ITT Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 10, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 4 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4
ITT Industries, Inc. and International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO.
Case 7–CA–40946
May 10, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On May 5, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Martin J.
Linsky issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
The General Counsel also filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions,
except as modified here, and to adopt his recommended
Order as modified.
The General Counsel has excepted, inter alia, to the
judge’s finding that the Respondent did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) when two of its supervisors prohibited em-
ployee Karen Richardson from talking with other em-
ployees about the Union during work. We find merit in
the exception.
Richardson was an active union supporter and a mem-
ber of the Union’s organizing committee. On May 7,
1998, the Respondent’s Tawas City plant manager, Rod
Kaschner, summoned prounion employee Karen Rich-
ardson to his office. Jeff Binder, Richardson’s immedi-
ate supervisor, was also present. Kaschner told Richard-
son that he had received complaints from a few employ-
ees about her talking about the Union. He told Richard-
son that she was not to talk about the Union on the pro-
duction floor anymore to anyone, that such conversations
should be kept outside, in the lunchroom, and on off
time. Kaschner and Binder refused to tell Richardson
which employees had complained.
Richardson wrote a statement of what had been said at
the May 7 meeting and sent it to Kaschner. In a memo-
randum dated May 8, Kaschner replied, inter alia:

You are entitled to your opinion and personal goals and
they will not be interfered as long as it does not inter-
fere with production in work areas.
The point again of the whole meeting was if an
individual is not interested in talking with you about
union activities, you should respect their wishes and
avoid such discussions.

1 In adopting the judge's dismissal of the allegation that the Respon-
dent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by the manner in which its supervisor, Tony
Orlando, drove his vehicle near some handbilling employees on May 5,
1998, we do not rely on Orlando’s state of mind. Instead, we find that
the General Counsel failed to present sufficient objective evidence
demonstrating that the employees could reasonably believe that Or-
lando’s reckless driving was directed against union activity.

As a result of the May 7 meeting, Richardson stopped
talking about the Union for about 7 days. She then felt
free to start talking about the Union again. No discipline
resulted.
The Respondent has a no-solicitation rule in its hand-
book. The rule, which is valid on its face, prohibits “all
solicitations of any kind by any employee during work-
ing time.” In practice, however, the Respondent permit-
ted employees and managers to talk about various sub-
jects while at their workstations as long as it did not in-
terfere with production and to engage in a variety of so-
licitation activities, usually for some charitable cause.
The judge found that Kaschner and Binder did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when they told Richardson
not to talk to employees about the Union on the produc-
tion floor. He noted that Richardson admitted talking to
one employee who said she did not like the Union and
that Richardson resumed her union solicitation activities
a week after management’s admonition without any ad-
verse consequences. The judge concluded that the Re-
spondent “was essentially telling Richardson not to
bother her fellow employees at least one of whom had
complained and I see at most a de minimus or insignifi-
cant infringement on Karen Richardson’s Section 7
rights.” We do not agree.
It is well established that “[w]here an employer forbids
employees to discuss unionization on worktime but permits
discussion of other subjects unrelated to work, the disparate
rule is itself unlawful.” Jennie-O Foods, 301 NLRB 305,
316 (1991) (citation omitted). In this case, notwithstanding
the existence of a rule in the employee handbook banning
all solicitations during working time, the Respondent per-
mitted employees and managers alike to engage in discus-
sion and solicitation on the production floor. When some
unidentified employees complained about Richardson’s
union solicitation activities, however, Kaschner and Binder
responded by warning Richardson on May 7 not to engage
in any discussion of the Union with any employee on the
production floor. This disparate treatment was a clear viola-
tion of Richardson’s statutory rights.2
Furthermore, contrary to the judge, the violation was not
de minimus. Neither Richardson’s subjective reaction to
the warning (i.e., her willingness to resume solicitation
activities 7 days after the warning) nor the failure of the
Respondent to take any further action against her are de-
terminative on this point. In and of itself, a disparate
prohibition of union solicitation activity by a prominent
2 Nor do we find that Kaschner’s memo of May 8 constituted a suffi-
cient clarification or reupudiation of the May 7 comments. Indeed, the
memo did not alter the disparate nature of the Respondent’s treatment
of Richardson’s union acitivities. There is no evidence that the Respon-
dent had previously concerned itself with whether employees wished to
be subjected to the numerous kinds of nonunion discussion and solicita-
tion freely permitted on the production floor.
331 NLRB No. 7
ITT INDUSTRIES 5
prounion employee is an unfair labor practice warranting
remedy. Moreover, this disparate no-solicitation rule
must be considered in the context of the Respondent’s
contemporaneous attempts to limit off-duty employees
from engaging in solicitation activities in its parking lot.
The judge found, and we affirm, that these actions violated
Section 8(a)(1). Under these circumstances, we reject the
view that any restriction of Richardson’s rights was de
minimus and does not require Board remedial action.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge, as
modified below, and orders that the Respondent, ITT
Industries, Inc., Oscoda, East Tawas, and Tawas City,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(b) and reletter the
subsequent paragraph accordingly.
“(b) Disparately prohibiting employees from talking
about the Union.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the adminis-
trative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT deny our off-duty employees access to
our parking lots for the purpose of distributing union
campaign materials.
WE WILL NOT prohibit our employees from talking
about the Union during work while we permit other
kinds of employee discussion and solicitation.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL permit off-duty employees, whether or not
they are assigned to any particular facility, access to our
parking lots for the purpose of distributing union cam-
paign materials.
ITT INDUSTRIES, INC.
Jerry Schmidt, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard Hawkins, Esq., of Atlanta, Georgia, and Robert P.
Harris, Esq., of White Plains, New York, for the Respon-
dent.
Kenneth Bieber, International Representative, of Grand Rap-
ids, Michigan, and Diana Ketolo, International Representa-
tive, of Traverse City, Michigan, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARTIN J. LINSKY, Administrative Law Judge. On May 7
and 13, 1998, a charge and amended charge in Case 7–CA–
40946 were filed by the International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, UAW, AFL–CIO (the Union) against ITT Industries, Inc.
(Respondent).1
On November 6, 1998, the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board), by the Acting Regional Director for Region 7,
issued a complaint, which was amended at the hearing before
me, which alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act when on April 28 and May 14, 1998, it prohibited em-
ployees from engaging in legitimate handbilling activity in
support of the Union in the employee parking lot during non-
worktime, when on May 5, 1998, one of Respondent’s supervi-
sors drove a vehicle recklessly and dangerously close to em-
ployees engaged in legitimate handbilling activities in support
of the Union, and when on May 7, 1998, two of Respondent’s
supervisors disparately prohibited a supporter of the Union
from talking about the Union.
Respondent filed an answer in which it denied that it violated
the Act in any way.
A hearing was held before me in Tawas City, Michigan, on
January 20 and 21, 1999.
Upon the entire record in this case, to include posthearing
briefs submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent, and
upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, Respondent, a corporation with offices
and places of business located in Oscoda, East Tawas, and
Tawas City, Michigan, has been engaged in manufacturing
automotive parts and related products.
Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times it has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times the
Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview
Respondent has three facilities in northeast Michigan called
the northern plants. They are located in Oscoda, East Tawas,
and Tawas City, Michigan.

1 The name of the Respondent was corrected at the hearing before
me from ITT Automotive Division of ITT Corporation to ITT Indus-
tries, Inc.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6
Approximately 600 employees work at the Oscoda plant and
approximately 180 employees work at each of the other two
plants in East Tawas and Tawas City.
The three plants are within easy commute of one another as
reflected in General Counsel’s Exhibit 18, a map. In addition,
employees have transferred from one plant to another over the
years. Indeed in 1998, 18 employees were transferred between
the three plants. (See G.C. Exh. 17.)
Back in 1994, the Union began an organizing drive among
Respondent’s employees. A representational election was held
on March 30, 1995, for a unit that included employees at all
three plants. The Union lost the election. Thereafter, the Un-
ion filed unfair labor practice charges and a complaint issued.
A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Marion
C. Ladwig in February 1996. Judge Ladwig found that Re-
spondent had violated the Act and, among other remedies, or-
dered that the election results be set aside and a new election
ordered. The Board affirmed Judge Ladwig’s decision. See
ITT Automotive, 324 NLRB 609 (1997). The Board agreed
with Judge Ladwig that the election results should be set aside
and a new election held. Respondent is contesting the Board’s
decision before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit. A decision by the court is pending.
A second election petition was filed on June 10, 1998, and an
election scheduled for July 30, 1998. Again, the unit was to be
the employees of Respondent employed at all three plants. On
July 25, 1998, the Union withdrew the election petition. Prior
to the election petition being withdrawn the Union had filed the
unfair labor practice charge and amended charge, which re-
sulted in the issuance of the complaint in the instant case.
The allegations in the complaint, as amended at hearing, al-
lege unfair labor practices by Respondent during the union
organizing campaign in April and May 1998 prior to the July
30, 1998 second election, which never took place. The election
again was to be among the employees at all three plants. In
other words, one unit of approximately 960 employees from all
three plants. Respondent stipulated that the appropriate unit
would be the employees from all three plants.
B. Handbilling Activities
On April 28 and May 14, 1998, several employees of Re-
spondent handbilled in support of the Union in the parking lot
of the East Tawas plant. The employees were employees of the
Respondent who worked at the Oscoda plant. The parking lot
at the East Tawas plant is surrounded by a 6-foot high cyclone
fence and has approximately 110 parking spaces. The gates to
the parking lot are locked on the weekends but not during the
week.
On April 28, 1998, a Thursday, approximately seven em-
ployees of Respondent, who work at the Oscoda plant, hand-
billed in the parking lot beginning at approximately 6 a.m. The
handbills set out employee rights under the Act and the em-
ployees also had a union organizing petition, which they
wanted the East Tawas employees to sign.
The superintendent of the East Tawas plant, Jeff Minnick,
who previously worked at the Oscoda plant, in the company of
Supervisor Bruce Curtis, told the handbillers that they were on
private property and had to leave. The handbillers told him that
they were employees of Respondent but he said they had to
leave the parking lot and do their handbilling outside the fence.
On Thursday, May 5, 1998, a group of approximately seven
of Respondent’s employees who worked in the Oscoda plant
handbilled outside the parking lot of the East Tawas plant and
off of Respondent’s property.
On Thursday, May 14, 1998, once again a group of approxi-
mately eight of Respondent’s employees who worked at the
Oscoda plant handbilled on the parking lot at Respondent’s
East Tawas plant beginning at approximately 6 a.m. Again
Plant Superintendent Jeff Minnick told them they had to leave
the parking lot even though the handbillers again identified
themselves as employees of Respondent.
On April 28 and May 14, 1998, Respondent’s employees
from the Oscoda plant were accompanied by UAW Field Rep-
resentative Diana Ketolo. Ketolo credibly testified and was
corroborated by several witnesses that only employees of Re-
spondent entered onto the East Tawas plant parking lot. Ketola
stayed outside the fence and off the parking lot and off of Re-
spondent’s property.
On all three dates, the employees wore union pins, hats, and
T-shirts clearly proclaiming that they were part of a union or-
ganizing campaign.
On both April 28 and May 14, 1998, the employees were
told to leave the parking lot because they were trespassing.
An employer can certainly restrict handbilling and soliciting
on its property by nonemployees. See, e.g., Lechmere v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527 (1992). Lechmere does not apply to off-duty
employees. Nashville Plastic Products, 313 NLRB 462, 463
(1993). However, as the Board has held when addressing the
issue of no-access rules concerning off-duty employees that
such a rule is valid only if it “(1) limits access solely with re-
spect to the interior of the plant and other working areas; (2) is
clearly disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-
duty employees seeking access to the plant for any purpose and
not just to those employees engaging in union activity. Finally,
except where justified by business reasons, a rule which denies
off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and other out-
side nonworking areas will be found invalid.” Tri-County
Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089, 1089 (1976). Respondent’s
employees from the Oscoda plant who handbilled on the East
Tawas plant parking lot were off duty. In addition, employees
of the employer who work at one plant are still considered em-
ployees of the employer if they handbill at another of the em-
ployer’s plants. See, e.g., Southern California Gas Co., 321
NLRB 551 (1996), and Postal Service, 318 NLRB 466 (1995).
The business reasons put forth by Respondent to restrict its
own off-duty employees from handbilling in the parking lot are
woefully inadequate to warrant this limitation on employee
protected activity, i.e., claims of possible vandalism, which are
negated by Respondent’s policy of permitting entry onto the
parking lot of spouses, children, or friends to drop off or pick
up employees who work at the East Tawas plant. There was
also evidence that a few years earlier the window of a car
parked in the parking lot shattered but no one knew why and a
few years earlier the lug nuts on the right front tire were loos-
ened on a supervisor’s vehicle a few weeks after he fired an
employee. Respondent, however, never installed security cam-
eras or even requested the police to patrol the area.
Again, off-duty employees of Respondent who worked at the
Oscoda plant were banned on April 28 and May 14, 1998, from
distributing union literature during a union organizing cam-
paign to their fellow employees in the parking lot of the East
Tawas plant. The unit which the union sought to represent and
which Respondent conceded was the appropriate unit included
employees at the Oscoda plant (where the handbilling employ-
ITT INDUSTRIES 7
ees worked), the Tawas City and the East Tawas plants (where
the parking lot was located). The issue of alternative means of
communicating its message such as radio, television, and
newspaper ads is relevant only if nonemployees are the hand-
billers.
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it de-
nied its off-duty employees access to its parking lot for the
purpose of engaging in the distribution of union campaign lit-
erature and the soliciting of signatures on a union organizing
petition.
C. Incident Involving Vehicle Driven by Supervisor
Tony Orlando
On May 5, 1998, several of Respondent’s employees from
the Oscoda plant were handbilling by the gate to the parking lot
of the East Tawas plant. It is alleged that Tony Orlando, a su-
pervisor, drove his vehicle recklessly and dangerously close to
some handbilling employees.
On May 4, 1998, Tony Orlando, a supervisor at the East Ta-
was plant, had gone to court with his 15-year-old son who was
in trouble with the law. The son was 15 years old.
The court ordered that Orlando’s son be taken out of the
family home and put in a group home. Orlando went to work
that night on his usual 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift.
When he got off work on the morning of May 5, 1998, he
was not unreasonably very upset because of his son and very
tired because he’d had no chance to sleep during the day of
May 4 because of his son’s situation. He drove in an inappro-
priate manner. In order to get around a car stopped at the gate
he popped the clutch on his vehicle and took off with his tires
squealing.
Some of the handbillers thought Orlando, in driving erratic-
ally, came close to hitting them. Fortunately no one was hurt.
Orlando admits he drove in an inappropriate manner but did
so because of his emotional state occasioned by his problems
with his son and not because of any union animus. I believe
him. It makes more sense to believe that a man coming off the
midnight shift is upset and drives inappropriately risking by-
standers because he is distraught about his young son being
removed from the family home than to believe he drives in the
fashion he drove because some employees were handbilling.
Because of a lack of union animus on Orlando’s part on May
5, 1998, I find no violation of Federal labor law based on Or-
lando’s actions. The traffic law may well have been violated
but I have no jurisdiction in that area.
D. Restriction in Talking about the Union
Karen Richardson is an employee of Respondent who previ-
ously worked at the East Tawas plant but transferred to the
Tawas City plant close to 10 years ago. She was very active on
behalf of the Union and a member of the organizing committee.
It is uncontested that employees are allowed to talk about
various subject matters while at their work station provided it
doesn’t interfere with production. Karen Richardson wore a
union T-shirt and union buttons to work and talked in favor of
the Union with her fellow employees. Sometimes they ap-
proached her and sometimes she approached them.
On May 7, 1998, she had a meeting with Plant Manager Rod
Kaschner and her immediate supervisor, Jeff Binder. After the
meeting, she wrote down what had occurred. Her statement
was received in evidence as General Counsel’s Exhibit 7. Her
statement of what happened on May 7, 1998, is as follows:

Jeff Binder came to my testing board, F8AH-19C827-
AA, and asked me to go speak to Rod Kaschner in Rods
office. The time was 9:15 A.M. I asked Jeff if it could
wait because I was working with two other people in a
cluster. Jeff said it’d take only one minute.
Rod asked me to sit down. He then said he has had a
few people on the floor complaining to him about me talk-
ing about union related activities and union information to
them and they were offended. He told me then that any
more conversations about the union were to be kept out-
side, in the lunchroom and on my off time. He said I
wasn’t to be talking about the union on the floor any more
to anyone.
I said I don’t believe that any one has really com-
plained about me and that they were trying to harass me. I
said if you really did have a complaint from someone, I
have a right to face my accuser. I said I think you are ly-
ing about this. I said everyone I have ever talked to about
the union has never said or showed any sign of being upset
about the conversations. In fact everyone has been pleas-
ant about it.
I tried to leave then and Jeff Binder told me to stay and
sit down.
Rod then said there have been some complaints and
Jeff said, yes Karen there has been complaints.
I repeated myself about letting me face any accusers. I
said if someone really is complaining how am I suppose-
to-know not to talk to that person if I don’t know who it
is? I said I believe this is just your way of harassing me
and trying to intimidate me. I said I know I have my
rights. I can talk to anyone on the floor as long as they let
me and as long as other people are allowed to walk around
and talk. I then tried to leave again.
Jeff Binder told me to stay and sit down. I stayed
standing at the door. He asked me to sit down again so I
did.
Rod then asked me if I was going to shut up for a little
bit and let him talk for a change? So I shut up and sat still.
Rod said that he wouldn’t let me know who made this
complaint to protect that person. He said that is what he
and Jeff were for. So people who couldn’t speak to me
had someone to go to and speak for them. Rod said it was
his place to bring it to my attention. He said some people
are afraid to tell me that I am bothering them.
I said I don’t believe them because I haven’t been talk-
ing to people hardly at all on the floor. I said as long as I
don’t know who these, suppose of, complaining people are
I’m not going to know who not to talk to because everyone
I have talked to have been pleased to talk with me or that’s
the impression they give. I said as long as Tim DeWald
can stand at Julies board on Monday morning for 25 min-
utes and talk I can stand around and talk. I said this is har-
assment and you’re trying to intimidate me. I said I’m
very proud for what I’m doing and what I stand for. I also
said I was very pleased with how people are dealing with
this and I’m glad about the way things are going so far.
Rod and Jeff both said they were not harassing me.
I got ready to leave for the fourth time and knowbody
[sic] said anything to stop me. I looked at both of them
and waited a second and then left.
Jeff gave Ruth, Mary and I .20 down time for the 10
minute interruption in our production.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8

Neither Rod Kaschner nor Jeff Binder testified but the Gen-
eral Counsel moved into evidence as General Counsel’s Exhibit
8 a statement of Rod Kaschner commenting about Karen
Richardson’s memo set out above. Kaschner’s statement, dated
May 8, 1998, is as follows:

Karen

I received your letter dated May 7, 1998. I basically
agree with your quotes of Jeff’s, and my statements. We
certainly have a difference of opinion about what other
employees had said. We have not made up any of these
concerns brought to your attention. You are entitled to
your opinion and personal goals and they will not be inter-
fered as long as it does not interfere with production in
works areas.
The point again of the whole meeting was if an indi-
vidual is not interested in talking with you about union ac-
tivities, you should respect their wishes and avoid such
discussions.

Thank You

Karen Richardson testified that a few days before her meet-
ing with Rod Kaschner and Jeff Binder that she had spoken
about the Union with a fellow employee who told her that he
didn’t like the Union. She also testified that her encounters
with Kaschner and Binder caused her to cease and desist from
talking about the Union for about 7 days and then she felt free
to say what she wanted. She was not disciplined.
In light of the above I do not find that the Act was violated
because management was essentially telling Richardson not to
bother her fellow employees at least one of whom had com-
plained to them and I see at most a de minimus or insignificant
infringement on Karen Richardson’s Section 7 rights.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By denying off-duty employees access to its parking lot at
the East Tawas plant for the purpose of distributing union cam-
paign materials, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
The remedy in this case should include a cease-and-desist
order and the posting of an appropriate notice at all three of
Respondent’s northern plants.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, ITT Industries, Inc., East Tawas, Tawas
City, and Oscoda, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Denying its off-duty employees access to its parking lots
for the purpose of engaging in the distribution of union cam-
paign materials.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Permit its off-duty employees, whether or not those em-
ployees are assigned to that particular facility, access to its
parking lots for the purpose of distributing union campaign
materials.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in East Tawas, Tawas City, and Oscoda, Michigan, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
7, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized represen-
tative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed any of the facilities involved in these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and for-
mer employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
April 28, 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted By Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgement of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”