. Generally,
they worked in their respective sections, although occasionally, as needed, the
crew of one section would work in the other. Reed, who became woods foreman
in June 1945, was Johnson's supervisor. Throughout Johnson's employment, he
occupied a company-owned house at the woods camp, for which he paid 5 dollars
a month.
Johnson testified that about a week after the strike began , Reed told him "to
cut some wood" and that he refused to do so, whereupon Reed said that "if I
couldn't cut wood to move by the 15th." Reed's testimony fixes the morning of the
first day of the strike as the time of the conversation. His version is that he
asked Johnson "to go to work out there and help us push a gang . . . for
getting wood," and that Johnson refused to do so, stating that he "belonged to
the union" and that "he was going with the other boys " According to Reed, he
did not direct Johnson to move on that occasion. It was about a week later, Reed
testified, that he "asked him to vacate the house, that he wasn't going back to
work." Reed's statement to Johnson has revealing significance.
A. G. Scott, woods superintendent and Reed's superior, testified that he spoke
to Johnson about a week after the beginning of the strike. Scott gave the follow-
ing version of the conversation :
Robert, I understand you've quit, and he said, "Yes, Sir," he reckoned so.
I said, "All right, now Robert, you know the rules. If you quit, you are going
to have to move." "Well," he said, "I'll move just as quick as I can get a
place to move." I said , "All right."
Johnson also testified that he had a conversation with Scott about moving, but
he fixed the time as about 3 weeks after the beginning of the strike. Johnson
stated that Scott asked him whether Reed had given him orders to move, and
when he (Johnson) responded in the affirmative, Scott requested that he move the
following Tuesday. According to Johnson, he told Scott that he did not know
when he could move, and then he inquired , "What would they want to make me
move for ; what did they fire me for?" Johnson testified that Scott made no
response to his query. Scott did not deny that Johnson asked him the reason for
his discharge , and the undersigned credits Johnson's testimony that he made the
inquiry.
The variances in the respective accounts of the conversations Johnson had with
Reed and Scott are minor ands of no moment . The crucial facts are that Reed
and Scott asked Johnson to return to work while the strike was on , and upon
his refusal to do so, took the position that his employment was terminated, al-
though he had not, in fact, terminated it, but the Respondent had done so.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 819
This conclusion is fortified, not merely by the request that Johnson move, but
by the following testimony Scott gave :
Q. Do you know whether he had quit, or whether he had been fired or what
took place?
A. Well, he quit, he went out, that is he was off his job.
Q. He was not working any more?
A. That's my understanding. Here's the way I understood it, that neither
one of them could join the Union as long as they had the authority to hire
and fire men, like Mr. Goodwin and Robert. They was foremen. [Emphasis
supplied.]
In effect, what Scott was saying was that Goodwin and Johnson had no right
to join in the strike, and that the Respondent for that reason regarded their
employment as ended.29 However, the Respondent's unilateral assumption could
not sever the employment relation which continued throughout the strike, at
least in the absence of the replacement of the employees.80 The fact is that
Johnson (as did Goodwin) continued to regard himself as an employee, as
evidenced by his continued picketing activities and his application, with the
other employees, to resume his work after the conclusion of the strike ai In
short, the Respondent's conduct, which is placed in clear relief by its direction to
Johnson to vacate his home, constituted a discharge of the employee.
Johnson moved out of his house at the time the woods camp was abandoned,
which approximately coincided with the end of the strike. Like the other strik-
ing employees, he sought to return to work after the conclusion of the strike,
making his application to Reed. Reed told him his job had been eliminated 32
According to Johnson, he also applied to Scott at some unspecified date, but
Scott stated that he was not hiring any more foremen 32 The Examiner finds
29 The Respondent's evidence stressed the need for wood to maintain steam in the mill
shortly after the beginning of the strike. Scott testified, "All of the men we had cut wood,
foremen and all " Scott s testimony reflects his view that men "like Mr Goodwin and
Robert" had no right to participate in the strike. The Examiner finds that the Respondent
took the position that it was Johnson's duty to respond to its request, and that Johnson's
refusal to do so and to abandon the strike motivated the Respondent in discharging him.
