INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 10, 2020

13670392 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/670,392 11/06/2012 Frederic Barrat AUS920120311US1 5904
77351 7590 07/10/2020
IBM CORP. (AUS)
C/O THE LAW OFFICE OF JAMES BAUDINO, PLLC
2313 ROOSEVELT DRIVE
SUITE A
ARLINGTON, TX 76016
EXAMINER
BULLOCK, JOSHUA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2153
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/10/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte FREDERIC BARRAT, KHALID FILALI-ADIB,
and PERINKULAM I. GANESH, JOHN M. MCCONAUGHY
____________

Appeal 2019-002261
Application 13/670,392
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and LINZY T.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 7–17, and 24–28, which are all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant states the real party in interest is International
Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Specification is directed to systems and a computer
program product for ensuring consistent operation across different
computing environments based on a saved checkpoint state when an
application and/or workload may be migrated from one computing
environment to another computing environment. See Spec. ¶¶ 1–4.
Exemplary claim 7 under appeal reads as follows;
7. A system, comprising:
a processor; and
a compatibility tool executable by the processor to:
compute and generate a first signature from a data
structure corresponding to a first computing environment, the
first computing environment associated with a first version of
an operating system;
compute and generate a second signature from the data
structure corresponding to a second computing environment,
the second computing environment associated with a second
version of the operating system different than the first version;
and
perform an application mobility operation from the first
computing environment to the second computing environment
in response to verifying data structure compatibility between
the first and second computing environments based on a
comparison of the first and second signatures.

Claims 7–17 and 24–28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 7–9.2

2 We consider a provisional rejection of claims 7–17 on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting (see Final Act. 2–5) to be withdrawn in view
of a Terminal Disclaimer filed October 8, 2018 and its absence from the
Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 3–5.
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ANALYSIS
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We have reviewed the Examiner’s
rejection in light of Appellant’s arguments, but are unpersuaded that the
Examiner erred. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Rejection and Arguments
The Examiner finds the claimed invention is “directed to collecting
and comparing signatures to determine differences,” which is similar to the
concepts identified by the courts as abstract, “such as obtaining and
comparing intangible data in CyberSource,3 and collecting and comparing
data in Classen.”4 Final Act. 7. The Examiner additionally finds
[t]he claims further demonstrate collecting information for the
purpose of identifying data and generating results of the
analysis, which is similar to concepts that have been identified
as abstract by the courts, such as the collecting of information,
analysis, and display of the results of the collection and analysis
in Electric Power Group. 5
Id. The Examiner also finds the additional elements, such as “a processor,
an operating system, program code, the signatures relating to debug data,
and a computer readable storage memory, . . . do not amount to more than a
[sic] implementing the abstract idea on a generic computer comprising

3 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
4 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
5 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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generic computing components.” Final Act. 8. According to the Examiner,
how the recited signatures relate “to an operating system or compiled debug
data does not transform the abstract idea to be patent eligible,” “The
invention does not improve the functioning of the computer itself and there
is not a nonconventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional elements (Bascom),” and “does not describe a particular
solution to a problem or particular way to achieve a desired outcome defined
by the claimed invention (McRo. Note that in the Ameranth case, the courts
used this rational [sic] in step 2 for dependent claim 3).” Id.
Appellant contends “Claim 7 is not directed solely toward gathering
and comparing information,” but “is directed toward computing and
generating signatures from data structures corresponding to different
computing environments having different operating system versions to
determine data structure consistency between the two different computing
environments.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant specifically argues claim 7 is
directed “toward an improvement in a computer-related and computer-
driven environment” such as “different computing environments each
having a different version of an operating system and verifying data
structure consistency across the different computing environments to
facilitate the mobility of an application from one computing environment to
another, different computing environment.” Appeal Br. 7–8. Appellant also
argues the recited limitations, rather than directed to the abstract idea of
comparing information, provide “the inventive concept of improving the
operation and processing of data across different computing environments.”
Appeal Br. 9, emphasis omitted. Additionally, Appellant contends the
Examiner’s assertion that “Claim 7 recites a generic arrangement of ‘known’
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and ‘conventional elements,’” does not “meet the Eligibility Guidance
requirements” based on “a citation to an express statement in Applicant’s
specification or made by Applicant during prosecution of the instant
application, with a citation of a court decision, with a citation to a
publication that demonstrates the asserted well-understood nature, or any
statement of official notice.” Appeal Br. 5, 10–11. Appellant contends the
eligibility of independent claims 13 and 24 based on similar arguments
presented for claim 7. Appeal Br. 11–23; Reply Br. 7–18.
Regarding dependent claim 8, Appellant contends the claim “is clearly
directed toward an improvement to a technological process and an
improvement in the functioning of a computer itself” and considering the
claim as an ordered combination, “the invention as a whole amounts to
significantly more than an abstract idea” and “[c]laim 8 recites meaningful
limitations that add more than generally linking the use of an abstract idea to
a computer.” Appeal Br. 24. According to Appellant, “the Examiner has
not supported such assertions with a citation to an express statement in
Applicant’s specification or made by Applicant during prosecution of the
instant application, with a citation of a court decision, with a citation to a
publication that demonstrates the asserted well-understood nature, or any
statement of official notice.” Id. Appellant presents similar arguments for
dependent claims 9–12, 14–17, and 25–28. Appeal Br. 25–37.
Legal Principles
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
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title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under
the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th ed. rev.
08.2017 Jan. 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
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See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Discussion
Abstract Idea
Turning to claim 7, we first note that the claim recites functions that
fall within the process category of § 101. But despite falling within this
statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is directed to a
judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. We
therefore determine (1) whether claim 7 recites a judicial exception
(Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1) and, if so, (2) whether the identified judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application (Guidance Step 2A, Prong
2). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 7 recites features that are
directed to “collecting and comparing signatures” that are used “to
determine differences,” which is a judicial exception. The recited judicial
exception can be categorized as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed
in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, and opinion) under the Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.6

6 If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human
using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent eligible
under § 101. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372–73; see also Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While
the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases
like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[ ] analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category’”
(brackets in original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354);
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
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The recited functions of “compute and generate a first signature” and
“compute and generate a second signature,” receiving “the measured number
of minutes” constitute mental processes or concepts performed in the human
mind. People can determine the recited computing and generating first and
second signatures from data structures by, for example, determining
properties or characteristics of the data structures in each computing
environment. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that a
limitation that “requires ‘obtaining information about other transactions that
have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card
transaction’—can be performed by a human who simply reads records of
Internet credit card transactions from a preexisting database” (alteration in
original)).
We also note the recited “perform an application mobility operation
from the first computing environment to the second computing
environment” function of claim 7 merely moves or presents data from one
database to another without altering the data itself. Courts have found such
data gathering and presenting steps to be insignificant extra-solution activity.
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub
nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering
steps as insignificant extra-solution activity).
With respect to dependent claims 8–12, 14–17, and 25–28, we also
agree with the Examiner that the claims “include the abstract ideas of
gathering intangible data and comparing intangible data, which is similar to
concepts which have been identified as abstract by the courts such as
obtaining and comparing intangible data in CyberSource, and collecting and
comparing data in Classen.” Ans. 4–5. Dependent claims are generally
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directed to converting the data structure to another form of data (i.e.,
“generate debug data from compiling the data structure” in claims 8–10,
“expand the nested data structure element” in claim 11, and “the first and
second signatures are compared to identify a disparity of the data structure
between the first and second versions of the operating system” in claim 12).
Dependent claims 14–17 and 25–28 recite similar features which embody
converting one form of data to another and comparing the results to identify
similarities in different systems, rather than improvement to a technological
process or the functioning of a computer itself. Our reviewing court has
held that a process that starts with data, applies an algorithm, and ends with
a new form of data is directed to an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs.,
LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Integration of the Abstract Idea into a Practical Application
Although claim 7 recites an abstract idea based on these mental
processes, we nevertheless must still determine whether the abstract idea is
integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies,
relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55. We therefore (1) identify whether there are any additional recited
elements beyond the abstract idea; and (2) evaluate those elements
individually and collectively, along with the limitations that recite an
abstract idea, to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application. See id.
Here, the recited “processor,” “compatibility tool,” “the first
computing environment,” “the second computing environment,” and “data
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structure” are the only recited elements beyond the abstract idea, but these
additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application when reading claim 7 as a whole. As discussed below, the
additional elements do not improve computer capabilities or a technical
field. Nor do they implement the abstract ideas on a particular machine that
is integral to the claims or effect a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. They
simply use computers and other components as tools to apply the abstract
ideas. “[M]ere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
223; see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335‒36 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
The above-mentioned elements employ generic components that
perform generic functions of computing, generating, and performing
mobility operation (migrating an application and/or workload from one
computing environment to another computing environment), which do not
integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55, n.31. These recited functions are performed by processing
components that are disclosed as generic processors (“processor of a general
purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data
processing apparatus,” Spec. ¶¶ 18, 26, 30), computing and degenerating
signatures (“system 400 for verifying data structure consistency across
computing environments” Spec. ¶ 37), and performing mobility operation
(“moving a workload and/or application from one operating system version
or level to a different operating system version or level ( e.g., migrating a
WPAR from one LPAR to another LPAR)” Spec. ¶ 36). Based on the
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description of the computer-readable storage and the system recited in
claims 13 and 24, a general purpose processor executes or performs the
recited functions whereas the debug data constitutes merely another form of
data. See Spec. ¶¶ 19, 31, 39. Simply adding generic hardware and
computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those
ideas into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55
(identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea
on a computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been
integrated into a practical application).
It is well settled that “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea while adding the words
‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result.) See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & n.30. Thus, if a
process starts with data, applies an algorithm, and ends with a new form of
data, it is directed to an abstract idea. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351.
Similarly, dependent claims 8–12, 14–17, and 25–28 do not include
any additional element(s) or a combination of elements that apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that it is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. The recited additional elements, including a
compiler, compatibility tool, or similar elements for converting the data
structure to another form, do not recite a specific manner of operating the
underlying computer which provides a specific improvement over prior
systems, resulting in an improved processor, compatibility tool, or compiler.
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Additionally, the claimed features that involve identifying nested data
structure elements, outputting an expanded data structure, and identifying
disparity between different versions of the operating systems are
insignificant post-solution activities to the abstract idea, which do not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(g); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715–
16 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (restricting public access to media was found to be
insignificant extra-solution activity); Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (step of
adjusting an alarm limit based on the output of a mathematical formula was
“postsolution activity” and did not render method patent eligible).
Therefore, claims 8–12, 14–17, and 25–28 as a whole do not integrate
the mental process into a practical application.
Inventive Concept
Because we determine claim 7 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
consider whether claim 7 recites an “inventive concept.” We agree with the
Examiner that Appellant’s disclosure refers to the recited “processor, an
operating system, program code, the signatures relating to debug data, and a
computer readable storage memory,” which “do not amount to more than a
implementing the abstract idea on a generic computer comprising generic
computing components,” in general terms and only amount to routine and
conventional elements that perform a conventional data collection and
analysis. See Final Act. 8. As discussed above, the additional elements
include “processor,” “compatibility tool,” “the first computing
environment,” “the second computing environment,” and “data structure”
without requiring any specific functions other than the known functions
associated with those components. See Spec. ¶¶ 27, 28, 33, 35. Using
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generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the
necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken
individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the
abstract ideas themselves.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the Examiner has
not supported such assertions with a citation to an express statement in
Applicant’s specification or made by Applicant during prosecution of the
instant application, with a citation of a court decision, with a citation to a
publication that demonstrates the asserted well-understood nature, or any
statement of official notice.” Appeal Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 7. We find
Appellant’s Specification expressly describes well-known examples of
collecting and analyzing vehicle information. Spec. ¶¶ 18, 26, 30–39.
We also observe that the Examiner provides Berkheimer evidence in
support of the “well-understood, routine, and conventional” fact findings in
the form of citations to numerous Federal Circuit case authorities, which
Appellant has not substantively and persuasively distinguished from the
claims before us on appeal. See Ans. 3–5. In that regard, the cited list of
cases in the MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) supports the characterization of the
recited “receiving, processing, and storing data, receiving or transmitting
data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data” as “well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a
merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality).”7 See

7 Changes in Examination Procedures Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
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Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[w]hether
something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan
at the time of the patent is a factual determination.”).
The Examiner correctly found that the recited processor, computer
readable storage memory, an operating system, and program code, which are
all used in a manner that is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the
field, “do not amount to more than a implementing the abstract idea on a
generic computer comprising generic computing components” (see Final
Act. 8) and thus are not “additional elements” that “‘transform the nature of
the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24
(“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim
features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the
identified judicial exception.” (Emphasis added)).

Inc.)” (“USPTO Memorandum”) provides that, in a step 2B analysis, an
additional element (or combination of elements) is not well-understood,
routine or conventional “unless the examiner finds, and expressly supports a
rejection in writing with, one or more of the following”:
(1) a citation to an express statement in the specification or to a statement
made by an applicant during prosecution that demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s);
(2) a citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional
nature of the additional element(s);
(3) a citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-understood,
routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s); and,
(4) a statement that the examiner is taking official notice of the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s).
See USPTO Memorandum, 3–4.

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As such, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
recited inventive concept “isn’t the abstract idea of comparing information,
it’s the inventive concept of improving the operation and processing of
data across different computing environments.” Reply Br. 7. In fact, as
explained by the Examiner (Final Act. 8), the claims can be distinguished
from patent-eligible claims such as those in McRO and BASCOM that are
directed to “a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology” (McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) or “solving a technology-based problem”
(BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
We also agree with the Examiner that the dependent claims “recite
well-known, routine and conventional functionalities.” Ans. 4. As
discussed above, the Specification describes the recited components, such as
the compatibility tool or compiler, as generic components. Spec. ¶ 37
(stating “[c]ompiler 420 and/or compatibility tool 422 may be implemented
in any suitable manner using known techniques that may be hardware-based,
software-based, or some combination of both”). We observe that Appellant
provides no persuasive rebuttal or citation to relevant portions of their
disclosure in support of Appellant’s assertion that claims 8–12, 14–17, and
25–28 improve a technological process or the functioning of a computer
itself, or the claims include features that are not well-known, routine and
conventional. See Reply Br. 18–32.

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Conclusion
For at least the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claims
7, 13, and 24 are “directed to” an abstract idea and does not recite an
“inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 7, 13, and 24 and the remaining claims which fail to include
additional elements that add significantly more to the abstract idea, under
35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
7–17, 24–28 101 Eligibility 7–17, 24–28
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED