Int'l Union of Electrical, Etc., Frigidaire Local 801

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 19, 1961

129 N.L.R.B. 1379 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1379
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL OUR MEMBERS, OFFICERS, REPRESENTATIVES AND AGENTS AND
TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF EDITORIAL "EL IMPARCIAL," INC.
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT physically assault or threaten to inflict bodily injury upon em-
ployees of Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc., for the purpose of compelling them to
cease work and to engage in a strike.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees of Editorial
"El Imparcial ," Inc., in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, as amended, including the right to refrain from any or all concerted activi-
ties as guaranteed by the Act.
TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
LOCAL 901, IBTCW & H OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801 (General Motors Corporation,
Frigidaire Division ) and Donald L. Snyder
General Motors Corporation , Frigidaire Division and Donald L.
Snyder. Cases Nos. 9-CB-772 and 9-CA-1924. January 19, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 3, 1960, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his Inter-
mediate Report in this case, finding that the Respondents had not
violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) and Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A)
of the Act, as alleged in the complaints, and recommending that the
complaints be dismissed in their entirety, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and a brief in
support of the exceptions, and the Respondents filed briefs in support
of the Intermediate Report.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this
case, and finds merit in the General Counsel's exceptions. Accord-
ingly, the Board hereby adopts the findings of fact of the Trial Ex-
aminer, but not his conclusions or recommendations.
129 NLRB No. 169.
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Tender of February 27, 1959
Donald Snyder, the Charging Party, had been a member of Re-
spondent Union from August 1955 to June 1, 1958, pursuant to a
union-security agreement. He had refused to sign a dues checkoff au-
thorization, but had paid his dues directly to the Union. Several times
he had been delinquent in the payment of his dues, but he had paid
them after the Union notified Respondent Company of the delinquency
and the Company in turn had notified Snyder. No request for his dis-
charge had been made on the occasion of these delinquencies.
On May 31, 1958, the bargaining agreement between Company and
Union expired. Thereupon, on June 1, 1958, Snyder terminated his
union membership. Respondents did not sign a new agreement until
October 6, 1959. This agreement, like the old, provided for a valid
form of union security, which was to become effective 90 days after
October 21, 1958, the effective date of the contract.' Thus, Snyder was
under no obligation to pay union dues and fees until January 19, 1959.
Snyder made no tender as of that date.
On February 23, 1959, the Union informed the Company that
Snyder had resigned from its membership and had failed to rejoin
pursuant to the new agreement. There is no indication that Snyder
was made cognizant of his obligation at this time, but on February
26, 1959, while talking to his supervisor, Snyder was informed that
he would be required to join the Union. Subsequent to the conver-
sation, Snyder, on February 27, 1959, mailed a money order for $15 to
the Union. He enclosed a short letter with the money order stating
that it was for "dues in full for October, November and December of
1958, and January, and February of 1959." 2 On March 3, 1959,
Snyder received an envelope mailed by the Union in which the money
order was returned to him without any explanation or direction. The
Union, on that day (March 3, 1959), wrote to the Employer requesting
that Snyder "be removed from the bargaining unit" pursuant to their
collective-bargaining agreement 3 On March 4, 1959, Snyder spoke to
a member of the Company's labor relations staff, as to why his $15
money order had been returned by the Union. He was told to return
'Board Member Rodgers assumes that there exists a valid , enforcible union-security
provision in the bargaining contract between the Respondents . So doing, he agrees with
the reasoning and result set forth in this Decision and Order ; but he does not pass upon
the General Counsel's contention that the union -security provision is legally defective
because of a lack of specificity concerning its effective date
2 Union dues are $3 a month , and there is a $5 initiation fee for new members As
Snyder was not required to join the Union until January 19 , 1959, at the most , he would
have been required to pay dues for January and February ($6), and an initiation fee
of $5. Thus, the money order mentioned above contained a $4 surplus on the date of
mailing
9 The General Counsel contends that this was not a demand for discharge but merely a
request for removal from the bargaining unit. The Trial Examiner found , and we agree,
that Respondent Union's letter of March 3 , 1959, was a demand for the discharge of
Snyder
INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1381
the next day, and upon his return was informed that the Union re-
turned his money order because Snyder was not a union member.
Thereupon, Snyder obtained from the Employer a union membership
application, and an authorization for dues "checkoff" which he filled
out, signed and returned to the Company's representative. Snyder
also left the $15 money order with this representative, stating that if
the Union was concerned about his dues he would pay them for the
entire year.
On March 18, 1959, Snyder mailed a $3 money order to the Union
for his March dues. This, like the first money order, was returned by
the Union without explanation.
On April 2, 1959, at a grievance meeting between representatives of
the Company and the Union, Douglas R. Stanley, of the Company's
labor relations staff, indicated to the Union that Snyder would be
willing to pay any and all dues and initiation fees required. He then
showed the Union the membership and dues checkoff authorization
executed by Snyder. To this the Union replied that it was "too late"
and requested Snyder's discharge. On or about that same day, Ed-
ward W. Irons, the Employer's supervisor of labor relations, told
Snyder that he had tried to arrange a meeting between the Union and
Snyder but that the Union refused to meet with him, or to accept his
money or application for membership.
On April 3, 1959, Snyder spoke with Charles Bennet, a union com-
mitteeman. He asked Bennet if he knew why the Union refused to
take his money, and offered to pay his dues in advance for a year.
Bennet said he did not know why the Union refused his money, that
he could not accept it, that he had been told by the Union to keep
out of the matter, and that he did not think it would do Snyder any
good to go to the union hall with his money.
On April 6, 1959, pursuant to the demand of the Union, the Com-
pany discharged Snyder.
The Trial Examiner found that Snyder had not tendered "all his
dues and initiation fee" prior to his discharge and therefore that the
rule of the Aluminum case 4 was not applicable. The Trial Examiner
apparently found Snyder's February 27, 1959, tender defective be-
cause it did not specify that it was in payment of both the initiation
fee and dues.
Snyder's withdrawal from the Union in June was lawful and he
was not required to rejoin the Union under the new contract until
January 1959. However, the Union's rules required that he pay a
reinstatement fee on reapplying for membership, in addition to cur-
rent dues. But nobody explained the mechanics of reinstatement to
Snyder and his money order for $15 was more than enough to cover
4 Aluminum Workers International Union, Local No 155, AFL (The Metal Ware Corpo-
ration), 112 NLRB 619, enfd. 230 F. 2d 515 (C.A. 7).
1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
both the reinstatement fee required and dues for the 2 months of
January and February. There is not the slightest evidence that
Snyder would have objected to the allocation of his $15 money order
as between the reinstatement fee and current dues. On the contrary,
all the evidence is that Snyder was eager to pay any moneys required
to enable him to retain his job. In view of the fact that Snyder's
tender was sufficient in amount and was made in good faith, the Re-
spondent Union was under no obligation before rejecting the tender
to explain the mechanics of reinstatement to Snyder and give him the
opportunity to direct the allocation of his tender in the manner
required by the Union's rules for reinstatement.' Instead the Union
simply returned the tender without explanation. We hold that
Snyder's tender of February 27 was adequate and that, as it was made
before the Respondent Union requested his discharge, it was timely.'
We find that, as the Respondent Company had reasonable grounds
for believing that membership was denied Snyder for reasons other
than his failure "to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees"
required as a condition of attaining membership, Respondent Com-
pany's discharge of Snyder violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the
Act. We further find that the Respondent Union caused the Respond-
ent Company to discriminate against Snyder and that the Respondent
Union thereby violated Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act?
THE REMEDY
Having found that each of the Respondents has violated the Act,
we shall order them to cease and desist therefrom. We shall further
order that the Company offer Donald L. Snyder immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position with-
out prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges; and that
the Union notify the Company in writing and furnish a copy thereof
to Snyder that it withdraws its objections to his employment and
requests the Company to offer Snyder reinstatement. We shall also
order the Company and the Union jointly and severally to make
Snyder whole for any loss of pay suffered by reasons of discrimination
against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount
he would normally have earned as wages from the date of the dis-
crimination until compliance by each Respondent respectively with
the reinstatement provisions, less his net earnings during this period.
5 See 52 Am . Jur sec 22, p 231
e N L R.B . v. Aluminum Workers International Union, Local No 135 , AFL, 230 F 2d
515, 520 ( C A. 7) ; International Assoc,at,on of Machinists v N L.R.B, 247 F. 2d 414, 418,
footnote 6 (CA 2).
'In view of our findings that Snyder made an adequate tender of his initiation fees
and dues before the request for his discharge was made, we find it unnecessary to con-
sider in this case whether the further tender made after the request for discharge, but
before the actual discharge, was a lawful tender so as to make his subsequent discharge
unlawful.
INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1383
The loss of earnings shall be computed in accordance with the formula
set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Respondent
Union's liability shall terminate 5 days after its notification to the
Company that it has withdrawn its objection to the reemployment of
Snyder. We shall also order that the Company make available to the
Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the check-
ing of compliance with our Order.
Upon the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, we hereby make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division, is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. Respondent International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Donald L. Snyder for reasons other than his
failure to tender periodic dues and initiation fees to Respondent
Union, Respondent General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division,
violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By causing Respondent General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire
Division, to discharge Donald L. Snyder for reasons other than his
failure to tender periodic dues and initiation fees, Respondent Union
violated Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that:
A. Respondent General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division,.
Dayton, Ohio, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Encouraging membership in International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801, or in
any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging, or in
any other manner discriminating against any employee in regard to^
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment,
except as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in See-
1384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act
as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.
Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Donald L. Snyder immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and jointly and severally with
the Respondent Union make him whole for any loss of pay suffered
as a result of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth
hereinabove.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination or copying, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary or useful to an analysis of the amount of back-
pay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its place of business in Dayton, Ohio, copies of the
notices attached hereto marked "Appendix A" 8 and, as soon as for-
warded by the Regional Director, "Appendix B." Copies of such
notices, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region,
shall be duly signed and posted immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.
B. Respondent International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers, AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801, Dayton, Ohio, and
its officers, representatives, and agents shall :
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Respondent Company to dis-
criminate against any of its employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except
to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1385,
as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Company make whole
Donald L. Snyder for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against him in the manner set forth hereinabove.
(b) Notify Donald L. Snyder and the Company, in writing, that it.
withdraws its objection to Snyder's employment and requests the Com-
pany to offer him reinstatement.
(c) Post at its business office copies of the notice attached hereto,
marked "Appendix B." 9 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall be duly signed and
posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained for 60,
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Forward signed copies of Appendix B to the Regional Director
for posting by the Company at its place of business.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, in writing,.
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.
9 See footnote 8.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Frigidaire
Local 801, or any other labor organization, by discharging or in
any other manner discriminating against any employee in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment except as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in See-
1386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL offer Donald L. Snyder immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or a substantially equivalent position without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make
him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of our dis-
crimination against him.
All our employees are free to become or remain or to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of the above-named Union or any
other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be
affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
FRIGIDAIRE DIVISION,
Employer.
Dated-------- -------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectaute the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause General Motors Cor-
poration, Frigidaire Division, to discriminate against Donald L.
Snyder or any other employee in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of
the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL notify General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Divi-
sion and Donald L. Snyder, in writing, that we withdraw our
objections to his employment and request his reinstatement to his
former or an equivalent position.
WE WILL make Donald L. Snyder whole for any loss of pay
suffered because of the discrimination against him.
NVE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1387
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL
RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-
CIO, FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding , with all parties represented , was heard before W. Gerard Ryan,
the duly designated Trial Examiner, on the complaints of the General Counsel and
answers of,the Respondents ( herein called the Employer and the Union , respectively),
at a consolidated hearing in Dayton , Ohio, on October 26 to 29, 1959, inclusive.
The issues litigated were whether the Employer had violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1)
of the Act and whether the Union had violated Section 8 ( b) (1) (A) and (2) of the
Act. At the close of the hearing the parties participated in oral argument. Decision
was reserved during the hearing on motions to dismiss. They are disposed of as
appears hereinafter in this report . The General Counsel, Employer , and Union
have filed briefs which have been fully considered.
The Respondents moved at the outset of the hearing for dismissal of this pro-
ceeding on the ground that service of the charges upon them, respectively, was de-
fective because service was made by the Board's Regional Office rather than by the
Charging Party, which , under the Board 's Rules and Regulations , bears the re-
sponsibility of service thereof. Such motions are hereby demed . The service of the
charges by the Board's Regional Office on the Respondents herein is sufficient.
N.L.R.B . V. Arthur J . Wiltse, d/b/a The Ann Arbor Press, 188 F . Zd 917, 926
(C.A. 6), enfg. 85 NLRB 58, cert. denied 342 U S. 859 ; General Motors Corpo-
ration V N .L.R.B., 222 F. 2d 349 , enfg. 109 NLRB 1429; Erving Paper Mills, 82
NLRB 434.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer is a Delaware corporation having its principal offices in Detroit,
Michigan. Frigidaire Division is an unincorporated division of General Motors
Corporation located at Dayton, Ohio, where the Employer is engaged in the manu-
facture of electric refrigerators, household appliances, and other products. During
the year prior to the issuance of the complaints, the Employer sold, shipped, and
delivered, from its plants in said Frigidaire Division, to persons, firms, and corpo-
rations located outside the State of Ohio, products of a value in excess of $500,000.
I find that the Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act
and that assertion of jurisdiction is warranted.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
Frigidaire Local 801 , is now and at all times material herein has been a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The complaints in substance alleged that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act and that the Union violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the
1388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Act, in that the Employer discharged Donald L. Snyder at the request of the Union,
for nonpayment of dues and initiation fee pursuant to a collective -bargaining agree-
ment between the Employer and the Union, even though the said Snyder, to the
knowledge of the Employer had tendered to the Union prior to the discharge all
sums due the Union under the agreement and had authorized the Employer, in
writing, to deduct from his earnings all sums due the Union under the terms of the
agreement and even though the Union, to the knowledge of the Employer , had, prior
to the discharge , refused to accept said tender and authorization.
Donald L. Snyder had been a member of the Union from August 1955 until
June 1, 1958 . His membership had been required by the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement between the Employer and the Union. During the term of
that agreement , Snyder did not sign a checkoff authorization but paid his dues
directly to the Union. Several times during his membership he had been delinquent
in the payment of his dues but paid them to the Union after notification from the
Employer that he was delinquent . The Union had notified the Employer of the
delinquency who then notified Snyder. That agreement expired on May 31, 1958,
and there was no agreement in effect until a new agreement was entered into on
October 6, 1958, which became effective on October 21, 1958, which was the day
following notice of ratification by the union membership . On June 6, 1958, Snyder
wrote a letter to the Union enclosing his dues for April ad May 1958 and terminating,
his membership in the Union as of June 1, 1958.
The current contract between the Employer and the Union contains a valid union-
security clause which the General Counsel stipulated was not being attacked The
provision of the current contract which was invoked by the Union in requesting
the discharge of Snyder is contained in paragraph ( 4a) and provides:
An employee who is not a member of the Union at the time this Agreement
becomes effective shall become a member of the Union within 60 days after
the thirtieth ( 30th ) day following the effective date of this Agreement or within
60 days after the thirtieth ( 30th ) day following employment , whichever is later,
and shall remain a member of the Union, to the extent of paying an initiation
fee and the membership dues uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership in the Union, whenever employed under , and for the
duration of, this Agreement.
In November or December 1958, Snyder asked William Ferguson , his foreman
and immediate supervisor , if he had a copy of the collective-bargaining agreement
for him but Ferguson replied he did not and did not think they had been printed yet.
Ferguson testified that sometime in November 1958 Snyder asked for a copy of the,
contract prior to the time Ferguson had them for distribution . Ferguson told.
Snyder he would have them at a later date.
On February 23, 1959, Archie Little, financial secretary of the Union , advised
James Rife, a member of the Employer's labor relations staff, that Snyder had
resigned his membership in the Union during the "no contract" period and had failed
to rejoin within the 90-day period subsequent to the effective date of the new agree-
ment as required under paragraph (4a). That was the first knowledge which the Em-
ployer had that Snyder had resigned from the Union. Little informed Rife that
Snyder was in serious trouble for failing to rejoin the Union within the period pro-
vided by the agreement and said that the Union would probably be writing a letter
requesting his discharge.
On February 26, 1959, Sherman J. Shump , president of Local Union 801, dis-
tributed an information letter at the plant gate to employees in which, inter alia,
was stated that "they [Employer] still won't give an exact date when your `Local
Agreement ' will be available ." Upon receiving this, Snyder went to Ferguson's
office on February 26 and asked if it was necessary to belong to the Union in order
to retain his job to which Ferguson answered in the affirmative . Snyder replied to
Ferguson that he would get a money order and remit his dues to the Union.
On February 27, 1959, Snyder mailed a letter with ,a money order for $15 to the
Union The letter stated that the money order was in full payment of dues to date
for October , November, and December 1958 and January and February 1959.
Snyder also wrote on the face of the money order that it was for "dues in full for
Oct. Nov . Dec. 1958 Jan & Feb. 1959." On March 3, 1959, Snyder received an
envelope in which the money order was returned to him by the Union. No letter of
transmittal accompanied the returned money order and no reason was given by the
Union as to why it was returned to Snyder . (As the record later shows , the Union
returned the money order for the dues because Snyder had not rejoined the Union.)
On March 4 , 1959 , the Employer received a letter dated March 3 from the Union
INT'L UNION OF ELECTRICAL, ETC., FRIGIDAIRE LOCAL 801 1389
the substance of which requested that Snyder "be removed from the bargaining unit"
pursuant to paragraph 4A through 4c of the collective-bargaining agreement because
of Snyder's failure to make application for union membership or join the Union
within the specified time.
On March 4, 1959, Snyder asked Henry R. Stout, who is employed by the Em-
ployer as labor relations representative in the plant's labor relations office, if he
knew why the $15 money order was returned by the Union. Stout replied he would
try to find out and told Snyder to return the next day. On the next day when Snyder
returned Stout told him that the Union had returned Snyder's dues because Snyder
was not a member of the Union. Snyder thereupon obtained from Stout an appli-
cation for membership and authorization for dues-checkoff card which Snyder
filled out and returned to Stout. Snyder also gave to Stout the $15 money order
which had been returned by the Union and told Stout if the Union was afraid he
would not pay dues he would pay his dues for the duration of the year. Stout said he
did not think that would be necessary.
Snyder did not hear from Stout following the above conversations. On March
18, 1959, Snyder mailed a money order for $3 to the Union for March dues which
was returned to him on April 1 or 2, in an envelope and without any comment as to
why -it was returned.
On April 1, 1959, during a regular negotiating meeting between representatives of
the Union and the Employer, a grievance was presented to the Employer by the
Union. This grievance requested backpay for an unnamed laid-off employee who
was not returned to work because of the Employer 's continued refusal to remove
Snyder from the bargaining unit. The union representatives requested an immediate
hearing of the grievance case, but the matter of the grievance was put over until the
following day. On April 2, at the grievance meeting, representatives of the Union
demanded that Snyder be discharged before April 3, indicating that the grievance as
it related to back wages for another laid-off employee would be withdrawn if the
demand was complied with. Douglas R. Stanley of Employer's labor relations staff
indicated in his opinion that Snyder would be willing to pay any back dues or initiation
fees required by the Union if the Union's request for his discharge was withdrawn.
Stanley also showed Union Representatives Shump and Sparks the executed applica-
tion for membership and authorization for dues checkoff which had been left with
Stout by Snyder. In reply to Stanley's comments, Shump stated that the Union
would not accept Snyder's dues and fees because it was "too late." The union repre-
sentative took the position that Snyder had resigned from membership and had not
rejoined within the period specified under the collective-bargaining agreement; and
he had become more than 60 days delinquent in the payment of his dues. At the
close of the grievance meeting Stanley agreed to effect the discharge of Snyder on
April 6
On or about April 2, Snyder went to the office of Edward W. Irons, the Employer's
supervisor of labor relations, to find out if he knew what was wrong. In the past when
Snyder had been in arrears in his dues, Irons had twice advised him of his delin-
quency. Irons told Snyder that the situation looked bad; that he had .tried to arrange
a meeting between the Union , the Employer's labor relations department , and Snyder;
but that the Union refused to sit in such meeting and had refused to accept the money,
the application for membership, and had filed a grievance requesting his dismissal.
Snyder testified that he did not go to the Union with his problem because in his 30
years of employment he had always dealt successfully with management by taking it
up with his foreman; and he could see no reason to go to the Union.
On April 3, 1959, Snyder asked Charles Bennet , a union committeeman for a copy
of the contract and Bennet gave him a copy. Snyder also asked Bennet on April 3 if
he knew why the Union was refusing to take his money and Bennet answered that be
did not know ; and that he had been told by union officials to keep out of it. Snyder
offered to pay dues in advance for a year but Bennet said he could not accept; and that
he did not think it would do any good for Snyder to go to the union hall with it.
On April 6, 1959, Snyder was notified by Ferguson at 8:30 a.m. to go to Irons'
office. Snyder went there at 9 o'clock. Also present were Douglas R. Stanley of
the Employer's labor relations staff, Foreman Ferguson, and 'Supervisor Miller.
Stanley stated to Snyder, Ferguson, and Miller that he had tried to get the Union to
drop their charges and allow Snyder to remain as an employee but that the Union
had refused and demanded his discharge as of that day; and that Snyder therefore
must be out of the plant by 3:18 p.m. that day. Snyder left the plant a little after
4 p.m. as he had to get his papers and money orders that he had left with Irons. In
the latter part of August or the early part of September 1959, Snyder filled out an
1390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
application for reinstatement in his job and filed it with the Employer but heard noth-
ing further concerning it.
Conclusions
I find contrary to the contention of the General Counsel that the sole reason for
Snyder's discharge was his failure to tender his initiation fee and dues prior to his
discharge. The Aluminum case i in which the Board stated that the tender of all dues
and initiation fee prior to actual discharge protected the employee from discharge has
no application because at no time did Snyder prior to his discharge tender all his
dues and initiation fee to the Union. The record has no basis for finding that any
reason for this discharge existed other than his failure to make the required tender.
Nor does the record contain any basis for finding that such tender would have been
futile. Snyder had 90 days from October 21, 1958, to tender his initiation fee and
monthly dues. He did nothing in that respect constituting a sufficient tender. If the
Union had wanted his job and not his money as the General Counsel suggests it seems
unlikely that the Union would have waited more than 1 month after January 21, 1959,
until February 26, 1959, before indicating to the Employer that it would probably
request his discharge. The Union did not request his discharge in writing until March
3, 1959, and it was not until April 6 that the Employer discharged him. Snyder was
aware that his job was in peril at least from February 26, 1959, until his discharge on
April 6. During that entire period he could have protected his job at any time by
tendering the $5 initiation fee and dues at $3 per month beginning for the month of
January 1959 if he had chosen to deal with the Union. For reasons of his own he
preferred not to take the matter up with the Union but to discuss his problems with
the Employer's labor relations staff.
I find no ment in the General Counsel's contention that the union-security clause
although concededly lawful was unenforceable against Snyder because the printed
booklet distributed as a copy of the contract by the Employer did not include the
effective date of October 21, 1958, as the date when the contract became effective.
By simple inquiry Snyder could have ascertained the effective date if he had been
interested. It is incredible that Snyder an employee of the Employer for 30 years and
a member of the Union during the preceding contract terms was naive enough to
believe that the union-security clause had not begun to run as far as he was concerned.
He was told at least on February 26, 1959, that it was necessary for him to join the
Union in order to retain his employment. From that moment on it was only a ques-
tion of his making a proper tender of the initiation fee and monthly accrued dues.
That he failed to do. When in March he filled out the application form for member-
ship with authorization for checkoff of dues, such checkoff, according to the contract,
related to prospective dues and not for the payment of dues accrued to the date of the
checkoff authorization.
I find no merit to the further argument of the General Counsel that the Union's
request that Snyder "be removed from the bargaining unit" was an illegal request in
that the Union could request his discharge and nothing less than his discharge. I do
not consider this to be a cogent reason to support the complaints. The record shows
that the Union was requesting Snyder's discharge, the Employer understood his dis-
charge was requested, Snyder knew the Union sought his discharge, and he finally
was discharged.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and upon the entire record in the case,
I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove the allegations of the com-
plaints by the required preponderance of evidence.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire record, I make
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division, is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. The Respondent, General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division, has not en-
gaged in any unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of
the Act.
3 The Respondent, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, Frigidaire Local 801 has not engaged in any unfair labor practices.
within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
1112 NLRB 619, 621.