20 N. L R. B v Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co , 304 U. S. 333.
2z The Examiner attaches no significance to the fact that, in responding to Scott's state-
ment (according to Scott) that he understood Johnson had "quit," the latter "reckoned"
that he had. Scott's "understanding" was in effect a conclusion which he thrust upon
Johnson In view of Johnson's status and his entire course of conduct, what he "reck-
oned" at the time Scott spoke to him has no real bearing on Johnson's actual relation to
the Respondent during the strike
32 Reed testified that Johnson asked for reinstatement twice and that on both occasions
he told Johnson that no opening was available.
37 Scott's testimony contains no explicit denial that he told Johnson he was not hiring
any more foremen . Scott testified that Johnson asked him "about a job" on two occasions.
He fixed the first as shortly before Reed resigned (March 1947) and stated he referred
Johnson to Reed. According to Scott, he spoke to Reed several days later and was informed
that Johnson "didn't show up " However, in view of Reed's testimony, it may be inferred
that Johnson did "show up" on that occasion, although probably after Reed's report to
Scott. The other occasion , Scott testified, occurred "a month or so after that, two or
three months, maybe," and at that time Johnson asked for a track-walker 's job. Scott
stated he told Johnson that the job was temporarily filled by a man who had been hurt at
"the loader ," but that when the injured man would be able to return to his regular work,
Johnson could have the track -walker 's job, "and when a job opens, you'll get your job back."
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Johnson made an application for reinstatement to his position to both Reed
and Scott and credits his testimony concerning what they told him.
D. The Respondent's claim that, Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson were
supervisors
The Respondent's brief argues that Goodwin and Robert Johnson were fore-
men and that, presumably,' the Board is thereby precluded from granting the
relief visualized by the complaint, including the prospective application of an
order directing the Respondent to cease and desist from committing unlawful
practice. The Respondent's position is without merit. The events in question
occurred before the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,
and at that time supervisors were covered as employees by the National Labor
Relations Act" The exclusionary provisions of the Amended Act do not retro-
actively preclude the issuance of an order requiring the reinstatement, with
reparation, of supervisors discharged prior to the amendatory legislation's
Moreover, the evidence does not sustain the view that Goodwin and Johnson
were supervisors within the meaning of the Amended Act. The Respondent's
evidence contains generalizations that Goodwin supervised the fireman and
brakeman on the train hauled by his locomotive, and that he had the power
to hire and fire. Goodwin testified that he "was just running the engine and
doing what (Reed) told me to do" and that he kept the time of the train crew
upon the Respondent's orders. Although asserting that Goodwin "was in charge"
of the train crew, Buckner testified that "generally" Reed or Scott gave Goodwin
his instructions each morning, but that "ordinarily every man knew his job and
knew what to do " [Emphasis supplied.] Asserting that Goodwin had a "perfect
right to hire and fire," Buckner could not "recall" any occasion when he had
done so. Similarly, Scott gave an account 'of Goodwin's duties which demon-
strates that they were of a routine nature, although affirming, also, that the
fireman and brakeman were "under" Goodwin. While Scott stated that the
According to Scott , he told Johnson to see the foreman who had replaced Reed , but John-
son did not do so. Johnson did not testify concerning this conversation . In any event,
it id clear that it did not constitute an offer to reinstate Johnson to his former position,
particularly in view of the finding made below that the evidence fails to establish that
Johnson 's job was "abolished ," as claimed by the Respondent.
u The Respondent 's brief does not clearly , if at all, point out what legal significance the
Respondent believes should be attached to its claim that Goodwin and Johnson were foremen.
Moreover , its answer does not interpose the claimed status as a bar to the proceeding. How-
ever, the Respondent adduced evidence , without objection from the General Counsel , bearing
on the employees ' alleged supervisory functions . While there is at least some doubt that
the Respondent has raised the question adequately , the Examiner has undertaken its con-
sideration and disposition.
35 Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B. 330 U . S. 485; N L . R. B. v. Skinner and Kennedy
Stationery Co., 113 F. (2d) 667 ( C. A. 8) and Matter of Budd Mfg . Co., 65 N . L R. B. 612,
enforced , N. L. R. B . v. Budd Mfg. Co., 162 F. (2d) 461 ( C. A. 6), certiorari granted, 332
U. S. 840 , and remanded on the limited question of the effect of the Amended Act on the
Board's order directing the employer "to cease and desist from discouraging membership
in the Foreman 's Association of America ," leaving in effect that part of the Board's order
directing the reinstatement of a supervisor ( so construed , on remand, by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 169 F . ( 2d) 571, certiorari denied by the Supreme Court on
January 10 , 1949 ). On remand , the Court of Appeals modified the order to inhibit its pro-
spective application , applying the Amended Act to that portion of the order although the
unfair labor practices occurred prior to the passage of the amendments. •
®^ Matter of Eastern Coal Corp., 79 N. L . R. B. 1165 ; Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 77
N. L. R. B . 1107 ; Matter of Califruit Canning Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 112 ; Matter of Autopart
Mfg. Co., 78 N. L. R. B. 481 ; N. L. R. B . v. Budd Mfg. Co., supra.
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 821
engineer "certainly did" have a right to hire and fire or to make recommenda.
tions to that end, he cited no actual instance of Goodwin's exercise of the
power, aside from a hearsay account (which for that reason the Examiner
cannot credit) that the engineer had fired someone in 1932. Reed, also, gener-
alized that Goodwin "had authority to tell them to do anything he wanted," but
stated that he "would give (Goodwin) the orders and then he would carry them
out, just carry them out like any of the rest of them." Reed's testimony is less
certain concerning Goodwin's right to hire and fire than the claims advanced by
Buckner and Scott. Reed stated that Goodwin "could discuss the matter and
pick a man." However, he asserted that the engineer had never done so "while
I was there."
It is evident that Goodwin's duties were of a routine nature, as were the
functions of the fireman and brakeman, and that the latter, like the engineer,
"knew (their) job, and knew what to do." There is no proof that Goodwin's sup-
posed "authority" to hire and fire was ever communicated to him and the
Examiner cannot credit a posteriori claims of the existence of the power, par-
ticularly in the absence of any probative evidence that it was ever used a4
Johnson was little more than a section hand, earning 46% cents an hour, and
performing routinized manual labor with the other members of the crew. There
was no evidence that his work was "responsibly to direct" the men under him.
On the contrary, whatever evidence there is of his work, it yields the conclusion
that his duties by their very nature were "merely routine," and not requiring
the "use of independent judgment." Johnson stated that prior to Reed's assump-
tion of the duties of woods foreman, he (Johnson) had authority to hire and
fire, but that when Reed became foreman, the latter took the authority away
from him
Reed denied that he had withdrawn the authority from Johnson, stating that
Johnson hired the men for the section crew and that "if he couldn't find one,
why I would hustle him up one."
Significantly, the Respondent did not produce the name of a single individual
hired or fired by Johnson during Reed's tenure. Generalizations and conclusions
may so often rest concealed in the term "authority" and are so subject to
misuse that the Respondent's failure to produce concrete evidence of Johnson's
exercise of his "authority" to hire and fire while Reed was foreman cannot be
ignored. Coupling that circumstance with his impression that Johnson was an
honest and reliable witness, the Examiner credits Johnson's testimony concern-
ing the withdrawal of his authority.
The Examiner concludes that it was not the function of Goodwin and Johnson
"responsibly to direct" the men in their respective crews ; that their duties were
"merely routine" and not requiring the "use of independent judgment" ; and that
there was no credible, probative evidence that, at the time in question, they had
the effective right to hire or fire or make recommendations with respect thereto.
