International Business Machines CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 17, 20212020006319 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/473,128 08/29/2014 K. Anne-Rivers Forcke YOR920140266US1 (31282) 1095 48233 7590 09/17/2021 SCULLY, SCOTT, MURPHY & PRESSER, P.C. 400 GARDEN CITY PLAZA SUITE 300 GARDEN CITY, NY 11530 EXAMINER ANDERSON, MICHAEL W ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/17/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IBMPAIRENotify@ssmp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte K. ANNE-RIVERS FORCKE, DIMITRI KANEVSKY, WALTER S. KUHNEL, ELIZABETH V. WOODWARD, and SHUNGUO YAN ____________ Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–11, 13–16, and 18–21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF THE DECISION We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as International Business Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The Appellant’s claimed invention relates to a method and system to evaluate potential transactions by a consumer and provide feedback about how these potential transactions would affect specified goals (Spec., paras. 1, 4). Claim 1, reproduced below with the italics added, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A computer-implemented method of providing feedback to a client computer device about a potential impact of a potential transaction on defined goals of a specified person, the method comprising: a financial analysis computer system retrieving financial information about the specified person from a financial repository; the financial analysis computer system, after retrieving said financial information, connecting with a client application running on the client computer device, said client application being selected by the specified person to purchase goods or services; receiving at the financial analysis computer system specified digital interactions intercepted from the client computer when the specified person uses the client application running on the client computer device to identify a potential transaction, including detecting a context and an activity of the potential transaction by an analysis of a display screen of the client computer device; storing in the financial analysis computer system a plurality of transaction analysis applications, each of the transaction analysis applications being used to analyze an associated type of transaction; the financial analysis computer system processing said intercepted specified digital interactions to determine a potential impact of said potential transaction on one or more defined goals of the specified person, including the financial analysis computer system invoking one or more of the Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 3 transaction analysis applications to analyze the potential transaction of the specified person; and before the specified person commits to said potential transaction, the financial analysis computer system, in real time, generating a client guidance signal based on the determined potential impact of the potential transaction, and sending the client guidance signal to the client computing device to instruct the client computing device to convey specified guidance to the specified person about the potential transaction. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the rejections: Name Reference Date Fellowes US 2010/0280935 A1 Nov. 4, 2010 Kolkowitz US 2011/0251951 A1 Oct. 13, 2011 Calman US 2012/0232968 A1 Sept. 13, 2012 Joa US 2014/0258023 A1 Sept. 11, 2014 The following rejections are before us for review: 1. Claims 1, 3–11, 13–16, and 18–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. 2. Claims 1, 5–11, 14–16, and 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Fellowes, Joa, and Kolkowitz. 3. Claims 3, 4, 13, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Fellowes, Joa, Kolkowitz, and Calman. Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 4 FINDINGS OF FACT We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence.2 ANALYSIS Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 The Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because the claim is not directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 23-26; Reply Br. 5, 6). The Appellant argues further that the claim relates to an improved computer technology and is “rooted in computer technology” (Appeal Br. 26, 27; Reply Br. 6). In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the rejection of record is proper (Final Act. 7–9; Ans. 10–15). We agree with the Examiner. An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, 2 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Patent Office). Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 5 we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 6 to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” (see Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 7 elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The Specification states that the invention generally relates to a method and system to evaluate potential transactions by a consumer and provide feedback about how these potential transactions would affect specified goals (Spec., paras. 1, 4). Here, the Examiner has determined that the claim sets forth a method of organizing human activity and fundamental economic practice (Final Act. 8, Ans. 11). We substantially agree with the Examiner. We determine that the claim sets forth the subject matter in italics above which describes the concept of: [1] “retrieving financial information about the specified person from a financial repository”; [2] “receiving . . . specified digital interactions . . . when the specified person uses the client application …to identify a potential transaction, including detecting a context and an activity of the potential transaction by an analysis”; [3] “storing . . . a plurality of transaction analysis applications”; [4] “processing said intercepted specified digital interactions to determine a potential impact of said potential transaction on one or more defined goals of the specified person . . . invoking one or more of the transaction analysis applications to analyze the potential transaction of the specified person”; and [5] “before the specified person commits to said potential transaction, . . . Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 8 generating a client guidance signal based on the determined potential impact of the potential transaction, and sending the client guidance signal to the client . . . to convey specified guidance to the specified person about the potential transaction;” which is a certain method of organizing human activities and fundamental economic practice, i.e. a judicial exception. A method, like the claimed method, “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” See Digitech Image Techs, LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) where collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying results from certain results of the collection and analysis was held to be an abstract idea. We next determine whether the claim recites additional elements in the claim to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Guidance references the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h). Here, the claims do not improve computer functionality, improve another field of technology, utilize a particular machine, or effect a particular physical transformation. Rather, we determine that nothing in the claims imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claims are more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception. For example, in the claim, the additional elements beyond the abstract idea are the recited “computer system” and “client computer device”. These are described in the Specification as generic computer components (Spec., paras. 29–31). The claimed limitations of “retrieving,” “connecting,” “receiving,” “identify[ing],” “storing,” “processing,” “invoking,” Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 9 “generating,” and “sending” as recited “do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself,” do not improve the technology of the technical field, and do not require a “particular machine.” Rather, they are performed using generic computer components. Further, the claim as a whole fails to effect any particular transformation of an article to a different state. The recited steps in the claim fail to provide meaningful limitations to limit the judicial exception. In this case, the claim merely uses the claimed computer elements as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Considering the elements of the claim both individually and as “an ordered combination” the functions performed by the computer system at each step of the process are purely conventional. Each step of the claimed method does no more than require a generic computer to perform a generic computer function. Thus, the claimed elements have not been shown to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application as set forth in the Guidance which references the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h). Turning to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, we determine that the claim does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. Considering the claim both individually and as an ordered combination fails to add subject matter beyond the judicial exception that is not well- understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Rather the claim uses well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in the art and they are recited at a high level of generality. The Specification at 29-31 for example describes using conventional computer components such as a personal computer, network computer, and network, in a Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 10 conventional manner. The claim specifically includes recitations for computers to implement the method but these computer components are all used in a manner that is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Here, the claimed generic computer components which are used to implement the claimed method are well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the computers described in the Specification at paragraphs 29 and 30 for instance are not general purpose computer components known to perform similar functions in a well-understood manner. Here, the claim has not been shown to be “significantly more” than the abstract idea. The Appellant, at page 6 of the Reply Brief, has cited to McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) but the claims in that case are distinguished from this case in being directed to rules for lip sync and facial expression animation. We note the point about pre-emption (App. Br. 26). While pre- emption “might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it, ‘thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws”’ (Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012))), “the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility” (Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 11 For the above reasons, the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. The remaining rejected claims are directed to similar subject matter, and the rejection of these claims is sustained for the same reasons given above. Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because the cited prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation drawn to identifying a potential transaction “including detecting a context and an activity of the potential transaction by an analysis of a display screen of the client computer device” (Appeal Br. 20). In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the cited claim limitation is disclosed by prior art citing to Fellows at para. 49, and Joa at Figure 1 (element 116), Figure 3 (elements 330–340), and paragraphs 14 and 15 (Ans. 7). We agree with the Appellant. Here, the argued claim limitation requires identifying a potential transaction “including detecting a context and an activity of the potential transaction by an analysis of a display screen of the client computer device.” Fellows at paragraph 49 discloses raw data including account number, transaction type, balances but nothing related to the context of an activity of a potential transaction on a display screen. While, Joa at Figure 1 does display a generic computer screen 116 on a user terminal there is no disclosure related to detecting a context and activity of a potential transaction in the manner claimed. Joa at paragraphs 14 and 15 fails to disclose the specific claim limitation as well. As the cited claim limitation has not been shown in the prior art, the rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims is not sustained. Independent claims 11 and 16 contain a Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 12 similar limitation, and the rejection of these claims and their dependent claims is not sustained for the same reasons given above. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3–11, 13–16, and 18–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. We conclude that Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 5–11, 14–16, and 18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Fellowes, Joa, and Kolkowitz. We conclude that Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 3, 4, 13, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Fellowes, Joa, Kolkowitz, and Calman. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–11, 13– 16, 18–21 101 Eligibility 1, 3–11, 13– 16, 18–21 1, 5–11, 14– 16, 18–20 103 Fellowes, Joa, Kolkowitz 1, 5–11, 14– 16, 18–20 3, 4, 13, 21 103 Fellowes, Joa, Kolkowitz, Calman 3, 4, 13, 21 Overall Outcome 1, 3–11, 13– 16, 18–21 Appeal 2020-006319 Application 14/473,128 13 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation