International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 25, 2020

14836067 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/836,067 08/26/2015 Jared M.D. Smythe AUS920150298US1 6123
50170 7590 06/25/2020
IBM CORP. (WIP)
c/o WALDER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, P.C.
445 CRESTOVER CIRCLE
RICHARDSON, TX 75080
EXAMINER
LELAND III, EDWIN S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2677
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/25/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JARED M.D. SMYTHE and ERIC WOODS
____________________

Appeal 2019-001815
Application 14/836,0671
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, 13–15, and 17–20. Claims 2, 7, 12, and 16
have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 2.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed August 26, 2015,
the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed January 4, 2018, the Appeal
Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed June 27, 2018, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed October 31, 2018, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed December
28, 2018.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for “deriving
logical justification information in an extensible logical reasoning system.”
(Spec. ¶ 1; Abstract.) In particular, Appellant’s invention “implement[s] a
logical reasoning and justification engine that operates to receive a logical
parse data structure of natural language content,” “operates to receive a
selection of a node in the logical parse data structure to thereby form a
selected node,” executes a logical justification module on the selected node
to identify “justifying nodes that provide a contribution to a knowledge state
of the selected node,” generates a logical justification output based on the
identified justifying nodes, and outputs the logical justification output.
(Abstract.)
Claims 1, 11, and 20 are independent claims. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, in a data processing system comprising
a processor and a memory comprising:
executing, by the processor, first instructions that
configure the processor to execute a logical reasoning and
justification engine;
executing, by the processor, second instructions that
configure the processor to execute at least one logical
justification module, wherein each justification module in the at
least one justification module is specifically configured to
comprise logic to reverse engineer a corresponding knowledge
reasoner used to propagate knowledge when generating the
logical parse data structure;
receiving, by the logical reasoning and justification engine
executing on the processor, the logical parse data structure of
natural language content, wherein the logical parse data structure
comprises nodes and edges linking nodes and identifies latent
logical terms within the natural language content indicative of
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logical relationships between elements of the natural language
content;
receiving, by the logical reasoning and justification engine
executing on the processor, a selection of a node in the logical
parse data structure to thereby form a selected node;
execute the logic of the at least one logical justification
module on the selected node to perform reverse engineering on
the selected node and identify one or more justifying nodes that
provide a contribution to a knowledge state of the selected node
during generation of the logical parse data structure of the natural
language content;
generate, by the logical reasoning and justification engine
executing on the processor, a logical justification output based
on the identified one or more justifying nodes, wherein
generating the logical justification output comprises extracting
factual basis information for the knowledge state of the selected
node; and
output, by the logical reasoning and justification engine
executing on the processor, the logical justification output,
wherein the at least one logical justification module comprises
an evidential support logical justification module, and wherein
executing at least one logical justification module on the selected
node to identify one or more justifying nodes that provide a
contribution to a knowledge state of the selected node comprises:
collecting first knowledge contributions from one or
more child nodes of the selected node in accordance with
an evidential support reasoner propagation rules;
collecting second knowledge contributions from a
parent node of the selected node in accordance with the
evidential support reasoner propagation rules;
collecting sideways propagation knowledge
contributions from the parent node and one or more sibling
nodes of the selected node; and
combining the first, second, and sideways
propagation knowledge contributions to generate a set of
justification facts for justifying the knowledge state of the
selected node.

(Appeal Br. 47–56 (Claims App.).)
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REJECTION
Claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, 13–15, and 17–20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. (Final Act. 3–
5.)

ANALYSIS
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we review the Examiner’s § 101 determinations concerning
patent eligibility under this standard.
Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows:
[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Benson”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(“Mayo”); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(“Alice”). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building blocks of
technology would not “promote the progress of science” under the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would impede it.
Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not
patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850
F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17).
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The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice (573 U.S. at 217–19). The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the
second step of the Alice/Mayo test in which we “examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need
to proceed to the second step, however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo
test yields a determination that the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject
matter.
The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply
the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (“the Revised Guidance”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Revised
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated,
then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent-eligible
under § 101. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Only if a claim (1)
recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then evaluate whether the claim provides an
inventive concept. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–19, 221. Evaluation of the inventive concept involves consideration of
whether an additional element or combination of elements (1) adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present; or (2) simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may not be present.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance

Step 2A—Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry (Step 2A, Prong 1 of the
Revised Guidance), the Examiner finds independent claim 1 (and similarly,
independent claims 11 and 20) is directed to an abstract idea because the
claim
is directed to a method for receiving a [(logical parse)] data
structure, receiving a selection of a node in the data structure,
identifying zero or more additional nodes that provide a
contribution to the state of the node, generation [sic] a
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justification output based on the additional nodes, then
outputting the justification output.

(Final Act. 3; Ans. 6–7.) Particularly, the Examiner determines claim 1
“perform[s] data analysis in and of itself,” and “a human with pencil and
paper and a hard copy of the logical parse data structure could perform this
analysis” in, e.g., a logic class. (Final Act. 3; Ans. 6–7.) The Examiner also
determines the abstract idea recited in claim 1 is “similar to ‘communicating
targeted information’ . . . ‘Data recognition and storage’ . . . and ‘Collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis.’” (Final Act. 4 (citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com
Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).)
The Examiner also finds claims 1, 11, and 20 do not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to “significantly more” than
the judicial exception because “[t]he data analysis in the claims is not an
improvement to another technology or technical field” and “[t]he claims . . .
fail to provide meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an
abstract idea to a particular technological environment, as this is simply data
analysis on an NLP [(natural language processing)] based tree structure.”
(Final Act. 4; Ans. 9–10.)
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 11, and 20 together,
presenting arguments directed to independent claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 11–
12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 34–36.) As a result, we select independent claim 1 as the
representative claim for the group and address Appellant’s arguments
thereto. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
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Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter because the
claims are not directed to an abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 7–34; Reply Br. 4–6,
9.) Particularly, Appellant contends
The human mind does not perform this specific ordered
combination of operations to determine a logical justification for
a knowledge state of a selected node of a logical parse tree data
structure corresponding to a portion of natural language content.
. . . .
. . . [N]o human being attempts to determine the reason for
a knowledge state by specifically following the particular
ordered combination of operations set forth in the present claims.
These are specific to a computer tool and computer environment,
and more importantly to the specific computer tool invented by
Appellants.

(Appeal Br. 11, 17; see also Reply Br. 6–7.) Appellant also argues “the
Examiner’s allegation of the abstract idea is a generalization and
oversimplification of what is actually claimed,” and “Affinity Labs, Content
Extraction, and Electric Power Group, do not in fact support the Final
Office Action’s position [that the claims are directed to an abstract idea] but
instead are either not applicable to the present claims or if applicable,
support Appellants’ position that the present claims are statutory.” (Appeal
Br. 14, 26–27.)
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that claim 1 does not recite
an abstract idea, and we concur with the Examiner’s conclusion that the
claim recites an abstract idea. (Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 5–10.)
Under its broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites an
abstract mental process of providing reasons for making a decision by:
collecting/gathering information (“receiving . . . the [generated] logical
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parse data structure of natural language content” having “nodes and edges
linking nodes” and “identif[ying] latent logical terms within the natural
language content indicative of logical relationships between elements of the
natural language content,” and “receiving . . . a selection of a node in the
logical parse data structure to thereby form a selected node” as recited in
claim 1); analyzing it (“identify one or more justifying nodes that provide a
contribution to a knowledge state of the selected node during generation of
the logical parse data structure of the natural language content” by collecting
“first knowledge contributions from one or more child nodes of the selected
node,” “second knowledge contributions from a parent node of the selected
node,” and “sideways propagation knowledge contributions from the parent
node and one or more sibling nodes of the selected node” and “combining
the first, second, and sideways propagation knowledge contributions to
generate a set of justification facts for justifying the knowledge state of the
selected node,” and “generate . . . a logical justification output based on the
identified one or more justifying nodes, wherein generating the logical
justification output comprises extracting factual basis information for the
knowledge state of the selected node,” as claimed); and providing results of
the collection and analysis (“output . . . the logical justification output” as
claimed). (See Ans. 6–7, 9; Final Act. 4–5.)
That is, although claim 1 recites that the steps are performed by a
“processor,” the underlying steps recited in the claim are all acts that, as the
Examiner observes (see Ans. 6–7, 9), could be performed mentally or
manually, using pen and paper, without the use of a computer or any other
machine. For example, generation of a claimed “logical parse data structure
of natural language content” is performable in the human mind or with pen
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and paper when analyzing logical connections (claimed edges) between
constituent parts/words/phrases (claimed nodes) of a sentence, and the
claimed “selection of a node” is performable in the human mind by focusing
one’s attention on particular word(s)/phrase(s) in the sentence. (See Ans. 6–
7.) Identifying justifying node(s) that provide a contribution to a knowledge
state of a selected node by collecting and combining knowledge
contributions from surrounding nodes is performable in the human mind or
with pen and paper when a person evaluates knowledge (claimed knowledge
contributions) regarding concepts/words/phrases (child, parent, and sibling
nodes) mentioned in a sentence, and identifies a context of the sentence or a
conclusion or answer responsive to the sentence (thereby providing the
claimed contribution to a knowledge state of a selected node/word in the
sentence). (See Ans. 6–7, 9.) For example, medical professionals routinely
analyze, in their minds, patients’ diagnoses and illnesses (claimed “nodes”
and “justifying nodes”) to determine best treatments for their patients. (See
Spec. ¶¶ 89–91, 98, 199, 209 (explaining that “an external source of
information, such as a medical record database,” and a patient’s medical
record, may be used to determine knowledge content for medical concepts
and terms).) A clinician for example, in considering medical treatments,
reviews medical documents in natural language form for medical concepts
(such as a patient’s symptoms and test results, and a list of known
treatments), and determines which treatments are most suitable for the
patient based on the medical concepts. Such reasoned treatment decision by
a clinician comprises a logical justification for a treatment (claimed “logical
justification output”)—such as a clinician’s answer (to a patient question)
explaining which treatment(s) is/are most suitable for the patient’s illness.
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The broad limitations in claim 1 recite steps of a computer program for
implementing on a machine the types of mental analyses people (such as,
e.g., medical professionals) perform when making reasoned decisions.
Our reviewing court has concluded that mental processes include
similar concepts of collecting, manipulating, and providing, data. (See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (the Federal Circuit held “the concept of . . . collecting
data, . . . recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and . . .
storing that recognized data in a memory” ineligible); see also Content
Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (claims are drawn to the basic concept of data
recognition and storage); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353 (merely
selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and
display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary
mental processes); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F.
App’x 950, 951–52, 955–56 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential)
(“[C]omparing new and stored information and using rules to identify
medical options” did not satisfy Alice step one); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (purely mental
processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer);
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[W]e continue to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category’”) (citing Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354); Ans. 6–8; Final Act. 4.) Claim 1’s
“processor” and “engine” automate such actions manually performable with
pen and paper, however, mental processes remain unpatentable even when
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automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been
done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s additional arguments that “[t]he
Examiner repeatedly alleges that the operations recited in the claims are
somehow able to be performed manually or have been performed manually”
but “not once does the Examiner provide any evidence to support such
allegations. To the contrary, the Examiner merely makes conclusions
without any factual basis whatsoever.” (Reply Br. 9 (emphasis added); see
also Reply Br. 7 (“the Examiner has presented no evidence that the actually
recited operations can be done with pencil and paper,” moreover, “there is
no prior art that would represent evidence that the recited operations are
operations previously performed manually or even that could have been
performed manually”).) Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because
they improperly conflate the test for § 101 with the separate tests for §§ 102
and 103. See, e.g., Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed
to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea)
cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept
necessary for patent eligibility”). Additionally, we are aware of no
controlling authority that requires the Office to provide factual evidence
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under step one of the Alice framework to support a determination that a
claim is directed to an abstract idea. Instead, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly noted that “the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that
enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production.” Hyatt v. Dudas,
492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has held that the USPTO carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of
the reasons for rejection, “together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of
[the] application.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus,
all that is required of the Office is that it set forth the statutory basis of the
rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Id. at 1363; see also Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Section 132 “is violated when
[the] rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.”). Here, the
Examiner has articulated explanations as to why claim 1’s steps are
performable mentally, or manually using pen and paper (e.g., during a logic
class). (See Ans. 6–7, 9.)
Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner oversimplified and generalized the claimed invention, improperly
expanded the scope of claim 1 to include an abstract idea, or otherwise erred
in determining that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 13–14, 16,
26–27; Reply Br. 5–7.)
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Having determined that representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea
(a mental process of providing reasons for making a decision) identified in
the Revised Guidance, we turn to Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Revised Guidance
to determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.

Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we discern no
additional element (or combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s
representative claim 1 that integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements (beyond the abstract
idea) include a “data processing system,” “a processor” executing “first
instructions that configure the processor to execute a logical reasoning and
justification engine” and “second instructions that configure the processor to
execute at least one logical justification module,” “a memory,” “a logical
reasoning and justification engine,” “at least one justification module . . .
specifically configured to comprise logic to reverse engineer a
corresponding knowledge reasoner used to propagate knowledge when
generating the logical parse data structure,” and “an evidential support
logical justification module” in the “logical justification module” recited in
claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 47–48 (claim 1).) These additional elements do
not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are
not applied with any particular machine (except for generic computing
components); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a
different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond
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generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
In particular, Appellant’s representative claim 1 merely links the use
of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment. The
additional elements in claim 1 (“data processing system,” “processor,”
“memory,” “logical reasoning and justification engine,” “logical justification
module,” and “evidential support logical justification module”) are broadly
claimed to cover a computing device executing instructions. Claim 1’s
processor, memory, engine, modules, and their operations and interactions
are recited in such a general, generic, and functional manner that the claim
fails to capture how the claim would be “improving the manner by which
natural language processing is performed” or “improving the ability of a
logical reasoning system to justify the underlying reasoning as to why a
particular result was generated by the logical reasoning system” as Appellant
argues. (See Appeal Br. 13.) The results-based-functional language in claim
1’s steps and the generically claimed processor, memory, engine, and
modules also fail to capture how the method of claim 1 would be different
from operations of known Question and Answer (QA) systems. (See Spec.
¶ 41 (describing existing QA systems).) Appellant argues “known natural
language processing mechanisms and logic systems employing such natural
language processing mechanisms do not provide any indication as to the
reasoning for the conclusions reached.” (Appeal Br. 25.) However, the
broad language of claim 1 does not exclude (from the claimed “logical
justification output” and “set of justification facts for justifying the
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knowledge state of the selected node”) a simple answer (e.g., an answer
indicating best treatments) being provided by a QA system or by an Internet
search engine, in response to an input question (e.g., a question asking for
treatments for a specific disease). Thus, claim 1’s computerized
implementation does not evidence an “improved computing mechanism,” a
“non-abstract improvement in computer functionality,” or an “improvement
in computer-related technology of cognitive treatment recommendation
implemented in a specifically configured cognitive computing system” as
Appellant argues. (See Appeal Br. 17, 29, 33; Reply Br. 2–5.)
In addition, it is clear from the claim language and the Specification
(describing “general purpose hardware, software instructions stored on a
medium such that the instructions are readily executable by specialized or
general purpose hardware, a procedure or method for executing the
functions, or a combination of any of the above,” “a processor of a general
purpose computer,” a “data processing system . . . [that] may be, for
example, an IBM® eServer™ System p® computer system . . . a symmetric
multiprocessor (SMP) system including a plurality of processors in
processing unit 1506. Alternatively, a single processor system may be
employed,” and a “computer readable storage medium [that] includes the
following: a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access
memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable
read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), a static random access
memory (SRAM), a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM)”),
claim 1’s computing elements require no improved processor, computer
system, or memory. (See Spec. ¶¶ 45, 49, 53, 178; see also Ans. 6, 8–9.)
Claim 1’s computing elements are described in the Specification at a high
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level of generality, i.e., as generic computer components. (Id.) Thus, claim
1’s limitations are not indicative of “integration into a practical application.”
Rather, the processor and memory are readily available computing elements
using their already available basic functions as tools in executing the
claimed manually performable process of providing reasons for making a
decision. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1169–70
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant argues that generic computers cannot perform the steps
recited in claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 11–12 (the independent claims “recite[]
a transformation of the processor or computing device by specifically
configuring the processor or computing device to implement logic that it
previously did not, logic that performs the specifically recited ordered
combination of operations which are not generic computing operations” and
are “specific operations requiring specific configuration of the
processor/computing device for such operations to be realized.”).) More
particularly, Appellant argues
the independent claims specifically recite operations involving
the actual execution of instructions by the processor to
specifically configure the processor to execute both a logical
reasoning and justification engine and at least one logical
justification module. Moreover, the claims recite that each
justification module in the at least one justification module is
specifically configured to comprise logic to reverse engineer a
corresponding knowledge reasoner used to propagate
knowledge when generating the logical parse data structure. . . .

. . . Moreover, the claims recite that logic of the at least
one logical justification module is executed on the selected node
to perform reverse engineering on the selected node and identify
one or more justifying nodes that provide a contribution to a
knowledge state of the selected node during generation of the
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logical parse data structure of the natural language content. This
again is a clear recitation of an operation that is only performed
by and within a specifically configured technological
environment and is not recited as being performed somehow in
the abstract.
. . . .
. . . [T]he claimed invention requires a specific
configuration of the data processing system, as well as the
processor, which involves the specific execution of instructions
by the processor to configure the processor to implement both a
logical reasoning and justification engine, and at least one logical
justification module. Furthermore, these elements implemented
by the processor through the execution of these specific
instructions, are specifically configured to perform the ordered
combination of operations set forth in the claim and attributed to
these elements. This cannot be performed in the abstract and
must be performed in a specifically configured data processing
system.

(Appeal Br. 11–12, 15; see also Reply Br. 5–6, 13.) Appellant’s arguments
are not persuasive. The Federal Circuit has explained that the relevant
question is “whether the focus of the claim[] is on the specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Appellant does not direct us to any indication
that the operations claimed in claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive
programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive
computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed
invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to
perform generic computer functions of data input, processing, and output.
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And “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
Appellant argues “the presently claimed invention sets forth a specific
manner for reverse engineering the knowledge state of a node so as to
provide a logical justification for that nodes’[sic] state,” and provides an
“improvement to computer functionality” that is “the improvement in
generating a logical justification for the state of nodes in the logical parse
tree data structure.” (Reply Br. 2–4, 10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 38–42, 227–234,
Fig. 24).) More particularly, Appellant explains that
as outlined, for example, in paragraphs [0038]–[0042] and
paragraphs [0227]–[0234] . . . which set forth the technological
problem solved by the presently claimed invention and the
technological solution provided by the present invention, which
is reflected in the features specifically recited in the present
independent claims (see also paragraphs [0077] and [0084], for
example), the present claims are directed to a technological
computer based invention that is specifically directed to
improving the manner by which natural language processing is
performed and for improving the ability of a logical reasoning
system to justify the underlying reasoning as to why a particular
result was generated by the logical reasoning system. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]he claimed invention is specifically directed to
improvements rooted in computer technology and directed to
solving a problem in the software arts. . . . . [The claims] are
directed to an improvement in computer-related technology of
cognitive treatment recommendation implemented in a
specifically configured cognitive computing system.

