International Business Machines Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 29, 2021

2021000432 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/420,142 01/31/2017 Gregory J. Boss END920160729US1 2777
37945 7590 10/29/2021
DUKE W. YEE
YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P.O. BOX 6669
MCKINNEY, TX 75071
EXAMINER
KOESTER, MICHAEL RICHARD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptonotifs@yeeiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GREGORY J. BOSS, JAMES E. BOSTICK,
JOHN M. GANCI JR., and MARTIN G. KEEN
____________

Appeal 2021-000432
Application 15/420,142
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–7 and 9–23, which constitute all
the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
International Business Machines Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Appellant’s invention “relates generally to an improved computer
system and, more specifically, to a method and apparatus for predicting an
arrival of a guest at a hotel room, [and s]till more particularly, . . . for
predicting the arrival of a guest at a hotel room using a keyless entry
system.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 10, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claims 1
and 19 are illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and are reproduced
below (lettered bracketing added for reference).
1. A method for predicting a hotel room arrival, the
method comprising:
a hotel computer system implementing an arrival
predictor, the arrival predictor comprising a cognitive system, an
action generator, a guest unlock history database, and a hotel
unlock history database different than the guest unlock history
database, the arrival predictor:
[(a)] receiving calendar information for a guest
from a mobile device for the guest of a hotel, wherein the
calendar information is received while the guest is in the
hotel;
[(b)] predicting the hotel room arrival for the guest
using the calendar information, wherein the hotel room
arrival is for arrival of the guest at a hotel room of the
hotel, wherein:
[(b1)] the cognitive system is in
communication with the guest unlock history
database, the hotel unlock history database, and the
action generator; and
[(b2)] the cognitive system is configured to
predict the hotel room arrival for the guest using the
calendar information, the guest unlock history
database, and the hotel unlock history database; and
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[(c)] responsive to predicting the hotel room arrival,
performing an action in the hotel based on the hotel room
arrival predicted for the guest, wherein the action is
performed by the action generator;
wherein:
[(d)] the cognitive system uses the guest
unlock history database to look for patterns of when
the guest has historically unlocked their door;
[(e] the arrival predictor is in communication
with a hotel door entry system;
[(f)] the hotel door entry system controls
locking and unlocking of the hotel room;
[(g)] the mobile device establishes
communication with the hotel door entry system;
[(h)] the hotel door entry system uses near
field communication to communicate with the
mobile device; and
[(i)] locking or unlocking of the hotel room is
more responsive based on predicted hotel room
arrival using the calendar information, the guest
unlock history database, and the hotel unlock
history database.

19. A computer program product for predicting a hotel
room arrival, the computer program product comprising:
a non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium
including instructions that are executable by one or more
processors, the instructions comprising:
[(a)] first program code for receiving calendar
information from a mobile device for a guest of a hotel,
wherein the calendar information is received while the
guest is in the hotel;
[(b)] second program code for predicting the hotel
room arrival for the guest at a hotel room using the
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calendar information and a history of unlocks for the hotel
room; and
[(c)] third program code for performing an action in
the hotel based on the hotel room arrival predicted for the
guest;
wherein:
[(d)] the second program code uses the guest
unlock history database to look for patterns of when
the guest has historically unlocked their door; and
[(e] locking or unlocking of the hotel room is
more responsive based on predicted hotel room
arrival using the calendar information and the
history of unlocks for the hotel room.
Appeal Br. 30–31, 35 (Claims App.).

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner are:
Name Reference Date
Remenih et al. (“Remenih”) US 2004/0160305 A1 Aug. 19, 2004
Lau et al. (“Lau”) US 2013/0102283 A1 Apr. 25, 2013
Griffin et al. (“Griffin”) US 2015/0073980 A1 Mar. 12, 2015
Perret US 2015/0324332 A1 Nov. 12, 2015
Isaacson US 2016/0300411 A1 Oct. 13, 2016
Mintz US 2017/0115018 A1 Apr. 27, 2017

REJECTIONS
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1–4, 9–13, 18, 19, and 21–23 stand rejected under 35 US.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Mintz, Griffin, Remenih, and Lau.
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Claims 5–7, 14–16, and 20 stand rejected under 35 US.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Mintz, Griffin, Remenih, Lau, and Isaacson.
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 US.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Mintz, Griffin, Remenih, Lau, and Perret.

OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 101 – Statutory Subject Matter
35 U.S.C. § 101 Framework
Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citations omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
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elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
USPTO Section 101 Guidance
We are also guided by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
Guidance, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”) and the October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”),
incorporated into the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§§ 2104–06, Rev. 10.2019 (“MPEP”) in June 2020. “The guidance sets out
agency policy with respect to the USPTO’s interpretation of the subject
matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of decisions by
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51.
Although “[a]ll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance,” the guidance “does not
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the USPTO.” Id. The Guidance, by its terms, applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019. Id. at 50.
Under USPTO guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including laws of nature, natural phenomena,
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and products of nature (see MPEP §§ 2106.04(II)(A)(1), 2106.04(b))
(“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see id. §§ 2106.04(II)(A)(2),
2106.04(d)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).2
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the additional elements, individually or in combination,
provide an inventive concept. See MPEP §§ 2106(III), 2106.05. “An
inventive concept ‘cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or
natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.’” Id. § 2106.05 (quoting
Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Among the considerations in determining whether the additional elements,
individually or in combination, amount to significantly more than the
exception itself, we look to whether they add a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(II); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Preliminary Matter
We first address the Appellant’s argument that “[t]he features recited
in Claim 19 clearly do not seek to tie up any judicial exception such that

2 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54–55; MPEP § 2106.04(d).
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others cannot practice it, and therefore Claim 19 does not need to proceed
through a full analysis.” Appeal Br. 8; see also id. at 10 (presenting the
same argument for claim 20); Reply Br. 3–4. Our reviewing court provides
applicable guidance: “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2013). Furthermore, the Streamlined Analysis may be used only
“when the eligibility of the claim is self-evident e.g., because the claim
clearly improves a technology or computer functionality.” MPEP § 2106.06.
As set forth in the MPEP, the streamlined analysis is an optional tool for
Examiners to use at the Examiner’s discretion. See id. (“A streamlined
eligibility analysis can be used . . . .”) (emphasis added).
[I]f there is doubt as to whether the applicant is effectively
seeking coverage for a judicial exception itself, the full
eligibility analysis (the Alice/Mayo test described in MPEP
§ 2106, subsection III) should be conducted to determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application or recites significantly more than the
judicial exception.
Id. Here, the Examiner’s decision to perform a full eligibility analysis is not
an error.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A, Prong
One of USPTO guidance, the Examiner determines that claims 19 and 20 are
directed to the abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human activity,
specifically, to “Concepts relating to managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (See MPEP 2106)” because
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they recite “using a computer system to organize and schedule services for a
guest at a hotel based on the guest's particular schedule.” Final Act. 3; see
also Ans. 4. Under Prong Two of USPTO guidance, the Examiner also
determines that the additional elements do not “integrate the exception into a
practical application of the exception” because they merely limit “the claims
to a computer based environment” and “limit the computer based
environment to a hotel,” i.e., “a particular field of use.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 5.
The Appellant disagrees and contends that the Examiner’s assertion
under Prong One that the claims recite an abstract idea is in error because
they are “not ‘directed to’ certain methods of organizing human activity
since no ‘human activity’ is recited in Claim 19 [and Claim 20] at all.”
Appeal Br. 8; see also id. at 9–10; Reply Br. 4–5. Under Prong Two, the
Appellant contends that “the recitation of performing an action in the hotel
based on the hotel room arrival prediction for the guest . . . further ties the
alleged abstract idea of managing human activities to a specific hotel-based
action that is performed based on a predicted behavior/action of a user.”
Appeal Br. 10.
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A of
USPTO guidance, we first determine to what the claims are directed, i.e.,
whether the claims recite an abstract idea and if so, whether the claims are
directed to that abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the
‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed
to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active
Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
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focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or
on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the
Specification, including the claim language, that the claims focus on an
abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical
field.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. Here, the “Field” section provides that the invention “relates
generally to an improved computer system,” “more specifically, to a method
and apparatus for predicting an arrival of a guest at a hotel room,” and
“[s]till more particularly, . . . to a method and apparatus for predicting the
arrival of a guest at a hotel room using a keyless entry system.” Spec. ¶ 1.
The “Description of the Related Art” section discusses hotels employing a
keyless entry system allowing a guest to unlock a door using their mobile
devices that use a “token in an authentication and authorization process.” Id.
¶¶ 2, 3. The invention predicts a hotel room arrival using calendar and
historical information and performs an action based on the predicted arrival.
See id. ¶ 4.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 19 recites a
“computer program product for predicting a hotel room arrival, the computer
program product comprising: a non-transitory, computer-readable storage
medium including instructions that are executable by one or more
processors, the instructions comprising:” code for receiving calendar
information from a guest’s mobile device, predicting the hotel room arrival
for the guest using calendar and history information, and performing an
action based on the predicted arrival. See Appeal Br. 35 (Claims App.).
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Dependent claim 20 further comprises code to receive a token and to unlock
a door using the token. See id. at 36.
We consider the claims as a whole3 giving them the broadest
reasonable construction4 as one of ordinary skill in the art would have
interpreted it in light of the Specification5 at the time of filing.
The limitations of claims 19 and 20 are recited functionally without
details on how, technologically or by what algorithm, they are performed.
Claim 19’s limitation (a) of receiving calendar information and claim 20’s
limitation of receiving a token recite receiving data, which is an extra-
solution activity and an abstract idea. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)
(characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity);
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(collecting information is an abstract idea); MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Claim 19’s limitation (b) of predicting guest arrival using calendar
data and history data, including unlocking patterns (as recited in the wherein
clause) does not recite how this is performed, and thus comprises analysis of
data, which is a mental process. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354

