01A30630_r
03-19-2003
Isaiah Williams, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (United States Marshals Service) Agency.
Isaiah Williams v. Department of Justice
01A30630
March 19, 2003
.
Isaiah Williams,
Complainant,
v.
John Ashcroft,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
(United States Marshals Service)
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A30630
Agency No. M02-0040
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the final
agency decision dated September 20, 2002, dismissing his complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
791 et seq.
The record reflects that during the relevant time, complainant was a
Court Security Officer (CSO) through a corporate entity identified as
AKAL Security, Inc. and worked at the agency's United States Courthouse
of the Southern District of Georgia in Savannah, Georgia.
In his formal complaint dated July 8, 2002, complainant alleged that he
was subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability when on April
16, 2002, he was terminated from his position of Court Security Officer
(CSO), without notice. Complainant claimed that he was instructed to
take a follow-up hearing test without the use of his hearing aids, and
that the medical information from that test was used to terminate him
from his position with AKAL Security. Complainant further claimed that
there was no attempt to accommodate his disability while other CSOs with
similar disability were accommodated.
The agency dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on the
grounds that complainant
was employed by the AKAL Security, Inc., under a contract with the
agency. The agency found that complainant did not meet the common law
of agency test necessary to satisfy requirements for employee standing.
Specifically, the agency stated that complainant was a contract employee
at the time of the alleged discrimination. The agency found that AKAL
Security controlled the "means and manner" of complainant's performance;
that the contractor was complainant's supervisor; and that the contractor
paid complainant's salary and provided him with vacation and retirement
benefits. Further, the agency argued that equipment necessary for
complainant's position was provided by the contractor. Moreover,
the agency found that complainant was medically disqualified from his
position because he did not meet the medical standards and functional
requirements to perform safely the duties of the CSO position pursuant
to the contract between the agency and AKAL Security. According to
the agency, in any event a CSO fails to meet the medical standards,
the contract only requires AKAL to remove the CSO from performing on
the contract. The agency stated that the complainant's employer, AKAL
Security, removed him from his CSO position, and not the agency.
The record in this case contains a document identified as the United
States Marshals Service, Judicial Security Division. Therein, Section
B-1(a) "Description of Services" lists the contractor's responsibilities
and requirements with the agency.
Before the Commission or the agency can consider whether the agency has
discriminated against complainant in violation of Title VII, it first
must determine whether complainant is an agency employee or applicant
for employment within the meaning of Section 717(a) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(a)
et seq.
The Commission has applied the common law of agency test to determine
whether complainant is an agency employee under Title VII. See Ma
v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Appeal No. 01962390 (June
1, 1998) (citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. et al v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)). Specifically, the Commission will look to the
following non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) the extent of the employer's
right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance; (2)
the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work is usually done
under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without
supervision; (3) the skill required in the particular occupation; (4)
whether the �employer� or the individual furnishes the equipment used and
the place of work; (5) the length of time the individual has worked; (6)
the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (7) the manner in
which the work relationship is terminated, i.e., by one or both parties,
with or without notice and explanation; (8) whether annual leave is
afforded; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the
�employer�; (10) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11)
whether the �employer� pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention
of the parties. See Ma v. Department of Health and Human Services, supra.
In Ma, the Commission noted that the common-law test contains, �no
shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the
answer...[A]ll of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive.� Id., (citations omitted).
The Commission in Ma also noted that prior applications of the test
established in Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
using many of the same elements considered under the common law test,
was not appreciably different from the common law of agency test. See Id.
Under this test, the Commission finds that complainant was not an
employee with the agency. The record contains evidence reflecting that
complainant was paid, supervised and disciplined by contractor employees.
The record reflects that equipment necessary for complainant's position
was provided by the contractor; that insurance benefits and vacation were
provided by the contractor. Moreover, in his complaint and statement on
appeal, complainant identified himself as an employee of AKAL Security,
a private company contracted by the U.S. Marshal's Service to provide
court security. Under such circumstances, the Commission determines
that complainant was not an agency employee.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's
dismissal of the instant complaint.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 19, 2003
__________________
Date