International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 24, 2022

2021002798 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/826,451 11/29/2017 Manish Kataria IN820170202US01 (790.327) 4967 89885 7590 02/24/2022 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER ARAQUE JR, GERARDO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/24/2022 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MANISH KATARIA, AMIT ANIL NANAVATI, and GYANA RANJAN PARIJA ____________ Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JAMES P. CALVE, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-3, 5-13, and 15-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed November 30, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” mailed March 22, 2021), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” January 22, 2021) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 29, 2020). Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he techniques and systems as described herein provide a sentiment analysis tool that can determine a sentiment intent of a user with respect to a particular interaction based upon a personality or overall attitude of the individual” (Spec. ¶ 18). Claims 1, 11, 12, and 20 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, comprising: [(a)] utilizing at least one processor to execute computer code that performs the steps accessing, for an identified individual, a sentiment profile comprising at least one average sentiment score, wherein the sentiment profile is generated by analyzing interactions of the identified individual with other individuals and wherein the sentiment profile reflects the identified individual’s personality in interactions with other individuals, wherein the sentiment profile further comprises at least one sentiment score corresponding to the identified individual and another identified individual; [(b)] receiving input corresponding to a current interaction between the identified individual and at least one other individual; [(c)] generating, during the current interaction, a current sentiment score for the identified individual corresponding to the current interaction using a sentiment analysis tool, wherein the generating comprises utilizing at least one sentiment analysis technique comprising computational linguistics; [(d)] determining a sentiment intent of the identified individual corresponding to the current interaction, wherein the determining a sentiment intent comprises comparing the current sentiment score to at least one of the at least one average sentiment score and the at least one sentiment score from the sentiment profile, wherein the determining comprises identifying at least one attribute of the identified individual and wherein the sentiment intent is based upon the at least one attribute; and Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 3 [(e)] providing to a user, feedback of the determined sentiment intent of the identified individual, wherein the providing feedback comprises, responsive to determining a negative sentiment intent, modifying communications between the identified individual and other individuals. REJECTIONS Claims 1-3, 5-13, and 15-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1-3, 5-13, and 15-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Conway et al. (US 2014/0355749 A1, published Dec. 4, 2014) (“Conway”). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (Appeal Br. 27-38). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 4 patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 5 The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54-55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claims 1, 11, and 12 “recite accessing a profile, receiving input corresponding to an interaction, generat[ing] a current sentiment score, determining a sentiment intent, and providing Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 6 feedback,” and that independent “[c]laim 20 recites similar steps, but recites attitude rather than sentiment” (Final Act. 2). The Examiner reasoned that these limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, fall within both the “Mental Processes” and “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activit[y]” groupings of abstract ideas because claims recite “steps that can be performed in the human mind” (e.g., having a user observe an interaction and determining a score regarding a user’s sentiment/attitude mentally or using pen and paper) as well as “analyzing interactions to determine a user’s sentiment/attitude and determine how a particular user should be handled by comparing the interaction with other interactions” (id. at 2-3). The Examiner also determined that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application; that the independent claims do not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself; and that the dependent claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons (id. at 4-5). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 28-32). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 7 tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “SENTIMENT ANALYSIS BASED ON USER HISTORY,” and discloses in the Background section that “[s]entiment analysis may be a useful tool for entities (e.g., corporations, individuals, groups of users, etc.) by providing a tool for identifying whether an interaction between two or more people was a positive, neutral, or negative interaction” (Spec. ¶ 1). The Specification describes that sentiment analysis may “determine the attitude of one individual with respect to another object or user,” and that the identified sentiment can be used to “enhance future interactions with the same individuals” (id.). For example, if the sentiment analysis tool identifies an interaction as negative, the individual may contact the other individual to determine what caused the negative interaction and attempt to correct the identified problem (id.). As another example, a corporation or other group may identify individuals who have negative interactions and avoid assigning those individuals to the same project to avert disagreements or interactions that result in a loss of productivity; conversely, individuals who have positive interactions may be assigned to the same project to enhance productivity (id.). The Specification describes that traditional sentiment analysis techniques use natural language processing, text analysis, computational linguistics, biometrics, or the like, to identify the attitude of an individual with respect to an object or other user (Spec. ¶ 15). But, the Specification describes that a problem with these traditional techniques is that the sentiment analysis is performed without regard to the personality or history Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 8 of the user and, therefore, does not account for the typical personality of the individual or the history that an individual may have with another individual (id.). Thus, for example, if an individual is very direct, conventional sentiment analysis techniques may flag interactions with that individual as negative, even though the individual may have considered the overall interaction neutral or positive (id.). “Additionally, conventional sentiment analysis techniques do not allow for identifying an average sentiment across an entire group of users” (id. ¶ 17) and, thus, do not provide a mechanism for determining whether a particular user has an issue interacting with other users or is interacting in a manner consistent with other individuals within her group (id.). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to improve on these conventional techniques by providing a sentiment analysis tool that can determine a sentiment intent of an individual with respect to a particular interaction based on “a personality or overall attitude of the individual” (Spec. ¶ 18). Thus, for example, if the individual is typically a direct individual, and during a particular interaction she is direct, the system may identify this as a typical interaction from the individual and then determine that the intent of the individual was neutral (id.). The sentiment analysis tool additionally can identify an average or overall sentiment for a group of users that can then be used in identifying the sentiment for a particular user (id.). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a method comprising: (1) accessing, for an identified individual, a sentiment profile, which reflects the individual’s personality in interactions with other individuals, and includes at least one average sentiment score, i.e., Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 9 utilizing at least one processor to execute computer code that performs the steps accessing, for an identified individual, a sentiment profile comprising at least one average sentiment score, wherein the sentiment profile is generated by analyzing interactions of the identified individual with other individuals and wherein the sentiment profile reflects the identified individual’s personality in interactions with other individuals, wherein the sentiment profile further comprises at least one sentiment score corresponding to the identified individual and another identified individual (step (a)); (2) “receiving input corresponding to a current interaction between the identified individual and at least one other individual” (step (b)); (3) generating, using a sentiment analysis tool, a current sentiment score for the identified individual that corresponds to the current interaction, i.e., “generating, during the current interaction, a current sentiment score for the identified individual corresponding to the current interaction using a sentiment analysis tool, wherein the generating comprises utilizing at least one sentiment analysis technique comprising computational linguistics” (step (c)); (4) determining a sentiment intent of the identified individual by comparing the current sentiment score to the average sentiment score in the sentiment profile, i.e., determining a sentiment intent of the identified individual corresponding to the current interaction, wherein the determining a sentiment intent comprises comparing the current sentiment score to at least one of the at least one average sentiment score and the at least one sentiment score from the sentiment profile, wherein the determining comprises identifying at least one attribute of the identified individual and wherein the sentiment intent is based upon the at least one attribute (step (d)); and (5) providing, to a user, feedback of the determined sentiment intent, and modifying communications between the identified individual and other individuals if the determined sentiment intent is negative, i.e., Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 10 “providing to a user, feedback of the determined sentiment intent of the identified individual, wherein the providing feedback comprises, responsive to determining a negative sentiment intent, modifying communications between the identified individual and other individuals” (step (e)). These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite (1) collecting information, i.e., a profile for an identified individual and input corresponding to a current interaction between the identified individual and at least one other individual; (2) analyzing the information, i.e., generating a sentiment score and determining a sentiment intent based on the sentiment score; and (3) reporting the results of the collection and analysis, i.e., providing feedback to a user. As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a mental process and, therefore, an abstract idea (Final Act. 2-3 (observing that the method steps can be performed in the human mind by, for example, “having a user observe an interaction and determin[e] a score regarding a user’s sentiment/attitude mentally or using pen and paper”)). See also 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). Appellant argues that claim 1 does not recite subject matter that falls within the “mental processes” grouping of abstract ideas, i.e., that a human would be unable to perform the analysis required to obtain an accurate Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 11 sentiment intent, as called for in claim 1, because “a human cannot possibly have access to the information contained within the sentiment profile that would provide all of the historical information regarding all of the historical interactions that an individual has had” (Appeal Br. 31). Appellant asserts that although “an individual interacting with a person may know the interaction history for themselves, the individual cannot know the interaction history for all other individuals that the person has interacted with” (id.). Yet, as the Examiner observes, “there is nothing . . . uniquely difficult for a human to keep a paper file about interactions, customers, and agents” and nothing to stop a human from “looking up a particular individual in order to determine the past or typical behavior of the individual based on information that can be written down using pen and paper” (Ans. 4). Also, although Appellant summarily asserts that a human could not perform computational linguistics to generate a current sentiment score, we are not persuaded that linguistic analysis and assignment of a sentiment score could not be performed in the human mind (see Ans. 4 (noting that “computational linguistics stems from/[is] based on linguistic analysis that human can perform in their mind and[,] where the rules of linguistic analysis . . . are programmed and regularly being updated for a computer[,] is based on how a human is instructing a machine on how words should be understood as based on context, usage, and so forth”)). Indeed, with the exception of the recited “at least one processor,” we find nothing in claim 1 that precludes the claimed method steps from being performed by a human. Cf. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where the claims were directed to a post office for receiving and redistributing email messages on a computer network, the Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 12 court observed that “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”). Appellant maintains that the claimed subject matter also does not fall within the “Certain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas; Appellant argues that although “the present application is attempting to determine the sentiment intent of an individual with respect to a current interaction, . . . the claims are not directed to management of the human interactions” (Appeal Br. 30-31). Yet, Appellant cannot reasonably deny that determining a sentiment intent of an identified individual corresponding to a current interaction with another individual, and modifying communications between the identified individual and other individuals, responsive to determining a negative sentiment intent, as called for in claim 1, is “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people,” i.e., a method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We also are not persuaded that claim 1 includes additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Appeal Br. 33-35). Claim 1 recites that the method steps are performed “utilizing at least one processor.” But, the processor is recited at a high level of generality and described in the Specification as a generic computer component (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 14, 43-47). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 1 invoke any allegedly inventive programming; require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 13 components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an improvement in technology and/or a technical field to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the 2019 Revised Guidance.3 3 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)-(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) applies or uses the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; (3) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the claim; (4) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing; or (5) applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. At the Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 14 Appellant argues that “the claims are drafted in a manner where any judicial exception is very narrowly tailored to a specific application” (Appeal Br. 33). Yet, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent to the extent Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible because it presents no risk of preemption (id. at 33-35). Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a mental process and/or a method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional element recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea, i.e., at least one processor, is no more than a generic computer component used as a tool to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, it same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 15 does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 cannot be sustained because “the claims determine sentiment intents in an unconventional manner” (Appeal Br. 36). Appellant explains whereas “conventional techniques simply analyze a current interaction and do not take into account the overall personality of the individual,” the claimed limitations determine “a sentiment intent of an individual with respect to a current interaction not only based upon an analysis of the current interaction but also based upon a Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 16 sentiment history or profile of the individual that identifies the individual’s personality in interactions with other individuals,” and thereby provide a more accurate sentiment intent determination (id. at 36-37). Appellant concludes that the claims represent an inventive concept and are, thus, patent eligible (Appeal Br. 37). Yet, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive at least because “the relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention [itself] is unconventional or non-routine.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Instead, the question under step two of the Mayo/Alice framework (i.e., step 2B) is whether the claim includes additional elements, i.e., elements other than the abstract idea itself, that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent- eligible application.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). See also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73 (requiring that “a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself” (emphasis added)). The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only claim element recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea is a processor, i.e., a generic computer component (Final Act. 4-5) - a determination amply supported by, and fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 14, 43-47). Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there is insufficient factual support for the Examiner’s determination that the operation of the processor is well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 17 any specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, processing, and outputting information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech does not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in combination, are not well- understood, routine and conventional database structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and claims 2, 3, 5-13, and 15-20, which fall with claim 1. Anticipation Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 2, 3, and 5-10 We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 as anticipated by Conway at least because Conway does not disclose “generating, during the current interaction, a current sentiment score for the identified individual corresponding to the Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 18 current interaction using a sentiment analysis tool,” i.e., step (c), as recited in claim 1 (Appeal Br. 38- 41). Conway is directed to a system and method for optimizing the routing of customer communications, e.g., in a telephone call center, and describes that customer contacts are routed to available agents based on retrieved and/or predicted customer profiles and the agent’s proficiency in handling customers with the retrieved and/or predicted profiles (see, e.g., Conway ¶ 7, Abstr.). Conway discloses that customer profiles include information, e.g., race, age, education, nationality, marital status, job status, credit score, personality type, etc., regarding an individual customer (id. ¶ 41), and describes that, in one embodiment, “the prediction of customer profile (e.g., based on personality type) is based on past calls or communications to that contact center and other organizations,” i.e., on historical customer communications (id. ¶¶ 45, 46). There is no dispute that Conway discloses that customers are routed to particular agents based on the predicted personality type of the customer and the agent’s predicted proficiency in handling customers with that personality type - Appellant admits as much (Appeal Br. 39). We, however, agree with Appellant that “Conway makes no mention of a sentiment or attitude analysis,” and, thus, does not disclose generating a sentiment score for an identified individual using a sentiment analysis tool, as called for in step (c) of claim 1 (id.). Responding to Appellant’s argument, i.e., that Conway’s “personality type . . . is distinguishable from a sentiment or attitude of the claimed limitations” (Appeal Br. 39), the Examiner opines that “in light of [Appellant’s] own specification, there is no difference between personality Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 19 and sentiment/attitude” (Ans. 6). Citing paragraph 19 of the Specification, the Examiner, thus, posits that the Specification “explicitly states that the personality comprises attitude/sentiment, thereby establishing that they can be one and the same” (id.). We disagree. It clearly appears from a fair reading of paragraph 19 that Appellant uses the terms “sentiment intent” and “attitude” interchangeably.4 Appellant also refers in the alternative to a sentiment profile or a personality profile. However, we find nothing in paragraph 19 that suggests, as the Examiner concludes, that “personality” and “attitude/sentiment” are one and the same. In fact, Appellant’s critique of “traditional sentiment analysis techniques” (see Spec. ¶ 15 (explaining that the problem with these traditional techniques is “that the sentiment analysis is generally performed without regard to a personality or history of a user”)) suggests that personality and sentiment are not the same. The Examiner refers, in the Answer, to definitions of sentiments and personality traits, as purportedly further evidencing that personality and sentiment are one and the same (Ans. 7 (explaining that “[t]he state of the art 4 Paragraph 19 reads, in part: Using traditional sentiment analysis tools, the system may generate a current sentiment score for the individual corresponding to the interaction with the other individual. The system may then determine a sentiment intent or attitude of the user by comparing the generated sentiment score or attitude score to the scores within the sentiment or personality profile of the user. By comparing the generated sentiment score or attitude score to the sentiment or personality profile, the sentiment intent can be biased based upon an overall personality of the individual or an attribute of the individual. Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 20 has provided the following definitions: ‘Emotions and moods are relatively short in duration (i.e.[,] acute), while sentiments and personality traits display themselves over longer periods of time (i.e.[,] dispositional).’ (https://affectivedesign.com/articles/3-emotions-moods-sentiments-and- personality-traits/)”). Yet, the cited definitions, in our view, suggest just the opposite, i.e., that sentiment and personality are distinguishable. Sentiments are described as constituting our attitudes and standards, i.e., our likes and dislikes, whereas personality traits relate, for example, to “character.” See “Emotions, Moods, Sentiments & Personality Traits,” available at https://affectivedesign.com/articles/3-emotions-moods-sentiments-and- personality-traits/. The sole premise for the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is that there is no difference between personality and sentiment/attitude, i.e., that “Conway discloses the same equivalent concepts, albeit using different technology” (Ans. 8). We do not agree with the Examiner that Appellant is using these terms interchangeably, and, as such, we do not agree with the Examiner that Conway discloses the argued limitation. In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2). For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 3, and 5-10. Independent Claims 11, 12, and 20 and Dependent Claims 13 and 15-19 Independent claims 11, 12, and 20 include language substantially similar to the language of claim 1 (except that claim 20 recites “attitude” rather than “sentiment”) and stand rejected based on the same rationale applied with respect to claim 1 (Final Act. 6-9). Therefore, we do not Appeal 2021-002798 Application 15/826,451 21 sustain the Examiner’s rejection, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2), of independent claims 11, 12, and 20, and claims 13 and 15-19, which depend from claims 11 and 12, for the same reasons set forth above with respect to independent claim 1. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 5-13, 15-20 101 Eligibility 1-3, 5-13, 15-20 1-3, 5-13, 15-20 102(a)(1)/ 102(a)(2) Conway 1-3, 5-13, 15-20 Overall Outcome 1-3, 5-13, 15-20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED