Iron Workers Local 433 (Steel Fabricators Assn.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 2004

341 N.L.R.B. 523 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433 (STEEL FABRICATORS ASSOC.) 523
International Association of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433, AFL–
CIO (Steel Fabricators Assoc.) and Sotero Lo-
pez. Case 21–CB–12858
March 31, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On September 30, 2002, Administrative Law Judge
William L. Schmidt issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions,
supporting briefs, and answering briefs. The Charging
Party filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act as alleged by informing Sotero
Lopez that any payment he made toward the periodic
dues required under a contractual union-security clause
would be applied against his fine balance until fully paid;
by applying Lopez’ dues payments to his outstanding
fine balance rather than to his dues; by threatening Lopez
that he would not be permitted to work if suspended from
membership for his continued failure to pay dues; and by
suspending Lopez from membership without notifying
him of his rights as a nonmember under Communications
Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (Beck),
and NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963)
(General Motors). The judge dismissed the allegation
that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2) by refusing
to permit Lopez to register for referral from its hiring hall
or to refer him for employment because he failed to pay
his dues.
We agree with the judge, for reasons set forth in his
decision, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
when it threatened to, and later did, apply Lopez’ dues
payment to his fine balance, and thereafter threatened
him with suspension for failing to pay his dues.1 How-

1 With one exception, we affirm the judge’s finding that none of the
complaint allegations are time-barred by Sec. 10(b). Sec. 10(b) pro-
vides, in relevant part, that “no complaint shall issue based upon any
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing
of the charge.” The Respondent first informed Charging Party Lopez in
August 1999, more than 6 months before he filed his charge, that any
dues payments he made would be applied to his outstanding fine bal-
ance. A violation based on that statement (which is not alleged to
violate the Act) would be time-barred. As the judge found, however,
the Respondent engaged in other unlawful conduct—reiterating that it
ever, we reverse the judge’s finding that Lopez was sus-
pended. Consequently, we dismiss the allegation that
the Respondent unlawfully failed to give Lopez notice of
his Beck and General Motors rights. We also find, con-
trary to the judge, that the Respondent unlawfully re-
fused to register and refer Lopez for employment.
A. Background
The Respondent and the other local unions that are
members of the District Council of the Iron Workers of
California and Vicinity operate hiring halls. The locals
and employers using these hiring halls are parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement that contains a union-
security clause.
Lopez, a journeyman certified welder, has used the
Respondent’s hiring hall since he became a member of
the Local in 1980. Lopez injured his back in 1996 and
missed work in 1997 and 1998. He returned to work in
1999 and worked until July 1999, when he was exposed
to acid fumes and became seriously ill. As a result of
that exposure, he still experiences a variety of serious
health problems.
A physician’s disability certificate stated that Lopez
was unable to work from August 10, 1999, until ap-
proximately April 3, 2000. At various points during his
periods of disability, Lopez received either the Local’s
short-term disability benefits or state disability benefits.
He was on state disability in January and February of
2000, but those benefits ended in March or April of that
year. In March 2000, Lopez had a pending claim for
long-term, permanent disability benefits with the Union’s
pension fund. While he was disabled, Lopez continued
to pay dues and remained a union member.
In 1996, the Respondent accused Lopez of violating a
rule barring employees from registering on the out-of-
work list at more than one branch office. Following in-
ternal union proceedings, the Respondent found Lopez
guilty and fined him $998. On appeal, the International
reduced the fine to $499. Lopez never paid the fine.

would apply any dues payments to Lopez’ fine balance (and actually
doing so), and threatening to suspend him and to refuse to allow him to
work if he did not pay his dues—within the 10(b) period. As we find
below, the Respondent also unlawfully refused to allow Lopez to regis-
ter for referrals from its exclusive hiring hall, again during the 10(b)
period. These actions would be unlawful even absent the Respondent’s
August 1999 statement. Cf. Machinists Local 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan
Mfg. Co.), 362 U.S. 411, 416–419 (1960). See also Teamsters Local
896 (Anheuser-Busch), 339 NLRB 769, slip op. at 2 (2003); Control
Services, 305 NLRB 435 fn. 2, 442 (1991).
As discussed below, we find that the Respondent did not suspend
Lopez from membership, and thus we need not decide whether it would
have violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) as alleged by suspending him without
informing him of his Beck and General Motors rights. Accordingly, we
need not determine whether that allegation is barred by Sec. 10(b).
341 NLRB No. 68
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 524
In August 1999, a union official told Lopez that the
Respondent planned to collect the fine by applying his
dues payments against his fine balance until he had paid
the fine in full. Later in 1999, Jim Butner, the Respon-
dent’s business manager, wrote to the International Un-
ion’s general secretary, James E. Cole, seeking advice
about collecting the Lopez fine. By letter dated January
3, 2000, Cole advised Butner that he could apply Lopez’
future dues payments against his fine balance but cau-
tioned that if “the member goes suspended for non-
payment of dues, you would still be required to allow
him to use the hiring hall . . . and you should take no
action with respect to denying him employment.”
Later in January, Lopez went to the Respondent’s of-
fice to pay his dues for November and December 1999
and January 2000.2 Kim Taylor, the Respondent’s office
manager, informed Lopez that any money he tendered for
dues would be applied against his fine balance. How-
ever, she also showed him a copy of Cole’s January 3
letter and said that working would not be a problem.
Lopez decided not to pay his dues. Because he lacked
the dues receipt he needed to be dispatched out to work,
Lopez did not register to work at that time.
About March 16, Lopez received a letter from Butner
reminding him that “any payments received from you
will be applied to this fine until it is paid in full.”
On March 22, Lopez went back to the Respondent’s
office and told Monica Urrea, one of its office employ-
ees, that he wanted to pay his dues. She told him that
any money he paid would be credited against his fine.
Lopez tendered $100 for his union dues. Urrea gave
Lopez a receipt showing that his payment of $100 had
been applied against his fine of $499, leaving an unpaid
fine balance of $399. The receipt also stated that his
dues were still paid only through October 1999.
On April 17, Butner again wrote Lopez, pointing out
that his dues had not been paid since October 1999. The
letter warned, “If we do not receive a payment on or be-
fore April 30, 2000 you will go suspended from Local
433 . . . [and] if your membership goes suspended you
will not be allowed to work until you have been rein-
stated.” Lopez made no further payments to the Respon-
dent. Instead, he filed a Board charge shortly after re-
ceiving Butner’s letter.
In late July, Lopez wrote to the International regarding
the inconsistency between Cole’s and Butner’s letters.
He requested that the International compel the Respon-
dent to allow him to work. The International did not
respond. However, on September 5, the Respondent’s
attorney advised Lopez in writing that he would be

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent dates refer to 2000.
“placed in the appropriate list for dispatch purposes
without regard to any fine which was imposed on you.”
Lopez did not attempt to register on the Respondent’s
out-of-work list until November 16. He was allowed to
register for work and received some referrals. He has
made no further payments to the Respondent.
B. Analysis
1. The Respondent unlawfully informed Lopez that it
would apply his dues payments to his fine balance
We agree with the judge, for the reasons stated in his
decision, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by informing Lopez that it would apply his dues pay-
ments to his fine balance. In exceptions, the Respondent
argues that the judge erred in finding this violation, be-
cause the complaint contained no such allegation. We
find no merit in this argument.
It is well settled that the Board may find and remedy a
violation even in the absence of a specific complaint al-
legation if the issue is closely connected to the subject
matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated. Per-
gament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 334 (1989), enfd.
920 F.2d 130 (2d. Cir. 1990). Both of those conditions
have been met here. The complaint alleges, and the
judge found, that the Respondent applied Lopez’ dues to
his fine balance after it refused to apply his $100 pay-
ment to his dues. The Respondent’s statements that it
would take such action could hardly be more closely
related to the complaint’s subject matter. (The judge
even stated at the hearing that he viewed the statements
as encompassed by the complaint allegations.) And the
issue was fully litigated. Indeed, the judge’s ruling that
the complaint encompassed the additional violations put
the Respondent on notice that the issue would be liti-
gated and evidence was introduced on it. In any event,
the Respondent’s witness, Kim Taylor, testified on direct
examination that she told Lopez “that his dues would go
toward his fine until the fine was paid.” Without objec-
tion from the Respondent, Lopez gave similar testimony.
Finally, the Respondent has not shown that it was preju-
diced by the General Counsel’s failure to formally allege
this violation. Baytown Sun, 255 NLRB 154 fn. 1 (1981).
2. The Respondent unlawfully refused to
register or refer Lopez
The judge dismissed the complaint allegation that the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by
refusing to register for referral, and refer, Lopez. Thus,
the judge found no evidence that Butner or any other
agent of the Respondent acted on Butner’s April 17
threat to prevent Lopez from registering for referral or
from obtaining a referral. He also found that Lopez’
disability prevented him from working until at least July,

IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433 (STEEL FABRICATORS ASSOC.) 525
and that the Respondent’s counsel assured him, first in
July and later in September, that he would be allowed to
register. Finally, the judge found that when Lopez at-
tempted to register in November, he was allowed to do
so and actually received referrals. The General Counsel
has excepted, and we find merit in the exception.
The General Counsel does not contend that an agent of
the Respondent physically prevented Lopez from regis-
tering at the hiring hall or refused to refer him to jobs
after he registered. Rather, the General Counsel argues
that, given what Lopez had been told and what he already
knew about the operations of the Respondent’s hiring
hall, it would have been futile for him to attempt to regis-
ter. Thus, the Respondent informed Lopez repeatedly
that any dues payments he attempted to make would be
applied to his fine balance, and when he attempted to pay
his dues in March, the payment was, in fact, credited to
the fine balance instead of his dues. On April 17, Butner
advised Lopez that if he did not pay his dues by April 30,
he would be suspended and not allowed to work until he
was reinstated.3 Moreover, as Lopez credibly testified,
even if he registered, he would not have received a refer-
ral without a paid-up dues receipt, which he could not
produce as long as the Respondent was unlawfully apply-
ing his dues payments to his fine balance. Not until Sep-
tember 5, when the Respondent’s counsel assured him
that he would be allowed to register for referrals, did
Lopez have any reason to believe that there was any
point in his attempting to register. 4 We agree with the
General Counsel that, under these circumstances, it is
irrelevant that Lopez did not attempt to register for refer-
rals, at least before September 5, because any such at-
tempt would have been futile. Iron Workers Local 377
(M.S.B., Inc.), 299 NLRB 680, 684 (1990); Laborers
Local 1440, 233 NLRB 1366, 1370 (1977). Accord-
ingly, we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by preventing Lopez from regis-

3 Although Lopez was shown Cole’s letter directing the Respondent
to allow Lopez to work even if it applied his dues payments to his fine
balance, Butner’s April 17 letter to Lopez demonstrated that the Re-
spondent did not intend to follow that direction. Moreover, when Lo-
pez wrote to the International Union asking it to instruct the Respon-
dent to allow him to work, he received no answer.
4 Lopez excepted to the judge’s finding that he admitted that the Re-
spondent’s counsel provided him with a verbal assurance in July that he
would be permitted to register for referral. Contrary to the judge’s
finding, there is no evidence that the Respondent’s counsel gave Lopez
such an assurance in July, or at any time prior to September 5.
Unlike the judge, we are not persuaded, by the mere fact that Lopez
was allowed to register in November, that he would have received the
same treatment before September 5. Until that date, the Respondent had
unequivocally informed Lopez that he would not be allowed to work
because he had not paid his dues, and we find nothing in this record
that might reasonably have caused Lopez to doubt that the Respondent
meant what it said.
tering for and receiving referrals from its hiring hall from
April 305 until September 5.6
Lopez’ prolonged period of disability does not require
a different result. Contrary to the judge’s finding, there
is no evidence that Lopez was unable to work at his trade
until July, or, indeed, at any time after April 2000, the
last dated covered by his physician’s certificate. He
ceased receiving state disability payments by March or
April of that year. The judge found that Lopez “admit-
tedly remained in a disabled status apparently unable to
work at least until July.” That finding is inconsistent
with Lopez’ testimony. Although Lopez admitted that he
had a variety of physical problems and a pending claim
for permanent disability with the Union’s pension fund in
July 2000,7 he testified that he could have taken a job at
that time and “they would have torn [up] that disability.”
Because Lopez gave uncontradicted testimony that it was
the Respondent’s refusal to register and refer him—not
his physical problems or disability claim—that prevented
him from working, we reject the judge’s finding that Lo-
pez was unable to work because of his claimed disability
until July.
3. There is no evidence that Lopez was suspended
The judge found that the Respondent suspended Lopez
from membership on April 30. In exceptions, the Re-
spondent argues that there is no evidence that Lopez was
suspended. We agree.
In his April 17 letter, Butner threatened to suspend
Lopez if he did not pay his dues by April 30. However,
there is no evidence that Lopez was actually suspended.
Indeed, the General Counsel argues only that, given But-
ner’s threat, “It is reasonable to conclude that when April
30th came and went, and Lopez did not make a union-
dues payment, Respondent considered him suspended.”
In the absence of any other record evidence that Lopez
was actually suspended, we agree with the Respondent
that an inference of suspension is unwarranted and shall
dismiss this allegation.8
5 April 30 is the date on which the complaint alleges that this viola-
tion commenced.
6 For the reasons discussed below, we find no evidence that Lopez
was actually suspended from membership, as Butner had threatened.
That does not change our finding that it would have been futile for
Lopez to attempt to register for referrals.
7 That Lopez had a pending disability claim does not mean that he
was unable to work. Even if Lopez had received disability benefits
from the Union’s benefits funds, that fact would not establish prima
facie that he was ineligible for backpay. See Performance Friction
Corp., 335 NLRB 1117, 1120 (2001) (holding that the employee’s
inability to perform his past or similar work, not his receipt of disability
benefits, tolled his backpay); see also Superior Export Packing, 299
NLRB 61 fn. 2 (1990).
8 See, e.g., Howard Electrical & Mechanical, 293 NLRB 472 fn. 2
(1989), enfd. mem. 931 F. 2d. 63 (10th Cir. 1991).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 526
4. Because there is no evidence that Lopez was sus-
pended, no Beck/General Motors notice issue arose
Because there is no evidence that Lopez was sus-
pended, we need not reach the issue of whether a sus-
pended worker must be notified of his Beck and General
Motors rights. We therefore dismiss the allegation that
the Respondent unlawfully deprived Lopez of those
rights.9
AMENDED REMEDY
We shall modify the judge’s remedy as follows:
Having found that Lopez was not suspended by the
Respondent, we shall not require that the Respondent
notify him of his Beck and General Motors rights. Hav-
ing found that the Respondent violated the Act by refus-
ing to register and refer Lopez from April 30 to Septem-
ber 5, 2000, we shall order it to make him whole for any
loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct, in the manner pre-
scribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as provided in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The Respondent, International Association of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 433,
AFL–CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Informing employee-members that any payments
tendered to Local 433 to satisfy the initiation fees and
periodic dues required under the union-security clause of
the California-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement
will be applied to satisfy an outstanding fine balance
until fully paid.
(b) Applying the moneys tendered by employee-
members to Local 433 in payment of the dues and fees
required under the union-security clause of the Califor-
nia-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement to an out-
standing fine balance.
(c) Threatening employee-members that they will be
suspended from membership and not permitted to work
under the California-Southern Nevada Iron Worker
Agreement for failing to pay dues and fees required un-
der that agreement’s union-security clause after misallo-
cating dues payments to an outstanding fine balance.
(d) Failing and refusing to register for referral or to re-
fer for employment employee-members because the Re-
spondent has misallocated their dues payments under the

9 We note that the General Counsel does not contend that there was a
total failure to apprise Lopez of his Beck and General Motors rights;
the contention is only that the Respondent Union had a special obliga-
tion to apprise him of these rights after the alleged suspension.
union-security clause of the California-Southern Nevada
Iron Worker Agreement to pay off their fine balance.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, credit
Sotero Lopez’ payment to Local 433 on March 22, 2000,
to those dues and fees collectible under the union-
security clause of the California-Southern Nevada Iron
Worker Agreement, debit his fine balance by an equal
amount, and issue an official receipt to him reflecting
this action.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to any failure by em-
ployee-member Sotero Lopez to pay dues which arose
from the Respondent’s misallocation of his dues pay-
ments to his outstanding fine balance, and within 3 days
thereafter notify him in writing that this has been done
and that the information will not be used against him in
any way.
(c) Make Sotero Lopez whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
each of its Southern California and Nevada hiring halls
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”10
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 21, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees and members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433 (STEEL FABRICATORS ASSOC.) 527
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board had found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for our benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT inform employee-members that any
payments tendered to satisfy the periodic dues and fees
required under the union-security clause of the Califor-
nia-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement will be
applied first to satisfy an outstanding fine balance until it
is fully paid.
WE WILL NOT apply moneys tendered by employee-
members in payment of the dues and fees required under
the union-security clause of the California-Southern Ne-
vada Iron Worker Agreement to an outstanding fine bal-
ance.
WE WILL NOT threaten employee-members that they
will be suspended from membership and not permitted to
work under the California-Southern Nevada Iron Worker
Agreement for failing to pay dues and fees required un-
der that agreement’s union-security clause after misallo-
cating dues payments to an outstanding fine balance.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to register for referral or
to refer employee-members because we have misallo-
cated their dues payments under the union-security
clause of the California-Southern Nevada Iron Worker
Agreement to pay off their fine balance.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make Sotero Lopez whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from the discrimina-
tion against him, less any net interim earnings, plus in-
terest.
WE WILL credit Sotero Lopez’ March 22, 2000, dues
payment to those dues and fees collectible under the un-
ion-security clause of the California-Southern Nevada
Iron Worker Agreement, debit his fine balance by an
equal amount, and issue an official receipt to him reflect-
ing this action.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to any failure by
employee-member Sotero Lopez to pay dues which arose
from our misallocation of his dues payments to his out-
standing fine balance, and within 3 days thereafter notify
him in writing that this has been done and that the infor-
mation will not be used against him in any way.
WE WILL make Sotero Lopez whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of the Board’s decision.

LOCAL 433, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKERS, AFL–CIO

Sonia Sanchez and Robert MacKay, Attys., for the General
Counsel.
David L. Rosenfeld, Atty. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld, P.C.), of Oakland, California, for the Respon-
dent.
Sortero Lopez, pro se.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge. On No-
vember 8, 2000, the Regional Director for Region 21 issued a
complaint and notice of hearing alleging International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
433, AFL–CIO (Respondent, Local 433, or the Union) violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act). The complaint is based on a charge Sotero Lo-
pez (Lopez) filed on April 28, 2000,1 and amended on July 7,
and again on October 11. As amended at the hearing, the com-
plaint presents the following issues for resolution: (1) Did Lo-
cal 433 insist unlawfully upon allocating the dues Lopez of-
fered to pay January and March against his 1996 fine; (2) Did
Local 433 unlawfully refuse to register or refer Lopez from its
exclusive hiring hall after suspending him from membership on
April 30; and (3) After suspending Lopez from membership,
did Local 433 breach its duty of fair representation by failing to

1 Unless shown otherwise, all further dates refer to the 2000 calendar
year.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 528
inform him of his membership and dues options under General
Motors and Beck.2
I heard this case in Los Angeles, California, on June 24,
2002. Having now carefully considered the record and the
demeanor of the witnesses,3 and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel, Lopez, and Local 433, I find the
General Counsel prevailed on the first and third issues, above,
but did not prevail on the second issue based on the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The District Council of Ironworkers of the State of Califor-
nia acting on behalf of Respondent and other local unions af-
filiated with the International Association of Bridge, Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers negotiates and executes collec-
tive-bargaining agreements with various employer associations
and contractors, including the Steel Fabricators Association
(SFA), the Building Industry Association of Southern Califor-
nia, Inc. (BIASC), the Southern California Contractors Asso-
ciation, Inc. (SCCA), Bragg, Crane and Rigging Company
(BCR), and the Western Steel Council, Inc (WSC). The em-
ployer-members of SFA, BIASC, SCCA, and WSC as well as
BCR each provide services valued in excess to $50,000 to cus-
tomers in the State of California each of whom in turn annually
purchase and receive goods valued in excess of $50,000, di-
rectly from suppliers located outside the State of California.
Accordingly, I find the above-named employer-associations
and BCR to be employers engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. I further find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. The Union is aligned with the named
statutory employers through a multistate collective-bargaining
agreement titled: Iron Worker Employers State of California
and a Portion of Nevada and District Council of Iron Workers
of the State of California and Vicinity [California-Southern
Nevada Agreement]. Accordingly, I find that it would effectu-
ate the purposes of the Act for the Board to exercise its jurisdic-
tion to decide this dispute.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Relevant Facts
The collective-bargaining agreement involved here that ap-
plies to the employees employed by the employer-members of
the associations mentioned above provides for the operation of
an exclusive hiring hall and details a number of rules and pro-
cedures governing the hiring hall operation. Officials of Local
433 and the other local unions comprising the District Council
oversee the hiring hall operations at their respective locals.
Pursuant to this contractual arrangement, Local 433 maintains
an out-of-work register at each of its branch offices.

2 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
3 My findings reflect credibility resolutions based on factors cited by
Judge Medina in U.S. v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 388–390 (1949). Testi-
mony inconsistent with my findings is not credited.
The California-Southern Nevada Agreement also contains a
standard, construction industry union-security clause. It re-
quires as a condition of employment that employees who were
union members and employed under the agreement on its effec-
tive remain members in good standing. All others who become
employed under the agreement must “on or after eight (8) con-
tinuous or accumulative days of employment on such work
with any individual employer following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of the [Agreement], which-
ever is later” become a member of the local union having juris-
diction over the territory where the employee is employed and
thereafter remain a member in good standing. Jt. Exh. 1, pp. 6–
7 (sec. 4 A). By the terms of the union-security clause, an em-
ployer may not terminate an employee for noncompliance with
its requirements until it receives a “written request from the
District Council . . . or Local Union . . . stating all pertinent
facts. . . .” Jt. Exh. 1, p. 7 (sec. 4 B).
Lopez, a certified welder, became a member of Local 433 in
1980 and remained a member at all times until Local 433 sus-
pended his membership in April 2000, ostensibly because his
dues became 6 months past due. Over the years, he regularly
sought work in his trade by registering for referral on the Un-
ion’s out-of-work list. In recent years, however, Lopez has
suffered from significant work injuries that resulted in lengthy
periods of disability. The first occurred in June or July 1996
when a back injury left him unable to work again until Novem-
ber 1998. The second occurred in July 1999 when he became
seriously ill after exposure to acid fumes. This disability period
lasted until July 2000 or longer.
At some time in 1996, local union officials initiated internal
union charges against Lopez claiming that he violated the con-
tractual rule barring employees from registering on the out-of-
work list at more than one branch office. (See Jt. Exh. 1, p. 12
(sec. 5 H-2)). Following internal union proceedings, Local 433
found Lopez guilty and imposed a $998 fine against him.
When Lopez appealed this action, the International Union af-
firmed the local union’s findings and conclusions but reduced
Lopez’ fine to $499. Over the next 3 years, Lopez apparently
ignored Local 433’s efforts to collect the fine. However, he
otherwise maintained his membership in good standing by pay-
ing the regular periodic dues and fees assessed against all
members, usually in person at the union’s office. In addition,
he continued to obtain work when not disabled through the
Local 433’s hiring hall.
Although the full scope of Local 433’s efforts to collect his
fine are not fully known, Lopez acknowledged that in August
1999 some unspecified union official told him that Local 433
planned to collect the fine by applying his dues payments
against his fine balance until paid in full. Later in 1999, Jim
Butner, Local 433’s business manager, wrote to General Secre-
tary James E. Cole seeking advice about collecting the Lopez
fine. Cole responded in a January 3 letter advising Butner the
he could apply Lopez’ future dues payments against his fine
balance but cautioned that if “the member goes suspended for
non-payment of dues, you would still be required to allow him
to use the hiring hall . . . and you should take no action with
respect to denying him employment.”

IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433 (STEEL FABRICATORS ASSOC.) 529
Later in January, Lopez went to Local 433’s office intent
upon paying his dues as his last payment only covered the pe-
riod through October 1999. On this occasion, Kim Taylor,
Local 433’s office manager, advised Lopez that any money he
tendered would be applied against his fine balance. When Lo-
pez protested that he would not be able to work, Taylor pre-
sented a copy of Cole’s letter and assured him that working
would not be a problem. At Lopez’ request, Taylor provided
with a copy of Cole’s January 3 letter. Lopez then left without
making any payment.
Thereafter, Butner wrote to Lopez on March 16. In this let-
ter, Butner reminded Lopez that “[a]s you have been previously
informed, any payments received from you will be applied to
this fine until it is paid in full.” This prompted Lopez to visit
the Union’s office again on March 22 to pay his dues. Monica
Urrea, one of the Union’s office employees, dealt with Lopez.
Although Lopez told Urrea that he wanted to pay his dues, she
told him any money he paid would be credited against the fine.
Lopez protested but finally tendered $100 saying that it was for
his union dues and that whatever she did with the money was
her business. Urrea took the money and provided Lopez with a
receipt showing that his payment had been applied against his
fine leaving an unpaid fine balance of $399. That receipt also
prominently reflected that his dues were still paid only through
October 1999.4
On April 17, Butner wrote Lopez calling attention to the fact
that his membership dues had not been paid since October
1999. The letter states: “If we do not receive a payment on or
before April 30, 2000 you will go suspended from Local 433.”
The letter further warns: “[I]f your membership goes suspended
you will not be allowed to work until you have been rein-
stated.” Lopez made no further payments to Local 433; in-
stead, he filed this charge shortly after receiving Butner’s April
17 letter. On April 30, Local 433 suspended Lopez’ member-
ship.
In late July, Lopez wrote to the International Union enclos-
ing Cole’s January 3 letter and Butner’s April 17 letter, and
calling attention to the obvious inconsistency as to whether he
would be “allowed to work” following his membership suspen-
sion. He asked that the International Union assist him by com-
pelling Local 433 officials to allow him to work. So far as is
known, no International Union official responded. However,
Lopez admitted that Local 433’s attorney advised him in July
that he would be permitted to work even though suspended
from membership. Later, Local 433’s attorney sent Lopez a
letter dated September 5 stating that if he desired to work he
would be “placed in the appropriate list for dispatch purposes
without regard to any fine which was imposed on you.” As for
Butner’s April 17 letter, the attorney noted that the letter ad-
vised Lopez “that you had not paid membership dues which are
required to be kept current under the terms of the Union’s Secu-
rity Provision of the contract” and that “[t]he Union will apply
that provision to the extent permitted by law.”

4 The portion of the receipt showing the status of his dues payments
is enclosed in a computer-generated box in the middle part of the upper
third of the document.
Lopez never worked during the 2000 calendar year. He did
not attempt to register on a Local 433 out-of-work list until
November 16. At that time, Jack Holt, Local 433’s new busi-
ness manager, permitted him to register only on the “E-list,” the
lowest category of registrants, assertedly because he had insuf-
ficient recent work experience to qualify for registration on any
higher list.5 Lopez subsequently convinced Holt in August
2001 that he should be permitted to register of the A-1 list, the
highest category of contractual registrants. Since registering,
Lopez has received some referrals but has made no further
payments to Local 433.
B. Argument and Conclusions
The General Counsel claims that Respondent adopted a de
facto policy of collecting dues before fines by thrice telling
Lopez, per Cole’s January 3 “instructions,” that any future dues
payments from him would be applied against his 1996 fine.
Pointing to a variety of Board decisions finding different sorts
of union rules establishing a fines-first scheme unlawful where
co-extensive with a contractual union-security clause, the Gen-
eral Counsel contends that this conduct violated Section
8(b)(1)(A). The General Counsel also contends that Local 433
also violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by actually crediting Lopez’
$100 dues payment on March 22 against his fine balance. The
General Counsel further argues that Local 433 violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by Butner’s written threat to Lopez of
April 17 that he could not work if he did not pay his dues vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A), and that this threat coupled with the
actual suspension on April 30 effectively constituted a refusal
to register and refer Lopez in violation of Section 8(b)(2). Fi-
nally, the General Counsel contends that Local 433 violated
8(b)(1)(A) when it suspended Lopez from membership without
providing him with a notice of employee rights that have
evolved out of General Motors and Beck.
Local 433 claims that it did not violate the Act by crediting
the moneys tendered by Lopez to his outstanding 1996 fine for
two reasons. First, Local 433 argues that Section 10(b) bars the
complaint allegation that its allocation of the Lopez’ March
payment to the fine balance violated the Act because Lopez
learned in August 1999 that Respondent planned to credit his
dues payments against his fine balance. Second, Local 433
argues that Cole’s letter to Butner cautioning against barring
Lopez from registering for referral on the out-of-work list or
depriving him of employment distinguishes Lopez’ situation
from that found in Elevator Constructors Local 8 (San Fran-
cisco Elevator), 243 NLRB 53 (1979), and its progeny. Local
433 also claims that it never refused to refer Lopez because of
the dues/fine issue and, in any event, Section 10(b) also bars
that allegation. As for the obvious conflict between Cole’s
letter and Butner’s April 17 letter, Respondent contends that
Lopez could easily have learned that Butner did not mean what
he said in his letter had he made the slightest effort to ask But-
ner for a clarification of the apparent conflict. Lopez did not do
so, Respondent contends, because he had been placed on dis-
5 Local 433’s counsel asserted without contradiction at the hearing
that the General Counsel declined to proceed on a separate unfair labor
practice charge Lopez filed concerning his placement on the out-of-
work list.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 530
ability and not intended to register on the Union’s out-of-work
lists at that time. Finally, Respondent contends that it had no
duty to provide Lopez with specific notice of rights under Gen-
eral Motors or Beck because Lopez has always insisted upon
continuing his 20-year old union membership.6
I agree with the General Counsel that Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by telling Lopez that his dues payments
would be applied to satisfy his fine. In reaching this conclu-
sion, I reject Respondent’s claim that Cole’s January 3 advisory
letter distinguishes this situation from San Francisco Elevator,
id. and similar cases cited by the General Counsel. In my
judgment, Respondent had the burden of proving that it law-
fully maintained a concurrent fine-first rule side-by-side with a
union-security clause. Although probably well intentioned,
Cole’s letter alone is insufficient to meet that burden. Butner’s
April 17 letter, most likely a form letter Local 433 sends to any
member whose dues become seriously past due,7 illustrates the
virtually impossible task this Respondent or any other labor
organization would have in attempting to dance on the lawful
side of the line by adopting a fine-first rule in the context of a
union-security clause. As applied to Lopez, of course, the es-
sence of the Respondent’s fine-first rule would mean that his
dues would never be fully paid until he knuckled under by pay-
ing the fine.
In reality, Respondent would have an arduous, time-
consuming oversight task to deal with a member such as Lo-
pez’ in order to insure he suffered no adverse employment im-
pact from the application of a fine-first rule. Employee-
members who work under agreements such as the one involved
here encounter periodic, lawful demands that they document
their eligibility for employment under the membership mainte-
nance requirements of the collective-bargaining agreement. In
his testimony, Lopez repeatedly and credibly protested that he
could not even obtain a referral ticket without showing the
hiring hall agent a paid-up dues receipt. Although this hurdle
might be cured with a simple direction to the hiring hall agent,
Respondent does not fully control every possible source that
could potentially disrupt Lopez employment under the Califor-
nia-Southern Nevada Agreement. Thus, this collective-
bargaining agreement provides for the employer-transfer of
employees to other local union jurisdictions and requires the
employee-member to notify a sister local when transferred to its
jurisdiction. It would be reasonable to presume that agents of
the sister local at some point would also insist on proof of work
eligibility in the form of a paid-up dues receipt. In addition, as
illustrated in a case the General Counsel cites, Iron Workers
Local 377 (M.S.B., Inc.), 299 NLRB 680 (1990), job stewards
have occasion from time-to-time to demand evidence of work

6 I reject and do not further consider Respondent’s claims concern-
ing the application of 10(b) to this case. Even though it may have told
Lopez that his dues would be applied to his fine more than 6 months
before actually doing so, a separate violation occurred when it actually
took that step in March. Plainly, the charge was timely filed as to this
allegation. As I have found in agreement with Respondent that it never
actually refused to refer Lopez, I find it unnecessary to consider its
puzzling 10(b) argument concerning this allegation.
7 In fact, Respondent’s counsel described the April 17 letter as a
“form” letter in the course of argument at the hearing.
eligibility in the form of a paid-up dues receipt. Hence, in or-
der for Respondent to maintain a sanitized fine-first rule, it
would have to be vigilant that of all the various union officials
Lopez might possibly encounter while seeking or engaging in
his trade under the contract understood and agreed not to inter-
fere with his employment. Such an expectation is, at best, an
illusion. As noted, even Respondent’s own business manager,
within 3 months of Cole’s cautionary advice specifically ad-
dressed to him, threatened Lopez’ employment prospects. Fur-
thermore, I find the verbal assurances he received from the
union’s two clerical employees that he could register for refer-
ral, and be referred, insufficient to overcome the contractual
and cultural obstacles Lopez would likely face when seeking
employment without written proof of compliance with the un-
ion-security clause.
In addition I agree with General Counsel’s claim that Re-
spondent violated the Act by actually crediting Lopez’ $100
dues payment on March 22 against the fine balance rather than
against his dues as requested when he submitted the payment.
Iron Workers Local 377, supra, citing Bay Counties District
Council of Carpenters, 145 NLRB 1775 (1964). For reasons
addressed above, Cole’s advisory letter is insufficient to shield
Lopez from the far reaching impact of an institutional culture
resulting from Local 433’s historical hiring hall practice that
required the production of a paid-up dues receipt from long-
term employees in order to obtain a job-referral ticket. By
crediting the March 22 dues payment against the fine balance,
Respondent deprived Lopez of the necessary dues receipt that
would fully facilitate his referral and employment. I find that
by this separate conduct Respondent put Lopez’ further em-
ployment through the hiring hall in peril and thereby restrained
him within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
However, the General Counsel’s claim that Respondent ac-
tually refused to register and refer Lopez as alleged in com-
plaint paragraph 22(e) is another matter. In support of this
allegation, General Counsel relies solely on the threat made by
Butner in his April 17 letter. Although I find Butner’s threat
unlawful, the evidence is insufficient to establish that Butner or
any other Local 433 agent acted on that threat to prevent Lopez
from actually registering for referral or from actually obtaining
a referral. On the contrary, Lopez admittedly remained in a
disabled status apparently unable to work at least until July.
Furthermore, he admitted that Respondent’s counsel provided
him with a verbal assurance in July that he would be permitted
to register for referral and gave him a written assurance to that
same effect in September. When Lopez finally attempted to
register for referral in November, he was permitted to do so. In
addition, sparse as it is, the evidence available shows that Lo-
pez was referred for employment at some point after he finally
registered on the out-of-work list. For the foregoing reasons, I
conclude that General Counsel failed to prove complaint para-
graph 22(e) by a preponderance of the credible evidence and,
hence, I recommend dismissal of this allegation.
General Counsel contends, in effect, that a suspension or ex-
pulsion of a worker from membership, made contractually
mandatory for work purposes, triggers an obligation that the
union taking such action provide the employee with a notice of
the options available under General Motors and Beck. In com-

IRONWORKERS LOCAL 433 (STEEL FABRICATORS ASSOC.) 531
plaint paragraph 22(g), the General Counsel claims that the
content of that notice include a statement that: (1) he had the
right to be or remain a nonmember; (2) that he had a right as a
nonmember to object to paying for nonrepresentational activi-
ties and to obtain a reduction in fees for such nonrepresenta-
tional activities; (3) that he had a right to be given sufficient
information to enable him to intelligently decide whether to
object; and (4) that he had a right as a nonmember to be ap-
prised of any internal union procedures for filing objections to
the fee imposed. I agree with the contention that a notice of
right must be given and with most, but not all, of General
Counsel’s contentions as to the substance.
General Counsel cites no case directly on point and I have
been unable to locate precise precedent concerning the content
of a General Motors/Beck notice required when a labor organi-
zation suspends or expels a long-term union member from
membership for reasons other than failing to pay mandatory
dues and fees as is the case here. In her brief, counsel for the
General Counsel argues that in the absence of a Beck notice, a
union may not lawfully seek the discharge of an employee,
whether a member or a nonmember, for failing to pay the req-
uisite dues and fees under a union-security agreement. In sup-
port, she cites Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997), affd.
194 F.3d 1311 (6th Cir. 1999); and Production Workers Local
707 (Mavo Leasing Co.), 322 NLRB 35 (1997), affd. 194 F.3d
1311 (6th Cir. 1999). Although these cases provide pertinent
direction, they do not address the particular fact situation found
here.
California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224, 230 (1995),
holds generally “that a union’s obligations under Beck are to be
measured by [the duty of fair representation] standard.” It and
Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320
NLRB 349 (1995), a companion case decided the same day as
California Saw, established an “inextricable link” between
General Motors and Beck rights in that without exercising the
former, the latter never come into play. However, in this case
Lopez eschewed the exercise of his General Motors rights.
Instead, Local 433 effectively altered his status to that of a
nonmember against his will. For reasons explained below, I
find that where a labor organization acts to suspend or expel a
long-term member, its duty of fair representation (DFR) obliga-
tions require a General Motors/Beck notice but one more care-
fully tailored to fit situation than that advanced by the General
Counsel.
When the Board considered the specific allegations of the
California Saw complaint, it noted that the General Counsel
claimed that the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) violated the Act by failing to place
some kind of an alert on the cover of the union magazine issue
where it annually published a statement of its Beck policy. The
General Counsel also alleged that the IAM unlawfully failed to
issue an additional Beck notice—apart from the annual publica-
tion—that pertained to “two subgroups of non-member em-
ployees: (1) newly hired nonmember employees at the time
they are hired into the bargaining unit; and (2) to newly re-
signed nonmember employees when they resign their union
membership.”
As to employees in the first subgroup, the Board found that a
union has a DFR obligation to furnish those individuals with a
Beck notice before they become subject to obligations under a
union-security clause. Undoubtedly the Board felt there would
be a strong likelihood that employees in this category would
not have had an opportunity to see the union’s annually pub-
lished policy statement. However, as to the second subgroup
—those employees who recently resigned their union member-
ship—the Board found that a union has no DFR obligation “to
issue an additional notice of Beck rights to new non-member
employees at the time they resign their union membership.”
[Emphasis mine] In the following paragraph, the Board be-
came more specific by stating that the IAM had a DFR obliga-
tion to give a Beck notice to “currently employed employees at
the time they become nonmembers if these currently employed
employees have not been sent a copy of [the monthly Machin-
ist’s magazine containing the IAM’s Beck policy statement].”
320 NLRB 231.
I find a union’s DFR obligation to provide a General Mo-
tors/Beck notice to recently expelled or suspended member-
employees at the very least parallels the obligation found appli-
cable to newly resigned members in California Saw. Having
reached this conclusion, Respondent was obliged to show ei-
ther: (1) that it regularly publishes a lawful statement of its
General Motors/Beck policy by a means that made it available
to its membership-at-large including Lopez; or (2) that it pro-
vided a separate, lawful General Motors/Beck policy statement
to Lopez at or near the time of his suspension or expulsion.
Respondent did neither. Although its counsel quizzed Lopez
concerning various union publications, no proof was ever sub-
mitted that Respondent regularly publishes a widely distributed
notice to its members concerning their General Motors/Beck
rights. Likewise, Respondent provided no evidence contradict-
ing Lopez’ claim that he never received a DFR-type notice
around the time of his membership suspension on April 30.
Accordingly, I find generally that Respondent violated the Act
by its failure to give Lopez a proper General Motors/Beck no-
tice when it suspended his membership.
However, I do not entirely agree with the General Counsel
concerning the substance of a DFR notice required of a labor
organization where, as here, it suspends a member for reasons
other than the failure to pay the fees mandated in the second
proviso of Section 8(a)(3). As shown in complaint paragraph
22 (g)(i),8 the General Counsel believes that Lopez should have
been told that he had “the right to be or remain a nonmember,”
the standard General Motors notice that would be apt before a
union imposes union-security obligations on a new employee.
However, requiring a labor organization to give a DFR notice
to that effect to a long-term member about to be involuntarily
banished would be irrelevant and inappropriate. Where a labor
organization expels or suspends an employee from member-
ship, the employee ceases to have a choice about membership
options. Informing such a person that he/she has a right to be
or remain a nonmember can easily be characterized as informa-

8 When the complaint issued, the referenced subparagraph was num-
bered 22(h)(i). At the hearing, a subparagraph was added to complaint
paragraph 22 so that the referenced subparagraph became 22(g)(i).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 532
tion hardly worth knowing. I find no rational purpose relevant
to the Act that would be served by elevating such a notice in a
situation such as this to the level of a DFR obligation.
Instead, the more appropriate DFR notice in this type of case
should draw its essence from the situation and the Supreme
Court’s core observation in General Motors concerning the
degree to which the law permits union membership to impact
on an employee’s employment. “It is permissible to condition
employment upon membership,” Justice White wrote for the
Court, “but membership, insofar as it has significance to em-
ployment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment
of fees and dues [specified in Section 8(a)(3)].” 373 U.S. 742.
[Emphasis mine.] Applying this principle here, I find Local
433 forfeited its right to affect Lopez’ employment under the
contractual union-security clause when it unlawfully misallo-
cated his dues payment to his fine balance and then suspended
him from membership for failing to pay his dues. In this Catch
22-like situation, the more appropriate DFR notice should ad-
dress the highly significant question Lopez or any other simi-
larly situated employee would likely have concerning their
continued employment through the union hiring hall and under
the union-security clause.
Based on the foregoing rationale, I find that at or about the
time Respondent suspended Lopez’ membership, it had a DFR
obligation under the General Motors/Beck principles to inform
him: (1) that as a nonmember he could continue to register for
referral at the hiring hall and be referred for employment under
California-Southern Nevada Agreement the so long as he con-
tinued to pay the dues and fees lawfully required of all others
under the agreement’s union-security clause; (2) that if he ob-
jected paying (through his dues payments) for union activities
other than collective bargaining, contract administration, or
grievance adjustment, he could obtain a prorated reduction in
the mandatory union-security fee for amounts spent by the un-
ion on all other activities; (3) that he had a right to sufficient
information that would enable him to intelligently decide
whether to object to paying for union activities other than col-
lective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance ad-
justment; and (4) that he had a right to be apprised of the un-
ion’s procedures for objecting to the union-security fee im-
posed if he declined to pay for union activities other than col-
lective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance ad-
justment. Because Local 433 failed to provide this or any other
type of DFR notice to Lopez when it suspended his member-
ship, I conclude that it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 433 is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Local 433 engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by informing Lopez in January
and March 2000 that any payment made by him toward the
periodic dues required under the union-security clause of the
California-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement would be
applied against his fine balance until fully paid; by applying the
payment tendered by Lopez on March 22 to his outstanding
fine balance rather than to the amount due under the union-
security clause of the California-Nevada Iron Worker Agree-
ment; by threatening Lopez in an April 17 letter that he would
not be permitted to work under the California-Southern Nevada
Iron Worker Agreement if suspended from membership for his
continued failure to pay the dues required by that agreement’s
union-security clause; and by suspending Lopez from member-
ship on April 30 without providing him with a notice of his
employment rights as a nonmember.
3. The unfair labor practices described above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The General Counsel failed to sustain its burden of prov-
ing that Local 433 failed and refused to permit Lopez to register
for referral or to refer Lopez for employment under the Califor-
nia-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
As I have concluded that Respondent misappropriated the
dues payment made by Lopez on March 22, my recommended
order also requires Respondent to restore the status quo ante by
crediting that payment to those dues and fees collectable under
the union-security clause of the California-Southern Nevada
Iron Worker Agreement, to debit his fine balance by an equal
amount, and to issue an official union receipt reflecting this
action. Respondent also will be required to provide Lopez with
a written assurance of his employment rights under the Califor-
nia-Southern Nevada Iron Worker Agreement as detailed
above.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]