For the reasons stated, Goodwin and Johnson cannot be regarded as supervisors
within the meaning of the Amended Act.88
:n Matter of Cole Instrument Co , 75 N L. R B. 348; Matter of Sterling Pulp and Paper
Go, 77 N. L. R. B. 63.
as See, among other cases , N. L. R. B . v. Browne and Sharpe Mfg. Co ., 169 F ( 2d) 331
(C. A. 1) ; Matter of Austin Co., 77 N. L R. B 938; Matter of Sterling Pulp and Paper Co,
77 N L . R. B. 63; Matter of Cole Instrument Co , 75 N L. R. B . 348; Matter of Providence
Public Market Co., 79 N . L. R. B. 1482 ; Matter of Ohio Power Co., 80 N . L R. B. 582;
Matter of A. S. Abell, 81 N. L . it. B. 82.
84440-50-vol. 83-53
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL' LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. The Respondent's claim that the jobs of Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert
Johnson have been abolished
The-Respondent also argues that an order directing the reinstatement of Good-,
win and Johnson would be inappropriate because the jobs formerly held by them
have been "abolished" by the elimination of 9 miles of track over which they
worked, and because their seniority status does not entitle them to reinstatement.
The track in question ran from the vicinity of the woods camp through por-
tions of the Respondent's timber holdings which had been denuded. Like the
camp, the use of the track was discontinued. ,
Although it is true that the Respondent discontinued a portion of its trackage,
it does not necessarily follow,from that that the jobs were abolished "auto-
matically," as Buckner put it. The nature of the firm's business and its opera-
tions did not change. All. that, the abandonment of the track meant was that
the company no longer operated in that portion of its apparently extensive timber
holdings. The work of Goodwin and Johnson was not peculiarly related to the
abandoned track ; it was merely the site where they usually performed their
work. They could as readily function in any other portions of the Respondent's
trackage which were not abandoned. The mere fact, as claimed by the Respond-
ent, that No. 55 has been used only infrequently since the strike has little
significance, since Goodwin could perform his work with another engine, as the
Respondent's evidence shows he sometimes did.
While Buckner testified that employees who performed work on the abandoned
track were, where possible, transferred to other jobs on a seniority basis, the
Examiner regards his testimony on this point as unreliable and not to be credited.
He affirmed that the wood-cutting job offered to Johnson was the one that was
"offered to him in lieu of the abolished" job. That is manifestly untrue. The
wood-cutting job was an emergency task which Reed asked Johnson to undertake
shortly after the strike began. The track was not abandoned until several
months later, according to the Respondent's own evidence. Buckner also asserted
that Goodwin, among other employees, was given consideration for another job
on the basis of seniority. The Examiner does not credit that testimony either.
In the letter written to Goodwin on April 20, 1946, Buckner himself took a
definitive position that Goodwin was no longer employed by the concern. It
seems quite improbable that upon the elimination of the track several months
later, Buckner would have Goodwin in mind for another position. The Examiner
does not credit Buckner's claim that he gave Goodwin consideration for
reinstatement.
Much of the Respondent's other evidence on the purported application of
seniority as a basis for determining which employees who worked on the aban-
doned track were to be given jobs elsewhere is evasive and unconvincing. The
firm employed another section foreman on what it called the main line, leading
from the mill to the "Y." He was not even clearly identified by name. When
questioned how long he had worked as a section foreman, Buckner said, "No.
I don't, but for several years," and asserted that he doesn't "recall" whether
the main line employee had worked for the concern longer than Johnson. Signifi-
cantly, the firm's records were not produced even for the purpose of refreshing
89 The Respondent suggests that the General Counsel has intimated that the removal of
the woods camp and the elimination of the track were accomplished with discriminatory
intent. The Examiner 'finds that the camp was-moved and the track eliminated in the
course of the Respondent's business and not with any intent to discriminate against its
employees or to interfere with the rights guaranteed to them by the Amended Act.
' J:-A'. BENTLEI'•-LLi1VIBER' "COM1ANi' -' 823
Bucks idr's recbllection.' Similarly, Scott stated that he didn't even know, the
-name of the other foreman, nor how long he had worked for the firm.
The Respondent's evidence concerning the seniority status of its locomotive
-engineers also,contains elements of vagueness and contradiction. Scott testified
that at the time of the strike three engines were in active operation, with a
fourth held in reserve, leaving the inference that there were three regular
'engineers . Buckner's testimony supported that inference. He stated there
were three engineers at the commencement of the strike, identifying them as
'Goodwin, a man named Rayborn (referred to as Rayburn in the transcript),
and another named'Hayden (apparently Hager who is also referred to. as Hegler
in the transcript). According to Buckner, Goodwin operated the engine on the
woods main line; Rayborn the locomotive on the main line. (from the mill to
the "Y") ; and Hager (apparently mistakenly named Hayden by the reporter)
the switch engine. Buckner asserted "the switch engine operated all over the
woods." However, Scott testified that Hager's "regular" work was that of a
fireman ; that the latter did not become a "regular engineer" until after 'the
strike, although he had been "running extra off and on for ... 12 or 15 years" ;
and that he regularly worked as a fireman on Goodwin's engine. If Scott's
testimony is correct, then the Respondent's evidence is susceptible to an infer-
ence that there were three regular engineers, but that Hager was not one of
them, thus raising a, question whether there was still another engineer who was
not identified and whether that individual had a seniority status inferior to that
of Goodwin." -
Goodwin testified that he had worked "continuously" for the firm since 1926.
Scott testified that Goodwin had "quit" at some unspecified time in 1945 for a
period of "10 or 12 days," thus, according to the Respondent, losing his seniority
to Hager (who was a fireman then) and to Rayborn who has been employed
by the company as an engineer since 1936. Scott first placed the incident in
1946, and then said, "I guess it was '45." Reed also testified to the incident,
stating that it was in " '45 I think." The Respondent did not produce its records
to make a definite identification of the period or that Goodwin was in fact
off the pay roll." The Respondent's failure to produce its pay-roll records and
the speculative character of its proof as to the time of the occurrence and the
period of Goodwin's absence makes it difficult to determine whether and when
Goodwin terminated his employment. On the basis of such evidence, a conclu-
sion that he had lost his seniority at a given time would not be warranted. 42
Perhaps the most persuasive factor to cast doubt upon the Respondent's claim
that the two jobs were "abolished" and that, on the basis of seniority, no other
jobs have been available for Goodwin and Johnson emerges from the Respond-
ent's own evidence. Buckner testified that the firm employed about 175 persons
40 The Examiner makes no finding whether there was in fact another engineer who was
not identified. The very fact that portions of the Respondent's proof are susceptible to an
inference that it employed an engineer besides those mentioned underlines the infirmities in
the Respondent's contention that it refused to reinstate Goodwin because he lacked suffi-
cient seniority.
41 According to Scott, Goodwin had "backed his empties into the loader," had become
angry, left his engine, and a day or two later asked Scott for his "time" and a letter of
recommendation. Scott agreed. The record is silent whether Goodwin was in fact given
his time Scott asserted that Goodwin "never did come" for the letter of recommendation
before he returned to work.
42 In view of the Examiner 's finding below that the Respondent has not established its
contention that Goodwin's job was abolished or that the application of rules of seniority
precluded his reinstatement after the strike, it is unnecessary to decide whether Goodwin,
in fact, quit for a few days in 1945.
824 DECISIONS OF- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at its peak of operations, and approximately 145 at the outbreak of the strike.