(Appeal Br. 12–13, 29.)
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Yet, no “improvements rooted in computer technology” or
“improvement to computer functionality” are apparent in claim 1. Although
claim 1 recites “identify one or more justifying nodes that provide a
contribution to a knowledge state of the selected node,” “generating the
logical justification output comprises extracting factual basis information for
the knowledge state of the selected node,” and “generate a set of justification
facts for justifying the knowledge state of the selected node,” the claim
provides no technical details for achieving those results. For example, claim
1 does not specify what are the “knowledge state of the selected node,” the
“factual basis information,” or the “knowledge contributions [e.g., from
child nodes],” and does not specify how to “identify one or more justifying
nodes that provide a contribution to a knowledge state of the selected node”
or how to “generate a set of justification facts for justifying the knowledge
state of the selected node.” Instead, “the claim language here provides only
a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer
accomplishes it. Our law demands more.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850
F.3d at 1342.
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments (reproduced
supra) about the Specification evidencing that claim 1 is “directed to a
technological computer based invention that is specifically directed to
improving the manner by which natural language processing is performed”
and “improving the ability of a logical reasoning system to justify the
underlying reasoning as to why a particular result was generated by the
logical reasoning system.” (See Appeal Br. 12–13, 29; Reply Br. 2–4, 10.)
Appellant’s Specification may well identify purported benefits of and/or
problems purportedly overcome by Appellant’s invention. However, as
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indicated above, the steps in claim 1 each recites results-based-functional
language without providing sufficient technological detail for how to achieve
the desired result.3 For example, claim 1 recites “generating the logical
justification output comprises extracting factual basis information for the
knowledge state of the selected node” and “combining the first, second, and
sideways propagation knowledge contributions to generate a set of
justification facts for justifying the knowledge state of the selected node,”
but no particular manner of “generating” (a “logical justification output” or a
“set of justification facts”) is recited that would indicate an improvement to
technology. The same holds true for the other recited limitations in claim 1.
As a further example, the claimed “reverse engineering” (of a “knowledge
reasoner used to propagate knowledge when generating the logical parse
data structure” and applied on “the selected node and identify one or more
justifying nodes that provide a contribution to a knowledge state of the
selected node”) does not evidence any technical effect beyond merely
reading data (e.g., reading a logical parse data structure, such as reading
elements of a sentence) and identifying nodes (e.g., words) connected to, or
adjacent to, other words in the sentence. As the Examiner explains,
“[s]imply labeling something a logical reasoning and justification engine
does not render it more than a general purpose computer executing
software.” (Ans. 6.) See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1342

3 For example, claim 1 does not specify any details of “logical parse tree
data structure mechanisms [that] utilize fuzzy logic values and various
methodologies to disseminate knowledge through the logical parse tree data
structure” (as described in Specification portions discussed by Appellant, see
Reply Br. 2–3 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 38–41)). Although claims are interpreted in
light of the Specification, limitations from the Specification are not read into
the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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(explaining that “[o]ur law demands more” than claim language that
“provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a
computer accomplishes it”); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to
impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant
part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing
calculations.”)
Appellant also analogizes claim 1 to claims of Enfish, McRO, and
Finjan, asserting that (i) “similar to the decision in McRO, the claimed
invention performs operations that previously were not performed manually
and are specifically directed to an improved computer functionality that
automates a process of reverse engineering in a manner that previously was
not done manually,” and the claim “recite[s] specific features that reflect a
specific implementation not demonstrated in existing techniques, whether
manual or automated,” (ii) similar to Enfish, “the claimed invention is
specifically directed to improvements rooted in computer technology,” “an
improvement in computer-related technology of cognitive treatment
recommendation implemented in a specifically configured cognitive
computing system,” and improvement to “the functionality of computer-
related technology with regard to reverse engineering the logical reasoning
underlying the knowledge state of a selected node of a logical parse data
structure corresponding to a portion of natural language content,” and (iii)
“similar to the way in which the Downloadable security profile in Finjan
was a new data structure that facilitated new functionality in the computing
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device,” the claimed invention provides a “non-abstract improvement to
computer technology by providing a specifically configured data processing
system . . . specifically configured to perform a specific set of operations to
reverse engineer the propagation of knowledge by knowledge reasoners
when generating a logical parse data structure of natural language content.”
(Appeal Br. 28–34 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1327; Finjan, Inc. v.
Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 7, 9–13.)
Appellant’s reliance on McRO, Enfish, and Finjan is misplaced. (See
Appeal Br. 28–34; Reply Br. 7, 9–13.) McRO’s ’576 patent (U.S. Patent No.
6,307,576) describes computer software for matching audio to a 3D
animated mouth movement to provide lip-synched animation. McRO’s
claims contain (i) specific limitations regarding a set of rules that “define[] a
morph weight set stream as a function of phoneme sequence and times
associated with said phoneme sequence” to enable computers to produce
“accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
characters” (McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313) and, when viewed as a whole, are
directed to (ii) a “technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D
animation techniques” that uses “limited rules in a process specifically
designed to achieve an improved technological result in conventional
industry practice.” Id. at 1316. Enfish’s data storage and retrieval method
and system recites a “self-referential table [for a computer database] [which]
is a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339. In
Finjan, the claims were directed to identifying and protecting a computer
against malware, which the court found to constitute sufficient non-abstract
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improvement in computer functionality to render the claims patent eligible.
Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1304–05.
In contrast to Enfish, McRO, and Finjan, Appellant’s Specification
and claims do not describe technological improvements similar to McRO,
improvements in computer functionality similar to Finjan, or a specific
improvement to the way computers store and retrieve data in memory
similar to Enfish. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313, 1316; Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1336, 1339; Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1304–05. Particularly, claim 1 does not
focus on an improvement to technology in performing “reverse engineering
on the selected node” or generating a “logical justification output”—at least
because claim 1 covers any manner of performing reverse engineering and
generating logical justification outputs that achieves the result-based
functional limitations. Additionally, claim 1 does not recite or require
technology for “cognitive treatment recommendation” and does not recite
“reverse engineering of the state of the node to determine the logical
justification for the state that the patient needs treatment,” as Appellant
argues. (See Appeal Br. 29 (emphasis added); Reply Br. 4 (emphasis
added).) The “logical justification output” in claim 1 is generically claimed
and does not evidence a particular improvement or technological effect
produced by collecting the claimed “knowledge contributions” to “a
knowledge state” of the selected node. Although Appellant argues technical
improvements—e.g., “an improvement in computer-related technology of
cognitive treatment recommendation,” “an improved computer functionality
that automates a process of reverse engineering in a manner that previously
was not done manually,” and an improvement to “the functionality of
computer-related technology with regard to reverse engineering the logical
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reasoning underlying the knowledge state of a selected node” (see Appeal
Br. 28–31 and Reply Br. 11)—Appellant’s broad recitations of a “logical
reasoning and justification engine,” “justification module,” “reverse
engineer a corresponding knowledge reasoner,” “reverse engineering on the
selected node,” “knowledge reasoner used to propagate knowledge,” and
“evidential support logical justification module” (in claim 1) do not specify
or evidence a technological improvement. Appellant’s claim 1 includes
“modules” and an “engine” and the broad claim language recites generic
operations of these modules and engine, i.e., operations that are not
distinguishable from generic automation of manually (e.g., pen and paper)
performable steps. (Ans. 6–7, 9.)
Appellant also argues the Examiner’s rejection “does not appreciate
the complexity of the problem addressed” by the invention, and “it should be
appreciated that the examples provided [(e.g., in paragraph 229 of the
Specification)] are kept simple for the reader’s understanding and in reality
there may be very complex rules and conditions that may be utilized which
may not be easily parsed or evaluated.” (Reply Br. 3–4.) However, as
discussed supra, the broad language in claim 1 recites generic operations of
“modules” and “engine” not distinguishable from generic automation of
operations performable in the human mind or with pen and paper. Claim 1
does not recite or require the use or analysis of “very complex rules and
conditions . . . which may not be easily parsed or evaluated” as Appellant
argues. (See Reply Br. 4.) Claim 1 broadly recites “evidential support
reasoner propagation rules” and a “logical parse data structure,” without
specifying details regarding the “propagation rules” or the complexity of the
“parse data structure.” As such, claim 1 includes analyses of sentence
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structure (such as syntactic tree diagrams) that “a human with pencil and
paper” could perform in, e.g., a logic class. (Ans. 6–7.)
Appellant also argues “the present claims recite a specific solution and
are not attempting to preempt or monopolize every possible way of
determining the reason for a state of a node,” which “supports a finding that
the present claims are directed to statutory subject matter.” (Appeal Br. 12,
16, 26 (citing Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1350); see also Reply Br. 13.)
As noted by the Examiner, however, “a lack of pre-emption in a set [of]
claims is a necessary but not sufficient condition for eligibility,” and
therefore “insufficient to establish eligibility.” (Ans. 8.) We agree with the
Examiner. As the McRO court explicitly recognized, “the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Furthermore, “[w]here a patent’s claims
are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter” under the
Alice/Mayo framework, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong 2, we conclude claim 1 does not
recite “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application,” and is directed to an abstract idea in the form of a
mental process of providing reasons for making a decision using thought
processes of observation, evaluation, and judgment. Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Therefore,
we proceed to Step 2B, The Inventive Concept.

Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
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As recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under
Alice step 2 can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or
combination of elements:
(1) “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity
in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept
may be present;” or
(2) “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We now determine whether representative independent claim 1 recites
any elements additional to the abstract idea that are not well-understood,
routine, or conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d). We are unable to
identify any.
The Examiner asserts,
the additional elements in the independent claims are a processor,
a memory and a computer program product, which appear to be
“adding the words ‘apply it’ (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on
a computer;” and “simply appending well-understood, routine
and conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.”

(Final Act. 4 (citing 79 Fed. Reg. 74624 (December 16, 2014)).)
Appellant argues claim 1 recites “significantly more” because: (i) the
“claimed invention provides an improvement to another technological field
or technical field in that the claimed invention provides an improvement to
natural language processing and logic or cognitive computing systems that
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operate using such natural language processing, as detailed in the present
specification” (Appeal Br. 35–37); (ii) claim 1 recites computer operations
that “are not conventional, well-understood, or routine operations” and “the
Examiner has provided no art, no Official Notice, and no evidence of any
kind that the operations recited in the present claims are merely conventional
activities previously known to the industry” (Appeal Br. 7, 39–40 (citing
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 13–15);
and (iii) for reasons similar to those discussed in BASCOM, “the claims are
directed to an ordered combination of elements that sets forth a technology-
based solution [that performs a reverse engineering of knowledge
reasoner(s)] to a computer-based problem,” to thereby determine “a logical
reason or justification for the knowledge state of a node in a logical parse
data structure of natural language content based on knowledge propagation”
(Appeal Br. 38 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Reply Br. 14).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Particularly, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that claim 1 provides “an improvement
to another technological field or technical field in that the claimed invention
provides an improvement to natural language processing and logic or
cognitive computing systems that operate using such natural language
processing, as detailed in the present specification.” (See Appeal Br. 35–
37). As discussed supra, the steps in claim 1 recite results-based-functional
language without providing sufficient technological detail for how to
achieve the desired results. We remain unpersuaded by Appellant’s
arguments (see Appeal Br. 35–37) that claim 1 invokes any assertedly
inventive programming, requires any specialized computer hardware, i.e., a
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particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other
than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions of
data input, processing, and output.
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has failed to produce factual
support or evidence that claim 1 is routine and conventional are also
unpersuasive. (See Appeal Br. 7, 39–40; Reply Br. 13–15.) The Examiner
has noted that Appellant’s claim 1 requires generic computer elements
performing generic computer functions. (See Final Act. 4; Ans. 10; see also
Spec. ¶¶ 45, 49, 53, 178; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838
F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (receiving, screening, and distributing
email is well known); Versata Dev. Group, Inc., 793 F.3d at 1334
(receiving, storing, retrieving, sorting, and eliminating information is well
known); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355 (finding that use of
“conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering,
sending, and presenting the desired information” does not add significantly
more to the claimed abstract idea); In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible
narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . .
. those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without
special programming.”).) “[T]he use of generic computer elements like a
microprocessor or user interface” to perform conventional computer
functions “do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d
1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256); see
also BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“[C]laims are not saved from abstraction merely because they recite
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components more specific than a generic computer”). Additionally, as
discussed supra, the results-based-functional language in claim 1’s steps and
the generically claimed processor, memory, engine, and modules fail to
capture how the method of claim 1 would be different from the operation of
conventional QA systems that automate the search for an answer to an input
question. (See Spec. ¶ 41 (describing existing QA systems).)
Additionally, Appellant’s abstract idea (of a mental process of
providing reasons for making a decision)—applied to generic computing
infrastructure—does not provide any particular practical application as
required by BASCOM. (Ans. 10; see BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1352, 1350.)
For example, BASCOM’s patent-eligible ordered combination of claim
limitations contains an “inventive concept [that] harnesses [a] . . . technical
feature of network technology in a filtering system by associating individual
accounts with their own filtering scheme and elements while locating the
filtering system on an ISP [(Internet Service Provider)] server.” See
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. BASCOM’s claimed ordered combination
“improve[s] the performance of the computer system itself” with a
“technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet that
overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems.” See
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351–52 (internal citation omitted). Appellant’s
abstract idea of providing reasons for a decision using generically-claimed
computing elements does not provide any particular practical application as
required by BASCOM, or entail an unconventional technological solution to
a technological problem as required by Amdocs. See Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As explained
supra, the results-based-functional language in claim 1’s steps and the
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generically claimed processor, memory, engine, and modules fail to capture
how the claimed method would be different from the operation of known
QA systems or Internet search engines.
Appellant also argues “the lack of any prior art to teach or render the[
claimed] operations obvious is further evidence that what is recited in the
claims are operations that are not conventional, routine, or well-understood,”
indicating the claims recite “significantly more.” (Appeal Br. 37.) As the
Supreme Court emphasizes, however, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (emphasis added). Thus, a novel and nonobvious
claim directed to a purely-abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89–91.
Because Appellant’s representative claim 1, and grouped claims 11
and 20 are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite
an “inventive concept” under the second step of the Alice analysis, we
sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claims 1, 11, and 20.
Appellant also contends the § 101 rejection of dependent claims 3, 4,
5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19, arguing the claims “recite
significantly more than any alleged abstract idea” and “define an
improvement to another technology or technical field” or “an improvement
of the functioning of the computer itself,” because the dependent claims: (i)
“define[] a specific configuration of the data processing system, computing
device, or apparatus as implementing different justification modules based
on different unique sets of reasoning and propagation rules that are
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implemented by their corresponding knowledge reasoners” (discussing claim
3); (ii) “defin[e] the specific configuration of the at least one logical
justification module . . . [and] further define the way that the logical parse
data structure is generated” (discussing claims 4 and 13); (iii) “set forth a
specific way in which these non-generic, non-routine, nonconvention[sic],
and non-well understood operations set forth in the independent claims are
actually performed by the specific elements of the data processing system or
computing device” (discussing claims 5 and 14); (iv) provide “a new, non-
generic, non-routine, nonconventional, and non-well-known functionality of
a data processing system or computing device” by “actually composing a
factual statement from the facts extracted from justifying nodes” (discussing
claims 6 and 15); (v) “defin[e] the specific way in which the at least one
logical justification module identifies one or more justifying nodes that
provide a contribution to a knowledge state of selected node” by “5 specific
operations. . . . [that] are not generic computer operations, are not routine,
are not conventional, and are not well-understood” (discussing claims 8 and
17); (vi) “defin[e] the specific manner by which the operation recited in the
claims from which claims 9 and 18 depend are performed and thus, is again
defining a specific application of any alleged abstract idea” (discussing
claims 9 and 18); and (vii) “defin[e] the specific configuration of the at least
one logical justification module, i.e. as comprising a relevance reasoner
logical justification module” and “defin[e] the specific way in which the at
least one logical justification module identifies one or more justifying
nodes” by “operations [that] are not generic computer operations, are not
routine, are not conventional, and are not well-understood” (discussing
claims 10 and 19). (Appeal Br. 42–45 (citing Berkheimer.)
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We are not persuaded and agree with the Examiner that dependent
claims 3–6, 8–10, 13–15, and 17–19 merely recite “additional data analysis
steps that do not change the underlying abstract nature of the claims.” (Ans.
10.) The broad language in dependent claims 3–6, 8–10, 13–15, and 17–19
recites generic functionality and generic modules (e.g., “different set of
logical justification operations,” “unique set of reasoning and propagation
rules,” “relevance reasoner,” “co-reference reasoner,” “relevance logical
justification module,” “co-reference logical justification module,” extracted
“facts,” node having “a logical or semantic match” to another node,
“quantifying” a “strength of a match” between nodes, “set of unique
matching nodes,” “determining a transfer of a maximum truth or falsity
value” between nodes, “relevance reasoner logical justification module,”
“relevance knowledge contributions,” and “relevance metrics” of nodes)
without reciting specific characteristics of these operations and modules.
For example, the dependent claims do not specify how the claimed “logical
or semantic match,” “strength of a match,” “relevance metrics,” and
“transfer of a maximum truth or falsity value” are determined. The
dependent claims also do not specify how the “set of unique matching
nodes” or “relevance knowledge contributions” are determined, or what is
included in the claimed “set of logical justification operations” and “unique
set of reasoning and propagation rules.” Regarding the labeling of various
modules and software recited in the dependent claims (e.g., “relevance
reasoner,” “co-reference reasoner,” “relevance logical justification module,”
“co-reference logical justification module,” “relevance reasoner logical
justification module”), we agree with the Examiner that simply labeling
something a logical reasoning and justification engine (or other results-
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based-functional names) “does not render it more than a general purpose
computer executing software.” (Ans. 6.)
Appellant also does not explain why the generic, results-based-
functional language in the dependent claims “define[s] an improvement to
another technology or technical field” or “an improvement of the
functioning of the computer.” (See Appeal Br. 25.) For example, the
“extracting [of] facts from the one or more justifying nodes and utilizing the
facts to compose a factual statement as to a justification for the knowledge
state of the selected node” recited in claim 6 fails to capture how the claimed
composition (of a factual statement) would be different from composition of
an answer by a conventional QA system or by an Internet search system
providing search results. Appellant’s arguments also have not persuaded us
that claims 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 19 recite “non-generic, non-routine,
non-conventional, and non-well-known functionality.” (See Appeal Br. 43–
45.) Like claim 1, Appellant’s claims 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 19 require
generic computer elements performing generic computer functions, and the
results-based-functional language in these claims fails to provide sufficient
technological detail to demonstrate Appellant’s argued “non-generic, non-
routine, non-conventional, and non-well-known functionality.” (See Appeal
Br. 43–45.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner the “abstract data analysis steps [in
Appellant’s dependent claims] do not change the underlying abstract idea
the claims are directed to” and do not change “the lack of further purpose the
results of the analysis are utilized for.” (Ans. 10–11.)
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of
dependent claims 3–6, 8–10, 13–15, and 17–19.
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35

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–6, 8–11, 13–15, and 17–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–6, 8–
11, 13–15,
17–20
101 Eligibility 1, 3–6, 8–11,
13–15,
17–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED