International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 12 (Southport Lumber Company, LLC)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 11, 2018

367 NLRB No. 16 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

367 NLRB No. 16
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local
12, and Southport Lumber Co., LLC. Case 19–
CD–144202
October 11, 2018
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS KAPLAN
AND EMANUEL
This is a jurisdictional dispute proceeding under Section
10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The
Employer, Southport Lumber Co., LLC, filed a charge on
January 12, 2015, alleging that the Respondent, Interna-
tional Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 12 (the
Union), violated Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act by engag-
ing in proscribed activity with an object of forcing the Em-
ployer to assign certain work to employees it represents
rather than to the Employer’s unrepresented employees.
On April 8 and 9, 2015, a hearing was held before Hearing
Officer Rachel Harvey. At the hearing, the Union orally
moved to quash the notice of hearing. The hearing officer
referred the Union’s motion to the Board. Thereafter, the
Employer and the Union filed posthearing briefs.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board affirms the hearing officer’s rulings, finding
them free from prejudicial error. On the entire record, the
Board makes the following findings.
I. JURISDICTION
The parties stipulated that the Employer is an Oregon
limited liability corporation engaged in the manufacture of
lumber and wood products at its facility in North Bend,
Oregon, and that during the year preceding the filing of
the charge, it derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000
and purchased and received at its North Bend facility
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Oregon. The parties also stipulated,

1 On February 10, 2016, the Union filed a motion requesting that the
Board take administrative notice of the Sec. 8(b)(4)(B) charge filed by
the Employer against the Union in Case 19-CC-156772, alleging unlaw-
ful picketing in May and July 2015, and the General Counsel’s letter sus-
taining the dismissal of the charge. The Employer filed an opposition to
the motion. We grant the Union’s motion because the documents are
official records of the Board. However, they do not affect this decision
and determination of dispute. See Independent Stave Co., 278 NLRB
593, 593 fn. 1 (1986). On March 1, 2016, the Union filed a second mo-
tion to take administrative notice of the underlying Advice Memo in Case
19-CC-156772. We deny the motion because advice memos have no
precedential value or dispositive effect before the Board.
2 The Employer and SFP are subsidiaries of Southport Investments.
Jason Smith and Jim Lyons own the three companies. Smith manages
and we find, that the Employer is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE DISPUTE
A. Background and Facts of Dispute
The Employer manufactures and sells lumber and wood
products at its sawmill and barge slip facilities in North
Bend, Oregon. In 2004, the Employer’s sister company,
Southport Forest Products (SFP), purchased 32 acres of
industrial land and a dilapidated barge slip on Coos Bay in
the city of North Bend.2 SFP built a sawmill on the prop-
erty, which the Employer operates. SFP and the Port of
Coos Bay jointly applied for and received a grant to reno-
vate the barge slip.3 In the spring of 2012, the renovated
barge slip became operational for inbound logs and out-
bound lumber. That same year, the Employer began con-
structing a radial stacking chip conveyor for loading chip
barges. The chip conveyor became operational in Febru-
ary 2013.
The Employer currently receives and unloads logs
shipped in on barges and loads wood chips onto barges at
the slip.4 To accomplish the chip loading, bulldozers or
“chipdozers” push wood chips from the sawmill into a
large concrete hole with a hopper that feeds the conveyor.
A series of belts moves the chips up the conveyor, and the
barges are loaded through a chute at the top of the con-
veyor. The position of the chute is controlled by a push-
button remote control device. With respect to unloading
logs, most barges have on-board cranes, operated only by
barge personnel. When a log barge comes into the slip,
barge personnel off-load the logs, placing them dockside.
The Employer’s employees then use special forklifts,
called LeTourneau machines, to move the logs from
dockside to the log yard at the sawmill.5 As used here,
“log unloading” refers to moving logs from the dock to the
log yard.
In early 2012, the Employer arranged to export logs by
barge for Weyerhaeuser Company. The Union learned of
the day-to-day operations of the Employer and SFP. Neither the Em-
ployer’s nor SFP’s employees are represented by a union.
3 The joint application stated that the rehabilitation of the slip would
create jobs for the Employer’s employees and would provide “additional
work opportunities for the local longshore labor force and for other per-
sons employed in marine trades in the Coos Bay harbor.” Martin Callery,
Chief Commercial Officer for the Port, testified that he was involved in
filing the joint application and that he understood the term “longshore
labor” as a generic term that applies equally to members of the Union
and “anyone who handles cargo on the waterfront.”
4 The Employer planned to load logs and lumber for shipping by
barges but had not done so as of the date of the hearing in this matter.
5 Operators maneuver the LeTourneau machines using toggles rather
than levers.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
the arrangement and met with the Employer to discuss us-
ing union labor to perform loading and unloading work at
the Employer’s slip. The Employer contacted the Pacific
Maritime Association (PMA) and ultimately invited PMA
member Jones Stevedoring Company to attend the meet-
ings with the Union.6 The parties discussed work involv-
ing pushing the remote buttons that control the chip con-
veyor chute, operating the LeTourneau machines to move
logs from dockside to the log yard of the sawmill or to an
interim point, and operating cranes to load and unload
logs. The Employer, the Union, and Jones Stevedoring
failed to reach an agreement, and Weyerhaeuser decided
to transport the logs by truck instead of by barge from the
Employer’s slip.
Afterwards, the Employer again attempted to reach an
agreement with the Union on manning. In a May 7, 2012
letter to the Union, the Employer’s co-owner Smith wrote
in relevant part:
We would like your consideration of the following man-
ning scenarios:
 Wood Chip Loading – 2 Button Pushers
 Inbound and Outbound Logs – 2 Crane Operators
 Lumber Barge Loading and Unloading – 4 Forklift
Operators and 2 Extra Men
As to others, we suggest working out the details through
your employers when opportunities come up.
On May 14, 2012, the Union responded that its membership
unanimously approved the following:
- Wood Chip Loading – 2 Button Pushers
- Inbound and Outbound Log Barges – 2 Crane Op-
erators and 2 Log Loader Operators
- Lumber Barge Loading and Unloading – On the
coastal barges: 1 Working Foreman, 4 Fork Lift
Drivers, and 1 Extra Man; 2 Fork Lift Drivers or
more as needed on face. On Hawaiian barges: 4
Fork Lift Drivers and 2 Hold Men; (1 Walking Boss

6 The PMA is a multiemployer association of stevedoring companies
that has a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. The Em-
ployer is not a member of the PMA nor signatory to any agreement be-
tween the PMA and the Union.
7 Around this time, the Employer was also pursuing an opportunity to
acquire log-unloading work at a Canadian company’s slip. Upon hearing
the news, the Union picketed the Employer’s slip. Subsequently, the
Employer informed the Union that it was no longer seeking this work
and that it had entered into an agreement with Ports America, a PMA
member, to create a mutually beneficial working arrangement with the
Union.
8 A February 27, 2013 news release by the Port of Coos Bay stated
that the Port’s partnership with the Employer “is expected to increase
– Local 92, and 1 Super Cargo – Local 40); 2 Fork
Lift Drivers or more as needed on face.
By letter dated June 4, 2012, the Employer responded that the
Union’s letter foreclosed the possibility of reaching an agree-
ment. The letter also stated that as the Employer had no col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the Union, it would use
nonunion personnel in its future work except where its cus-
tomers elected to contract with Jones Stevedoring.7
In February 2013, the barge slip became operational for
loading chip barges, and Weyerhaeuser, Georgia-Pacific,
and Capstone Paper began purchasing wood chips from
the Employer.8 The arrangement with Weyerhaeuser and
Georgia-Pacific, which purchased the chips “free along-
side” (FAS),9 was that they would hire a barge company,
and they had the option to use or not use union labor to
operate the Employer’s chip chute. The arrangement with
Capstone was for chips and delivery, or “free on board”
(FOB), so the Employer contracted with Dunlap Towing,
a barge company that in turn contracted for union steve-
dores through Ports America. For approximately 14
months, two employees represented by the Union and sup-
plied by Ports America performed the push-button work
involved in loading chips onto barges. Each employee
worked 2 hours on and 2 hours off during a shift. Richard
Coleman, the Employer’s sawmill yard manager, super-
vised their work, and millwright Mike Puls, a sawmill em-
ployee, assisted Coleman with the chip-loading operation.
In September 2014, the Employer imported its first
shipment of logs by barge. It initially arranged with
Brusco Tug & Barge to bring the logs to the slip and
planned to use its own employees to unload them. Brusco
bowed out of that arrangement after the Union advised that
it had a dispute with the Employer and that “there could
be a picket line.” On September 4, 2014, another com-
pany, Boyer Towing, brought the logs into the slip with
Knutson Towboat providing barge assistance, and the Em-
ployer’s employees unloaded the logs. The Union pick-
eted at the front gate of the Employer’s facility and near
employment in Southport’s local operations, and in maritime services
and the longshore labor sectors.” The news release also quoted Union
President Marvin Caldera saying, “We appreciate the fact that the Port
was able to partner with [the Employer] to get these funds for the barge
slip and create much-needed family wage jobs locally.”
9 “Free alongside” (FAS) is a commercial term used in the shipping
industry and means the seller is responsible for transporting goods to the
boarding area next to a ship, and the buyer is responsible for ensuring
that the goods are loaded onto the ship and conveyed from there. The
counterpart of FAS is “free on board” (FOB), which means the seller is
responsible for transporting and loading the goods onto the ship and de-
livering them to the buyer’s destination. See https://www.law.cor-
nell.edu/ucc/2/2-319 (last accessed on September 12, 2018).
LONGSHOREMEN ILWU LOCAL 12 (SOUTHPORT LUMBER CO.) 3
the barge with signs reading, “Shame on Southport” and
“Barge slip ILWU Local 12 jurisdiction.”10
Thereafter, the Employer’s employees, rather than Ports
America’s union stevedores, began loading wood chips.
The reason for the change is disputed: the Employer as-
serts that the Union refused to supply Ports America with
button pushers because the log-unloading work was not
given to employees it represented; the Union asserts that
the Employer stopped working with Ports America.11 In
any event, on December 4, 2014, the Employer engaged
Island Tug & Barge and Pacific Tug to provide towing and
ship assistance for Capstone Paper’s inbound chip barges.
The Employer’s yard manager, Coleman, operated both
the chip conveyor and chip chute. Millwright Puls re-
lieved Coleman when he took breaks and for 2 hours on
one occasion when Coleman left work early. The Union
picketed the Employer’s barge and sawmill. Subse-
quently, the Employer handled four additional chip
barges, and each time the Union engaged in picketing.12
B. Work in Dispute
The notice of hearing describes the disputed work as
“the loading and unloading of logs and wood products at
the barge slip operated by [the Employer] in North Bend,
Oregon.” At the hearing, the Union asserted that this de-
scription is overly broad and that the disputed work is lim-
ited to the control of the spout during chip loading and op-
erating the LeTourneau machines for log unloading. The
Employer asserted that the use of crane operators in log
unloading is also at issue because the Union had de-
manded that work in the past and had not withdrawn its
claim, but it later agreed to the Union’s description of the
disputed work. Indeed, in its posthearing brief, the Em-
ployer asserts that button pushing (to control the spout
during chip loading) and the operation of the LeTourneau
machines should be awarded to its employees, without
mentioning other work.13
However, the Union argues that the Employer’s yard
manager Coleman is a statutory supervisor, and as stated
above, Coleman did the lion’s share of the button-pushing
work involved in loading chips. Jurisdictional disputes
under Section 10(k) of the Act do not include disputes
over work performed by statutory supervisors.

10 After the picketing, Union Officer Gene Sundet asked Knutson
Towboat “if there was any chance that [Knutson Towboat] would not be
willing to work for” the Employer. Sundet also told Dunlap Towing that
the Union had a labor dispute with the Employer and that there could be
a picket line. As a result, Knutson Towboat and Dunlap Towing declined
to provide further services for the Employer.
11 No representative from Ports America testified.
12 On January 12, 2015, the Employer filed the charge in this case.
13 In its posthearing brief, the Union seeks to further specify the scope
of the disputed work, in part, as “the operation of on-dock heavy equip-
ment to transport logs from the dock to the first place of rest (i.e., the
Accordingly, we find that the work in dispute consists of
button pushing for chip loading and operation of LeTour-
neau machines in log unloading at the Employer’s barge
slip in North Bend, Oregon, excluding those times, if any,
when the button-pushing work is performed by an individ-
ual who is a supervisor under the Act.14
C. Contentions of the Parties
The Employer contends that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the
Act because it demanded the chip-loading and log-unload-
ing work, picketed the Employer and its customers, and
threatened the Employer’s customers with similar conduct
at other locations where they do business, all in further-
ance of its claim to the disputed work.15 It also contends
that the Union refused to supply employees to Ports Amer-
ica to perform chip-loading work in order to pressure the
Employer to accept its terms for providing union labor to
unload logs from barges. On the merits, the Employer
contends that the work in dispute should be awarded to its
employees based on the factors of employer preference,
relative skills, and economy and efficiency of operations.
The Union contends that the Board should quash the no-
tice of hearing. It argues that there is no valid jurisdic-
tional dispute because the Employer effectively created
the dispute by reassigning the chip-loading work previ-
ously performed by union personnel to its own employees.
In this connection, the Union contends that its picketing
was a lawful effort to preserve chip-loading work that the
employees it represents previously performed and to get
the Employer to follow through on commitments to use
union labor to unload logs. Finally, the Union contends
that if the Board does not quash the notice of hearing, the
work in dispute should be awarded to employees it repre-
sents based on the factors of past practice, area and indus-
try practice, relative skills, economy and efficiency of op-
erations, and job impact.
D. Applicability of the Statute
The Board may proceed with a determination of a dis-
pute under Section 10(k) of the Act only if there is reason-
able cause to believe that Section 8(b)(4)(D) has been vi-
olated. This standard requires finding that there is
decks in the yard).” Because the record establishes that the operation of
LeTourneau machines is at issue, we decline to adopt that description.
Nonetheless, we note that the Employer’s LeTourneau operators move
logs from the dock to log decks in the yard, and that one of the Union’s
manning proposals covered that work.
14 See Teamsters Local Union 525 (Tiger Stripers, Inc.), 241 NLRB
306, 307 (1979); Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local 420
(All American Asphalt, Inc.), 238 NLRB 934, 935 (1978).
15 The Employer also relies on the Union’s attempt to secure log-load-
ing work in 2012; however, this conduct occurred well before the Sec.
10(b) period.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
reasonable cause to believe that there are competing
claims to the disputed work, and that a party has used pro-
scribed means to enforce its claim to the work in dispute.
Additionally, there must be a finding that the parties have
not agreed on a method for the voluntary adjustment of the
dispute. See, e.g., Operating Engineers Local 150 (R&D
Thiel), 345 NLRB 1137, 1139 (2005). As explained be-
low, we find that these requirements have been met.
1. Competing claims for work
We find reasonable cause to believe that there are com-
peting claims for the work in dispute. The Union admits
that it has claimed the disputed work. As discussed below,
the Employer’s employees also claimed the disputed work
by performing that work.16 To begin, no party disputes,
and we find, that the Employer’s employees were per-
forming the log-unloading work. Also, contrary to the Un-
ion’s contention, we find that the Employer’s employee(s)
were performing the chip-loading work. The record es-
tablishes that although alleged statutory supervisor Cole-
man did the lion’s share of the button-pushing work in-
volved in loading chips beginning in December 2014, em-
ployee Puls relieved Coleman during Coleman’s breaks
and once substituted for him when he had to leave early.
The record does not quantify how often and for what pe-
riod of time Puls relieved Coleman. The Union challenges
Coleman’s veracity, arguing that his testimony regarding
the frequency of Puls’ button-pushing work is not worthy
of belief, but it does not challenge Puls’ status as a statu-
tory employee.17
We reject the Union’s argument that this is a work-
preservation dispute outside the scope of Section 10(k) of
the Act. As discussed above, the instant dispute arose af-
ter the Union’s efforts to obtain the log-unloading work,
and its members have never performed that work at the
Employer’s barge slip. See Longshoremen ILWU Local
14 (Sierra Pacific Industries), 314 NLRB 834, 836 (1994)
(rejecting work-preservation claim where union never pre-
viously performed chip-loading work at employer’s new
location but rather was seeking to acquire new work), affd.

16 See Seafarers District NMU (Luedtke Engineering Co.), 355 NLRB
302, 303 (2010); Operating Engineers Local 513 (Thomas Industrial
Coatings), 345 NLRB 990, 992 fn. 6 (2005).
17 The Board does not make credibility findings in a Sec. 10(k) pro-
ceeding. However, a conflict in testimony does not prevent the Board
from proceeding with a determination of the dispute. “In this regard, the
Board is not charged with finding that a [Sec. 8(b)(4)(D)] violation did
in fact occur, but only that reasonable cause exists for finding such a
violation.” Bricklayers Local 5 (Jersey Panel Corp.), 337 NLRB 168,
169 fn. 7 (2001) (citing Laborers Local 334 (C. H. Heist Co.), 175 NLRB
608, 609 (1969)). In any event, Employer co-owner Jason Smith’s testi-
mony corroborates Coleman’s testimony that a statutory employee, Puls,
occasionally performed the button-pushing work. Moreover, circum-
stantial evidence further supports Coleman’s testimony. The record
318 NLRB 462 (1995), enfd. 85 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir.
1996). Where, as here, a union is claiming work that has
not previously been performed by employees it represents,
the “objective is not work preservation, but work acquisi-
tion,” and the Board will resolve the dispute through a
10(k) proceeding. Laborers Local 310 (KMU Trucking &
Excavating), 361 NLRB 381, 383 (2014); Electrical
Workers, Local 48 (Kinder Morgan Terminals), 357
NLRB 2217, 2219 (2011), and cases cited therein.
Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local 167, etc. (Safe-
way Stores, Inc.), 134 NLRB 1320, 1323 (1961), and its
progeny, cited by the Union, is distinguishable. There, the
Board quashed the notice of hearing where a union was
“attempting, in essence, to enforce a clear and indisputable
contract claim to the work in dispute.” Teamsters Local
107 (Reber-Friel Co.), 336 NLRB 518, 520–521 (2001).
Here, however, no such contract claim exists. The Union
contends otherwise, citing its correspondence with the
Employer and a press release from the Port of Coos Bay
regarding the joint application for funding to renovate the
barge slip. But the Employer’s June 4, 2012 letter clearly
rejected the Union’s counterproposal for a manning agree-
ment and stated that the Employer would use nonunion
personnel except where its customers elected to contract
with Jones Stevedoring. Similarly, the joint application
and the press release also do not establish an agreement
between the Employer and the Union, as both refer to in-
creased employment opportunities for local “longshore la-
bor,” which, according to Chief Commercial Officer for
the Port of Coos Bay Callery, is a generic term that does
not distinguish between represented and unrepresented
longshore workers.18
We further reject the Union’s contention that the dispute
is of the Employer’s own making because it unilaterally
reassigned the disputed work at its barge slip to its own
employees. As discussed above, the Employer did not cre-
ate the dispute by reassigning existing work. Rather, the
dispute was precipitated by the Union’s attempt to acquire
the log-unloading work—in the absence of any agreement
that mandated assigning that work to employees
indicates that the chip-loading process can take anywhere from 6 hours
and 45 minutes to 10 hours, and prior to December 2014, two button
pushers supplied by the Union took turns performing the work.
18 We recognize that union-represented employees previously per-
formed the button-pushing work, and this may, in certain circumstances,
support a valid work-preservation claim for that work. However, the
Board looks to the “real nature and origin of the dispute” in determining
whether a jurisdictional dispute exists. Teamsters Local 578 (USCP-
Wesco), 280 NLRB 818, 820 (1986), affd. sub nom. USCP-Wesco, Inc.
v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1987). As discussed above, the instant
dispute arose only after the Union attempted to expand its work jurisdic-
tion by obtaining the log-unloading work—work that went beyond the
button-pushing work that its members had been performing.
LONGSHOREMEN ILWU LOCAL 12 (SOUTHPORT LUMBER CO.) 5
represented by the Union—when that work first became
available at the Employer’s barge slip.
The Union’s reliance on Longshoremen ILWU Local
62-B (Alaska Timber Corporation) v. NLRB, 781 F.2d
919, 924-925 (D.C. Cir. 1986), is likewise misplaced with
respect to the chip-loading work. In that case, the court
found that the Board erred in failing to quash a 10(k) no-
tice of hearing because, the court reasoned, the employer
had created the dispute by changing from selling timber
FAS to purchasers, who in turn contracted for loading with
a union stevedoring company, to FOB services using its
own employees to load the timber. 781 F.2d at 925. The
court found that the employer changed its business model
by reassigning the work from the stevedoring company to
its own employees, and that it was not a disinterested party
because it admitted that it made the change to retain its
mill employees who otherwise faced layoff. Id. Here, in
contrast, the parties dispute which one is responsible for
discontinuing the use of union-represented button pushers
supplied by Ports America. It is not clear on this record
whether the Employer stopped working with Ports Amer-
ica despite the Union’s willingness to continue supplying
union labor for the chip-loading operation, as the Union
contends, or whether the Union informed Ports America
that it would stop supplying Ports America with labor, as
the Employer contends.19 Thus, unlike in Alaska Timber,
the record evidence is insufficient to establish that the Em-
ployer changed its business practice in order to avoid hir-
ing union-represented stevedores for the button-pushing
work. Based on the foregoing, we find that there are com-
peting claims for the work in dispute, and we decline to
quash the notice of hearing.
2. Use of proscribed means
We find reasonable cause to believe that the Union used
proscribed means to enforce its claims to the disputed
work. The Union admits that, in furtherance of its claim
to the disputed work, it picketed the Employer on Septem-
ber 4, 2014, when the Employer imported its first ship-
ment of logs by barge, and on December 4, 2014, and
other dates thereafter, when the Employer loaded chip
barges without union-represented labor.20 See, e.g.,

19 The Union argues that Smith’s “double hearsay” testimony about
his conversation with Ports America regarding the Union’s unwilling-
ness to provide button-pushers for the Employer’s next chip barge should
be disregarded on the ground that it was directly denied by Union Presi-
dent Sundet. We find that Smith’s testimony, albeit hearsay on which
we do not rely for the truth of the assertion, sheds some light on his mo-
tivation for having the Employer’s employees perform the button-push-
ing work rather than waiting for union labor referred and supplied by
Ports America. See Continental Can Co., 291 NLRB 290, 294 (1988).
Further, recall that the Employer secured union-represented operators of
the remote-control chip-loading device by contracting with Dunlap
Longshoremen Local 19 (Seattle Tunnel Partners), 361
NLRB 1031, 1034 (2014).
3. No voluntary method for adjustment of dispute
The parties stipulated that there is no agreed-upon
method for the voluntary adjustment of the work in dispute
that would bind them.
Based on the foregoing, we find that there is reasonable
cause to believe that Section 8(b)(4)(D) has been violated,
and that there is no agreed-upon method for the voluntary
adjustment of the dispute. We accordingly find that the
dispute is properly before the Board for determination,
and we deny the Union’s motion to quash the notice of
hearing.
E. Merits of the Dispute
Section 10(k) requires the Board to make an affirmative
award of disputed work after considering various factors.
See NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1212 (Co-
lumbia Broadcasting), 364 U.S. 573, 577 (1961). The
Board has held that its determination in a jurisdictional
dispute is an act of judgment based on common sense and
experience, reached by balancing the factors involved in a
particular case. See Int’l Association of Machinists, Lodge
No. 1743 (J. A. Jones Construction Company), 135 NLRB
1402, 1410–1411 (1962). We have considered the follow-
ing factors, which we find relevant, and, for the reasons
set forth more fully below, we conclude that the Em-
ployer’s employees are entitled to perform the work in dis-
pute.
1. Board certifications and collective-bargaining
agreements
The Board has not certified any union as the collective-
bargaining representative of the Employer’s employees
involved here, and the Employer is not a party to any col-
lective-bargaining agreement covering those employees.
For the reasons stated above, we reject the Union’s con-
tentions that the parties reached agreement on loading logs
and that the Coos Bay press release and joint application
constituted an agreement. Accordingly, these factors are
neutral in determining the dispute.21
Towing, which in turn contracted for union stevedores through Ports
America, and that Sundet told Dunlap Towing that the Union had a labor
dispute with the Employer and that there could be a picket line, after
which Dunlap Towing declined to provide further services for the Em-
ployer. We find Smith’s testimony consistent with this evidence.
20 In light of the Union’s acknowledged picketing, we find it unneces-
sary in assessing proscribed conduct to rely on testimony that the Union
also threatened barge and assist boat operators with picketing.
21 See Carpenters (Overhead Door), 277 NLRB 1385, 1386 (1985)
(no Board awards or collective-bargaining agreements).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
2. Employer preference, current assignment, and
past practice
“The factor of employer preference is generally entitled
to substantial weight.” Laborers Local 265 (Henkels &
McCoy, Inc.), 360 NLRB 819, 824 (2014). The Em-
ployer’s owner Smith steadfastly testified that the Em-
ployer prefers that its own employees perform the work in
dispute, and those employees are currently performing this
work. See Laborers Local 265 (AMS Construction), 356
NLRB 306, 310 (2010) (according weight to employer’s
stated preference and also considering its current assign-
ment of work in dispute).22
We reject the Union’s contention that the Employer’s
preference should be disregarded because it is inconsistent
with its past practice. In support of this claim, the Union
cites Plumbers Local 412 (Zia Co.), 168 NLRB 494
(1967), and Carpenters Local 690 (Walter Corp.), 151
NLRB 741 (1965). In those cases, the Board accorded lit-
tle weight to employer preference where that preference
was not supported by any other legitimate, traditional fac-
tors. Here, in contrast, although the Employer’s prefer-
ence is inconsistent with its past practice of assigning the
chip-loading work to union labor,23 we find that the Em-
ployer’s preference is supported by consideration of rela-
tive skills and economy and efficiency of operations,
which are legitimate, traditional factors relevant to award-
ing work in dispute, as discussed below. Cf., e.g., Graphic
Communications Workers Local 508M (Jos. Berning
Printing), 331 NLRB 846, 848 (2000) (declining to assign
substantial weight to the employer’s preference based on
preference for “a stronger union” rather than traditional
factors); Steelworkers Local 3-U (Greyhound Exposition),
302 NLRB 416, 420 & fn. 8 (1991) (declining to give sub-
stantial weight to the employer’s preference where it was
not supported by traditional factors). Accordingly, we
find that this factor favors awarding the disputed work to
the Employer’s unrepresented employees.
3. Industry and area practice
The Union contends that its members perform the work
in dispute locally and along the Pacific Coast. The Em-
ployer acknowledges that employees represented by the
Union perform chip loading and log unloading at various

22 For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the Union’s
contention that the Employer preferred using its members for the dis-
puted work, which the Union supports by citing the parties’ correspond-
ence and the press release regarding the joint application for funding to
renovate the barge slip.
23 The Union cites testimony of the Employer’s co-owner Lyons that
as late as 2011, members of the Union unloaded logs at the Ocean Ter-
minals’ dock as evidence of the Employer’s past practice of using em-
ployees represented by the Union to unload logs. While Lyons has some
ownership interest in Ocean Terminals along with his three siblings, the
ports along the Pacific Coast from Eureka, California to
Longview, Washington. The Employer points out, how-
ever, that not all coastal log, lumber, and wood product
companies employ union labor, citing Sierra Pacific In-
dustries as an example. The Employer also asserts that
there had been no log unloading and loading operations
work in Coos Bay for 25 years prior to the work at issue
and that it was the first company locally to use the LeTour-
neau machines for log unloading.24
Accordingly, although area practice is inconclusive
with respect to unloading logs, we find that industry prac-
tice favors awarding the button pushing for chip loading
and log unloading to employees represented by the Union.
4. Relative skills
The Employer argues that its employees are more adept
at operating the chip conveyor and chute and that it em-
ploys several employees who are skilled at operating the
LeTourneau machines, including one with 25 years of ex-
perience. It cites Coleman’s testimony that, on an unspec-
ified number of occasions, union-represented employees
supplied to Ports America jammed the chute and dumped
chips into the bay.25
Smith testified that he worked with an engineer to de-
sign the chip loader and that Coleman and Puls were “in
on” its construction and helped with design changes and
alterations. The Employer also emphasizes that its
LeTourneau machines are unique and require training and
experience to operate properly and that the Union
acknowledged it would have to train employees or bring
them in from outside the geographical region to operate
the machines.
The Union asserts that its members along the Pacific
coast have the requisite button-pushing experience to op-
erate chip conveyors and chutes. The Union dismisses the
Employer’s assertions that the LeTourneau machines are
specialized and require more training than other log
transport machines that its members are adept at operat-
ing. The Union states that its members are adept at com-
municating by radio with barge crews during chip loading.
The Union also contends that its members are trained in
the use of safety equipment during these operations.
The record establishes that millwright Puls and union-
supplied stevedores are skilled at operating the push-
Union does not argue, nor does the record suggest, that Ocean Terminals
and the Employer constitute a single employer. Therefore, we give no
weight to the Union’s argument in this regard.
24 The Employer appears to be mistaken with respect to log unloading.
Lyons testified that, as recently as 2011, log barges were unloaded at
Ocean Terminals, which is also on Coos Bay.
25 The Employer’s witnesses also testified that workers supplied by
the Union frequently failed to wear appropriate safety gear, such as life
vests and hard hats.
LONGSHOREMEN ILWU LOCAL 12 (SOUTHPORT LUMBER CO.) 7
button controls for the chip conveyor. However, Puls’
knowledge of the conveyor’s construction and participa-
tion in fine-tuning that machine militates in favor of
awarding the work to the Employer’s employees. The rec-
ord also establishes that the Employer’s employees have
experience operating the LeTourneau machines used in
log unloading, and that union-supplied labor lacks that ex-
perience. Accordingly, we find that this factor favors
awarding the disputed work to the employees of the Em-
ployer.
5. Economy and efficiency of operations
The Employer characterizes the use of union-supplied
button pushers to load chips as wasteful and inefficient be-
cause the Union insists on supplying two employees at a
time who alternate working 2 hours on and 2 hours off
during a shift. Moreover, the record shows that Coleman
has to be available to oversee and supervise the chip load-
ing by union labor.26 Generally, upon advance notice, the
Union supplies button pushers in three shifts—day, even-
ing, and graveyard—but with little flexibility in starting
and ending times, according to the Employer. This ar-
rangement adversely affects chip loading if a barge arrives
early or late owing to weather or water conditions, or if
loading has to be paused during periods of strong seasonal
winds that blow chips from the chute into the bay.
The Union asserts that its members work more effi-
ciently and economically and cites evidence showing that
union labor loaded 40 chip barges in 14 months, while
Coleman loaded 5 chip barges in approximately 4 months.
The Union also asserts that the chip loading takes Cole-
man away from his duties managing the sawmill yard. Fi-
nally, the Union contends that it based its manning re-
quirements on the Employer’s insistence on continuous
operations and the Union’s attempts to ensure the Em-
ployer’s compliance with wage and hour laws.
Only one employee is needed to load chips onto barges.
Although employees represented by the Union are skilled
at button pushing, Puls can do that work and also has the
capacity to make mechanical adjustments to the chip con-
veyor. Coleman oversees the union-supplied button push-
ers, but can attend to other tasks when Puls performs this
work. Significantly, scheduling is easier when the Em-
ployer uses its own employee to load chips.
Accordingly, we find that this factor favors awarding
the button-pushing and log-unloading work to the employ-
ees of the Employer. See, e.g., Luedtke Engineering Co.,
355 NLRB at 305 (finding economy and efficiency favors

26 Again, the record indicates that Coleman does the most of the but-
ton-pushing work. Whether he is or is not a statutory supervisor cannot
be clearly determined on the record before us, but we reiterate that it need
not be: the dispute we resolve here does not include chip loading when
it is performed by supervisors under Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
awarding work to employees who can perform all aspects
of work in dispute over employees who can perform only
one aspect); R&D Thiel, 345 NLRB at 1141 (considering
additional costs associated with one group of employees
sitting idle while another group works); Laborers Local
113 (Michels Pipeline Construction), 338 NLRB 480, 484
(2002) (observing that “[h]aving fewer employees accom-
plishing the same task . . . reduces costs in time, money,
and personal safety”).
6. Job impact
Citing Laborers Local 681 (Elmhurst-Chicago Stone
Co.), 263 NLRB 980, 982-983 (1982), the Union asserts
that the Board should consider job impact in making its
determination. The Union contends that prior to Septem-
ber 2014, its employees unloaded log barges at the Ocean
Terminals’ dock on Coos Bay. It contends that its mem-
bers have lost this work because the log barges now go to
the Employer’s slip to be unloaded. The Union also points
out that its members lost chip-loading work when Cole-
man began performing that function. Further, it points to
co-owner Smith’s testimony that the Employer uses em-
ployees who were already at the mill yard to unload logs
and that these employees will not lose their jobs if that
work is assigned to union-represented employees.
The Employer’s co-owner Lyons, whose family also
owns the Ocean Terminals docks, testified that Ocean Ter-
minals last received a load of logs in 2011 and that, in July
2013, it leased its facility to Merrill and Ring Corporation.
Despite some common ownership of the Employer and
Ocean Terminals, there is no evidence that the two com-
panies’ operations are intertwined. Accordingly, the fact
that employees represented by the Union may have lost
jobs when Ocean Terminals leased its facility to Merrill
and Ring Corporation does not favor awarding the work
to those employees.
Conclusion
After considering all of the relevant factors, we con-
clude that employees of the Employer are entitled to per-
form button pushing in the chip-loading process27 and to
move logs from dockside to the sawmill yard in the log-
unloading process. We reach this conclusion relying on
the factors of employer preference and past practice, rela-
tive skills, and economy and efficiency of operations. Our
determination is limited to the controversy that gave rise
to this proceeding.
27 As noted above, our award does not apply to the work involved
when the button-pushing work is performed by an individual who is a
statutory supervisor.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
The National Labor Relations Board makes the follow-
ing Determination of Dispute:
1. Employees of Southport Lumber Co., LLC are enti-
tled to perform log-unloading work and button pushing for
chip-loading work at the Employer’s barge slip on Coos
Bay in North Bend, Oregon.
2. International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Lo-
cal 12 is not entitled by means proscribed by Section
8(b)(4)(D) of the Act to force Southport Lumber Co., LLC
to assign the disputed work to the employees it represents.
3. Within 14 days from this date, International Long-
shore and Warehouse Union, Local 12 shall notify the Re-
gional Director for Region 19 in writing whether it will
refrain from forcing Southport Lumber Co., LLC, by
means proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(D), to assign the
disputed work in a manner inconsistent with this determi-
nation.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 11, 2018
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
______________________________________
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD