Iron Workers Local 627 (National Steel)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1990

298 N.L.R.B. 29 (N.L.R.B. 1990)

IRON WORKERS LOCAL 627 (NATIONAL STEEL) 29
International Association of Bridge , Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers , Shopmen's Local
627, AFL-CIO (National Steel and Shipbuilding
Company) and Robert Loftis and Armando
Barron and Danilo B. Quileza . Cases 21-CB-
10366, 21-CB-10372, and 21-CB-10376
March 30, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
named above on various dates in October 1988,1 and a
consolidated complaint issued December 19. The funda-
mental allegation of the case is that International Asso-
ciation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, Shopmen 's Local 627, AFL-CIO (Respondent or the
Union), restrained and coerced employees within the
meaning of, and in violation of, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On September 13, 1989, Administrative Law
Judge David G. Heilbrun issued the attached deci-
sion. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed excep-
tions, a supporting brief, and an answering brief to
the General Counsel's exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, fmdings,1 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent , International
Association of'Bridge , Structural and Ornamental
Iron Workers, Shopmen 's Local 627, AFL-CIO, it
officers , agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.
IIn Machinists Lodge 1233 (General Dynamics), 284 NLRB 1101
(1987), on which the judge relied, the Board held that fines unposed for
working on the day an employee' s resignation was received violated the
Act because the employee returned to work after the resignation was re-
ceived Where the record contained no evidence regarding which oc-
curred earlier on the critical day-i.e., receipt of the resignation or cross-
ing the picket line-the Board stated that "absent direct contrary evi-
dence" it would presume the resignation was received an hour before the
employee crossed the picket line. Id al 1102 fn 9. Here, the record fails
to show at what time the five individuals reported to work the day their
resignations were received. Accordingly, the Respondent did not rebut
the presumption, and the judge correctly found that the fines imposed for
working on the day the Union received the employees' resignations vio-
lated the Act.
Robert R. Petering, for the General Counsel.
Richard D. Prochazka, APC, by Michael S. Villeneuve, of
San Diego , California, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID G. HEILBRUN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried at San Diego, California, on February 21
and April 5, 1989. Charges were filed by the individuals
1. JURISDICTION
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO)
is a Nevada corporation engaged in the construction and
repair of ships for the U.S. Navy, operating a shipyard in
San Diego, California, where it annually purchases and
receives goods and products valued in excess of $50,000
directly from suppliers located outside the State of Cali-
fornia. Such operations of NASSCO have a substantial
impact on the national defense of the United States. On
these admitted facts I find that it is an employer engaged
in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
As also admitted, I find that Respondent is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The principal issues raised by the pleadings are first,
whether Armando Barron effectively resigned from the
Union by his oral statement to a union official prior to
crossing the Union's picket line or whether his utterance
was not a clear intention to resign at that time.
Second, whether Respondent's court-collectible fines
against Robert Loftis, Barron, Danilo B. Quileza, Adolfo
Lopez, and Carlos Torres are for both preresignation and
postresignation activity and therefore a violation and ap-
portionable,2 or whether the fines are solely for preresig-
nation activity and a valid internal union matter not sub-
ject to Board scrutiny as to reasonableness, and not an
8(b)(1)(A) violation of the Act.
B. Basis for Analysis
Loftis, Barron, Quileza, Lopez, and Torres, all em-
ployees of NASSCO, were members in good standing of
Respondent at the commencement of a strike during the
late summer of 1988. Barron and Lopez were standing
outside the main entrance of this company on strike as
Manuel Ruiz, business agent of Respondent, approached
and initiated an exchange.
The episode opened at approximately 9 :30 a.m. on
Friday, August 19, when Ruiz approached Barron with
an inquiry about picketing on Saturday.3 Barron prompt-
ly and plainly declined. Barron testified that Ruiz asked
him the reason, which he gave as simply not wanting to.
i All dates are in 1988, unless otherwise indicated.
2 Barron would be included in this group absent an effective oral resig-
nation.
3 A later answer to Ruiz by participant Lopez that his own picketing
duty would be fulfilled the next day does not require further comment.
298 NLRB No. 7
30 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ruiz rejoined that he could be subject to a fine. Lopez
added the assertion that Ruiz quoted $25 as the amount
of a prospective fine for members not picketing.
Barron and Ruiz testified that Barron next said he was
"going to resign" union membership, a phase of the con-
versation which Lopez recalled as Barron saying he
"was [so] resigning."4 Barron and Lopez each testified
that Ruiz exited the topic by expressing regret over what
he had heard from Barron. Ruiz, in contrast, recalled
"mention[ing]" to Barron that he should "send in a
letter, if he was going to [resign]."
Subsequent to this conversation, Barron and Lopez
proceeded to the NASSCO office, filled out resignation
forms, and mailed them to Respondent from a National
City, California post office later that same day.
Stipulations by the parties establish that the written
resignations of Barron and Lopez, as well as for Loftis,
were delivered to Respondent's office on Tuesday,
August 23, at 10:30 a.m. Additional stipulations fixed de-
livery of written resignations of Quileza at 10:30 a.m. on
August 25, and Torres at 10:30 a.m. on August 30. The
written resignations and the crossing of the picket line
are shown in the following columns for each employee
in this dispute:
Name Date Union Recd
Letter
Date Picket Line
Crossed
R. Loftis 8/23/88 8/22/88
A. Barron5 8/23/88 8/22/88
A. Lopez 8/23/88 8/22/88
D. Quileza 8/25/88 8/24/88
C. Torres 8/30/88 8/29/88
In each case, the employee crossed the picket line the
day before, and the same day, that the Union received
the written resignation.
Between September 27 and October 5 Respondent ac-
cepted and processed internal union charges against
Loftis, Barron, Quileza, Lopez, and Torres. On or about
October 20 Respondent notified these five men that
court-collectible fines had been assessed against them.
These initial fines were based on $500 against each
person, plus wages earned working for the struck em-
ployer varying from 4 to 9 days' pay. On February 17,
1989, Respondent sent letters to the five men notifying
each that their fines were being reduced to $500 plus 2
days' pay. This adjustment reduced that portion of each
former member's fine to the day before and the day of
the Respondent receiving the written resignation.
C. Contentions
General Counsel contends Barron orally resigned by
expressing the intent to resign to union official Ruiz.
General Counsel further disputes the amount of the fines
that Respondent is attempting to charge the other four
4 Cross-examination elicited a refinement of- Lopez' testimony to the
effect that Barron's announced plan was to resign "right now "
5 A finding that Barron's oral resignation on August 19 is valid would
make the date the Union received his written resignation a moot point
members, claiming (1) apportionment is appropriate in-
cluding the $500 portion, where a union's fine covers
both preresignation and postresignation conduct, and (2)
the fines for crossing the picket line on the day the resig-
nation is received is postresignation, thus violative of
Section 8(b)(1)(A).
Respondent contends Barron's oral resignation was in-
effective due to its ambiguity and the communicant's
subsequent written resignation. Therefore, the fines for
all five former members are claimedly attributable to
preresignation conduct, including the flat fee portion,
and are an internal affair of the Union. Respondent thus
contends inquiry into the reasonableness of these fines is
prohibited by the Act, citing NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973).
D. Credibility
Demeanor factors as between the witnesses are not
highly influential. With respect to Barron, he presented
as a person of candor, but neither accustomed nor
equipped to rendering precise details from the past. His
manner was slightly forced, and seemingly inclined to
permit saying what was convenient or vaguely helpful to
his cause. Lopez was characterized in General Counsel's
brief as "the only disinterested witness" to the episode.
Contrarily, I believe he was plainly aligned with Barron
in interest and by affinity as long-service coworkers in a
common craft. More importantly, I am persuaded from
the limited observation of Lopez' demeanor that he testi-
fied mainly from a generalized view of what he had ex-
perienced, compounding this trait with an inclination to
benign slanting of nuance and detail. Further, I sense
that Lopez has succumbed to some suggestiveness con-
cerning the situation, and has confused certain of the
subtleties involved insofar as obligation, option, and po-
tential consequence faced by striking employees as
grounded in their union membership. For these reasons, I
discredit Lopez to the extent that he recounted how
Ruiz quoted a $25 penalty for ducking out of a picket as-
signment, and, more importantly, that Barron at any time
emphasized immediacy to his stated intent of resigning.
As to Ruiz I am satisfied that his testimony represents an
experienced and alert ability to recount eventful past
happenings. The fact that he did not testify to his expres-
sion of regret toward Barron is something I take only to
reflect his spare and more sophisticated faculty of testify-
ing about salient utterances of a conversation at issue.
E. Analysis
The complaint in this case expressly and exclusively
invokes Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act as that statutory
provision which Respondent allegedly violated. In rele-
vant part the statute thus provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7:
Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 627 (NATIONAL STEEL) 31
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein .. . .
1. Oral resignation
On a stipulated record the Board decided Machinists
Local 2045 (Eagle Signal), 268 NLRB 635 (1984), in
which one issue dealt with "effectiveness" of a charging
party's resignation from union membership. The decision
summarized applicable law as "well settled" that without
an established method for resignation, "A member may
communicate to the union his intent to resign in any rea-
sonable way so long as the intent to resign is clearly con-
veyed." Cf. Local 340 Potters (Macomb Pottery), 175
NLRB 756 (1969); Carpenters Local 1233 (Polk Construc-
tion), 231 NLRB 756 (1977).
In Machinists Local 758 (Menasco, Inc.), 275 NLRB
755 (1985), the Board approvingly reviewed several
holdings in which verbalisms were at the root of an issue
directly addressing whether certain "oral resignations
[were] valid." General Counsel's brief argues here that
the words of Barron "were far less ambiguous than those
found to constitute valid resignations in Menasco." Con-
trarily, I do not agree with this characterization, and ob-
serve instead and initially that the four separate instances
of a potential oral resignation in Menasca each involved
extremely unique, particularized and intricate facts.
Indeed the administrative law judge diluted each conclu-
sion by introduction of uncertainty, if not forced ration-
ales. I illustrate this by the following table as pertaining
to each person involved in Menasco:
Name Comment
Rabi "In any event"
Hincapie "on balance"
Brown "it seems [certain conduct]
Dobrucki
was tantamount to
[constructively oral]
resignation from the Union"
"in this context"
I thus find practically no significance in Menasco, and
relegate the issue to general reasoning founded in the
Board's controlling statement of principle.
I am of a view here that the facts and credibility of
witnesses establish that no oral resignation occurred.
Analyzing plain meaning of words, Barron did not ex-
press a present intent to resign. The words themselves
are vague, indicating a future action by Barron. The
statement is not time specific nor can it be construed as
an inartfuls demand to withdraw from the Union at that
moment in time.
Barron's statement taken in the context of the sur-
rounding situation is instructive. The initiator was Ruiz,
fulfilling normal functions of his office as he sought to
fully structure his picketing phalanxes. A Saturday was at
stake; never the easiest day to recruit quasi-volunteer
5 General Counsel's brief contended that use of "martful language"
would not destroy the clear intent of a person, citing Distillery Workers
Local 80 (Capitol-Busting), 235 NLRB 1264 (1978), for the proposition. In
this case a "letter" evinced the resignation which was held as an expres-
sion of "clear desire." It is unavailing to cite authority involving written
communication , when the point being briefed is "The Oral Resignation of
Armando Barron."
service. Viewed objectively, Ruiz could not be certain of
the outcome with Barron regarding the next day's picket
duty, nor whether he would actually resign. Ruiz' cred-
ited response of "mention[ing] to him to send in a letter
if he was going to [resign]" indicates he is unclear as to
Barron's intentions. While testimony that Ruiz said a $25
fine would ensue has been discredited, it may be pre-
sumed that such a collateral rule (as often the case) was
in effect. If so,-Ruiz would predictably focus on this rela-
tively minor fine for dereliction of picket duty while
union membership still existed, rather than the harsh pu-
nitive provisions for scabbing. Notably Barron did not
even hint at returning to work, only that he would not
for whatever reason agree to a stint of picketing on the
weekend. Thus, the probability of the situation suggests
no clearly conveyed action by Barron and no immediate
concern by Ruiz.
Finally, the boilerplate resignation letter signed by
Barron presents several contradictory technicalities.
First, the letter, received as Respondent's Exhibit 6
states: "I hereby resign." The "hereby" indicates that
Barron is resigning at that time, not that he previously
resigned. By implication, his oral conversation is insuffi-
cient. Barron merely needed to alter the form to reflect
the oral resignation, thus memorializing his prior , action.
Second, the resignation form concludes with the fol-
lowing explicit assertion, "Your resignation will be effec-
tive when received by the Union." These instructions
plainly state that the resignation is not valid until re-
ceived by the Union. Barron is effectively negating any
credibility for an alleged oral resignation by completing,
signing, and mailing this document without altering it to
reflect a previous oral event. Tested against express or
implied Board principles in this area Barron failed to
resign orally.
2. Fines generally
The threshold inquiry regarding the amount and ap-
portionability of the fines imposed on the five employees
is whether these fines are strictly an internal union
matter. Only a determination that these fines are entirely
for preresignation conduct allows this conclusion. The
record reveals that all five employees crossed a lawful
picket line a day before their resignations were received
by Respondent, thus subjecting themselves to union dis-
ciplinary measures. An examination of the fine structure
will illuminate the issue.
The fines are bifurcated into an initial flat fee portion
and a daily wage portion. Respondent's bylaws, article
XII, subsection (E) provides in pertinent part:
Any member who during an authorized strike vio-
lates a lawful picket line established by the Local
Union or performs work for the struck employer,
shall be charged with violation of Article XIX, Sec-
tion 10, paragraph 10 of the International Constitu-
tion because of his/her strikebreaking activities. A
member convicted due to the foregoing violation
shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars
($500.00), plus any wages he or she earns while
working for the struck employer.
32 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The intent of the $500 minimum fine is to act as a de-
terrent to members contemplating crossing a picket line.
The daily wage portion of the fine is designed to address
those members who subvert a strike by repeatedly cross-
ing a picket line. This Local 627 bylaw was added in
1984 subsequent to a problem collecting a fine in Small
Claims Court.
Thomas J. McCammon, Respondent's vice president
and chief shop steward, testified how the small claims
judge ruled that a higher fine imposed on a member who
had crossed a picket line twice was excessive. He ob-
served there was no standard set for a repeater in the
bylaws, and consequently reduced the fine. This judge
recommended that the Union establish a standard penalty
for strikebreaking, clearly specifying the rationale for the
fine in order to limit court intervention in the future.
3. The $500 fine
General Counsel and Respondent both refer in their
briefs to Carpenters San Diego District Council (Campbell
Industries), 243 NLRB 147 (1979). The Board in Camp-
bell stated employees could not be fined a maximum $300
for crossing a picket line after resignation. However, in
all cases the Board determined employees first crossed
the picket line either before the day, or on the day, that
the union in Campbell received their resignations. The
Board disagreed with the administrative law judge's ap-
portioning formula for this fine stating:
Respondent District Council's bylaws permitted a
fine of up to $300, and this fine was imposed upon
all who crossed the picket line, regardless of the
number of crossings. Thus the fine can be said to
have been imposed for the initial crossing (prior to
resignation) just as easily as it can be said to apply
to postresignation crossings. In these circumstances,
we can see no basis for finding part of the fine to
have been unlawfully imposed.
Respondent contends the $500 fine in the instant case is
analogous to the flat $300 fine, and thus is merely a pre-
resignation matter. General Counsel argues Campbell is
distinguishable from the instant case due to its narrow
fact pattern and no varying daily fines.
I find Campbell controlling here for the $500 portion
of the fines. The employees first crossed the picket line
the day before their written resignations were received.
The $500 fine can be imposed on these members for this
initial crossing. This then is a preresignation fine, and
therefore it is clearly an internal union matter not viola-
tive of the Act.
I reject General Counsel's argument that the bifurcat-
ed fine structure is hermaphroditic in combining the
"front loaded" fine with the variable daily wages fine. If
the daily fines are assessed for each day a member
crosses and works for the employer before that member's
resignation has been received by the union, they are also
preresignation fines. Thus, combining the $500 fine for
an initial crossing with a daily fine for working for the
employer before resigning is a legitimate internal union
matter and not a violation of the Act.
Respondent observes that in NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled that ."any in-
quiry [by the Board] into the reasonableness of the fines
is an unwarranted examination into the internal affairs of
the Union, which was specifically prohibited by Con-
gress." Allegations of the original charge filed with the
Board by the company in Boeing were: first, the union
committed an unfair labor. practice by fining employees
who had resigned (considered in the companion case
Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973)) and second, re-
garding members who were otherwise validly fined, that
the fines were unreasonable in amount. The Supreme
Court addressed this second issue in Boeing stating:
While "unreasonable" fines may be more coercive
than "reasonable" fines, all fines are coercive to a
greater or lesser degree. (Boeing, supra at 72-73.)
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
the Board was warranted in determining that when
the union discipline does not interfere with the em-
ployee-employer relationship or otherwise violate a
policy of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Congress did not authorize it "to evaluate the fair-
ness of union discipline meted out to protect a le-
gitimate union interest." [Boeing, supra at 78.]
In the instant case, as in Boeing, the issue in question is
member conduct prior to resignation. Thus an apportion-
ment argument, as indeed a reasonableness argument, is
inappropriate. I find that both the $500 fine and the daily
fine for crossing and working for the employer, the day
before resignations were received, involve preresignation
conduct. Therefore, I conclude they are an internal
union matter. As such I find the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Boeing compelling, and these two portions of the
fine not within the Board's power to regulate and thus
not violative of the Act.7
4. Date of resignation
In Machinists Local 1233 (General Dynamics), 284
NLRB 1101 (1987), the Board set forth certain applicable
principles. This applicability intrigues, because the fact
situation in General Dynamics bears a close parallel to
this case. The Board first held that resignation from
membership is "normally" effective upon receipt by a
union. A subsidiary presumption treated the exact hour
of crossing a picket line by resigning members. This
point is unnecessary to decision here, because the stipula-
tedly constructive postal receipt of resignation letters at
Respondent's office followed by a day the restart of
work by involved employees Barron and Lopez (plus
Loftis) on August 22 or such later dates as associate to
the others. The evolved principle is that fines imposed
against employees for "working on the day their resigna-
' In Boeing, supra at 77 fn. 13, the Court refers to the ruling of a mu-
nicipal court judge where a union imposed fine was properly reduced as
being too large and unreasonable. This parallels the 1984 action involving
Local 627 where a small claims judge reduced the union fine and recom-
mended the union establish a standard strikebreaking penalty, specifying
the rationale for same in its bylaws. As McCammon testified, this recom-
mendation was acted upon resulting in Local 627 bylaws art XII, subsec.
(E).
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 627 (NATIONAL STEEL) 33
tions were received . . . are, of course, violative of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A)." This basis for finding unlawful conduct
by the labor organization in General Dynamics was ex-
pressly contrasted with situations showing return to
work by an employee before "his or her union member-
ship" was effectively resigned from. See Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
I find such passages plainly control, noting too that no
presumption need be indulged because the picket line
crossings and legally effective receipt of resignations by
Respondent here were, in the case of each person in-
volved, occurrences of different calendar days. This
view accords with NLRB v. Teamsters Local 439, 837
F.2d 888 (1987), in which the court essentially approved
such principles. Also in Santa Clara Valley District Coun-
cil of Carpenters (Acme Fixture), 292 NLRB 473 (1989),
to the extent this case involved important written com-
munications to the local union by its members which
were received or delivery thereof refused, a similar view
was adopted.
There is ample justification for the composite rule
which emerges in these strike/membership resignation
cases, whether of our instant variety or a "financial
core" issue as present in Acme Fixture. A labor organiza-
tion is better positioned to know, or conveniently learn
of, the sequence of events as union and employers jockey
for advantage in a strike situation. Striking employees in
such a scenario typically exhibit behavior ranging from
fully committed collective solidarity to nonchalance.
Further, their conduct can also be mercurial as passing
days of a strike provide retesting of devotion to their
cause. Typically, too, the financial crunch of interrupted
income forces some to difficult individual decisions
rooted in responsibilities or simply reconsideration.8
Such influences are separate and apart from whatever
aid, persuasion, or temptation is advanced, as with the
printed resignation notices in the case at hand, by the
struck employer. The point is that where rank-and-file
employees exhibit reasonably timely and conscientious
efforts to make a lawfully available choice, there should
be no interference by strained reasoning to delay benefit
of what they tolerably set in motion.
Unions on the other hand may, as also here, react to
such perceived disloyalty by invoking their institutional
processes leading to fines. But in doing so they have
ample time and resources to determine exact events with
respect to when an individual abandoned strike action.
This includes when a resignation from membership was
actually or constructively received, and whether any
special circumstances might exist to affect now-settled
Board principles. Indeed the process here arose about a
month following these resignations, led to orderly hear-
ing processes still later, and ultimately resulted in formal
modification of the monetary, court-collectible fined
amounts only a scant several days before hearing opened
in the case. These factors amply satisfy any concern
8 The United States Supreme Court, in the case popularly cited Granite
State, wrote "Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have un-
settling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his
mind. The likely duration of the strike may increase the specter of hard-
ship to his family . .." NLRB v Textile Workers, 409 U.S 213, 217
(1972)
about whether the Board has suitably imposed the
burden of choosing that point in time in which particular
facts suggest what is truly, and as a matter of labor rela-
tions reality, preresignation conduct by a bellwether indi-
vidual, versus what that individual does after a worthy
effort toward giving his or her labor organization unwel-
come news that, to one small extent, their collective
strength has leaked away.9
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
(NASSCO) is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent, International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Shop-
men's Local 627, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By initiating and/or processing internal union
charges, and imposing fines, against Loftis, Barron, Qui-
leza, Lopez, and Torres, for activities in which they en-
gaged subsequent to receipt of their written resignations,
Respondent Local 627 has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom, and to take certain
affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act, including refunding to those persons named in
paragraph 2(a) of the Order any money they may have
paid as a result of the modified fines imposed against
them, with interest computed in the manner prescribed
by New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
edlo
ORDER
The Respondent, International Association of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Shopmen's
Local 627, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and represent-
atives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
9 I detect that Respondent anticipates this outcome to the "date of res-
ignation" issue, because its brief was silent on the point . This is so even
with its counsel's awareness of a specific oddity in the Barron and Lopez
resignation letters, plus his observation of record that "attempted deliv-
ery by ... the Postal Service" of these letters "makes no difference "
(Tr. 56.)
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
34 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Restraining or coercing employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, by im-
posing fines on employees because of postresignation
work by individuals during a strike at National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company, on the day their written resigna-
tions from union membership were received. -
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fines imposed against Loftis, Barron,
Quileza, Lopez, and Torres because of their postresigna-
tion work at National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
during a strike, notifying them in writing that this has
been done, and refund to them any money they have
paid as a result of such fines, plus interest computed in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(b) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""' Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 21, after being signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Provide the Regional Director sufficient signed
copies of the notice for comparable posting by National
Steel and Shipbuilding Company at its San Diego, Cali-
fornia facility, if it is willing.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT restrain or, coerce employees who have
resigned from, and are no longer members of, the Union
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act, by imposing court-collectible fines on indi-
viduals because of their postresignation conduct in work-
ing at National Steel and Shipbuilding Company during
the strike in August 1988.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the fines levied against Robert
Loftis, Armando Barron, Daniel B. Quileza, Adolfo
Lopez, and Carlos Torres because of their postresigna-
tion work for National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
during the strike in August 1988 as computed for the day
we received their written resignations, from union mem-
bership, and WE WILL refund to them any money they
may have paid as a result of such fines for that day, with
interest, and WE WILL notify them each in writing that
this has been done.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE,
STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKERS, SHOPMEN'S LOCAL 627, AFL-
CIO