Yet, its own seniority list in effect at the time of the hearing shows that it
employed 250 persons at that time , from which it is reasonable to infer that it has
expanded its operations rather than curtailed them. Certainly , in the absence of
any proof concerning the functions of the employees and the nature and scope of
the Respondent 's operations since the strike , a finding that , the positions of
Goodwin and Johnson have been eliminated and that they cannot be restored to
former or substantially equivalent positions would be unwarranted . The Ex-
aminer concludes that the evidence fails to sustain the Respondent 's contention
that the two positions have been eliminated and that the application of its
seniority rules precludes the restoration of Goodwin and Johnson to their former
or substantially equivalent positions.48
F. Concluding findings
The Examiner makes the following concluding findings :
1. The occupancy by Goodwin and Robert Johnson of houses owned by the
Respondent was a term or condition of their employment.44
2. The Respondent discriminatorily discharged Goodwin and Robert Johnson
after they went on strike in concert with other employees , because both Goodwin
and Robert Johnson refused to return to work and to withdraw from the strike,
a concerted activity protected by the statute.
3. The Respondent directed and required Goodwin and Robert Johnson to
vacate the houses occupied by them, because they refused to return to work
during the strike and to withdraw from it.
4. The Respondent , after the conclusion of the strike on July 12 , 1946, dis-
criminatorily failed and refused to reinstate Goodwin and Robert Johnson to
their former positions , although requested by the employees to do so.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices with respect
to Earl Allen and Erwin Johnson.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above , occurring in
connection with its operations described in Section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade , traffic , and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, and more particularly , that it has violated Section 8 (a) (1) and.8' (a)
(3) of the Amended Act, the Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
43 The Respondent also urges that Goodwin and Johnson have found "substantially
equivalent employment" and that such a circumstance precludes the issuance of an order
directing their reinstatement . The Respondent ' s legal premise is inaccurate . The Board
has power to direct the reinstatement of Goodwin and Johnson , with back pay, even if they
have secured " substantially equivalent employment " elsewhere ( upon which the Examiner
does not undertake to pass ) if it finds that such an order will effectuate the policies of
the statute (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R . B., 313 U. S. 177). In the judgment of the
Examiner, the facts in this proceeding warrant such an order and he concludes that it
will effectuate the policies of the statute.
44 Matter of Great Western Mushroom Company , 27 N. L. R. B. 352 ; Matter of Abbott
Worsted Mills , 36 N. L . It. B. 545, enforced , N. L. it. B. v. Abbott Worsted Mills, 127 F.
(2d) 438 ( C. A. 1).
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 825
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged and failed and,
refused to reinstate Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson, the Examiner will
recommend that the Respondent offer the named employees immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions 45 without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges and to make thefn
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered, by reason of the Respondent's
discrimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal
to the respective amounts which they would normally have earned as wages from
July 15, 1946, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less their respective net
earnings during such perlod.'0
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily required and directed
Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson to vacate dwellings owned by the Re-
spondent, whether such conduct constitutes a violation of Section 8 (a) (1)14 or
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Amended Act, the Examiner will recommend that
upon such offer of reinstatement of the said Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert
Johnson, the Respondent immediately offer to them occupancy of their former
or substantially equivalent living quarters in dwellings owned by the Respondent,
upon the same terms accorded to other employees.
Having found that the Respondent discharged and failed and refused to rein-
state the said Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson, and required and directed
the said employees to vacate dwellings owned by the Respondent, because they
exercised the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Amended Act, the
Examiner will recommend that the Respondent be directed, in any like or similar
manner'41 to cease and desist from -interfering with, restraining or coercing its
employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, to the extent provided by law.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and of the entire record in this
proceeding, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local 434, is a labor organ-
ization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Amended Act.
2. By discriminating in regard-to the tenure, terms and conditions of employ-
ment of Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson, the Respondent discouraged
membership in a labor organization, as defined in the Amended Act, in violation
of Section 8 (a) of the said Act, and has interfered with, restrained, and
In accordance with the Board's consistent interpretation of the term, the expression,
"former or substantially equivalent position," Is intended to mean "former position wher-
ever possible, but if such position is no longer in existence, then to a substantially equiva-
lent position " See Matter of The Chase National Bank of The City of New York, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 N. L. It. B. 827.
49 Matter of Crossett Lumber Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 440, 497-498.
44 The Board can exercise its affirmative remedial power under Section 10 (c), in order
to effectuate the purposes of the statute, if discriminatory conduct offends Section 8 (a)
(1). Matter of Rockingham Poultry Marketing Cooperative, Inc., 59 N. L. R. B. 486;
Matter of Ever Ready Label Corporation, 54 N. L R. B. 551 ; Matter of Sandy Hill Iron
and Brass Works, 55 N. L. R. B. 1 ; Matter of Texas Textile Mills, 58 N. L. R. B. 352.
48 There was no proof that the Respondent had engaged in any other acts of interfer-
ence, restraint, or coercion than those outlined above, and the Respondent had since nego-
tiated a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Hence, the Examiner recom-
mends that the direction to cease and desist from interference, restraint, or coercion
contain the limitation , "in any like or similar manner," indicated above.
-26 DECISIONS OF-NATIONAL LABOR,-RELATIONS BOARD
Coerced the said employees In-the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by said
Section 7, in -violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the said Amended Act. -
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning, of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Amended Act. -
4. The -Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices by failing
or refusing to- reinstate Earl Allen and Erwin Johnson.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and of the
entire record of this proceeding, the Examiner recommends that J. A. Bentley
Lumber Company of Alexandria, Louisiana, its trustees, successors and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in any labor organization of its employees by
discharging or failing or refusing to reinstate them, or by requiring or directing
-them to vacate dwellings occupied by them, or in any other manner discriminat-
ing against them in regard to their tenure or any term or condition of employment ;
(b) In any like or similar manner , interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid and protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Amended Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the undersigned ' finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Samuel L. Goodwin and Robert Johnson immediate and full rein-
statement to their former,or substantially equivalent positions, and immediate
occupancy of their former or substantially equivalent living quarters in dwellings
owned by the Respondent, upon the same terms accorded to other employees, and
make the said named employees whole in the manner set forth in Section V, above,
entitled "The remedy" ;
(b) Post at its plant in Zimmerman, Louisiana, copies of the notice attached
hereto and marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region , after being duly signed by repre-
sentatives of the Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days
thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees
customarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by other material; and
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region (New Orleans,
Louisiana), in writing within twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Inter-
mediate Report and Recommended Order what steps Respondent has taken to
'comply herewith.
The Examiner recommends that so much of the complaint as alleges that
the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices by failing or refusing to
reinstate Earl Allen and Erwin Johnson be dismissed.
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board-Series 5, as amended August 18, 1948, any party may,
within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring
the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations,
file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and
six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report and Recommended Order or to any other part of the record or
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY 827
proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon,
together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any
party may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in
support of the Intermediate Report and Recommended Order. Immediately
upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the
same shall serve a copy upon each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions
and briefs shall designate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon
and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed, and if mimeographed shall be
double spaced. Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the
..Board shall be promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further
provided in said Section 203.46, should any party desire permission to argue
orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board
within ten (10) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case
to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions,
and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 16th day of February 1949.
HERMAN MARX,
APPENDIX A
Trial Examiner.
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in any labor organization of our
employees by discharging or failing or refusing to reinstate them, or by
requiring or directing them to vacate dwellings occupied by them, or in any
other manner discriminating against them in regard to their tenure or any
term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection as guaranteed in
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL OFFER to the employees named below immediate and full rein-
statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed,
and immediate occupancy of their former or substantially equivalent living
quarters in dwellings owned by us, upon the same terms accorded to our
other employees, and make the said named employees whole for any loss of
pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Samuel L. Goodwin Robert'Johnson
J. A. BENTLEY LUMBER COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------------ By ------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 6Q days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.