International Business Machines CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 25, 20202020002998 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 25, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/794,422 10/26/2017 Justin D. Eyster AUS920170028US02 3098 45992 7590 11/25/2020 IBM CORPORATION (JVM-AUS) C/O LAW OFFICE OF JACK V. MUSGROVE 2911 BRIONA WOOD LANE CEDAR PARK, TX 78613 EXAMINER MARTINEZ BORRERO, LUIS A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3665 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/25/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JUSTIN D. EYSTER, AVERY K. ROWE, PRIYANKA SARKAR, and CHRISTOPHER E. WHITRIDGE ____________ Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, BRUCE T. WIEDER, MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1−7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF THE DECISION We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as International Business Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a method of finding a parking space for a vehicle (Spec., page 1, lines 10, 11). Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method of finding a parking space for a motor vehicle comprising: receiving a destination in a mobile computing device; determining a current location of the mobile computing device; receiving an estimated arrival time for travel from the current location to the destination in the mobile computing device; receiving a plurality of parking locations proximate the destination in the mobile computing device wherein each parking location has multiple parking spaces and an associated parking service system; transmitting a request for parking availability with the estimated arrival time from the mobile computing device to a plurality of the parking service systems; receiving one or more responses from the plurality of parking service systems wherein each response includes predicted parking availability for the estimated arrival time at one of the associated parking locations; and receiving a selection of one of the parking locations whose corresponding response indicates an available parking space from the predicted parking availability. Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 3 THE REJECTION The following rejection is before us for review2: Claims 1−7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kotecha (US 2015/066545 A1, pub. Mar. 5, 2015) and Quinn (US 2008/0048885 A1, pub. Feb. 28, 2008). FINDINGS OF FACT We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence3. ANALYSIS Claim 1 The Appellant first argues that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because the prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation for “transmitting a request for parking availability with the estimated arrival time from the mobile computing device to a plurality of the parking service systems” (App. Br. 12-14, Reply Br. 2-5). 2 Claims 1−7 were provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as unpatentable over claims 8−20 of copending application 15/499,280 in the Final Action. This rejection was not appealed, was not listed in the Answer, and it is unclear if it is still pending. Regardless, even if the rejection is maintained we do not reach the issue as the claims in the 15/499,280 application are still pending. See Ex parte Moncla, 2009- 006448, June 22, 2010. 3 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Patent Office). Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 4 In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the cited claim limitation is shown by Quinn at paras. 18, 21 and Figure 1; and Kotecha at para. 16 and Figure 1 (Ans. 4−6). We agree with the Examiner. Here, the argued claim limitation requires transmitting a request for parking availability with the estimated arrival time from the mobile computing device to a plurality of the parking service systems (claim 1, emphasis added). A request from the user to the parking manager is shown Kotecha at Fig. 2, step 205. However, the argued claim limitation requires that the “request for parking availability” is from the computing device to “a plurality of parking service systems.” The Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief at pages 10-12 refer to the Quinn reference, but do not address the citation to the Kotecha reference. The Appellant’s remarks in the Reply Brief at pages 4 and 5 are not persuasive. Kotecha in Figure 1 shows mobile computing device 13 connected by a mobile communication network 19 to a plurality of parking managers 19 (A, B) meeting the argued claim limitation. Figure 2 shows communication through the servers to the parking manager, but the claim does not require “direct” communication to the parking managers. Here, the claim term “parking service systems” in the claim is broad enough to encompass the prior art disclosed “parking managers” which are a “parking service system” under a broadest reasonable interpretation. Note that Kotecha at paras. 16 and 18 states that the parking managers 19 are responsible for “managing one or more parking lots” and can have a QR code for a parking spot. Kotecha at Figure 2, step 213, shows the transmission of the reservation to Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 5 the parking manager. Thus, the argued claim limitation has been shown in the prior art. Regardless, one of ordinary skill would have seen that direct communication between the cell phone and parking manager would be an obvious variation if greater speed of the communication was desired. The Appellant also argues that the cited prior art fails to disclose “receiving one or more responses from the plurality of parking service systems” (App. Br. 12−14, Reply Br. 5, 6). We disagree with this contention as Kotecha at Figure 1, and para. 16 disclose communication between the mobile computing device 13 connected by a mobile communication network 19 to a plurality of parking managers 19 (A, B). For these above reasons, the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. Claim 3 The Appellant argues that the cited prior art fails to disclose dynamically providing different travel directions as the cell phone moves with a predefined proximity of the destination (App. Br. 14, Reply Br. 6, 7). In contrast the Examiner has cited to Kotecha at paras. 41 and 42 and also stated that Quinn uses conventional vehicle navigation systems which are well known to provide proximity calculations as the vehicle approaches its final destination (Ans. 8). We agree the Examiner. Kotecha at para. 41 for example discloses that a real time parking guidance system can be integrated with a vehicle guidance device. Here, the use of dynamically providing updated travel directions is considered conventional in the field of navigation systems and obvious in the combination of references to provide more accurate navigation. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 3 is sustained. Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 6 Claims 4−6 The Appellant argues the cited prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation requiring analyzing the responses from the plurality of parking service systems using a cognitive system based on the one or more user preferences to derive a recommendation score for each of the responses. (App. Br. 15, 16, Reply Br. 7, 8). In contrast, the Examiner cites to the claim limitation being shown by Quinn at para. 20 (Ans. 9). We agree with the Appellant. Quinn at the cited para. 20 fails to specifically disclose “a cognitive system based on the one or more user preferences to derive a recommendation score”. While Quinn at para. 20 does disclose ranking the order of spaces based on distance or time, these are not based on specific “user preferences” as claimed. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 4, and dependent claims 5 and 6, is not sustained. Claim 7 The Appellant argues the cited prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation requiring “transmitting a reservation from the mobile computing device to the parking service system associated with the selected parking location” (App. Br. 16). In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the rejection of record is proper (Ans. 10, 11, Reply Br. 8−9). We agree with the Examiner. Kotecha in Figure 1 shows mobile computing device 13 connected by a mobile communication network 19 to a plurality of parking managers 19 (A, B) meeting the argued claim limitation. Kotecha at paras. 16 and 18 states that the parking managers 19 are responsible for “managing one or more parking lots” and can have a QR Appeal 2020-002998 Application 15/794,422 7 code for a parking spot. Kotecha at Figure 2, step 213, shows the transmission of the reservation to the parking manager. Thus, the argued claim limitation has been shown in the prior art. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 7 is sustained. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1−3 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kotecha and Quinn. We conclude that Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4−6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Kotecha and Quinn. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1−7 103 Kotecha, Quinn 1−3, 7 4−6 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN- PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation