International Union, UAW, Local 1331

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 13, 1977

228 N.L.R.B. 1446 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

1446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
International Union, United Automobile , Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, and its Local 1331 and Alva F. Cole, Jr. and
Chrysler Corporation , Party to the Contract. Case
8-CB-2960
April 13, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND WALTHER
On December 10, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas E. Bracken issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions cf Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified herein.
The case involves the maintenance and enforce-
ment by the Respondent of certain superseniority
provisions at the Employer's Van Wert, Ohio, plant.
The Administrative Law Judge recommended dis-
missal of all allegations of the complaint except that
concerning the provision giving union plant shop
committeemen preference in overtime work with
respect to which he found Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Respondent
excepted. For the reasons set forth below, we agree
with Respondent that it has established justification
for the provision in issue and shall accordingly
dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
The Van Wert supplemental agreement between
the Respondent and the Employer provides that
management will endeavor to equalize overtime
hours worked by employees, within reasonable
limits, by offering the available overtime work to the
employee with the least recorded overtime hours.
Equalization of overtime, however, does not apply to
plant shop committeemen or to chief stewards; under
the master agreement they shall be scheduled to work
overtime whenever their constituents are working.
The pertinent clauses read:
i The Respondent has requested oral argument This request is hereby
denied as the record, the exceptions, and the brief adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties
2 The contract provision for comnutteepersons was added in 1964
although the practice goes back to 1939 In fact, the position of
committeeman antedates that of steward
3 Because overtime at Van Wert is not based on semonty, these clauses
technically are not supersenionty provisions , but steward and committee-
person preference provisions However, the principles involved are identical
228 NLRB No. 186
During overtime periods or weekend work the
Plant Shop Committeeman shall be scheduled to
work as long as there is work scheduled in his
district he can do and any of his respective
constituents are working.2
The other clause is identical except "Chief Steward"
is substituted for "Plant Shop Committeeman."
These superseniority provisions3 are interpreted by
the parties to mean that the steward, who handles the
first step of the grievance procedure, is offered work
before the committeeperson.
The operative principle governing disposition of
this case is set out in the Board's Decision in Dairylea
Cooperative, Inc., 219 NLRB 656 (1975), enfd. 531
F.2d 1162 (C.A. 2, 1976). The Board there held (at
658) that superseniority clauses which operate to
keep a union steward on the job are permissible
because the steward's functions benefit all unit
employees, but that those clauses "which are not on
their face limited to layoff and recall are presump-
tively unlawful, and that the burden of rebutting that
presumption (i.e., establishing justification) rests on
the shoulders of the party asserting their legality.' 14
In the instant proceeding, the Administrative Law
Judge found that the clause giving stewards prefer-
ence for overtime work was fully justified because it
serves the purpose of achieving the continued
presence of the steward on the job to perform
essential grievance handling duties which redound to
the benefit of all unit employees. However, he found
that Respondent had not justified the presence of
committeepersons on the job during overtime periods
because employees do not need two overlapping
levels of representation to handle grievances that the
stewards alone can adequately handle. We find, to
the contrary, that a careful examination of the duties
of committeepersons shows that the contract provi-
sion requiring their presence during overtime work is
in fact justified.
The Van Wert plant has about 320 employees;
there are 3 stewards, I elected for each shift, and 4
committeepersons, 3 elected plantwide and 1 by the
skilled tradesmen.5 Stewards represent their shifts;
committeepersons are assigned to districts. Both
stewards and committeepersons are active partici-
pants in the first steps of the grievance procedure.
Initially the steward orally presents the grievance to
the foreman. If it is unresolved, the steward refers it
4 Chairman Murphy would find presumptively lawful j ob retention
supersenionty clauses for union stewards or officers , including layoff, recall,
shift assignment , or retention of the same job or category of job during
incumbency in such positions See her concurring opinion in Union Carbide
Corporation, 228 NLRB 1152 (1977)
5 The skilled trades committeeperson also acts as steward.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW, LOCAL 1331 1447
to the committeeperson for the employee's district
and the committeeperson orally takes up the griev-
ance with the superintendent or other designated
management representative. If not disposed of at this
stage, the grievance is then reduced to writing by the
steward and given to the foreman. If still not
disposed of, it goes to step 2 of the grievance
procedure wherein the committeeperson takes the
written grievance to the plant shop committee, which
is made up of all four committeeperson. The further
steps of the grievance procedure are not material
herein.
Supervision, disciplinary layoff, and discharge are
handled under a somewhat different procedure. In
such an event, the grievant, before he leaves the
plant, may consult either the steward or the commit-
teeperson. Even if the steward performs the initial
interview, the steward may request a conference with
the committeeperson for the grievant's district, and
the committeeperson may give detailed advice or
handle the matter himself. In addition, such griev-
ances are subject to a more rigorous time limit. If not
resolved in the initial step, the grievance must be put
in writing within 48 hours of the discharge and done
so by the committeeperson.6
A steward may consult the appropriate commit-
teeperson on any grievance. Because the commit-
teeperson is a member of the plant shop committee,
which handles second-step grievances, the commit-
teeperson is exposed to grievances throughout the
plant. He is aware of the type of grievance on which
management or the Union will take a strong stand
and those on which a party is willing to compromise.
By virtue of his broader experience a committeeper-
son is expected to have greater expertise in handling
grievances.
Grievances arise during overtime periods at least as
frequently (if not more so) as during regular hours.
Evidence on the record, as well as experience, shows
that grievances are generally more satisfactorily
settled if they are handled quickly at the oral level.
Once reduced to writing, positions tend to harden. It
is, thus, an important benefit for employees to have
grievance representatives readily available at all
times they are working. It is basically for these
reasons that the Administrative Law Judge found
that the presence of stewards during overtime periods
was justified. We believe that this reasoning applies
also to the presence of committeepersons. Although,
as found by the Administrative Law Judge, the
presence of committeepersons during overtime per-
iods is not strictly necessary, the presence of stewards
is similarly not necessary because they could be on
call. However, strict necessity is not the determinant;
the determining factor is the purpose. Here the
presence of both stewards and committeepersons
during overtime is desirable for the efficient handling
of grievances, a benefit for all unit employees then at
work. Committeepersons perform an active role in
handling grievances at the first, as well as the second,
step of the grievance procedure; they play a vital part
in the early processing of disciplinary layoff griev-
ances; and they are, at times, consulted about
grievances by stewards. The clause giving commit-
teepersons priority in overtime and weekend work is
a reasonable means to assure their presence on the
job where their services benefit unit employees. For
the above reasons, we find that there is ample
justification for assuring such presence of committee-
men.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
6 Disciplinary layoffs, of course, occur during overtime periods. Of the
few grievances which in the past year reached the third step, one involved
the discharge of an employee on a Saturday.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS E. BRACKEN, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me at Van Wert, Ohio, on May 20
and 21 and June 3 and 4, 1976. The charge was filed by
Alva F. Cole, Jr., an individual , on January 26, 1976, and
the complaint was issued on February 27, 1976 (amended
on June 3, 1976), alleging violations by Respondent Unions
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended . Chrysler Corporation, the
Company, was named in the complaint as a party to the
contract, and takes the position that there have been no
violations of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Unions, and
the amicus curiae brief by the Company, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Chrysler Corporation, called the Company or the
Employer at all times material herein, has been a
corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, and has maintained its corporate headquarters
in Highland Park, Michigan, and maintains plants
throughout various States of the United States. Among
these plants is the plant located in Van Wert, Ohio, the
plant involved in this proceeding, from which annually the
Company sells and ships goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points located outside the State of Ohio. The
Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged
1448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,
herein called Respondent International or UAW, and its
Local 1331, herein called Respondent Local , and both
herein collectively called Respondent Unions, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Essential Issues
1. Whether Respondent Unions have maintained and
enforced a verbal agreement that entitles committeeper-
sons and certain union officers to work on the day shift
regardless of their length of service , referred to herein as
natural service.
2. Whether Respondent Unions have unlawfully main-
tained and enforced contract clauses, granting union
stewardsi and committeepersons2 the right to work during
overtime periods or weekend work when any of his or her
respective constituents 3 are working.
3. Whether Respondent Unions have unlawfully main-
tained and enforced a contract clause that protects
stewards and committeepersons against layoff in the event
of a temporary adjustment , so as to secure for them priority
in the assignment of overtime.
4. Whether Respondent Unions have unlawfully main-
tained and enforced a practice that protects committeeper-
sons against layoff in the event his or her entire district is
laid off.
B. The Dairylea Case
The controlling law as set forth in Dairylea Cooperative
Inc., 219 NLRB 656 (1975 ), enfd . sub nom . Milk Drivers &
Dairy Employees, Local 338 531 F.2d 1162 (C.A. 2, 1976),
was summarized by Administrative Law Judge Benjamin
B. Lipton in Auto Warehouses, Inc., 227 NLRB 628 (1976),
as follows:
Contract supersenionty for a union steward which is
limited to layoff and recall is lawful . Recognition of
such a restricted grant serves a legitimate statutory
purpose in furthering the effective administration of
bargaining agreements by encouraging the continued
presence of a steward on the job , and thereby also
benefits all unit employees . However , "in this case or
elsewhere," it has not been shown to the Board that
supersenionty going beyond layoff and recall serves
any purpose other than the impermissible one of giving
stewards special economic or other on-the-job benefits
I It Exh 1 , which contains among other documents the national
production and maintenance agreement between the Company and the
Unions for the period of September 21, 1973, through September 14, 1976,
refers to chief stewards but, in the jargon of the plant, they are termed
stewards , and will be so referred to herein.
2 The same agreement also refers to plant shop committeemen, and in
solely because of their position in the union. Such
extended superseniority is not per se unlawful . In view
of the tendency of supersemority clauses to restrain,
coerce , and discriminate against employees for union-
related reasons - such clauses which are not on their
face limited to layoff and recall are presumptively
unlawful. The burden of rebutting that presumption, by
showing legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tion for such clauses, rests with the party asserting their
legality.
There is no necessity or justification for subsidizing
stewards at the expense of other unit employees by
requiring that the latter surrender certain job benefits
or privileges in return for the stewards ' union activity.
It is the union 's task to build and maintain its own
organization . Where the union's immediate problem is
that of encouraging employees to serve as stewards, the
union can alone handle the situation simply by paying
stewards a salary, or giving them other nonjob benefits
for work in such a capacity. For the union to employ
job-related benefits to maintain its own organization
would "fly in the face of the statutory purpose of
insulating employees ' jobs from their organizational
rights.
While Dairylea, supra, only concerned the special
seniority rights of stewards , the instant case , in addition to
stewards, also concerns special seniority rights of commit-
teepersons and local union officers . I have considered such
rights of committeepersons and such officers under the
same legal principles as set forth for stewards in Dairylea.
C. The Election of Stewards and Committeepersons
One basic difference in the facts of Dairylea, supra, and
the facts of this case is that in Dairylea the stewards were
appointed by the union hierarchy while , under the UAW
constitution , stewards and committeepersons are elected
democratically by the local union membership . Respon-
dent Unions in their brief strenuously point out this
difference , emphasizing that not only does the UAW
constitution require the election of stewards and commit-
teepersons by secret ballot , but it also provides for the
recall of such officials "by the members he represents for
failure to perform the duties of his office."
Testimony was produced that all kinds of candidates are
elected to union positions in various plants of the
Company, incumbents , anti-incumbents , pro-International
union administration , anti-International union administra-
tion , individuals with a history of previous union activity,
and individuals with no such history. Thus, Respondents
contend in their brief, "The Union here cannot and does
not select people who have a belief in and support for
union policy and goals."
However, in order for a steward or committeeperson to
assume that office, article 45 of the UAW International
the record they are also variously termed district committeemen , committee-
men, and committeepersons . They are referred to as committeepersons
herein
3 The employees represented by a steward or committeeperson are
referred to as his or her constituents.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW, LOCAL 1331
constitution requires that stewards and committeepersons
be required to take the oath of office as set forth in article
39. In this oath , these officials pledge on their honor to,
among other things, "bear true and faithful allegiance to
the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW);
to the best of your ability and with complete good faith to
support, advance and carry out all official policies of the
International Union and this Local Union."
Thus, a steward or committeeperson , once he is elected,
is required to be an active union supporter , and during his
term of office is constitutionally required to support union
policies and goals. I find, therefore, that the fact that the
Respondent Local's stewards and committeepersons are
elected rather than appointed does not exempt the
application of the Dairylea principle to the contractual
clauses and practices that grant special seniority status to
these UAW Van Wert officials. Martin Marietta Aerospace,
Case 27-CA-4704 (not published in bound volumes of
Board Decisions).
D. Background
In 1965 Chrysler Corporation acquired a one-building,
100-employee4 manufacturing plant in Van Wert, Ohio,
known as the Amplex or Van Wert plant, and proceeded to
recognize the UAW as the collective -bargaining represen-
tative of its production and maintenance employees. In
August 1965 the employees of the plant became partially
covered by the 1964 UAW Chrysler national production
and maintenance collective -bargaining agreement . Succes-
sive agreements have been entered into , and the national
agreement in its entirety for the period of September 21,
1973, through September 14, 1976 , was in effect at all times
material hereto . In addition, the Company and Local 1331
entered into a supplemental agreement covering local
issues, which terminates on the same date as the national
agreement . The national agreement is also referred to as
the master agreement.
The national agreement was first entered into by
Chrysler and the UAW in 1937, following a prolonged
strike. It was a very elementary, sparse document reprinted
on nine pages of a 3- by 5-inch booklet. As successive
agreements were entered into, and more plants were built
or acquired, each agreement became larger and more
sophisticated than the previous one, with national supple-
mental agreements and letters of understanding forming
parts of the overall agreement. The bound volume
containing the 1973-76 agreements consists of approxi-
mately 512 pages, 4 by 7 inches, 231 pages on the basic
agreement , 90 pages on the pension plan, 99 pages on the
insurance program, and 92 pages on the supplemental
unemployment benefit plan (SUB).5 The national agree-
ment covers approximately 60 Chrysler plants, and there
are supplemental agreements for each of these plants
between the Company and approximately 43 local unions.
At the Van Wert plant, because of the relatively small
number of employees , one steward is elected for each shift,
for a total of three stewards . There are 125 workers on the
4 In 1976, there were 320 unit employees , making it one of the smallest
plants in the Chrysler network The average plant has 3 ,000 employees
1449
first (day) shift, 103 on the second, and 86 on the third. The
master agreement provides that the ratio of stewards to
employees shall not exceed I to each 250 , so that in the
average Chrysler plant of 3,000 employees there would be
at least 12 stewards.
There are four committeepersons at the Van Wert plant,
although the national agreement permits a maximum of six
regardless of the size of the plant . Three of these
committeepersons are elected on a plantwide basis, and the
fourth committeeperson , the skilled trades committeeper-
son, is elected by the skilled tradesmen . These four
committeepersons constitute the plant shop committee.
Committeepersons all work on the day shift as the result of
a 39-year company requirement . In past contract negotia-
tions between the Respondent International and Chrysler,
the UAW has repeatedly sought to obtain the right to have
committeepersons work on the second and third shifts. The
Company has consistently refused to agree to this , and the
Union has never succeeded in achieving such a contractual
right.
The collective -bargaining agreement contains a valid
union-security clause requiring all employees in the
bargaining unit to become and remain members of the
Union, as follows:
(9) Requirement of Union Membership
(a) Employees covered by this agreement at the time
it becomes effective and who are members of the Union
at that time still be required as a condition of continued
employment to continue membership in the Union for
the duration of this agreement.
(b) Employees covered by this agreement who are
not members of the Union at the time it becomes
effective shall be required as a condition of continued
employment to become members of the Union for the
duration of this agreement , on or before the fortieth
(40th) day following such effective date.
(c) Employees hired , rehired, reinstated or trans-
ferred into a bargaining unit after the effective date of
this agreement and covered by this agreement shall be
required as a condition of continued employment to
become members of the Union for the duration of this
agreement, on or before the fortieth (40th) day
following the beginning of their employment in the
unit.
1. Duties of stewards and committeepersons
Stewards are primarily grievance handlers, and
represent fellow employees at the initial stage of a
dispute right on the plant floor . The master agreement
provides for a five -step grievance procedure. The first
three steps take place in the plant itself , and are set
forth as follows:
(24) Step 1
(a) The employee or one member of a group having a
grievance may take the grievance up with his Foreman,
5 There are also agreements in the book pertaining to office employees,
engineering and parts depot employees , but they are not material hereto.
1450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or may ask the Foreman to send for the Chief Steward
without undue delay.
(b) The Chief Steward then takes the grievance up
with the Foreman or other designated representative of
the management in the district.
(c) If the Chief Steward and the Foreman or other
designated representative of management are unable to
dispose of the grievance, the Chief Steward then refers
it to the Plant Shop Committeeman for his district. The
Plant Shop Committeeman then takes the grievance up
with the Superintendent or other designated manage-
ment representative.
(d) If the grievance is not disposed of and the Chief
Steward wishes to pursue it further, the grievance may
be reduced to writing and delivered to the Foreman or
other designated representative of management.
(e) If the grievance is not disposed of, the Plant Shop
Committeeman may take the written grievance up with
the Superintendent or other designated management
representative for the particular district.
(25) Step 2
(a) If the Plant Shop Committeeman and the
Superintendent or other designated representative of
management do not dispose of the grievance, then the
Plant Shop Committeeman refers the written grievance
to the Plant Shop Committee.
(b) The Plant Shop Committee then delivers a
written copy of the grievance to the Labor Relations
Supervisor and thereafter takes the grievance up with
the Labor Relations Supervisor at a scheduled meeting.
(26) Step 3
(a) If the Plant Shop Committee and the Labor
Relations Supervisor are unable to dispose of the
grievance, the Plant Shop Committee then refers the
grievance to the proper higher officer or officers of the
Local Union who may then take the grievance up with
the Plant Manager or his designated representative
after arranging a meeting. The Regional Director of the
Union for the area in which the plant is located, or his
regularly designated representative, and one member of
the Plant Shop Committee may attend the meeting.
(b) Officers of the Local Union working in the plant
and the member of the Plant Shop Committee shall
receive pay from the Corporation for time spent in such
meeting, if management agrees to a meeting or the
continuation of a meeting during overtime hours, each
officer and the member of the Plant Shop Committee
shall receive pay from the Corporation at the appropri-
ate overtime rate for the overtime he spends in such
meeting.
(c) The President of the Local or his designated
representative may investigate any grievance appealed
to this step of the grievance procedure and, if working
in the plant, will receive pay at his regular hourly rate
for time spent in such investigation.
This intricate grievance procedure works in the following
manner: After an employee makes an oral complaint to the
steward, the steward makes his investigation and then
confers with the foreman. If the steward is unsuccessful in
his oral presentation, the committeeperson investigates the
facts and then verbally discusses the grievance with the
plant superintendent. If the matter is not resolved orally, it
is referred back to the steward, who then reduces the
grievance to writing. The written grievance is then
answered in writing by the foreman. If still unresolved, it
goes to the written second step, where the plant shop
committee meets with the company representative, usually
the labor relations supervisor. At this step, the plant shop
committee is functioning as a unit , representing all
employees in the total plant, not merely the respective
constituencies of each committeeperson. If unresolved,
then it may be appealed to the third step. Between the
second and third step, the local union president or his
designated representative makes a new investigation of the
matter. The third step consists of the four top officers of the
local union meeting with the plant manager or his
designated representative. If the dispute cannot be resolved
at this level, it is referred to the International Union who
takes the matter up with the Company's corporate labor
relations department for the fourth and fifth steps.
Testimony was given by both union and company
witnesses that grievances are best resolved in the earliest
possible step of the grievance procedure and, if possible,
before a written grievance is filled out. Once a grievance is
reduced to writing, positions harden and neither party is as
ready to compromise and settle the grievance as when it
was being handled orally. Both parties also produced
testimony that, by having new people review the grievance
at its successive steps , a fresh look was given at each stage
of the grievance to the merits of the dispute, thus allowing
calmer and more objective people the opportunity to work
out the dispute in a more harmonious manner.
As can be seen from the multiple steps of the grievance
procedure , committeepersons are also grievance handlers,
as well as members of the plant shop committee. From the
1939 agreement down to the 1976 master agreement, all
agreements require that regular conferences shall take
place between the plant shop committee and the plant's
labor relations supervisor on Tuesday of each week. The
agreement also provides in section 21 for special conferenc-
es, at which the Local is represented by the plant shop
committee and the four top ranking officers, and the
Company is represented by its labor relations supervisor,
or the plant manager, or his designated representative.
Special conferences are to handle "important matters,"
which are not otherwise defined in the national agreement.
Stewards and committeepersons must not only know
their master and local agreements, but they are required to
be knowledgeable about some 450 umpire decisions
affecting the UAW-Chrysler agreement. In addition, they
are the initial handlers of inquiries from members concern-
mg their rights for benefits from the contractual benefit
programs, which include life insurance, sickness and
accident benefits, disability benefits, pensions, and supple-
mental unemployment benefits. They are also called on by
their constituents for advice on many matters of impor-
tance to plant employees, such as labor law, race and sex
discrimination legislation, health and safety laws, veterans'
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW, LOCAL 1331 1451
rights, workers' compensation, and unemployment com-
pensation law. The Federal and state agencies that operate
the offices affecting these various fields of law conduct
their businesses in the daytime, and are only available to
answer stewards' or committeepersons' questions in the
normal daytime working hours.
2. The grievance of Cole
Alva F. Cole, Jr., had been hired in 1967 as an electrician
in the maintenance department at Van Wert. In 1974 there
were approximately 60 skilled tradesmen in that depart-
ment, with five job classifications in addition to that of
electrician. A total of six electricians were employed, with
two electricians working on each of the three shifts. Cole
was the senior electrician in natural seniority, and worked
on the day shift. Another electrician, John Dull, who had
been hired in 1972, was the elected conmutteeperson for
the maintenance department. Because of the smallness of
the department, there was no steward for skilled trades-
men, only the committeeperson, who in fact performed the
functions of a steward and committeeperson.
In November 1974, the Company laid off a number of
employees, including four of the six electricians, leaving
only Cole and committeeperson Dull. Cole was transferred
to the afternoon shift, and Dull remained on the day shift
because he was a committeeperson. Dull thereafter protest-
ed several times to the Local's president, William Gorman,
and submitted a proposed "by-law change" that in
pertinent part read as follows: "The part of the local by-
laws granting officers and committeemen super seniority
pertaining to shift worked be deleted and the following be
substituted - The president may work the day shift."
Cole's proposal was never adopted and, after further
conferences with President Gorman, Cole filed a charge
with the Board, alleging union violations of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2).
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
As stated by the Board in the Dairylea case, supra, "there
is no occasion here for finding super seniority-even that
going beyond layoff and recall-to be per se unlawful."
Clearly, in the Van Wert plant, there was no superseniority
of the magnitude found in Dairylea where the steward had
top seniority not only with respect to layoff and recall, but
also with respect to all contractual benefits where seniority
was a factor, which included the assignment of overtime,
the selection of vacation period, the selection of lucrative
driver routes, and selection of shift, hours, and days off.
The Second Circuit, while enforcing the Board's Dairylea
decision, characterized the steward's superseniority therein
as his "perquisites are rather more extensive . . . than his
duties." N.L.R.B. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local
338, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 531 F.2d 1162
(1976).
However, at Van Wert there were no blanket, all-
encompassing superseniority rights enjoyed by any Local
1331 steward, committeeperson, or officer, nor could any
of the extended seniority rights be fairly classified as
perquisites of the job. Rather, the special seniority
provisions applicable to each type official were limited, and
tailored to the function that such union official performed
in the ongoing grievance and collective-bargaining process.
The clauses and practices under review herein had not
sprung forth full-blown as now contained in the 1973-76
mammoth 512-page book of agreements. These clauses had
evolved over a period of 27 years6 of collective bargaining
between the UAW and Chrysler, and there is nothing in
the record that would indicate other than that both the
UAW and the Company were intent only on providing and
maintaining clauses that would further the effective
administration of the collective-bargaining agreement.
"The issue ultimately is one of justification," the Board
further stated in Dairylea, and the Respondent Unions
have the burden to justify the maintenance and enforce-
ment of the clauses and practices that extended on-the-job
benefits to union officials, other than layoff or recall, by
legitimate and substantial justification.
I have limited my consideration of the reasons offered by
Respondent Unions to justify the additional seniority
rights extended to their officials, to the evidence presented
that related to the Van Wert plant. While some generalized
testimony was given as to other plants, such as the physical
danger that stewards faced from disgruntled workers in the
Company's large assembly plants in the Detroit area, no
such testimony was offered as to the Van Wert plant. The
matter of justification is a plant-by-plant matter, and my
decision in no way relates to any plant of the Chrysler
Corporation other than the Van Wert plant. Nor does my
decision in any way hold that any of the provisions of the
master agreement relating to seniority are per se illegal. In
the multiplant bargaining arrangement in effect herein,
with the master agreement and the numerous local
supplements, each plant would have to be examined as an
entity to determine if there was or was not sufficient
justification to permit the extension of seniority rights to its
union officials, beyond that of layoff and recall. My
holdings in this case, therefore, leave undisturbed the
seniority language contained in the master agreement, as it
affects any Chrysler plant other than Van Wert.
A. Committeepersons and Officers Working on the
Day Shift Regardless of Natural Seniority
Cole's belief that committeepersons and officers worked
on the day shift because of a provision in the union bylaws
was completely unfounded. Nor did the master agreement
or local supplement so provide. However, there was a
longstanding company policy, referred to by the General
Counsel in the complaint as a "verbal understanding" and
in his brief as a "verbal agreement," existing at the
Company's plants that committeepersons and officers of
the local union work the first shift regardless of their
natural seniority. This policy had been originated by the
Company following the adoption of the first collective-
bargaining agreement with the UAW in 1937, although
6 The last change in contract clauses affecting officials' seniority was in
the 1964 agreement when the provision that committeepersons would be
scheduled for overtime and weekend work was inserted in the agreement
The clause providing this right for stewards had been negotiated in the 1955
agreement.
1452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
there was no language inserted in the agreements to make
it a contractual matter . In the 1937 contract , committeeper-
sons were the sole grievance handlers on the shop floor,
and dealt with both the foreman and the superintendent as
stewards were not provided for until the second agreement
which was made in 1939. Following the signing of the 1937
agreement , the Company required the committeepersons
and officers to work on the first shift as a routine matter of
policy , for the very basic reason that company officials who
were the counterparts to the plant shop committee and the
top officers of the Union worked on the day shift. As a
matter of practicality, the Company insisted that commit-
teepersons , who formed the plant shop committee, and the
top union officers work the same day shift that company
officials and labor relations representatives worked, so that
they could meet and discuss the problems that apse out of
a collective -bargaining relationship , during the officials'
regular working hours.
The Company has adhered to its requirement that
committeepersons and officers work on the first shift down
to the time of the hearing . Frank Valle, who had advanced
from his original employment in 1955 as a plant labor
relations representative to become the corporate manager
of labor relations, testified that "it 's absolutely vital that
they be on the day shift ." He explained by stating that the
company offices in plants , as well as the corporate backup
offices in Detroit , are, as a practical matter, open during
normal daytime business hours . That in order to have the
communication that is necessary between representatives
of management and representatives of the local union, the
union representatives had to be present during the hours
worked by management officials, which were daytime
hours.
I find that there is no question but that committeeper-
sons at Van Wert must work on the day shift in order to
effectively represent the plant employees , and to see that
their rights under the contract are protected and enforced,
and that such representation is necessary to effectuate the
administration of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Committeepersons deal orally with the superintendent
about grievances , and the plant superintendent works on
the day shift . Pursuant to a 37-year-old contractual clause,
the committeeperson, as a member of the plant shop
committee , must attend a "Regular Conference" every
Tuesday with the plant labor relations supervisor , and this
management official works on the day shift. At these
meetings the committeeperson processes the second written
step of grievances.
In addition to grievances , any substantial plant practice
that management intends to establish or change is
discussed with the plant shop committee, and all such
changes are effectuated on the day shift. In 1975, 50 such
meetings were held with management , involving 90 written
grievances . Comnmtteepersons are also subject to attending
"Special Conferences" as contractually required by section
21(a) of the national agreement . Again, these meetings are
held in the daytime hours as the Company is represented
by the labor relations supervisor , plant manager, or his
designated representative, all of whom work daytime
hours.
As to the company policy that top officers of the Union
work on the first shift , I have also found sufficient
justification for such a requirement . This practice was
initiated by Chrysler in 1937 , and it is well-established
industrial history that the Company was not doing any
favors for the UAW at that time . In Chrysler's best
business judgment , it needed the union officers on the first
shift so as to successfully administer the collective -bargain-
ing agreement . That principle has remained Chrysler's
judgment down to date , and it still requires such officials to
be on the day shift , so as to handle the third step of the
grievance procedures and to be available to handle special
conferences . It is true that at Van Wert two of the four
union officers, the financial secretary and the recording
secretary , for reasons not shown in the record , work on the
third shift, and yet they managed to attend the five third-
level meetings that were held in the year prior to this
hearing. However , this does not negate the basic fact that it
is far easier for persons working on the day shift to attend
meetings on the day shift with management officials.
The number of third-step meetings , five, was not an
impressive total . However, at those meetings , the minutes
disclose that a total of 59 grievances were handled , which is
impressive ; 42 were withdrawn without prejudice, 4 wete
put on hold , and 13 were discussed and answered by
management . Thus , out of the 90 written grievances filed in
a year, the grievance procedure had worked harmoniously
and successfully to reduce that figure to 13 active ones. To
argue that five third-step grievance meetings are insuffi-
cient to justify two union officers from working on the first
shift is somewhat like arguing that a plant does not need
fire hydrants because it only had a few fires in the previous
year. The officers are present on the day shift to help put
the fires out, before they become mountainous. Thus, the
Company's requirement at Van Wert that the president
and vice president work on the first shift is amply justified.
It can in no way be regarded as a bonus or reward for their
service as officers , as the requirement has a direct
relationship to their duties as officers , and is necessary for
the proper meshing of the bargaining relationship between
the very company and union officials who make the
agreement work on a day-to-day basis.
I find, therefore , that the policy which requires commit-
teepersons and certain officers to work on the day shift,
regardless of their natural seniority , is a requirement of the
Company , and under the circumstances of this case was
justified , as such daytime representation is necessary to
effectuate the administration of the collective-bargaining
agreement . I do not find any discrimination by Respondent
Unions against Cole as , when Dull remained on the day
shift and Cole was transferred to the second shift, it was the
Company 's long-established practice that was being effec-
tuated . I would dismiss this portion of the complaint.
B. Stewards and Committeepersons Working During
Overtime Periods or Weekend Work
The supplemental agreement between the Company and
Respondent Local contains an equalization -of-overtime
clause for unskilled employees that provides that manage-
ment will endeavor to equalize overtime hours worked by
employees, within reasonable limits, by offering the
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW, LOCAL 1331 1453
available overtime work to the employee with the least-
recorded overtime hours.
However, this equalization of overtime provision does
not apply to stewards because of section 16 of the national
agreement , which had been inserted therein for the first
time in 1955:
(f) During overtime periods or weekend work the
Chief Steward shall be scheduled to work as long as
there is work scheduled in his district he can do and
any of his respective constituents are working.
Thus, on daily overtime work or weekend work, if one of
his constituents works, and there is work the steward can
perform, he is the person to be assigned to such work,
regardless of the length of his seniority. As Respondent
Unions stated in their brief, "The purpose of this provision
is to provide adequate representation for workers sched-
uled overtime." Arthur Hughes, who had been a member
of the UAW since 1937, a chief steward in a company plant
in 1939, and who has risen to be the administrative
assistant to the director of the UAW Chrysler department,
succinctly illustrated this point when he testified:
"[T]here's really no moratorium or assurance by manage-
ment in the schedule of overtime that they will not create
or pose problems in plant, that they will be super-religious
during periods of overtime differently than during normal
operations."
It is self-evident that grievances will arise during the
performance of overtime work as well as weekend work.
The Company realistically states in its brief: "Employees
are disciplined and discharged on overtime work as well as
straight time work." The minutes of the third-step griev-
ance procedure meetings, received into evidence, amply
support this proposition. Two of the five grievances
answered by the Company at the third-step meeting of
March 11, 1975, arose on a Saturday. The only discharge
appealed to the third step of the grievance procedure arose
on a Saturday, November 22, 1975. Section 41 of the
master agreement states that a disciplined or discharged
employee has the right to confer with his steward or
committeeman before he leaves the plant. This would be an
idle right if the steward was not scheduled to work
overtime, and be present when the disciplined or dis-
charged employee wanted to confer with him before
leaving the plant, on a discharge that occurred on overtime.
Experienced and knowledgeable union and company
officials agreed that disputes can best be settled orally in
their earliest stage, before positions harden and are
formalized in writing. Without a steward on the job during
overtime, this most favored avenue of settling disputes
would be severely curtailed to the detriment of the
Company and the Union.
As the Board stated in Datrylea, supra, the lawfulness of
such restricted superseniority is, however, based on the
ground that it furthers the effective administration of
bargaining agreements on the plant level by encouraging
the continued presence of the steward on the job. Clearly
the contractual requirement that stewards work overtime
encourages the continued presence of the steward on the
job. In N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975),
the Supreme Court upheld the right of an employee to have
a union representative present at an investigatory interview
at which the employee reasonably believed might result in
disciplinary action. If a steward was not at work at the Van
Wert plant during overtime periods and weekend work, an
employee who would be summoned for such an interview
by his foreman or superintendent would be denied the right
of union representation that the Supreme Court says he is
entitled to.
I am not unmindful, as General Counsel has pointed out
in his brief, that a steward may decline overtime work.
However, when a steward does decline overtime work, he
or she appoints as an alternate steward one who is
scheduled to work, and such alternate stands in the shoes
of the elected steward. It is true that such alternate steward
would probably not be as trained in the duties of a steward
as the elected steward. However, it is not required under
Weingarten, supra, that the employees have the best
representation possible, only that they are allowed union
representation. This function the alternate steward can
perform when called on by a unit employee on overtime.
I therefore find that the contractual provision that
requires stewards to work during overtime periods or
weekend work, so long as any of his constituents are
working and there is work the steward can do, is fully
justified and serves the legitimate purpose of achieving the
continued presence of the steward on the job, and
redounds to the benefit of all unit employees. I would,
therefore, dismiss this portion of the complaint.
However, I am unable to find that the Respondent
Unions have justified the presence of the committeeperson
on the job during overtime periods and weekend work,
whenever any of his constituents are working, and there is
work he can perform. [Sec. 17(f) of the master agreement is
identical with Sec. 16(f) as set forth supra, except "Plant
Shop Committeeman" is substituted for chief steward.] The
practice allowing committeepersons to so work had existed
since the 1939 contract, but it was not placed in the
contract until 1964, following some challenges by a few
plants.
The committeepersons undoubtedly are of a higher rank
than stewards, and preceded them as grievance handlers in
the bargaining history, having appeared in the first
contract between the parties in 1937, whereas stewards did
not emerge until the 1939 contract. However, from the
1939 contract to the 1973-76 contract, the stewards are the
level of union representatives who have the first and
earliest contact with fellow employees over disputes.
Committeepersons enter the disputes at the second step,
after the steward has handled the initial step. Since I have
found that stewards are entitled to work overtime when
one of their constituents is working, those employees so
working would have representation on overtime. For the
committeepersons also to be allowed to work on the same
overtime periods would mean two overlapping levels of
union representation to handle the same grievances. There
is nothing that the committeeperson can do on such
overtime that the steward cannot do. If an employee
working daily overtime or on the weekend feels aggrieved,
he may report such grievance to the steward. The steward
in handling the first level of the grievance procedure goes
to the foreman and tees to settle the grievance. The
1454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relevant function of a committeeperson on a grievance is to
handle the second step with the plant superintendent. It is
possible that the superintendent would be present on
overtime or weekend work but it would be extremely
remote that a comrmtteeperson would attempt to handle a
grievance proceeding with him on such overtime. While
employees are entitled to representation on such overtime,
it is not required that they have two levels of representation
to handle the duties that the steward can perform.
Therefore , I find that , in the Van Wert plant, that section
of the master agreement that accords committeepersons the
right to work during overtime periods or weekend work is
presumptively unlawful , and that Respondent Unions have
failed to justify by substantial reasons the maintenance and
enforcement of section 17(f) of this agreement . I ford that
the maintenance and enforcement of this section by
Respondent Unions violates Section 8 (b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act.
C. Priority for Stewards and Committeepersons for
Overtime Work During a Temporary Adjustment
General Counsel alleged in paragraphs 9(A), (B), and (C)
of the complaint that Respondent Unions have interpreted
and enforced the term "temporary adjustment" in section
(50) and (51) of the master agreement , so as to secure for
stewards and committeepersons a priority for the assign-
ment of overtime work over all other employees. These
sections read , in pertinent part, as follows:
Seniority of Chief Stewards
Subject to the provisions of Section ( 15) and
notwithstanding their position on the seniority list,
Chief Stewards shall, in the event of a layoff, or
temporary adjustment , be continued at work as long as
there is a job in their district which they are able to do
and any of their respective constituents still are at work,
and shall be recalled to work after the layoff as soon as
there is a job in their district which they are able to do
and any of their respective constituents have been
recalled to work . During temporary adjustments, Chief
Stewards shall investigate and present only grievances
that arise during such adjustment.
Seniority of Committeemen and Officers
Notwithstanding their position on the seniority list,
the Plant Shop committee shall in the event of a
temporary adjustment be continued at work as long as
there is a job in their district they are able to do and
any of their respective constituents are still at work.
During the course of the hearing no testimony was
produced by General Counsel to prove that the term
temporary adjustment has ever been interpreted to include
overtime work. Valle, the Chrysler manager of labor
relations , corporate staff, testified that, in his 20 years with
the Company, scheduled overtime for Saturday or a
Sunday has never been considered a temporary adjust-
ment . UAW Vice President Douglas Fraser [misspelled in
the transcript as Frazier], who had started in a Chrysler
plant in 1938 , and who had progressed to become the
director of the UAW Chrysler department, testified that
such a term had never been used to describe weekend
overtime work.
While the term temporary adjustment is not defined in
the agreement , the company and the union witnesses were
in agreement that it is akin to a layoff of a short duration,
and arises out of emergency situations such as part
shortages and snowstorms . The value of a temporary
adjustment to the Company is that , when it declares a
temporary adjustment , it can lay off employees without
regard to seniority , and avoid the complexities of reshifting
the work force by bumping , transfers, and shift changes
during the limited duration of the temporary adjustment. If
a temporary adjustment continues for 5 working days, the
Union has the right to file a 5-day notice and compel the
Company to follow the cumbersome regular rules of
seniority for a layoff.
I find that a temporary adjustment does not involve
overtime work , and is in fact a layoff of a short duration
and, because of its special nature, it is not subject to the
contractual layoff provisions . During such temporary
adjustments employees who continue to work in the plant
need the same representation by stewards and comnutte-
persons as they need in regular operations of the factory.
Also, the employees who are laid off out of seniority need
representation so as to protect their rights of recall, and to
protect certain equities they have under the contract, such
as their continued eligibility for hospital and surgical
insurance . Having stewards working during temporary
adjustments is justified for the same reason that protecting
them from the regular layoff is justified, as stated by the
Board in Dairylea, supra, "it furthers the effective adminis-
tration of bargaining agreements in the plant level by
encouraging the continued presence of the steward on the
job."
I also find that having committeepersons work during
temporary adjustments is justified . Committeepersons at
Van Wert play an indispensable role in the handling of
grievances , as the contract provides for their handling the
grievance at the second oral and written step with the
superintendent . The record is clear that the vital and most
effective times to settle a grievance is in its early unwritten
steps , before the parties' positions harden . If the commit-
teeperson was not present to carry out his step of the
procedure within the time limits prescribed therein, the
employee whose grievance was due to be handled at the
second oral or written step would be denied rights he is
entitled to under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Again, the committeepersons have to be available for the
regular Tuesday conference, as well as special conferences.
The committeepersons' presence plainly redounds to the
benefit of all unit employees . I will dismiss this portion of
the complaint.
D. Protection of Committeepersons Against Layoff
if His or Her Entire District Is Laid Off
In paragraph 12A of the complaint, General Counsel
alleges that Respondent Unions have maintained a
practice, whereby, upon the layoff of a committeeperson's
entire district, the committeeperson will be retained at
work by placing him in a job in another district. This is
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW, LOCAL 1331
further described by General Counsel as allowing the
committeeperson to "exercise special bumping6 privileges
onto a job in another district." Actually, the current master
agreement provides for the retention of a committeeperson
in the event his entire district is laid off, and has so
provided since the 1939 agreement. Section 51, in pertinent
part, reads as follows:
Notwithstanding their position on the seniority list, the
Plant Shop Committee . . . shall in the event of a layoff
and rehire be continued at work at all times when one
or more departments or fractions thereof are at work,
provided that they are able to do the work being done
at the time.
This provision is implemented by retaining the commit-
teeperson to work in the lowest job in any other district of
the plant, if he does not have sufficient natural seniority to
otherwise avoid layoff. At the Van Wert plant all
employees, including committeepersons, had seniority in
the district in which they worked. The departments that
constitute districts in a plant are determined by mutual
agreement between the plant management and the Local
Union, as provided in section 15(g) of the national
agreement. The manufacturing processes at Van Wert are
not integrated, and each of the three production buildings
constitutes a department as well as a district: powdered
metal, cold extrusion, and ferrite. There is also a fourth
building which houses the skilled tradesmen. Each of these
four buildings has a committeeperson who represents all
the employees in that district as a committeeperson, but
also, as a member of the plant shop committee, represents
all of the employees in the entire plant. Because of the lack
of integration in the manufacturing processes performed in
the different buildings, it is possible that one district could
be closed down because of a lack of work, whereas another
district could have ample work.? Cole testified that, in the 9
years he worked at Van Wert, that he could only recall one
time at which an entire district was closed down. He
"believed" that it took place at the Thanksgiving 1974
layoffs, when the cold extrusion district was shut down,
and committeeperson Tom Zaleski was not laid off with
the other employees, but was transferred to the ferrite
districts
Fraser testified that, if the layoff would persist for a
lengthy period, management would sit down with the plant
shop committee and redistrict the plant. This is actually
done pursuant to section 15(i) of the national agreement,
which provides that:
The plant may be redistricted in accordance with
Subsection (g) above from time to time upon written
request of either the Plant Management or the Local
Union. The parties in each plant may agree to establish
a flexible districting plan to pre-determine the districts
8 Bumping has been defined as, "The procedure used during layoffs
when an employee with greater seniority has the right to displace an
employee of lesser seniority ." Robert's Dictionary of Industrial Relations,
BNA, 1966.
7 UAW Vice President Fraser testified that, in an assembly plant, it is a
virtual impossiblity to have one district close , while other ones remain open,
because each department is an integrated part of a coordinated whole
1455
to be eliminated or added consistent with ratios at
various employment levels of the plant.
As a result of such redistricting the committeeperson's
former district may be eliminated, or the same number of
districts may remain with different departments and fewer
employees. If the committeeperson's district is eliminated
by the new redistricting, he loses his position as a
committeeperson and resumes his status as an ordinary
rank-and-file employee, with natural seniority only. If the
parties agree on a redistricting, the committeeperson
temporarily represents one of the new districts until
elections can be held, at which time he can be reelected or
defeated. If defeated, he resumes his status as a rank-and-
file employees, with no seniority rights different from any
other employee. If, in the interim, work picks up, and the
committeeperson's constituents are called back, he then
goes back to work in his own district.
Thus, Respondent Unions and the Company have not,
pursuant to a "practice," allowed the committeeperson
"special bumping privileges onto a job in another district,"
but, in accordance with a 37-year-old contractual clause,
have authorized the committeepersons to work in another
district after his entire district has been laid off. I find that
this contractual provision has legitimate and substantial
justification. The committeeperson has the contractual
duty of handling grievances at the second oral step, and the
second written step, with the superintendent. While there
are no statistics as to how many oral grievances were
presented in Van Wert in the previous year,9 the record
does show there were 90 written grievances. In all
probability, if an entire district was laid off there would be
active second-step oral grievances to be handled by the
committeeperson with the superintendent, as well as
written grievances to be adjusted with the superintendent.
If the committeeperson had been laid off, he would not be
available to adjust these grievances with the superintendent
during regular working hours. The committeeperson would
undoubtedly be looking out for himself by seeking a job,
temporary or permanent, or seeking unemployment com-
pensation. It would be unjust and unrealistic to expect the
committeeperson to loiter around the plant so as to be
available to perform the duties of a committeeperson while
on layoff.
In addition, when the committeeperson acts as a member
of the plant shop committee and deals with the labor
relations supervisor on grievances in part (b) of step 2, he
does not represent a district as an individual. He, as an
integral part of the plant shop committee, represents the
entire plant, which automatically includes the employees of
the district in which he now works.
As a member of the plant shop committee, the commit-
teeperson must also attend the regular conference on
Tuesday of each week, as called for in section 20 of the
master contract. The plant employees are owed this
8 The record does not show whether Zaleski had enough natural seniority
to qualify hun to transfer to the ferrite district, or if he was transferred
pursuant to Sec 51.
9 Hazel Lagers, steward on the first shift, testified that she handled 3 to
10 oral grievances a day. Lagers was a veteran Chrysler employee, having
started with the Company in 1955 in Michigan . She transferred to Van Wert
plant in 1970, and has served as day-shift steward since 1973.
1456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representation, and the commtteeperson could not be
expected to attend if he were on layoff. If ever there would
be a need for special conferences, it would certainly be
during the strained and tense period of the layoff of all the
employees of an entire district. Again, the master agree-
ment, section 21, provides for the plant shop committee to
be present, and the committeeperson owes this representa-
tion not only to the working plant employees, but more so
to the laid-off plant employees. The Company has
continuity of management representation during a layoff,
and the employees are also entitled to a continuity of union
representation during the same layoff. The retention of the
committeeperson is indispensable to this representation,
and I would dismiss this portion of the complaint.
E. Final Conclusions
Respondent Unions have violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) and
(2) by maintaining and enforcing, at the Van Wert plant, a
contractual clause that allows a commtteeperson to work
during overtime periods or weekend work so long as there
is work scheduled in his district he can do and any of his
constitutents are working, regardless of the equalization of
overtime provisions contained in the local supplemental
agreement. Respondent Unions have not violated the Act
in any other manner.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent Unions set forth in section
III and IV, above, occurring in connection with the
Company's operations described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Unions have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that they
cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative
action designated to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent Unions committed
certain violations of the Act by maintaining and enforcing
at the Van Wert plant a contract clause in the bargaining
agreement with the Company that accords supersemority
to Respondent Unions' committeepersons with respect to
allowing committeepersons to work overtime periods or
weekend work, and by failing to establish legitimate and
substantial business justification therefor, Respondent
Unions shall be ordered to cease and desist from maintain-
mg and enforcing such clause at the Van Wert plant.
Upon the foregoing finding of facts, and upon the entire
record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Chrysler Corporation is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,
and its Local 1331, are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining and enforcing at the Van Wert plant
a seniority clause in their collective-bargaining agreement
which accords committeepersons of Respondent Unions
superseniority for overtime periods or weekend work,
Respondent Unions have engaged in, and are engaging in,
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
4. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]