Intl. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Un., Loc. 13

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 12, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 1383 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UN., LOC. 13 1383
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, Local 13 (Pacific Maritime Association)
and Larry Sullivan . Case 21-CB-5631
April 12, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND
WALTHER
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C., Sec. 151, et seq., herein called
the Act.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear,
to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. Based upon the entire record,
upon the briefs filed on behalf of the parties, and upon my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the
following:
On December 16, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
William J. Pannier III issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
brief' and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local
13, Long Beach, California, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
I Respondent contends, inter aba, that it was deprived of due process by
the Board 's denial of the request , dated December 28, 1976, of its counsel
for an extension of time to April 15, 1977, to file exceptions and a brief on
the ground that an exacerbation of rheumatic heart disease seriously limited
his work capacity and that he was scheduled to undergo open heart surgery
on January 17. As the Board granted an extension to January 17, another
attorney was afforded sufficient time to study the record and issues herein
and on that date filed exceptions and a brief which ably present
Respondent 's case . Accordingly , we find there was no deprivation of due
process and we shall therefore deny Respondent 's request that its original
counsel now be permitted to file supplemental exceptions and a brief by
April 15, 1977
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard by me in Los Angeles, California, on
August 5, 1976.1 On May 20, the Regional Director for
Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint and notice of hearing, based upon an unfair
labor practice charge filed on April 8 alleging violations of
1 Unless otherwise stated all dates occurred in 1976
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Pacific Maritime Association, herein called PMA, is a
California corporation with offices and places of business
in Wilmington and San Francisco, California, and is the
collective-bargaining representative, on a multiemployer
basis, of its various employer-members engaged in long-
shore and stevedoring operations in and about the vicinity
of the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, California,
and other Pacific coast ports. The employer-members of
PMA annually derive revenue in excess of $50,000 from the
transportation of goods and passengers between the State
of California and other States and foreign countries.
Therefore, I fmd that, at all times material, PMA and its
employer-members have been employers engaged in
commerce and in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
At all times material, International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, herein called Respon-
dent, has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. ISSUES
1. Whether, for a 10-day period in April, Respondent
refused to dispatch Larry Sullivan to work for employer-
members of PMA for reasons other than his failure to
tender his dues, which included his share of the expenses of
the dispatching hall administered jointly by PMA and
Respondent, and if so, whether Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
2. Whether Respondent threatened to and did institute
discipline against Larry Sullivan for refusing to voluntarily
remove himself from his job for reasons other than his
failure to tender dues, and if so, whether Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
3. Whether Respondent threatened to prevent members
from working if they did not pay fines and assessments,
and if so, whether Respondent thereby violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
228 NLRB No. 174
1384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
For the most part, there is no dispute regarding the
operative facts in this matter. Respondent and PMA have
been parties to a collective-bargaining agreement. That
agreement contains no provision requiring employees to be
members of Respondent as a condition of employment. It
does, however, require that employees of PMA must be
dispatched through a dispatch hall administered jointly by
Respondent and PMA. It further requires that there be no
discrimination between members and nonmembers of
Respondent in dispatching, so long as the latter pay the
"pro rata share of the expenses related to the dispatching
hall, the Labor Relations Committee, etc." Respondent did
not dispute the testimony that, at the time material herein,
the pro rata share was $21 per month.
With regard to its members, Respondent's constitution,
bylaws, and general rules set forth two substantive
requirements pertinent to this proceeding. The first
provides that dues are owing and payable on the first day
of each month, but Respondent allows a grace period until
the 15th of the following month for payment of the amount
owing. The second provision requires that, "All fines,
assessments or other indebtedness must be paid before
your dues will be accepted."
On Thursday, January 15, Larry Sullivan, a member of
Respondent since 1953, reported to Respondent's business
office to pay his dues for the month of December 1975. The
testimony was conflicting with respect to the total amount
which Sullivan owed Respondent for dues, fines, and
assessments . However, there is agreement that Sullivan
lacked sufficient funds to pay for all items which he owed,
although it is undisputed that he did possess sufficient
funds to pay the amount which he owed for his dues.
Moreover, the amount which he possessed would also have
been sufficient to cover the pro rata share had he been a
nonmember of Respondent.2 As Sullivan lacked sufficient
funds to pay all fines and assessments levied against him,
the clerical employee of Respondent with whom Sullivan
spoke declined to accept the dues payment which Sullivan
proffered, apparently relying upon the above-quoted
provision in Respondent's constitution, bylaws, and gener-
al rules. Due to the need to take his mother to the doctor
and to a malfunction of his automobile on the following
day, Sullivan did not return to the business office on
Friday, January 16. Since the business office was closed
during weekends, it was not until Monday, January 19, that
he paid the full amount, including fines and assessments,
owing to Respondent.
In the meantime, Sullivan did go to the dispatch hall and
was dispatched to a job on the evening of Sunday, January
18. There he was approached by Business Representative
Paul Loveridge, who inquired if Sullivan had paid the
moneys owing to Respondent and who insisted that
Sullivan call a replacement when the latter explained what
had occurred at the business office on January 15. Sullivan,
relying upon the fact that he had tried to pay part of what
2 No issue was raised concerning the time period for payment of the pro
rata share and, accordingly, there is no contention that there was any
he owed, refused to call a replacement. On Monday,
January 19, Lovendge filed an internal complaint against
Sullivan, charging him with "Conduct Unbecoming a
Union Brother" and asserting in support thereof: "I went
to the job LB 21 where this brother was driving crane. I
asked him if his dues was paid and he said no. I asked him
to call a replacement and he refused."
A grievance committee convened on March 2 and, after
a hearing, imposed a penalty against Sullivan which barred
his use of the dispatch hall for 30 days, 20 days of which
were suspended with the result that the penalty entailed a
10-day interruption in Sullivan's ability to be dispatched to
PMA. Thereafter, the matter progressed through a series of
meetings before different bodies - on March 3 and 10
before the labor relations committee, on March 25 before
Respondent's executive board, and on April 1 before a
meeting of Respondent's membership. Sullivan's appeals
were denied and the 10-day penalty was ultimately
imposed from approximately April 2 to 12, though Sullivan
made efforts to be dispatched during this period. Two
points should be noted with regard to these various
meetings. First, it is clear, and I find, that during the course
of these proceedings Sullivan was advised that he could
avoid any interruption in dispatching by dropping his
membership in Respondent and converting to pro rata
status, thereby, as explained to him by Respondent's
officials, depriving Respondent of any control over him as
a member. However, Sullivan rejected this alternative and
insisted upon retaining his membership.
Second, there was a dispute regarding whether Sullivan
agreed to acquiesce in Respondent's disciplinary decision.
Arturo Almeida, Respondent's current president, testified
that, at the general membership meeting, Sullivan had been
asked if "he wanted to be part of the organization and was
willing to abide by the rules and regulations and the
consequences of being a member of Local 13 " While
Almeida testified that "consequences" had meant accep-
tance of the general membership's decision, it was not
altogether clear from his testimony whether this had been
clearly explained to Sullivan at the time, particularly as
Raul Olvera, Respondent's secretary-treasurer, made no
reference to this particular exchange. What all of the
witnesses - Sullivan, Almeida, and Olvera - did describe
as having occurred at that meeting was a discussion ansing
from Sullivan's expressed desire to be represented before
the general membership by outgoing President Rubio, in
which it was explained to Sullivan that, if he decided to be
represented, he would have to abide by Respondent's rule
that he could not speak on his own behalf and that he
would have to abide by those consequences. For example,
Olvera testified that when Sullivan had asked Almeida
about representation by Rubio, "I said, `Time out, Art.
You better tell him that there aren't any rebuttals and does
he wish' - I have it here: `Would he be willing to accept
the consequences of the appeal?' " Thus, testified Olvera:
[Almeida] asked Larry, he says, that "Almeida inter-
jected and told Sullivan that after Brother Rubio stated
his position" - was he aware of this - "after Brother
difference in the grace penod accorded nonmembers for paying such sums
than for members' dues payments
INTL. LONGSHOREMEN 'S & WAREHOUSEMEN 'S UN., LOC . 13 1385
Rubio stated his position, there would be no rebuttal
and would he be willing to accept the consequences to
this appeal?"
Sullivan conceded that he had told Respondent's agents
that he would abide or live with Respondent's constitution,
bylaws, and general rules. However, he testified that he had
made such statements in reply to questions concerning
whether he intended to remain a member of Respondent,
rather than convert to pro rata status. He denied ever
having been asked whether he was willing to accept union
discipline and abide by Respondent's decision in the
dispute concerning the delay in the January payments. He
further testified that the only agreement which he had
made with respect to the disciplinary proceedings was that
he was willing to permit Rubio to represent him before the
general membership and would accept the decision
rendered without insisting upon speaking on his own
behalf.
In March, while Sullivan's case was wending its way
through the various steps leading to the April membership
meeting, Respondent issued a notice to its members
regarding "Dues Increase and Assessment." The notice
first summarized the financial obligations of members,
taking into account the monthly dues, a death assessment,
and installment payments on an additional $34 assessment.
After reciting the above-quoted provision of the constitu-
tion, bylaws, and general rules pertaining to payment of
"fines, assessments or other indebtedness" before dues
would be accepted, the notice then reads: "This means that
the Officers have instructed the girls in the dues office that
if payments are not made on Caucus and Convention
assessments and fines, dues will not be accepted and you
WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK."
B. Analysis
Respondent concedes that its conduct in this case was
based upon its internal rule whereby members ' dues would
not be accepted until all fines and assessments were paid.
As the effect of not accepting dues was to bar members'
access to the dispatch hall, and therefore to employment
with PMA, the General Counsel contends that Respon-
dent's conduct violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
Act.
Integral to the policy underlying both Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the Act was the intent to separate membership
obligations owed by employees to their labor organizations
from the employment rights of those employees. "The
policy of the Act is to insulate employees' fobs from their
organizational rights ." The Radio Officers' Union of the
Commercial Telegraphers Union , AFL v. N.LR.B., 347 U.S.
17, 40 (1954). More specifically , Section 8(b)(1) and (2) and
Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act "form a web, of
which §8 (b)(1)(A) is only a strand, preventing the union
from inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the
job to enforce the union 's rules." Scofield et al. v . N.L.R.B.,
394 U . S. 423 , 429 (1969). Similarly , "§§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)
3 A labor organization may also take action which interferes with
employment "in instances where the facts show that the union action was
necessary to the effective performance of its function of representing its
constituency " International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, AFL_
were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their
right to join unions , be good, bad, or indifferent members,
or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their
livelihood." Radio Officers' Union, supra Consequently,
while a labor organization is free, under the proviso to
Section 8(b)(1)(A), "to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein," its
ability to enforce such rules is restricted by "barring
enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a
member's employment status." N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. et al., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967). For
example, while a labor organization may freely fine a
member for violation of a membership rule, "the same rule
could not be enforced by causing the employer to exclude
him from the work force or by affecting his seniority
without triggering violations of §§8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), 8(a)(l),
8(a)(2), and 8(a)(3)." Scofield, supra at 428.
An exception to this prohibition against labor organiza-
tion interference with employees' employment is provided
under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, allowing labor organiza-
tions to seek the discharge of employees who have failed to
comply with agreements requiring "as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth
day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement . . . ." Yet, this is a quite
limited exception, for "the burdens of membership upon
which employment may be conditioned are expressly
limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly
dues." N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963). "If the union imposes any other qualifications and
conditions for membership with which he is unwilling to
comply, such an employee may not be entitled to
membership, but he is entitled to keep his job." Union
Starch & Refining Company, 87 NLRB 779, 784 (1949),
enfd. 186 F.2d 1008 (C.A. 7, 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S.
815 (1951).3
Respondent had no union-security clause in its agree-
ment with PMA. It operated an exclusive dispatch hall
through which it dispatched employees to PMA. It
threatened to refuse to dispatch members from that hall for
failure to pay fines and assessments levied against them. It
threatened to and did institute discipline against Sullivan,
leading to his being barred from dispatch for a 10-day
period, because he had failed to pay the fines and
assessments levied against him, even though he had
tendered an amount sufficient to satisfy either the dues
which he owed or a pro rata share. While there is no
dispute concerning the validity of the obligation to pay
these fines and assessments , the General Counsel does
contend that Respondent's method of enforcing payment
- involving an employment-related sanction - does
violate the Act. The foregoing analysis amply supports that
contention. "While it might well be convenient for the
Union, in enforcing its own internal rules of conduct, to
have available an employment-related sanction, it can
hardly be said that such severe sanctions are necessary to
that end." Operating Engineers, Local 18, supra.
CIO (William F Murphy), 204 NLRB 681 (1973) However, this defense
would not be applicable to the situation presented by the instant case and it
has not been raised by Respondent.
1386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Therefore, I find that by refusing to dispatch Larry
Sullivan for work for employer-members of PMA for
reasons other than his failure to tender his dues, which
included his share of the expenses of the dispatching hall,
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act .4
Moreover, by threatening to and by instituting discipline
against Sullivan for refusing to voluntarily remove himself
from his job for reasons other than his failure to tender
dues and, further, by threatening to prevent members from
working if they did not pay assessments and fines,
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
However, this does not end the matter insofar as the
interruption of Sullivan's dispatches is concerned. Respon-
dent urges, in essence , two additional points. First, it is
argued that when Sullivan was offered the option of
relinquishing his membership and of switching to pro rata
status, prior to the actual implementation of the penalty
imposed by the grievance committee, he was accorded an
option that would have preserved his right to continue
being dispatched without interruption. Rather than accept
pro rata status, Sullivan insisted upon continuing his
membership in Respondent, even though advised that by
such insistence he would be subject to the penalty of being
barred from the dispatch hall for 10 days. In these
circumstances, argues Respondent, Sullivan may not now
complain of the penalty, since he had a means of escaping
it by leaving Respondent's membership and continuing to
be dispatched on a pro rata basis.
In making this argument, Respondent relies upon the
results reached in Allis-Chalmers, supra, and Scofield supra.
Yet, in Allis-Chalmers, the union had fined its members
and, in Scofield the penalties had been fines and suspen-
sions from membership. In both cases, the Supreme Court
distinguished between internal and external enforcement of
union rules, with the latter mode of enforcement being
defined as involving interference with a member's employ-
ment and being condemned as prohibited by the Act. Allis-
Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195; Scofield 394 U.S. at 428-429. In
essence , therefore, Respondent's argument is an effort to
compare apples and oranges, for it attempts to apply the
principles of internal sanctions to situations where external
sanctions have been applied. Yet, Congress has prohibited
the latter in circumstances such as are present in the instant
case . In fact, this argument is the same as that advanced by
the dissenting Board member in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, etc. (Frank Boston), 94 NLRB 1494 (1951),
one of the cases considered by the Supreme Court in Radio
Officers' Union, supra. It was an argument rejected in that
case and it must, accordingly, be rejected here. Therefore, I
find that Respondent cannot escape liability for its
violations of Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) by virtue of the fact
that membership was not compulsory and that Sullivan
could have been relieved of any interruption in dispatching
by relinquishing his membership in Respondent and
converting to pro rata status.
Respondent's second argument regarding Sullivan is that
he specifically agreed to accept the discipline meted out by
Respondent in this case. This argument is predicated upon
4 While the General Counsel did not show specificjobs to which Sullivan
could have been dispatched during the 10-day period that he was barred
from the hall, such a showing is not necessary to establish a violation See
the testimony concerning Sullivan's expressions of willing-
ness to abide by Respondent's disciplinary decision.
However, as pointed out above, Sullivan's statements in
this regard appear to have been directed to questions
regarding his desire to continue as a member of Respon-
dent and regarding his willingness to waive speaking on his
own behalf in return for representation by Rubio at the
April general membership meeting . The latter, of course,
would not constitute a waiver of a statutory right to protest
the employment-related discipline imposed by Respondent
and, as found above, Respondent is not entitled to rely
upon Sullivan's desire for continued membership as a
means of enforcing an internal rule in a manner proscribed
by the Act. At no point was there testimony - either in
this proceeding or during the proceeding before Area
Arbitrator George Love - showing that Sullivan "cons-
ciously yielded or clearly waived" his right to statutory
protection from Respondent's employment-related sanc-
tion. See Unit Drop Forge Division Eaton Yale & Towne Inc.,
171 NLRB 600, 601 (1968). Yet, at the very least, that must
be established for a waiver argument to be advanced in the
context of this case, since "Waiver of a statutory right will
not lightly be inferred." C & C Plywood Corporation, 148
NLRB 414, 416 (1964), enforcement denied 351 F.2d 224
(C.A. 9, 1965), reversed and enfd. 385 U.S. 421, (1967). In
these circumstances, Sullivan' s statements regarding his
willingness to abide by Respondent 's rules , made in the
context of his expressions of desire to continue being a
member of Respondent rather than convert to pro rata
status , and his expressed willingness to forgo speaking on
his own behalf in return for representation by Rubio, are
not a sufficient basis for consideration of a waiver theory of
defense to the employment-related sanction imposed
against him.
In sum, it is not Respondent's right to impose fines and
assessments which is under attack here nor is it Respon-
dent's right to collect the specific fines and assessments
owed by Sullivan which is at issue . Those rights are
conceded by the General Counsel, as indeed he must. Nor
does the General Counsel challenge the substance of
Respondent's internal rule , making the payment of fines,
assessments , and other indebtedness the price for accep-
tance of dues. Such a rule, on its face, does not impinge nor
threaten to impinge upon the employment of Respondent's
members. Rather, this case presents a challenge solely to
Respondent's resort to its dispatch hall as a vehicle for
enforcing the collection of fines and assessments - in
short, Respondent 's reliance upon "an employment-related
sanction" to enforce an internal rule regarding the
collection of fines and assessments . By resorting to this
vehicle, Respondent has taken the step from internal
enforcement to external enforcement of its rule and, in this
manner, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring
in connection with PMA's operations described in section
Utility and Industrial Construction Company, 214 NLRB 1053 (1974), and
cases cited in fn. 2
INTL. LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UN., LOC. 13 1387
I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation-
ship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead, and have led, to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, Local 13, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Pacific Maritime Association and its employer-mem-
bers are employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act, engaged in commerce and in a business affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
3. By threatening to refuse to dispatch and by refusing
to dispatch Larry Sullivan for a 10-day period in April 1976
because he had failed to pay fines and assessments,
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
4. By threatening to institute discipline and by institut-
ing discipline against Larry Sullivan for refusing to
voluntarily remove himself from a job because he had not
paid fines and assessments levied against him, at a time
when he had tendered an amount sufficient to satisfy his
statutory obligations, and by threatening to prevent other
members from working if they did not pay fines and
assessments , Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain
affirmative action set forth below to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
As there is no contention that Respondent has continued
to bar Larry Sullivan from dispatch following completion
of the 10-day period in April 1976 when he was barred
from dispatch, I shall recommend that Respondent be
required to make Sullivan whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered by reason of the unlawful conduct of
barring him from use of the dispatch hall for the 10-day
period in April 1976. Backpay is to be computed on a
quarterly basis, making deductions for any interim earn-
ings, with interest to be paid at the rate of 6 percent per
annum. F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950);
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962),
enforcement denied on different grounds 322 F.2d 913
(C.A. 9, 1963).
The General Counsel further requests that Respondent
be ordered "to publish and distribute to its membership a
notice or bulletin advising its members that the policy set
forth [in its March notice ) is no longer in force and effect."
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
However, no citations have been provided to support such
a remedy and no facts have been adduced to show that the
Board's normal notice-posting requirement would not be
sufficient notification to Respondent's members of their
rights in this regard. Accordingly, I do not recommend that
such a remedy be granted.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
The Respondent, International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, Long Beach, California,
its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening to refuse to dispatch and refusing to
dispatch Larry Sullivan and other employees because they
fail to pay fines and assessments levied against them.
(b) Threatening to institute and instituting disciplinary
action against Larry Sullivan and other employees for
refusing to voluntarily remove themselves from jobs
because they have failed to tender amounts sufficient to
fully pay fines and assessments levied against them.
(c) In any other manner restraining or coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Larry Sullivan for any loss of earnings
which he may have sustained by reason of the discrimina-
tion against him in the manner set forth in "The Remedy"
portion of this Decision.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
records necessary or useful to compute the backpay set
forth in "The Remedy" portion of this Decision.
(c) Withdraw, rescind, and give no further effect to any
notice, memorandum, letter, or statement which can
reasonably be construed as a record of the discipline
imposed upon Larry Sullivan in April 1976 when he was
denied dispatch for a 10-day period for reasons other than
his failure to pay dues.
(d) Post at its business offices, meeting halls, and
dispatch hall copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix "6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 21, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 21 signed
copies of said notices for posting by Pacific Maritime
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
1388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Association , if willing, in places where notices to employees
are customarily posted . Copies of said notices, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 21, after
being duly signed by Respondent 's authorized representa-
tive , shall be returned forthwith to the Regional Director.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing , within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to dispatch Larry Sullivan or
any other employee because he has failed to tender an
amount sufficient to satisfy fines and assessments
which we have levied against him.
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT threaten to refuse to dispatch or
threaten to prevent from working Larry Sullivan or any
other employee as a means of compelling payment of
fines and assessments and WE WILL NOT apply that
portion of our March 1976 notice which states that
employees who fail to pay fines and assessments will
not be permitted to work.
WE WILL NOT threaten to or institute discipline
against any employee for refusing to leave a job for
failing to pay fines and assessments.
WE WILL NOT in any manner restrain or coerce you
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make whole Larry Sullivan for any loss of
pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimina-
tion practiced against him.
INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION,
LOCAL 13