3 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 188.
4 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
5 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the
claims. . . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual
limitations, it is important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’”
Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335, among others).
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(“[W]e have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in
their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially
mental processes”).
Claim 19’s limitation (c) of performing an action based on the
prediction comprises performing some action based on analysis without
details on what action and how, technically or by what algorithm, it is
performed. Similarly, claim 20’s limitation of unlocking the door is recited
functionally without details on how that is performed, i.e., by what code or
algorithm. As such, these limitations recite performing an action based on
the analyses or receipt of data, which is post-solution activity. See Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; MPEP § 2106.05(g).
The computer program product comprising a computer-readable
medium is a generic medium that causes a generic processor to execute the
instructions. See Spec., e.g., ¶¶ 13–15 (describing a generic computer-
readable medium processor), 17 (describing the instructions provided to a
processor of a general purpose computer), 18, 67 (describing a generic
processor), 68, 72–76 (describing the instructions as program code), 77
(providing that the components provided are not limiting).
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the limitations of the claims recite a way of receiving data,
analyzing data, and performing an action based on the receipt and results of
the analysis to, as the Examiner finds, “organize and schedule services for a
guest at a hotel based on the guest’s particular schedule.”6 Ans. 4. This is

6 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
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an abstract idea of a “[c]ertain method[] of organizing human activity—. . .
managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions)”
comprising “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52; MPEP §§ 2106.04(a)(2)(II), 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Our reviewing court has held similar concepts to be abstract. For
example, the Federal Circuit in Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech.
Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2624 (2021), held that “[c]ontrolling access to resources is exactly the sort of
process that ‘can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a
pen and paper,’ which we have repeatedly found unpatentable” and “is
pervasive in human activity [such as] . . . in office buildings (allowing
certain employees entrance to only certain floors).” Courts have also held
abstract the concepts of “[c]ontrolling access to data items” in PersonalWeb
Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2021), “keeping
track of deadlines for clients and carrying out two-way communications with
clients relevant to meeting those deadlines” in WhitServe LLC v. Donuts
Inc., Appeal No. 2019-2240, 2020 WL 1815758, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10,
2020), “personal management, resource planning, or forecasting” in In re
Downing, 754 F. App’x 988, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and “scheduling business
activities using a computer and computer network” in P & RO Sols. Grp.,
Inc. v. CiM Maint., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d 699, 708 (E.D. Tex. 2017)
(quotation marks omitted).

(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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Accordingly, we disagree with the Appellant’s contention that the
claims do not recite an abstract idea because they are not a way of
organizing human activity. See Appeal Br. 8–10; Reply Br. 4–7.
Regarding the Appellant’s apparent contention that the claims do not
recite an abstract idea because there is no “person” recited but rather a
computer program that performs the actions (see Appeal Br. 8–11; Reply
Br. 4–7), we disagree. We note that “[c]ourts have examined claims that
required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-
ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s
mind.” Versata Develop. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2015). .
The next issue is whether claims 19 and 20 not only recite, but are
more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether they are instead
directed to some technological implementation or application of, or
improvement to, this concept, i.e. integrated into a practical application as
the term is used in USPTO guidance. To do so, we look to whether the
claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes
a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claims are more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e.,
“integrates a judicial exception into a practical application.” Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP § 2106.04(d). We agree with and adopt the
Examiner’s findings and conclusion that the additional limitations of the
claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, as the
term is used in USPTO guidance. See Final Act. 4. We add the following
for emphasis.
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Here, the only additional elements recited in claims 19 and 20 beyond
the abstract idea are the computer-readable medium and processor that are
described in the Specification as generic computer components. See supra;
Spec. ¶¶ 13–18, 67, 68, 72–77; see also Ans. 5. The claimed limitations of
receiving information, predicting arrival time, and performing an action
based on the prediction are part of the abstract idea and comprise extra-
solution activities and mental processes, as discussed above.
As is clear from the Specification, there is no indication that the
operations recited in the claims require any specialized computer hardware
or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, invoke
any asserted inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is
implemented using other than generic computer components to perform
generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no
doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention as recited in the claims effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of
record that attributes an improvement in technology and/or a technical field
to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed
invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that
phrase is used in USPTO Guidance.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error by the Appellant’s argument
that claims 19 and 20 “pass[] muster under Step 2A (Prong 2)” because they
recite “performing an action in the hotel based on the hotel room arrival
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prediction for the guest – which further ties the alleged abstract idea of
managing human activities to a specific hotel-based action that is performed
based on a predicted behavior/action of a user.” Appeal Br. 10. As
discussed above, performing an action in the hotel based on the prediction,
i.e., analysis, and unlocking a door using a token are post-solution
applications of receiving and analyzing data, similar to the adjusting of the
alarm limit in Flook, 437 U.S. at 585, 590; see also Ans. 6–7 (discussing
potential actions as described in the Specification including notifying
housekeeping). That they comprise a “specific hotel-based action” (Appeal
Br. 10) merely limits the abstract idea to a particular environment of a hotel
and at best, to a technological environment of remote unlocking, which does
not render the claims any less abstract. See Ans. 5–6; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223
(holding that attempting to limit the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment does not make a claim patent-eligible) (quoting
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[M]erely limiting the field of use of
the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not
render the claim[] any less abstract.”).
We thus agree with the Examiner that the additional elements of the
claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, as
the term is used in USPTO guidance.
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework and USTPO
guidance Step 2B, we “[e]valuat[e] additional elements to determine
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whether they amount to an inventive concept [which] requires considering
them both individually and in combination to ensure that they amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself.” MPEP § 2106.05(I).
Here, the Examiner finds that the “additional elements, when considered
both individually and as an ordered combination, . . . are insufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.” Final Act 4; see
also id.at 5 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(f) and Spec. ¶ 67); see also Ans. 6–7.
The Appellant disagrees and provides the same arguments as
presented for USPTO Step 2A, Prong Two, discussed above. See Appeal
Br. 10. That is, the Appellant argues that claims 19 and 20 “pass[]s muster
under . . . Step 2B” because they recite “performing an action in the hotel
based on the hotel room arrival prediction for the guest – which further ties
the alleged abstract idea of managing human activities to a specific hotel-
based action that is performed based on a predicted behavior/action of a
user.” Id.
We find that the Specification clearly supports the Examiner’s
conclusion by indisputably showing that the claimed additional elements of
the computer-readable medium and processor were conventional at the time
of filing. See supra; Spec. ¶¶ 13–18, 67, 68, 72–77, Fig. 7. Accordingly,
based on the Appellant’s description, we find these components to be well
understood, routine, or conventional.
As noted above, the claims functionally recite the instructions without
any details on how they are performed, technologically or by what code or
algorithm. “Indeed, the claim language here provides only a result-oriented
solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our
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law demands more.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
As also discussed above, the performing of an action in the hotel
based on the hotel room arrival prediction for the guest to which the
Appellant refers (Appeal Br. 10) comprises a post-solution application of
receiving and analyzing data that does not transform an abstract idea into a
patentable process. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
Taking the claimed elements separately, the functions performed by
the instructions are purely conventional. The claimed generic components
operate in their ordinary and conventional capacities to perform the well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions receiving data, analyzing
data, and performing an action based on the receiving and analysis. See,
e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355 (determining that gathering,
sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting information does
not transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible invention);
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a
‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing
the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the
method claims.”); Ericsson, 955 F.3d at 1331–32 (determining that
controlling access, receiving a request, and determining if the request should
be granted were not “sufficient to turn the claim into anything more than a
generic computer for performing the abstract idea of controlling access to
resources”).
Considered as an ordered combination, the components of the
Appellant’s claim add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of receiving data, analyzing data, and
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performing an action based on the results of the analysis is equally generic
and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See, e.g., Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354–56 (holding that the sequence of gathering,
analyzing, and displaying in real-time was abstract); PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th
at 1319 (concluding that there was nothing inventive about the claim details
of receiving a request including data and in response to the request,
comparing data, determining whether access to data is authorized, and
allowing or not allowing access based on the determination, individually and
as an ordered combination, to confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea).
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that the elements of the claims, considered individually and as an ordered
combination, do amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
of claims 19 and 20.
35 U.S.C. § 103 – Obviousness
The Appellant contends that the Examiner has not adequately shown
that the prior art teaches that “the cognitive system uses the guest unlock
history database to look for patterns of when the guest has historically
unlocked their door,” as recited in limitation (d) of independent claim 1 and
similarly recited in independent claims 10 and 19. Appeal Br. 12; see also
id. at 13–14; Reply Br. 8–9. Specifically, the Appellant argues that the
relied upon portions of the prior art does not teach “looking for patterns of
when the guest has historically unlocked their door.” Reply Br. 9; see also
Appeal Br. 13. We agree.
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The Examiner relies on the combination of Mintz, Remenih, and Lau
for teaching this limitation. See Final Act. 5–10; Ans. 9–10. Specifically,
the Examiner finds that Mintz teaches a cognitive system, Remenih teaches
a “lock/unlock database” with guest lock/unlock and lock access histories,
and Lau teaches “the use of patterns.” Ans. 9; see also Final Act. 7–10. The
Examiner relies primarily on the combination of Remenih and Lau for
teaching the element of using the history database to look for patterns of
when the guest has historically unlocked their door. See id. (citing Remenih
¶ 106, Lau ¶¶ 105, 106).
The portion of Remenih relied upon by the Examiner provides for a
database that can provide “key histories, lock access history, employee
report, activity reports, transaction reports, etc.” Remenih ¶ 106. The
portions of Lau relied upon by the Examiner teach executing a series of
verification algorithms “to authenticate the user based on the analysis of the
user’s recent behavior in relation to the user’s historical profile, the result of
such algorithms are used to determine the authorization of a certain access.”
Lau ¶ 105. Lau further teaches the “use and analysis of” data such as sensor
signal histories, activity/motion patterns, and place visits history “to build a
unique ‘fingerprint’ of the ‘pairing’ of a mobile device and its authorized
user for purposes in . . . building/room access control systems.” Id. ¶ 106.
Although the portions of Remenih and Lau relied upon by the
Examiner teach the analysis and use of patterns and histories, the Examiner
does not adequately show, and we do not see, where or how these portions
of Ramineh and Lau, alone or in combination, teach or render obvious using
the histories to “look for,” i.e., identify (see Spec. ¶¶ 47–49), patterns of
actions such as the claimed action of “when the guest has historically
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unlocked their door.” Stated differently, the Examiner does not adequately
show, and we do not see, where or how these portions of Ramineh and Lau,
alone or in combination, teach or render obvious that the analysis performed
includes looking for/identifying patterns of actions. See Appeal Br. 12–14.
We note that Lau does teach “collect[ing] all types of sensor data from
a mobile device, including location, motion, brightness, temperature,
environment sounds, WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.,” storing that data in a database,
and analyzing that data to identify “temporal patterns, such as when the user
visits certain places, how often the user visits the places, and how much time
the user stays at each place.” Lau ¶ 104. However, the Examiner does not
make any specific findings nor does the Examiner provide any explanation
or reasoning how one of ordinary skill in the art would combine Lau’s
teaching of identifying temporal patterns of when and how often a user visits
a place and how much time the user spends there with Remenih’s reports of
key and lock access histories to teach the claimed “us[ing] the guest unlock
history database to look for patterns of when the guest has historically
unlocked their door.” To the extent the Examiner asserts that the prior art
teaches “looking for time-based unlocking patterns” (Ans. 8 (quoting Appeal
Br. 12)), the Examiner does not adequately explain how Lau’s general
teaching of looking for time-based patterns combined with Remenih’s
general teaching of an unlocking database meets the specifically claimed
limitation of looking for patterns of when a particular guest has historically
unlocked their door. See Reply Br. 8–9.
Therefore, based on the record before us, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of independent claims 1, 10,
and 19 and of dependent claims 2–4, 9, 11–13, 18, and 21–23.
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We also do not sustain the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of
dependent claims 5–7, 14–17, and 20 because the Examiner’s reliance on
Isaacson or Perret fails to remedy the deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection
of the independent claims.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7 and 9–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed.
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
19, 20 101 Eligibility 19, 20

1–4, 9–13, 18,
19, 21–23
103 Mintz, Griffin,
Remenih, Lau
1–4, 9–13,
18, 19, 21–23
5–7, 14–16, 20 103 Mintz, Griffin,
Remenih, Lau,
Isaacson
5–7, 14–16,
20
17 103 Mintz, Griffin,
Remenih, Lau,
Perret
17
Overall
Outcome
19, 20 1–7, 9–18,
21–23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART