Iron Workers, Local 751

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 12, 1971

193 N.L.R.B. 665 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751 665
International Association of Bridge , Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751, AFL-CIO
(Red-E-Steel Company , Inc.) and Joseph Milligan.
Case 19-CB-1577
October 12, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On June 4, 1971, Trial Examiner Herman Marx
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision, and the
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the brief,
and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts
the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommend-
ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
Respondent, International Association of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751,
AFL-CIO, Anchorage, Alaska, its officers, agents,
and representatives, take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Trial Examiner It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a
Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear
preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing his findings
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HERMAN MARx, Trial Examiner: The complaint, in
material substance, alleges that the Respondent, a labor
organization named International Association of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 751,
AFL-CIO (herein the Union or Local 751) caused two
employers, Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., and Alaska State
Steel Company (herein, respectively, Red-E-Steel and
Alaska Steel) to discriminate against the Charging Party,
Joseph Milligan, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act' (herein the Act); and that
by its said conduct, the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(2)
and (1)(A) of the Act.2
The Respondent has filed an answer denying the
commission of the unfair labor practices imputed to it in
the complaint.
Pursuant to notice duly served by the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board on all other parties, a
hearing on the issues was held before me, on February 23,
1971, at Anchorage, Alaska. The Board's General Counsel
and the Respondent appeared through respective counsel,
and all parties were afforded a full opportunity to adduce
evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and
submit oral argument and briefs.
Upon the entire record, and my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and having read and considered
the briefs filed with me since the close of the hearing, I
make the following findings of fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED;
Jurisdiction of the Board
Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., is an Alaska corporation;
maintains a place of business in Anchorage, Alaska, where
it is engaged in the business of steel erection for general
building contractors; is, and has been at all material times,
an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act;
in the course and conduct of its business, annually
purchases and causes to be transported to Alaska from
other States goods and materials exceeding $50,000 in
value; and by reason of such purchases and shipments is,
and has been at all material times, engaged in interstate
commerce, and operations affecting such commerce, within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Alaska State Steel Company (which is a trade name for
an enterprise owned and operated by one Robert Mullins)
maintains a place of business in Anchorage, Alaska; is
engaged there in the business of steel erection for general
building contractors; and is, and has been at all material
times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act. In the course and conduct of its business
operations in 1970, Alaska State Steel Company rendered
services valued, in the aggregate, at approximately $150,000
1 29 U S.C 151, et seq
2 The complaint was issued on December 28, 1970, and is based on a
charge filed by Joseph Milligan with the National Labor Relations Board
on September 17, 1970. Copies of the charge and complaint have been duly
served on the Respondent
193 NLRB No. 92
666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to three enterprises, Howard S. Lease Construction
Company, J. B. Warrack Company, and Woodruff
Construction Company, each of which annually purchases
and causes to be transported from one or more States to
another State or States goods and materials valued in excess
of $50,000. By reason of its said services, and of the
interstate operations of the enterprises to which they were
rendered, Alaska State Steel Company is, and has been at
all material times, engaged in interstate commerce, and in
operations affecting such commerce, within the meaning of
Sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
In view of the operations of Red-E-Steel Company, Inc.,
and Alaska State Steel Company in and affecting interstate
commerce, as described above, the National Labor
Relations Board has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
this proceeding.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is, and has been at all times material here, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory Statement
Alaska Steel and Red-E-Steel are, and have been at all
material times, parties to "identical" collective-bargaining
agreements with the Union, each of which contains the
following hiring provisions. "Employers will hire qualified
workmen by calling the Union. Whenever the Employer
requires workmen on any job, he will notify the local Union
office either in writing or by telephone stating the location,
starting time, approximate duration of the job, and the type
of work to be performed and the number of workmen
required." As the complaint alleges, and the answer admits,
by force of these provisions, "and as a matter of practice,"
the Union has, at all material times, "operated an exclusive
hiring hall" which has been "the exclusive source of supply
of employees in the iron workers' trade for employers party
to said provisions." 3
The hiring hall is located at the Union's office in
Anchorage and is administered by its business agent whose
duties include the dispatch or referral of workmen to fill
requests by employers for labor In his office at the hiring
facility, the business agent maintains "out-of-work" rosters
which are, in effect, lists of qualified workmen who are
registered at the hall as available for employment. The
rosters are divided into various categories, including three
respectively identified as "A," "B" and "C", on the basis of
prescribed qualifications (not in question here), and contain
entries of information in appropriate columns, including
the name of the registrant, the date of registration, and a
telephone number where he can be reached. The registrants
are permitted by the Union to make the entries themselves
and often do so.
A registration is valid for 90 days, but the registrant may
renew it for additional successive 90-day periods by
entering the date of renewal and his initials in a prescribed
column (captioned "Date of Re-register"), provided the
renewal is accomplished before the expiration of the
registrant's immediately preceding registration period. If a
registration has expired for lack of timely renewal and he
wishes to reregister, he must do so "at the bottom of the
list," that is, below all unexpired registrations on the given
roster. The rosters are available in the business agent's
office for registration or renewal entries or inspection by
those eligible for listing.
From time to time, the business agent canvasses the lists,
entering the phrase "over 90 days" opposite a registrant's
name, and drawing a line through the name, to denote the
fact of expiration of his registration; and makes up new lists
to which he transfers the information pertinent to the
unexpired registrations, omitting the data relating to those
that have expired. Thus a "B" list (G.C. Exh. 4), effective
January 16, 1970 (and hereafter termed the January 16
roster), has been superseded by one (G.C. Exh. 5), effective
July 23, 1970 (and described hereafter as the July 23 roster).
Registrants are dispatched by the business agent who has
the duty of exhausting the "A" list first , then using the "B"
list, and then the "C" roster, dispatching registrants in
descending order on the given list or, in other words, in the
chronological order of effective registration on the roster.4
Dispatches are customarily made at the hiring hall between
8 a.m. and 11 a.m., but registrants need not be present as a
condition of referral. If a man is reached on the relevant
roster, and he is not present, the business agent customarily
attempts to reach him at the telephone number listed on the
roster, and if he is unable to reach the registrant, passes on
to the next eligible on the list. If the dispatcher knows that a
registrant has a particular interest in a job for which he is
eligible, the business agent will make "every effort" to reach
him, calling friends of the registrant for that purpose in the
event he can not be reached at the telephone number on the
roster.
At the times material to the issues here, the Union's
business agent was Don Hancock, who assumed the post in
January 1970 and held it until October 19, 1970. He has
been president of the Union for about a year prior to his
designation as business agent.
B. The Alleged Failures To Dispatch Joseph
Milligan
Joseph Milligan has been a member of the Union since
1959, and has been registered at its hiring hall from time to
time, usually entering the name of an Anchorage bar,
Murmac Lounge, or its telephone number, as a medium for
reaching him for dispatch. It is not unusual for a registrant
to list a bar's telephone number for such a purpose, and in
such a case, the dispatcher, as a matter of course, will
attempt to reach the registrant at that number when he is
eligible for dispatch.
In September 1969, Milligan secured a job by his own
3 The quoted contract provisions are included in an agreement in establish that Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are represented by either
evidence (Resp Exh 1) between the Union and two associations of association or are otherwise parties to the contract between the Union and
employers, and there is some intimation by the Respondent's counsel that the associations.
Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are parties to that agreement through the 4 Two additional rosters, "D" and "E", maintained at the hiring hall,
agency of one or both associations, but the evidence does not in fact have no relevancy here
IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751 667
efforts as a welder on a project located on the North Slope
of Alaska, about a thousand miles from Anchorage. The
employer, an enterprise called Frontier Sand and Gravel
(herein Frontier) was not unionized, and although the
project was at a considerable distance from Anchorage, the
fact that Milligan took a job with a nonunion employer was
a focus of attention among members and officers of the
Union. Hancock testified, in that regard, that "everybody
(members and officers of the Union) was keeping their eyes
on Milligan," "wondering why he was working for a non-
union contractor," and whether he "was getting the
negotiated wage scale, and fringe benefits." In short, as
Hancock conceded, there was "resentment" among mem-
bers of the Union over the fact that Milligan had taken the
nonunion employment, and they expressed themselves to
that effect to Hancock.5
Milligan worked for Frontier until some point in
February 1970, and then returned to Anchorage. He
registered on the January 16 roster for which he was
eligible, on March 23, 1970, entering his name, the date of
registration, and the name Murmac Lounge in the column
provided for telephone numbers, but furnished no number.
Hancock had by then become the Union's business agent
and dispatcher.
According to Milligan, he renewed his registration on
May 12, 19706 (within the 90-day period from his initial
registration date), by entering his initials followed by
"5-12-70" in the column provided for reregistration dates.
It may be noted, for future reference, that there are two
other entries in the column, one of them "7-13-70" above
the entry "5-12-70" and the other "6-16-70" below it; and
that the phrase "over 90 days," purportedly to indicate
expiration of Milligan's registration, has been written on
the line on which he registered, although, contrary to
customary practice in the case of expired registrations, no
line has been drawn through his name on that list.
On the morning of July 15, 1970, Hancock had occasion
at the hiring hall to fill a request from Red-E-Steel for a
man, and dispatched one Jim Clayson who was on the "C"
list, and thus not entitled to dispatch until after the
exhaustion, in turn, of the "A" and "B" rosters. Hancock
did not call or otherwise attempt to communicate with
Milligan regarding the job.
In explanation of the omission, Hancock gave testimony
to the effect that he had exhausted the "A" and "B" lists of
eligibles that morning before dispatching Clayson; that
Milligan was not eligible because his March 23 registration
had expired, as indicated by the entry "over 90 days"; that
it was he, Hancock, who had made the entry; that although
he could not recall the date he had done so, it was at some
point after expiration of the 90-day period; and that the
purported renewal entries, including the initialled one for
"5-12-70", for Milligan in the column marked "Date of Re-
register" were not in the roster at the time of the expiration
entry.
According to Milligan, however, although he was in
Anchorage throughout the period between his March 23
registration and some point in September, and looked at the
roster approximately once or twice a week during that
period, the first time he saw the entry "over 90 days" for his
registration was when the list was produced at the hearing
in this case (on February 23, 1971).
This testimony, taken together with the purported
reregistration entry for May 12 in the roster, places in issue
the credibility of Hancock's claim to the effect the entry
was made at some point subsequent to the expiration of 90
days following the March 23 registration, and that Milligan
was thus not eligible for dispatch to the Red-E-Steel job,
and was therefore passed over for it. The relevant
credibility issues will be resolved at a later point.
On August 31, 1970, Hancock processed a request for a
man by Alaska Steel, and dispatched one Eddie Koontz to
the job from the "B" roster. Koontz had registered on that
list on July 15, and there is no question that he was junior in
registration to Milligan if the latter had, in fact, renewed his
March 23 registration on May 12 and July 13.
Hancock testified that he does not recall whether he
telephoned the Murmac Lounge with a view to reaching
Milligan regarding the Alaska Steel job. Although there is
no direct evidence either way, one may fairly conclude that
Hancock made no effort to reach Milligan at or through the
bar. Its location was known to Hancock; there is
undisputed evidence that on about a half dozen occasions
prior to Hancock's tenure as dispatcher, Milligan had been
reached by the Union at the Murmac Lounge for dispatch
purposes; and the record establishes no reason why a
message left at the bar by Hancock would not have reached
Milligan. Moreover, bearing in mind that Hancock, as he
testified, does not know the Murmac Lounge's telephone
number, and would have had to look for it in the telephone
directory to ascertain it, it seems more likely than not that
had he gone to the trouble of consulting the directory and
then calling the number, he would remember the extra
effort involved in attempting to reach Milligan, particularly
as Milligan is the only registrant on the rosters in evidence
who listed no telephone number. I find, in short, that
Hancock did not attempt to reach Milligan regarding the
Alaska Steel job.
C. Discussion of the Issues; Concluding Findings
The ultimate issue here is whether Milligan, as the
General Counsel contends, was passed over for the Red-E-
Steel and Alaska Steel referrals because he had been
employed on "a non-union" job by Frontier. As a
preliminary, it is necessary to determine whether he was
effectively registered on the "B" list at the time of both
referrals and entitled to pnonty in dispatch over Clayson
on the first occasion, and over Koontz on the second. That
determination rests on the effect to be given to the
purported reregistration entries "5-12-70" and "7-13-70"
for Milligan. The Respondent, it may be noted, makes no
claim that Milligan's registration was invalid because he
designated a location, in the form of the name of a bar,
where could be reached, instead of specifying a telephone
number for that purpose.
In other respects, the evidence on both sides of the
S Milligan testified that the type of welding work he did for Frontier employment by Frontier shared that view
was not "normally" within the Union's "jurisdiction," but it does not 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates mentioned herein occurred in
appear whether the members of the organization who resented his 1970
668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
subject of roster entries leaves something to be desired.
Milligan testified that he did not make the "6-16-70" and
"7-13-70" entries that appear with the May 12 entry in the
January 16 roster, but he later stated that he made the
"7-13-70" notation, and that the "6-16-70" entry "looks
like it could be mine." Moreover, his testimony regarding
the superseding July 23 roster has manifest shortcomings.
That roster was prepared by Hancock to weed out expired
registrations and carry forward viable information from the
preceding roster. Milligan claims that he made an entry
"7-13-70" in the column captioned "Date of Re-Register"
in the later roster, but he was unable to give a satisfactory
reconciliation of the entry with the fact that the roster was
begun, as evidenced by its date, some 10 days after July 13,
and I am satisfied that it was Hancock, as he testified, who
made the relevant entry.?
The indicated deficiencies in Milligan's testimony (which,
in my judgment, derive from a short, and at times, confused
memory, rather than a purpose to deceive) place his
credibility in general in jeopardy, but that by no means
leads me to accept Hancock's claim to the effect that the
"5-12-70" and "7-13-70" renewal entries were made by (or
for) Milligan after the expiration of the March 23
registration, and after Hancock had made the notation
"over 90 days." On the contrary, a number of factors
persuade me of the regularity of the "5-12-70" and
"7-13-70" entries, and their efficacy as extensions of the
March 23 registration.8
To begin with, Milligan was in Anchorage for some six
months following his March 23 registration, and sought
work during that period, coming to the hiring hall about
once or twice a week to check the "out-of-work list," and
against that background, I find it wholly plausible that he
would guard against a lapse in his registration with
appropriate entries renewing it.9
For another matter, the Respondent's claim that the
renewal entrees for Milligan were not in the January 16
roster when Hancock made the entry "over 90 days" rests
solely on Hancock's claim to that effect, and there are
features of his testimony and of his roster entries that put
his credibility under a cloud. He professes an inability to
recall when he made the entry "over 90 days," or to explain
why, contrary to customary practice in the case of expired
registrations, he did not put a line through Milligan's name
in the January 16 roster. And it is noteworthy that in
preparing the revised roster of July 23, Hancock placed
Milligan's name in second place on the list, transferring
Milligan's initial registration date, "3-23-70," from the
superseded roster; 10 and that two registrants, Norm Baake
and D. Vanden Brook, with initial registration dates
(respectively April 28, 1970, and June 15, 1970) that
antedate the July 13, 1970, entry for Milligan appear in third
and fourth places, respectively, beneath Milligan 's position.
I The later roster also contains two entries, "7-31-70" and "9-14-70"
for Milligan in the "Date of Re-Register" column According to Milligan,
the first of these was made by him, but not the second It does not appear
who made the latter entry
8 It is unnecessary to decide whether the purported "6-16-70" renewal
entry was made by Milligan, nor whether it was effective as an extension of
Milligan's registration
9 1 find no significance in the fact that Milligan made renewal entries at
substantially less than 90-day intervals Others (for example, John Vaughn
and J J Smith, as reflected in G C Exh 4) followed a similar course A
Bearing in mind that job referrals are made from the roster
in descending order, and that according to Hancock
himself, a reregistration following an expired registration
should be made at "the bottom of the list," the order in
which he listed the three names on the revised roster
suggests that at the time of that listing, at least, he gave
effect to the May 12 entry for Milligan as a renewal of the
latter's March 23 registration.
To be sure, the revised roster shows lines drawn through
Milligan's name and the reregistration date "7-13-70" (as
well as through another purported reregistration date,
"7-31-70," but not through an entry "9-14" which Milligan
says he did not make), and Milligan's name is interlined
farther down the list, in eighth place, with a registration
date of "9-14-70"; but although Hancock had custody and
control of the rosters while business agent, he does not say
when, by whom, or under what circumstances lines were
drawn through his name and purported reregistration dates
in second place on the revised roster, nor when, by whom,
and under what circumstances the interlineated insertions
were made in eighth place. The absence of such informa-
tion detracts from the reliability of Hancock's uncorrobo-
rated claim that Milligan's March 23 registration had
expired before the entry "over 90 days" was made by
Hancock to signify such expiration.
Moreover, ambiguity and self-contradiction appear in
Hancock's testimony at material points. The thrust of some
of his testimony is that he did not call Milligan for the Red-
E-Steel job because the latter's March 23 registration had
expired and had not been renewed by July 15, the date of
Clayson's dispatch to the job; yet at other points Hancock
testified that he has no recollection whether he attempted to
reach Milligan before dispatching Clayson to the job. At
one point, he vaguely implied that he made no attempt to
reach Milligan for the Alaska Steel job because of lack of
time, since "when Alaska State Steel called for men, they
wanted them in the next half hour or hour"; but elsewhere
Hancock testified that "I would have to say that I didn't
call Mr. Milligan because . . . I regard [sic ] him as not
properly on the list"; and at other points, Hancock stated
that he could not recall whether he had tried to reach
Milligan for dispatch to the Alaska Steel opening.
Taking all factors into account, I do not credit Hancock's
claim that the renewal entries for Milligan were absent
from the January 16 roster at the time the notation "over 90
days" was made; and, I am convinced, and find, that
Milligan's March 23 registration was effectively renewed
for an additional 90-day period on May 12, 1970 by force of
the entry "5-12-70," that the registration was again
effectively renewed on July 13, 1970, for 90 days by reason
of the entry "7-13-70"; ii that by force of the two renewal
entries, he was effectively registered for dispatch to the
Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel jobs, and was entitled to
registrant may be at a great distance from Anchorage when his registration
expires, and it is thus reasonable that he should extend his existing
registration when he can do so at his convenience rather than run the risk
of expiration during an absence from Anchorage
10 According to Hancock , intermediate renewal dates (such as
"5-12-70" in Milligan' s case ) are not transferred to revised rosters, and it is
customary to transfer only the last renewal entry.
11 The Respondent makes no claim that the renewal of July 13, 1970,
lacked validity because it was not initialled . The rosters in evidence contain
many uninitialled renewal entnes It is clear, in any case , that the omission
IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751
precedence over Clayson for dispatch to the Red-E-Steel
opening, and over Koontz to the Alaska Steeljob; and that
the failure to dispatch Milligan to either job was not based
on his relative position on the roster.
The reason for the omission in each instance is to be
found, in my Judgment, in the "resentment" by members of
the Union toward Milligan because he had taken a
nonunion job with Frontier. That the attitude was
widespread may be inferred from Hancock's admission that
"everybody" in the Union's membership was "keeping (his)
eyes" on Milligan, "wondering why he was working for a
non-union contractor." To this, Hancock added that "every
member there [in the Union] was keeping their eyes on
me." He was an officeholder in the Union, first as president
and later as business agent, and dependent on the
membership for his status, and his testimony that "every
member" kept his "eyes" on him because of Milligan's
nonunion employment implies, in the context of circum-
stances, that the membership looked to him as an
officeholder, to do something about Milligan's nonunion
employment. I am persuaded that Hancock was responsive
to this attitude, and that his response took the form of
discrimination against Milligan in job referrals from the
hiring hall, as a reprisal for his employment by a nonunion
contractor.
In filling requests for labor by Red-E-Steel and Alaska
Steel, through the hiring hall arrangements with these
employers, the Union acted as their hiring agent, and thus
the discrimination against Milligan is imputable in each
case to the employer involved.
I find, for the reasons stated, that by dispatching Clayson
instead of Milligan to the Red-E-Steel job, the Union
caused Red-E-Steel to discriminate against Milligan in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, thus violating
Section 8(b)(2) of the Act; that by dispatching Koontz
instead of Milligan to the Alaska Steel job, the Union
caused Alaska Steel to discriminate against Milligan in
violation of said Section 8(a)(3), thus violating Section
8(b)(2) of the Act; and that by its conduct in causing such
discrimination, the Union in each case restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of that Act, thereby violating Section
8(b)( 1)(A) of the statute. 12
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices of the Union set forth in
section III, above, occurring in connection with the
operations of Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State
Steel Company described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
to initial the entry for July 13, 1970, had no connection with Hancock's
failure to refer Milligan to the Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel Jobs.
12 1 find no merit in an intimation by the Respondent at the hearing
that Milligan is barred from seeking relief through this proceeding because
he has not sought review of the discrimination in referrals by a tripartite
body, consisting of a representative of management , a representative of the
Union, and an " impartial umpire," established for such a purpose under
V. THE REMEDY
669
It has been found that the Union has engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
Act. In view of these findings, I shall recommend that the
Union cease and desist from such unfair labor practices
and take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
As the Union caused Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and
Alaska State Steel Company to discriminate against Joseph
Milligan in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, thereby
violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, as found
above, I shall recommend that the Union make Milligan
whole for any loss of pay he suffered, or may suffer, as a
result of its omission to dispatch him for employment by
Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel
Company between the dates of the respective omissions to
refer Milligan, as found above, and the expiration of 5 days
from the respective dates the Umon notifies Red-E-Steel
Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel Company, in writing,
as hereafter provided, that it has no objection to the
employment of Milligan; and that such loss of wages be
computed in accordance with the formula and method
prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, and include interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716, to which cases the parties hereto are expressly
referred.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the
following conclusions of law:
1. Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska State Steel
Company are, and have been at all material times,
employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
2. The Union is, and has been at all material times, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By causing Red-E-Steel Company, Inc. and Alaska
State Steel Company to discriminate against Joseph
Milligan in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as found
above, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act.
4. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, as found
above, the Union has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
the contract between the Union and the two associations, previously
mentioned . See Sec . 10(a) of the Act and Local 469, United Assn of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Ibpefitting Industry (Joe
Correa), 149 NLRB 39, 45-46. Moreover, as previously noted, the record
does not establish that Red-E-Steel and Alaska Steel are parties to the
contract to which the Respondent refers.
670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law , and upon the entire record in this
proceeding , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended Order: 13
International Association of Bridge , Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers , Local 751, AFL-CIO, its
officers , agents, successors , and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing, or attempting to cause, Red-E-Steel
Company, Inc. or Alaska State Steel Company, or any
other employer who uses any of its facilities for the hire of
employees , to discriminate against any employee in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner , restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of the right to self -organization,
to form , join, or assist any labor organization , to bargain
collectively with representatives of their own choosing, to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain
from any or all such activities , except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized in the Act.
2 Take the following affirmative actions which , I find,
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Joseph Milligan whole in the manner,
according to the method , and to the extent set forth in
section V , above, entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Forthwith notify Red-E-Steel Company, Inc., Alaska
State Steel Company, and Joseph Milligan in writing , that it
has no objection to his employment.
(c) Post, in conspicuous places, including places where
notices to its members are customarily posted , at its office,
usual membership meeting place , and hiring hall, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19 , after being signed by a duly authorized
representative of the Union , be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter , in such conspicuous places.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Union to insure
that said notice is not covered , altered, or defaced by any
other matenal.14
(d) Forthwith mail copies of the said notice to the said
Regional Director at the office of Region 19 of the Board in
Seattle , Washington , after such notices has been signed as
provided above, for posting by Red - E-Steel Company, Inc.
and Alaska State Steel Company, if they so agree , in places
where they customarily post notices to their employees.
(e) Notify the said Regional Director , in writing, within
20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision , what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.15
13 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recommended order herein
shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted
by the National Relations Board, and become its findings, conclusions, and
order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
14 In the event that the National Labor Relations Board's Order is
enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations
Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board "
15 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the National
Labor Relations Board, after exceptions have been filed, Paragraph 2(e)
thereof shall be modified to read "Notify the said Regional Director, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply therewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post
this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights: To
engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist
any union To bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choice To engage in
activities together for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To
refrain from the exercise of any or all such rights.
WE WILL NOT cause, or attempt to cause, Red-E-Steel
Company, Inc., or Alaska Steel Company, or any other
employer who uses any of our facilities to hire
employees, to discriminate against any employee in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce any employees in the exercise of any of the
rights stated above.
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to
dispatch Joseph Milligan for employment by Red-E-Steel
Company, Inc., and Alaska State Steel Company, and has
ordered us to reimburse him for any loss of pay he may
have suffered because of our refusal to dispatch him.
WE WILL reimburse the said Joseph Milligan for his
said loss of pay, together with interest thereon, in
accordance with the Board's order.
WE WILL forthwith notify said Red-E-Steel Compa-
ny, Inc., Alaska State Steel Company, and Joseph
Milligan that we have no objection to his employment.
Dated By
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE,
STRUCTURAL &
ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKERS , LOCAL 751,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
IRON WORKERS , LOCAL 751 671
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office,
or covered by any other material. Republic Building, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washing-
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with ton 98101, Telephone 583-7473.