Intl Union of Operating Engineers, Local 525

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 609 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

INTL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525 609
International Union of Operating Engineers , Local jurisdictions, collective-bargaining negotiations were
525, AFL-CIO and Clark Oil & Refining Corpora- conducted primarily on a joint basis.' In 1950, howev-
tion. Case 14-CB-1899 er, petitions were filed by each of nine unions then
August 27, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, MCCULLOCH, AND BROWN
On April 30, 1970, Trial Examiner Benjamin K.
Blackburn issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding finding that Respondent had not engaged
in a certain unfair labor practice alleged in the com-
plaint and recommending dismissal of the complaint
in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel
and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs, Respond-
ent filed cross-exceptions and a brief in support there-
of, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here-
by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions,
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consist-
ent herewith.
As set forth more fully in the Trial Examiner's
Decision, the Charging Party, Clark Oil & Refining
Corporation, is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in
the oil industry in several States. It purchased the
Hartford oil refinery, located in Hartford, Illinois,
from the Sinclair Refining Company in October 1967,
which in turn had acquired the refinery from the
Wood River Oil and Refining Company in July 1950.
The present proceeding involves only the Hartford
refinery.
Since 1941 the employees at the Hartford refinery
have been represented on a joint basis by various
labor organizations. The composition of this joint
representative had changed over the years with various
unions leaving and joining. Although before 1951
there were periods of time during which the National
Labor Relations Board recognized the separate craft
composing the joint representative, including
Respondent, in an effort to protect their representation
rights from an attempt by an intervenor, Oil Workers
International Union, CIO, which had representative
rights in other plants of Sinclair, to absorb the Hart-
ford refinery into its companywide contract with Sin-
clair. Each of the petitioning unions sought a separate
craft unit confined to its jurisdiction at the refinery;
each, however, requested, in the alternative, a single-
plant overall unit with all of the unions appearing
on the ballot jointly. The Board found on the basis
of bargaining history, and particularly because of
the joint negotiations and the petitioners' acceptance
of uniform contract terms, that separate craft units
limited to the single plant would not be appropriate,
but that a single-plant unit represented by the nine
petitioners jointly or a companywide unit would be
appropriate. The Board directed an election, following
which the Board in 1951 certified the petitioning
unions jointly as the representative of all the employees
in the Hartford plant.
When Clark Oil acquired the Hartford plant, it
recognized the unions, then 10 in number, as the
representative, acting jointly, of all its employees.
Negotiations from then were conducted as previously
between management and a negotiating committee
consisting of one representative from each craft.
Agreement on the terms of a contract was determined
by procedures adopted originally by the unions when
joint negotiations first began and amended in 1959
after Respondent had manifested some dissatisfaction
with such procedures and had sought, through a
petition with the Board, to withdraw the operating
engineers from the joint bargaining arrangement.
There is evidence as the Trial Examiner found, that
not all contracts agreed on met with the approval
of all the constituent unions; that on one such occasion,
the negotiating committee and the Company agreed
by memorandum to allow Respondent and the Compa-
ny to continue to negotiate over an issue involving
barge loading employees after multiunion negotiations
had been completed, and if agreement on that issue
was reached, to include such agreement in the new
contract. No agreement was ever reached and all
10 unions signed a new contract which contained
the same provisions as the old concerning barge load-
ers. Despite disagreements, at no time prior to the
1968-69 negotiations did any of the 10 unions, includ-
ing Respondent, refuse to execute the new contract.
' Sinclair Refining Company, 92 NLRB 643
185 NLRB No. 72
610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Bargaining between the Company and the negotiat-
ing committee for a new contract to replace the
one due to expire on Janaury 31, 1969, began on
December 17, 1968, in accordance with the parties'
previous practice. After a lapse, the negotiations
resumed in 1969, with the final bargaining session
taking place on January 28, 1969, at which time
the Company presented to the negotiating committee
for acceptance or rejection a memorandum of agree-
ment incorporating its understanding of agreements
reached and its offer on items which were still open.
During the negotiating committee's caucus Respond-
ent's representative, Harold Rice, objected to accept-
ance of the Company's offer because he wanted further
negotiations on several issues relating to the loading
rack and to a special rate increase in the wages
of laboratory testers. The negotiating committee
agreed that Respondent's loading rack demands could
be pursued, but refused to permit further negotiations
on the laboratory tester issue.' A vote was then taken
on the Company's proposal, with the result being
eight unions in favor of submitting the Company's
offer to their members for ratification and two
opposed, Respondent and the Laborers. The negotiat-
ing committee then resumed its meeting with the
Company. The chairman of the negotiating committee,
Arvel Pickering, informed the Company that a majori-
ty of the unions had agreed to accept the memorandum
of agreement and to recommend it to their members
for ratification. Rice said he disagreed because there
were no provisions concerning the loading rack and
laboratory tester issues. The Company's chief negotia-
tor, George H. Phillips, said that the omission concern-
ing loading rack proposals was an oversight and
offered to add to the memorandum a provision for
additional talks with Respondent on these issues and
inclusion of any agreement reached in the new con-
tract. However, Phillips said that Rice had raised
the laboratory tester issue too late and that the Compa-
ny would not bargain over the matter. Pickering
accepted Phillips' offer to add a loading rack bargain-
ing provision to the memorandum of agreement, but
agreed with the Company that Rice had brought
up the laboratory tester issue too late. Pickering then
informed the Company that a sufficient number of
the unions had agreed to the Company's proposal.'
Rice stated that he did not care what Phillips did
with respect to putting something about the loading
' During the caucus the Laborers' representative also refused to accept
the Company's offer because he wanted an across-the-board wage increase
instead of the negotiated percentage raise His position was rejected
by the Committee
' According to the amended voting procedure adopted in 1959, decisions
in all negotiations were based not on a majority vote as previously,
but only on approval of the Respondent and four other unions or,
alternatively, approval of any seven unions
rack in writing and left the meeting. Thereafter, the
following sentence was added to the memorandum
of agreement: "The loading rack changes discussed
between the Company and Union, if agreed upon,
will be included in this Agreement." The memoran-
dum of agreement was then signed by Refinery Manag-
er G. E. Burkhart on behalf of the Company and
Pickering on behalf of the Accredited International
Unions, acting jointly, subject to ratification of
employees in the bargaining unit. Presumably the
negotiators for each of the eight unions who voted
to accept the Company's offer thereafter recommended
acceptance to their members and their members rati-
fied the agreement.
In February 1969, the eight unions which had
voted to accept the Company's offer, and the Laborers,
although the latter had expressed some dissatisfaction
with the wage provision, signed a contract which
incorporated all the changes in the old contract provid-
ed for in the memorandum of agreement. The final
contract did not contain the aforementioned provision
concerning further bargaining over the loading rack
issues.
Since the joint negotiations ended on January 28,
1969, Respondent and the Company have had numer-
ous meetings. At these meetings the loading rack
issues were discussed, but Respondent continued to
refuse to execute the contract unless a satisfactory
resolution was made on the laboratory tester issue.
The Company refused to bargain on this issue on
the ground that the subject was barred by the decision
of the negotiating committee on January 28. At one
point the Company agreed to discuss the issue if
the other unions would give their consent, but they
refused to do so. At the last meeting on February
10, 1970, Respondent finally agreed to accept the
Company's proposal, to sign the contract, and to
drop the laboratory tester issue, if the Company would
make any wage adjustment for laboratory testers nego-
tiated in the next contract retroactive to February
1, 1969, and if the Company would insist that all
the unions agree to a contract before it is effective
or that the unions provide the Company with a
written voting procedure that is acceptable to all
the unions. The Company refused to accept the retro-
activity portion of Rice's offer.
On these facts, the Trial Examiner concluded that
Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act by refusing to sign the new contract executed
in February 1969 by the Company and the other
nine unions. While agreeing that, under Board preced-
ent, parties which have consented to multiparty negoti-
ations are bound by the results of these negotiations,
the Trial Examiner nevertheless considered that rule
inapplicable to the present situation since, in his
INTL. UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525
view, Respondent cannot be considered as having
voluntarily consented to multiparty negotiations as
the multiunion bargaining situation exists as the result
of a Board certification. He therefore concluded, that,
in these circumstances, Respondent cannot be bound
to a contract to which it has not individually assented
despite a history of bargaining which strongly supports
a contrary conclusion. As an additional rationale
for dismissing the complaint, the Trial Examiner also
concluded that Respondent did not violate the Act
by refusing to sign the contract as the contract does
not contain all the terms of the agreement reached-
namely, the provision for additional discussions with
Respondent on the loading rack issues and inclusion
on any agreement reached thereon in the new contract.
We disagree on both grounds.
We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that
because Respondent has participated in multiunion
bargaining since 1951 as the result of a Board certifica-
tion it necessarily follows that multiunion bargaining
was imposed upon Respondent without its consent.
We do not know what prompted the decision of
the nine petitioning unions in 1950 to seek representa-
tive status on a joint basis. However, the fact that
they decided on their own to proceed in this manner,
albeit on an alternative basis, is proof to us that
their decision was a voluntary and uncoerced one.
Moreover, Respondent's actions in 1959 in withdraw-
ing its petition for separate representation and its
continued participation in joint bargaining thereafter
until the instant dispute are persuasive evidence of
its continued consent to such procedures. It may
or may not be to Respondent's advantage to continue
to join with the other unions in joint negotiations,
but until it chooses another course and makes a
timely withdrawal from the multiunion bargaining
group, we think that the dictates of the statute require
Respondent to conform to the established procedures
of the joint bargaining representative and to sign
the contract agreed on.4 To conclude otherwise after
so long a period of a workable arrangement can
only lead to complete instability in bargaining rela-
tions.
Nor do we find any merit in the Trial Examiner's
additional finding that in any event Respondent did
not violate the Act because the contract submitted
for Respondent's signature was an incomplete agree-
ment since the issues involving the loading rack
employees were left for further negotiations and the
final contract does not contain a clause reserving
' While it is true that a number of unions acting jointly as a bargaining
representative constitutes a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act, the Board's mere taking cognizance of the procedures under which the
labor organization acts does not constitute an interference in the internal
affairs of that organization
611
to Respondent the right to bargain thereon. However,
it is clear that Respondent's refusal to sign the contract
was not based on the absence of this clause in the
contract. It indicated quite clearly that it would not
sign a contract unless the Company agreed to bargain
on the laboratory tester issue, notwithstanding the
fact that the negotiating committee had rejected
Respondent's demand that the Company bargain on
the tester issue. Moreover, the procedures which had
been in effect for nearly 30 years contemplated that
the agreement reached between the Company and
the negotiating committee would be the agreement
of all the parties and, upon ratification by their mem-
bers, all 10 members of the negotiating committee
would be obligated to sign the contract. That obliga-
tion, as their past bargaining history shows, was
not conditional on agreement being reached on any
issue reserved for further bargaining. If agreement
resulted, the matter agreed on would be incorporated
into the final contract, but if otherwise, the obligation
to sign the contract still remained. Here the Company
honored its obligation to bargain over the loading
rack issues, but no agreement was reached because
of Respondent's insistence on bargaining over the
laboratory testers. In these circumstances, Respondent
was obligated to sign the contract.
We find, on the record as a whole, that, by refusing
to sign the contract which had been ratified according
to the voting arrangement agreed upon by the 10-
member joint union group and signed by the other
nine unions, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
We have found, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that Respondent engaged in a certain unfair labor
practice in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act,
by refusing to execute the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the Charging Party and the joint bar-
gaining agent, composed of 10 unions, including
Respondent. Accordingly, we shall order Respondent
to cease and desist therefrom and take the following
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the record as a whole, we shall:
1. Substitute the following conclusion for the Trial
Examiner's third Conclusion of Law:
"By failing and refusing to execute the written
agreement between the Charging Party and the
joint bargaining agent, as agreed upon January
612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
28, 1969, and subsequently ratified, Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(b)(3) of the Act."
2. Add the following paragraph as the fourth Con-
clusion of Law:
"All employees at the Company's plant at
Hartford, Illinois excluding office and clerical
employees, guards, professional employees, and
supervisors, constitute an appropriate bargaining
unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that Respondent, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, Local 525, AFL-
CIO, Hartford, Illinois, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the following action:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collec-
tively in good faith with Clark Oil & Refining Corpora-
tion, as to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment covering employees in the
appropriate unit, by refusing to sign the collective-
bargaining contract on which the Charging Party
and the joint bargaining representative, of which
Respondent is a part, have agreed, or from engaging
in any like or related conduct in derogation of the
statutory duty to bargain.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request by Clark Oil & Refining Corpora-
tion, forthwith execute the contract tendered to it
by the Company, on which agreement was reached
between the Company and the joint bargaining repre-
sentative of which Respondent is a part.
(b) Post at its business offices and meeting halls,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly
signed by a representative of Respondent, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt there-
of, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including such places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
' In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
therewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
We hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
in good faith with Clark Oil & Refining Corpora-
tion, as a member of the joint representative
of the said Employer's employees by refusing
to sign the written collective-bargaining agree-
ment to which the point representative agreed,
and we will not engage in any like or related
conduct in derogation of our statutory duty to
bargain.
WE WILL, if requested by Clark Oil & Refining
Corporation, execute the contract on which the
point bargaining representative of which we are
a part reached agreement with the said Employer
on January 28, 1969.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, refuse
to bargain collectively with Clark Oil & Refining
Corporation, with respect to terms and conditions
of employment of the employees of the Company
which we jointly represent.
INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS , LOCAL 525,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative)
(Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 1040 Boatmen's Bank Building , 314 North
Broadway, St. Louis, Missouri 63102, Telephone 314-
622-4167.
INTL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: This case
arose on September 4, 1969, when Clark Oil & Refining
Corporation, referred to herein as the Charging Party or
the Company, filed a charge against International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 525, AFL-CIO, referred
to herein as Respondent The General Counsel of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for
Region 14 (St. Louis, Missouri), issued complaint on January
14, 1970. Respondent's answer, duly filed, admitted certain
allegations of the complaint and denied others, including
the allegation that it had committed unfair labor practices.
Hearing was held before me, pursuant to due notice,
in St Louis, Missouri, on February 24 and 25, 1970
The issue litigated was whether Respondent has violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to sign a contract
with the Charging Party which was negotiated jointly by
Respondent and nine other labor organizations. The other
nine have signed it All parties appeared at the hearing
and were given full opportunity to participate, to adduce
relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
to argue orally, and to file briefs Respondent's motion
to dismiss on the ground that it is not the exclusive bargain-
ing agent of the unit alleged in the complaint and the
other nine labor organizations which, jointly with it, com-
prise the exclusive representative, are not named as parties,
and on the ground that the General Counsel is attempting
to interfere in the internal affairs of a labor organization
which I took under advisement at the close of the hearing,
is disposed of herein. Upon the entire record,' including
briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Charging Party,
and from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying under oath, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company is a Wisconsin corporation involved in
the oil business in various States including Illinois, where
the refinery involved in this proceeding is located. During
1969 its direct inflow of raw materials and other goods
as well as its direct outflow of finished products across
State lines to and from that refinery exceeded $50,000.
On the basis of these admitted facts, I find that the Company
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
613
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. Facts
I Background
There are nine labor organizations involved in this case
in addition to Respondent They are-
1. Local No 553, United Association of Journeymen
and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry
of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO
2 Local No 649, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO.
3. Local No. 525, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
4. Local No 483, International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Help-
ers, AFL-CIO.
5. Local No. 338, Laborers' International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO.
6. Local No. 917, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators
and Paper Hangers of America, AFL-CIO.
7. Local No 1808, District Council of Madison County,
Illinois and Vicinity, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.
8. District 9, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
9. Local No. 56, International Association of Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL-CIO.
They are referred to, respectively, herein as the Fitters,
the Electricians, the Teamsters, the Boilermakers, the Labor-
ers, the Painters, the Carpenters, the Machinists, and the
Insulators.
The Charging Party purchased its Hartford, Illinois, refin-
ery from Sinclair Refining Company on October 1, 1967.
Sinclair had acquired the refinery from Wood River Oil
& Refining Corporation on July 1, 1950.
Employees at the refinery have been represented by vari-
ous of the 10 labor organizations involved herein on a
joint basis since 1941. At that time Wood River Oil &
Refining Company entered into the initial bargaining agree-
ment with Respondent, the Fitters, the Electricians, the
Teamsters, the Boilermakers, the Laborers, the Carpenters,
and the Machinists. The Painters were added in 1943.
At some time between 1941 and 1950 the Machinists
dropped out for a time. On January 15, 1951, at a time
when Sinclair Refining Company was the Employer, the
Board certified that Respondent, the Fitters, the Electricians,
the Teamsters, the Boilermakers, the Laborers, the Painters,
the Carpenters, and the Machinists "Jointly has [sic] been
designated and selected by a majority of the employees"
in an all-employees unit limited to the refinery at Hartford
"as their representative for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, and that, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act
as amended, the said organization [sic] is the exclusive
representative of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions
of employment."2 On January 27, 1955, by agreement of
' The General Counsel's motion to correct record is granted 2 Sinclair Refining Company, 92 N L R B 643
614 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sinclair, the Insulators, and the nine labor organizations
certified jointly by the Board, the Insulators were added
to the point bargaining "organization." When the Charging
Party purchased the refinery from Sinclair in 1967, it volun-
tarily recognized the 10 labor organizations as the joint
bargaining representative of the employees and assumed
the obligations of the existing agreement, with some modifi-
cations to which the unions agreed.
Since 1941 collective-bargaining agreements at the Hart-
ford refinery have taken the format of a single contract
containing the usual provisions with respect to recognition,
union security, grievance procedure, arbitration, hours, wag-
es, vacations, and the like, as well as addenda captioned
"Special Craft Rules for Operators," "Special Craft Rules
for Teamsters," and the like There are no special craft
rules in the contract for Fitters, Electricians, or Machinists.
The recognition article of the contract, while stating that
the 10 labor organizations are "joint representatives
for all employees of the Company within the unit afore-
said," recognizes Respondent as the representative for all
operating department employees and each of the other
nine unions as the representative for employees working
in that union's traditional jurisdiction Article VI of the
contract provides for a standing Union Plant Committee
consisting of one employee member from each of the 10
unions. Its primary function is to deal with day-to-day
administration of the contract
Bargaining for changes in the contract has been conducted
in this manner over the years: At the appropriate time
the unions jointly sent to management the requisite notice
to prevent the contract's automatically renewing itself Rep-
resentatives of each of the 10 unions, members of the
Union Plant Committee and/or nonemployee business repre-
sentatives, met to prepare their demands This group,
referred to as the negotiating committee, elected a chairman.
Each union brought up what it wanted Some of these
demands were dropped as a result of persuasion by other
members of the committee. The rest were adopted or modi-
fied and made part of a total list of demands which were
served on management. Management, in turn, put its propos-
als on the table. Discussions with management relating
to those parts of the contract, including wages, which
applied to all employees regardless of their craft were
conducted by the entire negotiating committee jointly Any
proposal which concerned a change in "Special Craft Rules"
was discussed separately with management by the union
recognized as the representative for that craft. When final
agreement was reached, subject to ratification by the employ-
ees, agreed changes in the existing contract were incorporat-
ed in a memorandum of agreement The chairman of the
negotiating committee signed the memorandum on behalf
of all 10 unions. When the agreement had been ratified,
the agreed changes were incorporated into a new, complete
contract which a representative of each of the 10 unions
signed on behalf of his union as a party to the contract.
Prior to 1959 decisions within the negotiating committee
were made on the basis of a simple majority with each
of the 8, 9, or 10 unions, as the case may have been
at any particular time, having one vote. This was a constant
source of irritation to Respondent, for the number of employ-
ees in the operating department, the craft which it represents,
was greater than the number of employees in the crafts
represented by the other nine unions.
2. The 1959 voting procedure
In 1959 Respondent sought to do something about the
situation On July 15, 1959, it filed a petition in Sinclair
Refining Company, Case 14-RC-3645, for an election in
a unit limited to the operating department. Representatives
of some but not all of the other nine unions showed
up for the hearing. A deal was worked out to modify
the majority vote rule to give Respondent a larger voice
at the refinery in exchange for withdrawal of the petition.
On October 1, 1959, the Regional Director for Region
14 approved withdrawal of Respondent's petition.
The negotiating committee got together shortly after the
deal was made at the Board's regional office to begin
preparing the unions' demands for upcoming negotiations.
Representatives were present from each union, employee
plant committeemen and/or nonemployee business repre-
sentatives. A proposal that from then on the unions would
base their decisions in all negotiations not on a majority
vote but only on approval by Respondent and four other
unions or, alternatively, approval of any seven unions'
was put to a vote It carried, 6-4. Respondent voted against
it. On various occasions thereafter, at meetings of the
negotiating committee, Respondent's representative pro-
posed giving each union one vote for each 10 employees
in its craft. It was never able to get such a plan to a
vote
3. Prior contract negotiations
It has not been unusual for one or more of the 10
unions to be unhappy at the outcome of negotiations with
respect to some provision or other of the contract. Discus-
sions of wage increases have traditionally been couched
in percentage terms. The Laborers, as the lowest paid
craft in the refinery, have regularly objected on the ground
' Whether, as it is referred to in the transcript, the "Operators and
four crafts or any seven crafts" rule exists was one of the most hotly
contested issues at the hearing The record is extremely vague on details
of its coming into existence, especially who was present at the 1959
meeting and their authority to "bind" the unions they represented My
findings of fact are based primarily on a document in evidence which
reads, in its typed part, "Proposed Method of Voting To ratify a new
Agreement or Modify any terms of the existing Agreement the method
of voting shall be 1 Operators and four Crafts 2 or any combination
of Seven Crafts Plant Committee" and, in its handwritten part, "Carried
by 6 to 4 votes this is for Contract Negotiation only " Lonzo V Smith,
Jr, a Teamsters business representative in 1970 and secretary of the
negotiating committee in 1959, testified that he typed the paper following
the meeting at which the vote was taken so that each union would
have a record of the change James A Cochran , plant committeeman
for the Insulators, testified that he wrote the handwritten words on
the paper when it was given to him in 1959 I credit both There
is nothing in the record on which I can base a finding that the new
procedure had to be ratified by the employees before it could come
into effect Therefore, I attach no significance to Smith's use of the
word "proposed "
INTL. UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525
that only an across-the-board raise in terms of dollars
and cents per hour is equitable. The negotiating committee
has regularly agreed to percentage raises.
On one occasion the Insulators objected to a change
which lumped their craft in with others for purposes of
assigning vacations. The change was agreed to by the negoti-
ating committee and remained in the contract until the
next negotiations a couple of years later.
When negotiations held in 1961 reached the memorandum
of agreement stage, a provision was included that Respond-
ent and the Company would continue to negotiate over
an issue involving barge loading employees and that, if
agreement was reached, it would be included in the new
contract. No agreement was ever reached. All 10 unions
signed a new contract which contained the same provisions
as the old with respect to barge loaders
Negotiations were held in late 1965 and early 1966 for
the contract which was in effect from February 1, 1966,
to January 31, 1969. In June 1957 the Teamsters had
won an arbitration award which limited the dnving of
motorized equipment in the refinery to their craft Sinclair
wanted other employees to be able to use motor scooters
in their work. In the 1965-66 negotiations the Teamsters
objected to negotiating a change with Sinclair but was
overruled by the other unions Consequently, the Teamsters
and Sinclair worked out a deal in which Sinclair made
wage and seniority adjustments in the warehouse in exchange
for abrogation of the 1957 arbitration award. A letter
setting forth Sinclair's right to use motor scooters was
signed by Sinclair's director of industrial relations and
the chairman of the unions' negotiating committee on Febru-
ary 11, 1966.° The new contract, containing the other
provisions of the deal between Sinclair and the Teamsters,
was executed on March 7, 1966 The Teamsters representa-
tive signed, along with the representatives of the other
nine unions
At no time prior to the 1968-69 negotiations did any
of the 10 unions, Respondent included, fail to execute
the new contract The record does not indicate whether
any of the disputes within the negotiating committee in
negotiations prior to the 1968-69 negotiations were resolved
by explicitly invoking the "Operators and four crafts or
any seven crafts" rule. Apparently, in each of these instances,
the unhappy union was persuaded by the others to go
along for the sake of unity 5
4. The 1968-69 negotiations
Negotiations in late 1968 and early 1969 for a new
contract to replace the one due to expire January 31,
1969, followed the usual pattern The unions served the
requisite notice, dated November 12, 1968, and signed
by Paul Flowers, chairman of the Union Plant Committee,
' The same day the memorandum of agreement was executed in
the 1965-66 negotiations
' Finding based on the credited testimony of Cochran that "this [i e,
1968-69 negotiations] is the first time it [i e , the voting procedure
adopted in 1959] has ever been put to a test" and the credited testimony
of Harold Rice, Respondent's president, that he was unaware of the
"Operators and four crafts or any seven crafts" rule until after January
28, 1969 1 also credit Rice's description of his experience in working
615
on Respondent to begin the negotiations The negotiating
committee met. It selected Arvel Pickering, International
representative of the Boilermakers, as chairman for the
negotiations over Harold Rice, Respondent's president, by
a 5-4 vote. It prepared its initial demands. Included in
the proposals served on the Charging Party were several
relating to the loading rack Loading rack employees are
among those in Respondent's craft These proposals were
included in the unions' demands at Respondent's request.
The document also provided that "the unions reserve the
right to make additions, corrections or modifications in
these proposals as they deem necessary during the course
of these negotiations " The document contained no reference
to an adjustment on equitable grounds in the wages of
laboratory testers, another job classification in Respondent's
craft.
Negotiating meetings between the unions' committee and
management began in December.' A week or two later,
in January, the negotiators settled down to daily sessions
Early in the negotiations it was agreed that Respondent
and the Company would work out the loading rack situation
between themselves Around the fourth meeting, apparently
a day or two before January 28, 1969, Rice brought up
a wage adjustment for laboratory testers.' The Company
rejected it and the matter was dropped. At one point,
the Fitters negotiator protested against a provision regarding
shifts but was outvoted by his colleagues. By January
27, 1969, agreement on a new contract was near. That
evening the Company's negotiators prepared a memorandum
of agreement containing its understanding of agreements
reached and its offer on items which were still open. The
document contained no reference to either loading rack
or laboratory testers.
On January 28, the Company presented its memorandum
of agreement to the unions' negotiating committee for
acceptance or rejection. The committee caucused. Rice ref-
used to agree to accept management's offer because he
was not satisfied with respect to the loading rack and
the laboratory testers issues. His colleagues agreed that
his loading rack demands should be pressed further. They
told him they would not agree to reject the Company's
offer in order to press his demands for more money for
laboratory testers. Erroll W. Fines, the Laborers business
manager and negotiator, refused to agree because he was
not satisfied with a percentage wage increase His colleagues
rejected his position. Pickering polled the committee. The
result was eight votes in favor of submitting the Company's
offer to employees for ratification and two opposed
Respondent and the Laborers were the two unions in the
minority.
out disagreements within the negotiating committee , " . generally
my recollection is one of friendly get togetherness , and I mentioned
this before, that there never had been an occasion to have a showdown
on a voting procedure because we would say, `Why don't you get that
out, it is ridiculous,' so they do "
' The record does not reveal exactly when or just how many meetings
there were before January 28
' I credit the testimony of Rice that he introduced the subject of
laboratory testers prior to January 28 over the testimony of Cochran,
Flowers, a negotiator for the Electricians, and George H Phillips, the
Company's chief negotiator, that Rice first mentioned the subject on
January 28
616 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The negotiating committee ended its caucus and resumed
the meeting with the Company's representatives. Pickering
announced that a majority of the unions had agreed to
accept the memorandum of agreement as written and recom-
mend it to their members for ratification. Rice said that
he did not agree because the loading rack and laboratory
testers issues raised by him were still unresolved George
H Phillips, the Company's chief negotiator, said that the
loading rack was an oversight. He offered to add to the
memorandum a provision for additional talks with Respond-
ent on that issue and inclusion of any agreement reached
in the new contract. He said that Rice had raised the
laboratory testers issue too late and that the Company
would not accede to Rice's demands. Pickering agreed
that Rice had brought up laboratory testers too late. He
accepted Phillips' offer to add the loading rack provision
to the memorandum of agreement. He said that the negotiat-
ing committee was ready to accept the Company's offer
as amended without any provision for a wage adjustment
for laboratory testers. He said that his committee had
enough of the unions signed up to reach an agreement
Rice said he did not care what Phillips did with respect
to putting something about the loading rack in writing
and left the meeting. Phillips added two lines to the last
page of the memorandum of agreement. They read, "The
loading rack changes discussed between the Company and
Union, if agreed upon, will be included in this Agreement."
G. E. Burkhart, manager of the Hartford Refinery, signed
on behalf of the Company. Pickering signed "For Local
Unions" and as "Chairman, Negotiating Committee,
Accredited International Unions,' acting jointly, subject
to ratification of employees in the bargaining unit."
The Company prepared a new contract which incorporat-
ed all the changes in the old contract provided for in
the memorandum of agreement, including a term beginning
February 1, 1969, and ending January 31, 1971. The provi-
sions in this new, complete document with respect to the
loading rack are the same as the provisions in the old
contract. There is no provision in the new, complete contract
that "the loading rack changes discussed between the Com-
pany and Union, if agreed upon, will be included in this
Agreement," either in those or any other words.
Rice did not take the memorandum of agreement back
to his members for ratification All the other unions did.
As of February 1, 1969, there were 129 employees in
the operating department represented by Respondent. There
were 97 other employees in the bargaining unit.' Fines
did not recommend to the employees he represented that
they ratify the agreement The Laborers voted to reject
it. Presumably the negotiators for each of the other eight
unions did recommend acceptance and their members rati-
fied. In any event, on February 19, 1969, Flowers notified
the Company that " . . eight of the ten unions represented
in Clark's Wood River Refinery, Hartford, Illinois, acting
jointly, have ratified the above agreement, and in accordance
with the voting procedure of the bargaining unit, this
° This phrase has apparently been used over the years as a shorthand
collective reference to the 10 unions
' There were 33 Fitters, 10 Electricians, 8 Teamsters, 13 Boilermakers,
11 Laborers, 3 Painters, 4 Carpenters, 11 Machinists, and 4 Insulators
now constitutes a valid agreement, and you should proceed
to put this agreement into effect." In February a representa-
tive or representatives of each of the 10 unions except
Respondent executed the new contract 10 The Company
has placed its wages and other benefits in effect for all
employees, including those represented by Respondent. The
Company and all 10 unions, Respondent included, have
conducted their labor relations, including the processing
of grievances, in conformity with its provisons. Rice has
consistently maintained the position that Respondent is
not bound by the new contract because it did not concur
in the agreement reached on January 28, 1969 He has
insisted on further negotiations on a wage adjustment for
laboratory testers as a prerequisite to agreement by Respond-
ent
5. Negotiations since January 28, 1969
On the afternoon of January 28 the Company made
an offer to Respondent to resolve the loading rack issue.
Rice rejected it a day or two later. Thereafter, on numerous
occasions in 1969 and early 1970, the Company tried to
get Rice to sign the new contract and discussed the loading
rack issue with him The Company consistently made agree-
ment on the loading rack contingent on Rice's signing
the new contract. Rice insisted that a wage adjustment
for laboratory testers be made part of any agreement.
The Company refused to bargain with him about laboratory
testers on the ground that the subject was barred by the
decision of the negotiating committee on January 28. The
Company's representative told Rice that Respondent was
bound by the decision of a majority of the unions at
that time not to press the issue. This impasse over laboratory
testers prevented a quick agreement on the loading rack
issue throughout 1969. At one point the Company offered
to negotiate with Rice about laboratory testers if the other
unions would give their consent. The other unions refused.
At another point Rice offered to sign the contract as
well as settle the loading rack issue if the Company would
agree to a wage reopener on the laboratory testers as
of February 1, 1970. On January 13, 1970, the Company
sent Rice, at his request, a copy of a written proposal
on the loading rack. On February 10, 1970, representatives
of the Company met with Rice and three operating depart-
ment employees to discuss it. Rice agreed to accept the
Company's offer, to sign the new contract, and to drop
the laboratory testers issue until negotiations for a new
contract, effective February 1, 1971, provided that the
Company would make any wage adjustment for laboratory
testers negotiated at that time retroactive to February 1,
1969, and provided, further, that the Company insist either
that all 10 unions agree before a new contract comes
into existence or that the unions adopt a voting procedure
acceptable to all 10 The Company refused to accept the
1° Whether Fines signed on behalf of the Laborers because his members
changed their minds and held a second vote, as he claims, or because
his International union told him to sign on the ground that he was
bound to the results of joint bargaining, as the Charging Party claims,
is immaterial 1, therefore, find it unnecessary to resolve that conflict
in the record
INTL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525 617
retroactivity part of Rice's offer There the matter stood
2 weeks later when the hearing opened in this case.
B Analysis and Conclusions
This case presents squarely the issue of whether a union
involved in multiunion negotiations may withdraw once
negotiations have begun. That issue arose, apparently for
the first time, in Local Union No. 525, United Association
of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting
Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (Rey-
nolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc.), 171 NLRB No.
176. There the Trial Examiner found, on the basis of
the facts before him, that the respondent union could
not. The Board reversed, finding that the union had not
11. . . engaged in multiunion bargaining [nor] was [it]
bound by any agreements reached by such bargaining during
that period." However, the Board affirmed the Trial Examin-
er's additional finding that the union had violated Section
8(b)(3) or the Act by engaging in bad-faith bargaining."
It would be difficult to imagine a stronger case than
this for applying the Trial Examiner's conclusion in Reynolds
Electrical, supra, that a union's efforts to withdraw from
multiunion negotiations without the consent of the other
participants once negotiations have begun is untimely and
thus violative of the Act. Respondent, whether in the person
of Rice or his predecessors, has bargained jointly with
the other unions for nearly 30 years. Even though it has
been unhappy with the minority voice it has had despite
its representation of a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit, Respondent has never before questioned
the results of this joint bargaining to the point where
it has failed to acknowledge and live up to the agreements
reached. Even if it did not agree at the time to the change
from a simple majority rule to the "Operators and four
crafts of any seven crafts" rule adopted in 1959, as its
negative vote shows, it acquiesced in application of that
rule thereafter This is proved by several examples in the
record of negotiations where the representatives of other
unions were outvoted by their colleagues, including the
representatives of Respondent. Even if I were to find,
as Respondent urged, that no new voting procedure was
adopted in 1959, the result would be the same, since the
record is clear that Respondent participated from 1941
until 1969 in multiunion negotiations in which all have
abided by decisions made by less than all, whether the
decisive vote was that of a mere majority of the unions
11 Both the General Counsel and the Charging Party argue in their
briefs that Respondent engaged in bad-faith bargaining by holding out
for a wage adjustment for laboratory testers despite the existence of
the "Operators and four crafts or any seven crafts" voting procedure
However, the complaint does not allege that Respondent violated the
Act by engaging in bad-faith bargaining, and the issue was not raised
in the hearing in a manner which would now permit a finding that
it was fully litigated Lee Deane Products, Inc, 181 NLRB No 168
Moreover, while I do not think the point has any controlling weight
in deciding whether Respondent is bound by the procedure, I have
credited Rice's testimony that he had no knowledge of the procedure
on January 28, 1969 This, I think, bars a finding that he was acting
in bad faith when he took the position then and thereafter that he
could only be forced to sign the new contract if he had agreed to
the settlement reached that day
or some other part of the whole. The fact that the record
contains no example of Respondent being outvoted by
the others prior to 1969 makes no difference By participat-
ing for so many years in negotiations in which I or more
of the 10 unions were dissatisfied with some aspect of
the result and yet the result was accepted by all, Respondent
committed itself to that outcome when the rule , whatever
it may have been , was invoked against it However , whether
Respondent 's failure to keep its commitment on January
28, 1969, and thereafter constitutes a violation of the Act
turns on factors other than those which make this at
first glance such a strong case.
As the Trial Examiner pointed out in Reynolds Electrical,
supra, as he weighed the facts before him in light of
the Board 's rulings in The Evening News Association, Owner
and Publisher of "The Detroit News, " 154 NLRB 1494,
and Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc, 156 NLRB 210,
parties to multiparty negotiations are bound to the results
of those negotiations , once they have begun , because they
have consented to negotiate on that basis . There the Trial
Examiner found , on the facts before him, that the union
had consented to bargain jointly with other unions and
was, therefore , bound The Board found that those facts
did not add up to consent . Here the facts, quite different
from the facts in Reynolds Electrical, also preclude a finding
that Respondent is bound to the agreement reached between
the unions ' negotiating committee and the Company on
January 28 , 1969, because it had consented.
The key fact in this case is the Board 's certification
in 1951 . In Sinclair Refining Company, supra, the nine
petitioners , Respondent included , sought "separate craft
units . . coextensive with their respective jurisdictions "
An intervenor , Oil Workers International Union , CIO, con-
tended " . that the plant has become integrated
in Sinclair 's total operations as to which the only appropriate
unit is company -wide in scope " The Board found that
11. all the production and maintenance employees had
been represented since 1941 by the various petitioning craft
unions herein While each of these unions retained its
full craft autonomy , bargaining was conducted on a joint
basis and a single master contract was executed by all
of them except" the Machinists . It ruled:
The primary contention of the Petitioners for an
election in their respective craft units confined to the
Wood River [i.e, Hartford] plant must be rejected
in view of the new status of these employees under
Sinclair , and the consequent necessity that any craft
units, now to be found appropriate , be company-wide
in scope. However , the effective bargaining history
at the Wood River plant, including the joint negotia-
tions on the part of the various Petitioners and their
acceptance of uniform contract terms, supports the
Petitioners ' alternative contention for a plant -wide unit
of the employees at the Wood River plant represented
by the Petitioners jointly Under all these circumstances,
and the entire record in the case, we find that a
unit of all the employees at the Wood River plant
may be appropriate , depending upon the results of
the election hereinafter directed If a majority of the
employees select the Petitioners as their joint representa-
tive, they will be taken to have indicated their desire
618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to be represented in a separate plant unit; if a majority
select the Intervenor, they will be taken to have indicat-
ed their desire to become a part of the existing company-
wide unit
The election which followed resulted in the certification
of a single," joint, multiunion bargaining representative
as set forth above under Facts. Therefore, since 1951, negoti-
ations at the Hartford refinery have been held on a multiun-
ion basis not by consent of the Respondent and the nine
other unions but by direction of the Board
A multiunion negotiating situation which exists as the
res•llt of the consent, freely given, of the participants,
the situation found by the Trial Examiner in Reynolds
Electrical, supra, and one which exists because the Board
so orders are two entirely different things. Respondent
finds itself in its present situation as a result of a second
alternative position which it took in Sinclair Refining Com-
pany. Its first two positions both contemplated its certifica-
tion as the sole bargaining representative of those employees
in the craft it represented. This is a far cry from a decision
freely made to enter into a multiunion situation. Even
if the fact that Respondent apparently freely consented
in the 1941-51 period is stressed, that consent became
lost in the overriding fact that the Board, by its certification,
laid down the rules of the game for it thereafter.
The Board's certification takes this case out of the consent
rationale of Reynolds Electrical, supra, because the Board
thereby has become the arbiter of the game, not the parties
themselves The only course which Respondent can follow
with certainty to extricate itself from the unacceptable
position in which it finds itself is to abandon its rights
as a joint representative of the Charging Party's employees
Such a solution , of course, would be absurd. All other
courses it might elect to try are fraught with uncertainty.
It might, for example, file a new petition with the Board,
again seeking, as it did in 1959, to carve out a unit limited
to the craft it now represents But the Board has already
found appropriate, relying on the long bargaining history
which has placed Respondent in its present dilemma, a
plantwide unit in which many unions act as one even
though they retain their craft autonomy insofar as the
practical give-and-take of representing employees is con-
cerned. The only new factor which the Board apparently
did not have before it in 1951 when it arrived at that
conclusion is Respondent's representation of more than
half of the employees in the unit That might be enough
to outweigh the factors the Board relied on in 1951 and
cause it to find a unit limited to operating department
employees appropriate now. But Respondent cannot be
sure Cf. United Metal Trades Association, 172 NLRB No
52, American Pipe and Construction Co., 169 NLRB No.
138.
" The fact that the Board certified nine unions as a single labor
organization is the core of Respondent 's motion to dismiss on procedural
grounds. The gravamen of the violation set forth in the complaint is
Respondent's failure to execute the new contract If such a violation
were to be found, the only remedy would be a cease-and-desist order
directed to Respondent and an affirmative order that Respondent sign
Therefore, I deny Respondent's motion on the ground that the other
nine unions are not necessary parties to the case as pleaded
Or Respondent might file a petition seeking to become
the sole representative of the plantwide unit already found
appropriate by the Board, But that choice plots Respondent's
course between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand,
Respondent would be forced to try to organize employees
in crafts in which it has no interest and no following.
On the other hand, considering that a score of 129 to
97 is not an overwhelming lead with which to go into
an organizing campaign, it would run a risk of losing
the game completely. The law should not force it to such
a perilous choice.
Or Respondent might file a motion with the Board
to clarify its decision in Sinclair Refining Company, supra
Such as motion could well ask the Board to rule specifically
that, although the 10 unions which now jointly represent
the employees as a single bargaining representative have
an equal voice in negotiations, they cannot thwart the
basic precept of the Act that the majority rules when
employees organize. Such a course might resolve the specific
problem posed in this case by preserving a multiunion
pattern of bargaining which has been successfully followed
for many years while escaping from the undemocratic situa-
tion which has grown up. However, it seems the least
likely of all the courses open to Respondent to have any'
real chance of success since it would clearly require the
Board to take a hand in the internal affairs of the single
"labor organization" its 1951 certification created.13
Or Respondent might try again to get the other nine
unions to agree that it should have a voice in the
negotiations commensurate with the percentage of the
employees it represents or that they should follow an all-for-
one and one-for-all policy. But the record indicates little
likelihood of that coming to pass The only time a change
was made, the minority unions carefully preserved their
power to outvote Respondent over Respondent's protest.
Respondent, despite continuing protests since 1959, has
never been able to get them to the formality of a vote which
might alter that situation
Or Respondent, finally, might wait for the onset of
negotiations due in late 1970 and early 1971, then announce
before they begin that it will not be bound by any agreement
reached by the Charging Party and the other unions contrary
to its wishes In so doing it would be relying 4on the
precedent of The Evening News Association, supra, as well
as those cases in which the Board has held that an employer
who is a member of a multiemployer association may
withdraw in timely fashion, thus, in effect, creating a new
unit with which the union or unions involved must bargain
separately. This course would seem to have the best chance
of solving Respondent's problem. But the analogy between
a union or an employer who wants to get out of a
multiemployer situation and a union which wants to get out
of a multiunion situation is not so close that Respondent
can be absolutely sure of an outcome in its favor. One
" Similarly, a finding that Respondent cannot continue to press the
laboratory testers issue must be based either on a finding of bad-faith
bargaining or a finding that Respondent consented to be bound by
the decision of the unions' negotiating committee Any other basis would
substitute the Board 's judgment for Respondent's as to positions Respond-
ent should take in bargaining and is barred by Sec 8(d) H K Porter
Company, Inc, v NL R.B, 396 U S 998
INTL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 525
obvious distinction that brings this discussion full circle
back to the concept with which it started is the element of
consent. Most multiemployer bargaining situations arise
because the employers and the union, or unions, involved
consent initially to bargain together. Having consented,
they are free to withdraw that consent, provided only that
they do so in a timely manner. Here, Respondent is now
part of a multiunion single labor organization not by choice
but by operation of law. If it were permitted to withdraw in
a timely manner, it would seem to follow from the Board's
recognition of the craft autonomy of the 10 unions in
Sinclair Refining Company, supra, that it would take the
operating department employees with it as a new unit.
Whether the Board would permit such a result in a new
unfair labor practice case, just as whether it would permit it
under the first option open to Respondent, is problematical.
It furnishes Respondent with no sure guide to the course it
should follow
So much for uncertainties. There are, on the other hand,
two bedrock principles of the Act which furnish guidelines
for a just and equitable solution in this case. The first,
already alluded to, is majority rule The whole concept,
now so deeply ingrained as to be beyond cavil, that a
labor organization which represents a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit has the right as well
as the duty to bargain for all, is subverted in this case.
The quick and easy answer to that statement is that all
the unions which participate in a multiunion bargaining
situation together represent the interests of each and every
one of the employees in the unit, thus the Board's always
couching its certification, just as it did in Sinclair Refining
Company, supra, in terms of a single labor organization.
Such a rationalization will not wash in this case, however,
for the Board, in Sinclair Refining, also specifically
recognized Respondent's and the other unions' preservation
of their craft autonomy
The second principle is the very purpose for which the
Act was passed, the promotion of peaceful and stable labor
relations Here, the relationship which has existed for nearly
30 years at the Hartford Refinery through three different
employers and several changes in the composition of the
multiunion bargaining representative has served that pur-
pose. Even the dispute which gave rise to this case has
not changed that situation, for the record is clear that
the day-to-day work of labor relations at the Hartford
Refinery, in areas other than those which Respondent claims
and the Charging Party denies Respondent now has a
right to bargain about, has continued to be handled smoothly
and amicably. In the areas which are still not pinned
down in the new contract to the satisfaction of both sides,
loading rack employees and laboratory testers are working
under the terms of the contract which Respondent has
refused to sign without any hint that the situation might
blow up To require Respondent to sign the new contract
would only formalize that status. But it would do so at
the cost of finding that Respondent, without its consent,
is legally locked into a situation which it now finds intolera-
ble. The potential for labor strife growing out of Respond-
ent's efforts in such a situation to force the Company
and the other unions to agree to a change in the rules
of the game is great. Thus the purpose of the Act might
619
be subverted if Respondent is held to have violated the
Act
I conclude that a union which is part of a multiunion
bargaining situation as the result of a Board certification
cannot be bound to a contract to which it has not individual-
ly assented. This is so even on the history of bargaining
present in this case, a history of bargaining which strongly
supports a contrary conclusion. Therefore, I find that
Respondent has not violated the Act by refusing to sign
the new contract executed in February 1969 by the Charging
Party and the other nine unions
There is a second reason why Respondent has not commit-
ted an unfair labor practice Agreement was reached between
the unions' negotiating committee and the Charging Party
that negotiations would continue on the loading rack issue
and any agreement reached would be incorporated into
the contract. As the Charging Party points out so cogently
in its brief, agreements to continue negotiations on some
limited issue when all other issues on the bargaining table
have been resolved are common. A contract which reflects
such an agreement clearly falls within the provision of
Section 8(d) that the duty to bargain includes the duty
to execute a written contract incorporating an agreement
reached. But that provision contemplates incorporation into
the written contract of all the terms of the agreement
reached, including the term that negotiations shall continue
on the still open issue. Such a provision is missing from
the written contract which Respondent has refused to sign.
Therefore, it has not violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act
by its refusal because the contract does not contain all
the terms of the agreement reached, even if Respondent
is found to be bound by the negotiating committee's agree-
ment to the memorandum of agreement of January 28,
1969. Rudnick Land & Cattle Co., 159 NLRB 477.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire
record in this case, I make the following-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Clark Oil & Refining Corporation is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act
2 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 525,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act
3. The allegation of the complaint that International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local 525, AFL-CIO, has violated
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by ". . . refusing . . to
sign a written agreement . after [the] agreement had
been properly ratified ... and at a time when Respondent
had neither filed a timely petition seeking a separate
appropriate unit or [sic] once bargaining had began [sic]
gained the consent of all parties to withdraw from joint
bargaining" has not been sustained.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety